People v. Johnson CA3

CourtListener 10303237Calctapp23 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/23/24 P. v. Johnson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----

THE PEOPLE, C097570

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CRF2200305)

v.

JERRY ALLEN JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Jerry Allen Johnson of first degree residential burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459—count 1)1 and possession of burglary tools (§ 466—count 3).2
Defendant admitted he had two or more prior strike convictions and admitted an

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The jury found defendant not guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition. (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1)—count 2.)

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enhancement for being released from custody on bail or on his own recognizance at the
time of the offenses (§ 12022.1).
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) admitting statements he
made to law enforcement regarding a white truck, (2) reading the section 12022.1
enhancement allegation to prospective jurors, and (3) admitting evidence regarding his
prior burglary convictions. Defendant also contends the cumulative effect of his alleged
errors necessitates reversal. We will affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. lives next door to his aunt and uncle’s property in Wheatland. The property has
a perimeter fence as well as inner fencing around the housing areas. The front gate is
electronic, and the other gates are secured using padlocks and chains. Prior to February
14, 2022, all the gates were secured, and the fences and windows were intact. At around
7:30 p.m. that evening, A. was outside with his cousin, J., when they heard a loud
breaking of glass. His aunt and uncle were away on vacation. Only their family
members had permission to enter the property while they were away.
A. and his cousin went toward where they thought they heard the sound. They
heard the sound again and could tell more clearly where it was coming from. A. was
behind his cousin. He saw defendant with cast-iron object in his hands in front of a
broken window. J. saw defendant standing on an air conditioning unit and breaking the
glass with the object. J. told defendant to stop. J. claimed he had a gun. Defendant put
his hands up and then took off without the object; the cousins followed. They caught
defendant and J. shoved him to the ground. J. also punched defendant in the face. The
cousins held defendant down until the police arrived. Defendant apologized for entering
the house and trespassing and told the cousins to let him go. At some point, defendant
said a friend was there with him.
Law enforcement found an 18-inch-long hatchet that weighed between five and
seven pounds by the broken window. The backpack defendant was wearing contained

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bolt cutters and a large screwdriver. A truck registered to a different Johnson was parked
on the levee. A shotgun shell was found in an inventory search of the vehicle.
In addition to the broken window, the fencing was cut in more than one place and
a lock and chain were missing from a gate.
II. DISCUSISON
A. Defendant’s Statements About the Truck
1. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude evidence of Deputy
Abe’s actions toward defendant during his arrest. The motion indicated Deputy Abe had
been charged with assault by a peace officer and would not be called as a witness at trial.
Defense counsel objected to the motion, stating he would like to have Deputy Abe testify
because “[i]t paints a full picture of the events of that day and what happened and why
[defendant] said certain things.” The court decided to hold an Evidence Code section
402, subdivision (b) hearing on whether Deputy Abe would invoke his Fifth Amendment
rights or testify. In the course of discussing this, the court also stated it would hold an
Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b) hearing on the subsequent statements made
by defendant.3
At the hearing on the statements, the prosecution clarified it was only seeking to
introduce defendant’s “second statement” that “[h]e came in the white truck that was on
the levee, that he drove it there.”
Deputy Paredes testified that he responded to a report of a fight possibly involving
a gun in a rural area. When he arrived at the location with Deputy Abe, A. and J. were on
top of defendant and holding him down. Deputy Paredes arrested defendant and placed
him in handcuffs. While Deputy Paredes was handcuffing defendant, defendant made

3 It appears the court raised the admissibility of defendant’s statements sua sponte.

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noises that sounded as though he had been previously injured. Deputy Paredes said, “it
took [defendant] about anywhere from 15 to 20 seconds of me constantly asking him to
get up, and he wouldn’t get up at that time.” Deputy Abe said, “ ‘Get up or I will boot
you in the ribs.’ ” Deputy Abe kicked defendant once with the bottom side of his foot.
Defendant got up in another second or two.
Deputy Paredes walked defendant to the fence, which was 25 to 30 yards away.
Deputy Paredes did a pat down for weapons. Deputy Abe asked defendant, without
Mirandizing4 him, if another individual was involved. Defendant said yes and that the
other individual had run towards the road.
Another minute or so later, while defendant was still handcuffed and standing at
the fence area, A. or J. said someone had observed a white truck on the levee near the
property. A. and J. were on the other side of the fence from defendant, about seven to 10
feet away. They were “in the background” speaking to someone on the phone and either
mentioned the truck to Deputy Abe or Deputy Abe overheard them. Defendant,
according to Deputy Paredes, “[s]pontaneously said, ‘It’s a white truck and we were in
it.’ ” Deputy Paredes relayed this information to the other deputies over his radio. At
this point, defendant added that the truck was white and belonged to his son. No officer
posed any questions to defendant before he made any of these statements about the truck.
Body camera video of the arrest and statements were played for the court, and
after viewing it, the court said, “I heard ‘white truck’, and my ruling is there was no
questions before him on that.” The court observed “there is a clear Fourteenth
Amendment violation when he’s being kicked. Nothing that is the fruit of that, anything
he said right there when he’s being kicked, that’s not how we interrogate people. Not in
this country.” The court ruled the statements to Deputy Abe in response to the question

4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

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about whether there was another person were inadmissible. Defense counsel argued “the
interrogation doesn’t end there” even though “I understand that no further questions were
posed.” The court found defendant’s statements regarding the truck admissible because
they were not elicited by the officers: “[T]hat is not fruit of the poisonous tree. He
volunteered of his own volition. He’s standing right there.”
2. Voluntariness
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting statements he made regarding
the truck after he was restrained and kicked and before he was read his Miranda rights.
We disagree.
“As is well-known, Miranda . . . and its progeny apply to exclude certain evidence
obtained during custodial interrogation. [Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he Miranda safeguards come
into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ [Citation.] [¶]
Interrogation thus refers to questioning initiated by the police or its functional equivalent,
not voluntary conversation.” (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 432.)
In the trial court, the People relied on People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, which
held that a “casual conversation” initiated by the defendant in a custodial setting was not
an “impermissible interrogation” for these purposes. (Id. at pp. 274-275.) Defendant
argues Lewis is distinguishable because he was talking to avoid being kicked or beaten
again, and his statements were not voluntary, but the result of compulsion, because he
knew if he did not cooperate, he would likely be kicked or punched again. The only
authority he cites to support his position in his opening brief is Oregon v. Elstad (1985)
470 U.S. 298, which addressed whether an initial failure to administer Miranda warnings
taints subsequent admissions made after a suspect has been advised of and waived his

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Miranda rights. (Id. at p. 300.) Defendant cites Elstad for the proposition that “[t]hough
Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of
any subsequent statement should turn . . . on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily
made.” (Id. at p. 309.) He argues the statements at issue were made as a result of
compulsion and were not voluntary.
“ ‘The court in making a voluntariness determination “examines ‘whether a
defendant’s will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
confession.” ’ [Citation.] The prosecution bears the burden of proof and must show ‘by a
preponderance of the evidence the statements were, in fact, voluntary.’ ” (People v. Krebs
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 299.)
“ ‘ “A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence,
obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence.
[Citation.] Although coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to establish an
involuntary confession, it ‘does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is
involuntary.’ [Citation.] The statement and the inducement must be causally linked.
[Citation.]” [Citation].’ [Citation.] A confession is not rendered involuntary by coercive
police activity that is not the ‘motivating cause’ of the defendant’s confession.” (People
v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176.)
“ ‘On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial court’s legal
determination and rely upon the trial court’s findings on disputed facts if supported by
substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] The facts surrounding an admission or confession are
undisputed to the extent the interview is tape-recorded, making the issue subject to our
independent review.” (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177.)
The record indicates defendant was kicked once by an officer for not standing up
after being asked to do so. The punch defendant relies on was thrown by a private party.
A confession can only be deemed involuntary if it is the result of “coercive police
activity.” (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167.) “Absent police conduct

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causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state
actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” (Id. at p. 164.) Even
“[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a
defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.” (Id.
at p. 166.)
The trial court concluded defendant was not asked any questions when he
volunteered information about the truck. This was supported by the record, which
indicates that defendant overheard A., J., and the officers talking and spontaneously
chimed in. Defendant concedes Deputy Abe’s back was to him. There would be no
reason for him to believe he would be kicked again if he did not interject himself into this
conversation and volunteer information he was not asked to volunteer. Thus, the trial
court did not err in concluding the statements about the truck were voluntary.
B. Reading of Section 12022.1 Enhancement Allegation
Defendant argues the trial court erred in reading the section 12022.1 enhancement
allegation to prospective jurors. The court read to potential jurors the information,
including these allegations: “[I]t is further alleged within the meaning of . . . Section
12022.1, that at the time of the commission of the above offense, the defendant . . . was
released from custody on bail or on his own recognizance prior to judgment becoming
final for a felony offense in Sutter County.” Previously, defendant filed a motion in
limine to bifurcate the prior strike and section 12022.1 enhancement allegations. Defense
counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the trial court read the allegations after
granting the motion and the allegation was prejudicial. The prosecutor explained the
People had presumed that the court had granted the entire motion. The court said it had
granted the motion as to the strikes only and had not ruled with respect to the section
12022.1 allegation. The court then raised the substantive issue of whether the People
wanted to try the allegation. The prosecutor stated that it would accept an admission.
Defense counsel stated defendant had agreed to admit. The court stated, “You have your

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objection on the record. I don’t believe it’s prejudicial error. We have jury trials where
juries hear these things. If he wants to admit it now, then the jury will be advised that
there are certain charges that were not submitted to you and you are not to speculate.
We’ll do a limiting instruction, and I’ll accept his admission if that’s what he wants to
do.” Defendant agreed, and the court took his waiver of his right to a jury trial on the
allegation and his admission.
The jury was ultimately instructed the allegation had been removed from their
consideration: “The further allegation that the defendant was in violation of . . . section
12022.1[, subdivision ](b) no longer needs to be decided in this case. [¶] Do not
speculate about or consider in any way why you no longer need to decide this allegation.”
Defendant cites no actual ruling to support his understanding or the People’s that
the motion for bifurcation of the section 12022.1 allegation had been granted at the time
the court read the allegation. The minutes state, “As to Defense motion in limine #13,
Court grants bifurcation on the issue of the strike priors.” Even if we conclude the issue
was not forfeited by defendant’s failure to obtain a ruling before the trial court read the
information, defendant has failed to demonstrate the reading of the allegation prejudiced
him. He cites no authority indicating the mere reading of an allegation is prejudicial.
Rather, he cites authority explaining that “a trial court has the discretion, in a jury trial, to
bifurcate the determination of the truth of an alleged prior conviction from the
determination of the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense, but is not required to do so
if the defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by having the truth of the alleged prior
conviction determined in a unitary trial.” (People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 72.)
Defendant has demonstrated no error in the reading of section 12022.1 enhancement
allegation.
C. Admissibility of Evidence Regarding Prior Burglary Convictions
Defendant raises two arguments challenging the trial court’s admission of
evidence pertaining to his previous burglary convictions. In the first, defendant

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challenges the admissibility of the evidence he committed other burglaries. In the
second, defendant challenges the admissibility of statements he made regarding these
burglaries.
1. Evidence of the Convictions
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior burglary
convictions under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The court admitted
certified records of conviction with respect to 13 instances of first degree residential
robbery. The court admitted them to prove intent and absence of mistake. The court
explained these convictions were recent, relevant, and defendant had pled to the
convictions “which lessens the prejudicial value to the defendant.”
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), “ ‘expressly prohibits the use of an
uncharged offense if the only theory of relevance is that the accused has a propensity (or
disposition) to commit the crime charged and that this propensity is circumstantial proof
that the accused behaved accordingly on the occasion of the charged offense.’ ” (People
v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 25.) “ ‘Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however,
that this rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when
such evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person’s character or
disposition,’ such as identity, common plan, or intent. [Citation.] Evidence of uncharged
crimes is admissible to prove identity, common plan, and intent ‘only if the charged and
uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference’ on these issues.”
(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 711.) “ ‘The least degree of similarity
(between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove
intent.’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328.) The same is true as to
absence of mistake. (People v. Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 643, 672.) “ ‘In order to
be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to
support the inference that the defendant “ ‘probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each
instance.’ ” ’ ” (Foster, supra, at p. 1328.)

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“We review the trial court’s determination for abuse of discretion, and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. Edwards,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 711.)
Defendant contends detail of the similarity between the charged burglary and the
prior burglaries is missing. The court examined this issue and concluded that because the
prior crimes also involved burglaries of residences, there was sufficient similarity
because the intent was the same. “[T]he recurrence of a similar result tends to negate an
innocent mental state and tends to establish the presence of the normal criminal intent.”
(People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 371.) In contrast, the court excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for second degree
burglary on the basis that entering a store with intent to steal was insufficiently similar to
entering a home with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein. As the trial court
explained, the risk of undue prejudice with respect to the convictions for first degree
residential burglary was minimal because defendant was convicted of these crimes, and
so the jury would not be tempted to convict him simply to punish him for the prior
offenses. (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287.) The evidence was presented
quickly, was not inflammatory when compared to the charged crimes, and we presume
the jury followed the court’s instruction on the proper purpose of the evidence. (Jones,
supra, at p. 371.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
2. Defendant’s Statements Regarding Prior Burglaries
Defendant argues the court erred in allowing his former probation officer to testify
to statements he made seven years earlier with respect to the earlier burglaries.
The prosecution moved in limine to introduce the statements, which defendant
made during a 2015 pre-sentencing interview with the probation officer. The motion
explained defendant told the probation officer that after his wife passed away,
“ ‘everything went downhill,’ ” he stopped working, and money started running out, so

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he started committing burglaries. The prosecution argued these statements were
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove intent. The court
ruled the testimony was admissible. At trial, the officer testified that, seven years earlier,
defendant said “after his wife passed away, things went downhill. He stopped working,
started committing burglaries, and didn’t give a shit.” Further, “[h]e said the money was
running out.”
On appeal, defendant argues, without citation to authority, that this testimony
should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. Defendant has
failed to demonstrate the evidence was irrelevant. Defendant asserts the information was
more than seven years old, did not account for defendant’s present situation, and
“allowed for additional evidence to be introduced of Mr. Johnson’s prior burglaries.”
Again, the prior crimes evidence was probative of intent and whether it was reasonable to
infer from the circumstances that defendant intended to commit theft inside the house
when he was caught breaking into it or whether defendant was merely trespassing. (See
People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 371 [“Evidence that defendant intended to rob the
Vernon victims tended to show that he intended to rob when he participated in the
Florville crimes”].) The fact seven years had passed and it was possible his financial
situation had improved went to the weight of the evidence, but did not make it irrelevant.
To the extent defendant’s reference to “prejudicial” was meant to invoke Evidence Code
section 352, “the test for prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 is not whether the
evidence in question undermines the defense or helps demonstrate guilt, but is whether
the evidence inflames the jurors’ emotions, motivating them to use the information, not to
evaluate logically the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish the defense
because of the jurors’ emotional reaction.” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 145.)
Defendant has not shown the evidence prejudiced him in this sense and has not
demonstrated any error in the court’s admission of this evidence.

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D. Alleged Cumulative Error
Defendant argues “reversal is required due to the individual errors” and also
because of “the cumulative errors.” “There was, however, no error to cumulate.”
(People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 244.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

EARL, P. J.

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

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