In re L.W. CA4/1

CourtListener 10297149Calctapp19 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/18/24 In re L.W. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.W. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D084649
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521350A, B)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed.
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
T.J. (Mother)1 appeals from orders sustaining petitions filed by the
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) under

Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (§ 300(b)(1)),
on behalf of her minor sons, L.W. and M.W. (collectively, the children).
Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the court’s
jurisdictional findings. She premises this argument largely on her claim that
she was not violent. She further contends that the dispositional orders were
erroneously made because they were predicated on the jurisdictional findings
she challenges. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between October 2 and November 28, 2023, the children were exposed
to multiple violent confrontations between Mother and Father. During the
October confrontation, Mother punched Father several times before
threatening him with a kitchen knife and attempting to stab him in the
presence of the children. Mother denied any violence towards Father. Father
sustained minor visible injuries, which Mother claimed were self-inflicted.
Mother further denied any knowledge of the knife police recovered at the
home and was arrested for child cruelty, assault with a deadly weapon, and
spousal abuse. Following the altercation in October, Mother temporarily
relocated to Iowa. Father obtained a temporary restraining order and an
emergency protective order and stated he would not let Mother return to the
home.

1 D.W. (Father) does not join Mother in this appeal.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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Nevertheless, Mother returned in November 2023 and Father allowed
her to return to the home and have unsupervised contact with the children.
She again became violent with Father in the children’s presence, culminating
in strangling him. Police responded to Mother’s call for assistance and
discovered Father with visible injuries. The paternal grandmother was
present when police arrived and reported witnessing the interaction,
including Mother strangling Father. Mother was identified as the dominant
aggressor and arrested for assault and battery. Mother maintained Father
was the only aggressor and denied strangling him or otherwise being
physically violent with him. She later asserted Father self-inflicted the
injuries observed by others.
The October and November altercations were not the only incidents for
which the parents sought law enforcement assistance. In the preceding year,
police were summoned to the family home at least seven times. Separately,
Father has further history with the Agency with his previous partners and
has had his parental rights to other children terminated.
Mother acknowledged that she failed to protect the children and
allowed them to witness physical violence in the home. She also admitted
that she is not level headed and struggles to communicate. In her
interactions with a social worker following the November incident, she
struggled against a set of handcuffs and began to yell and stomp her feet.
She reported a history of alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamine and cocaine
use, although Mother discontinued the use of methamphetamine and cocaine
prior to the incidents that gave rise to this case. Mother reported “drinking a
regular-sized bottle of vodka per day” and micro-dosing marijuana prior to
the incidents. She claimed to stop drinking following the October incident,
but tested positive for alcohol and marijuana on December 19, 2023; she

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continued testing positive for marijuana throughout 2024. She expressed a
willingness to discontinue her marijuana use, but ultimately chose to
continue her use, citing concern cessation might have a negative impact on
her mental health. Mother maintained that she was a victim of Father’s
domestic violence, describing Father physically and sexually assaulting her
over the course of their relationship. She also told a social worker that
Father had previously threatened to take the children away from her, and
alleged that Father would sexually and physically abuse them if they were
left in his care.
Father reported that Mother threatened to kill him and the children
prior to the November 2023 incident. He described Mother’s behavior during
the precipitating incidents as manic and said her manic states lasted
anywhere from days to a month. Father received an emergency protective
order following the October incident, which he allowed to lapse because
Mother was in Iowa. He received another temporary restraining order
following the November incident and told a social worker he intended to
make it permanent after an initial extension. He agreed to work with the
Agency to make a formal safety plan and to keeping Mother separated from
the children. Multiple minors made allegations that Father was sexually
inappropriate with them, and Father sustained a conviction for sexually
abusing a minor. Father admits he was the aggressor in domestic violence
incidents with previous partners, who obtained restraining orders against
him. He denies assaulting Mother and admits struggling with alcohol around
the time of the incidents.
The Agency was concerned that both parents posed a risk to the
children’s safety and recommended removal of both children. In line with
that recommendation, the court ordered removal on December 7, 2023, and

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detention on December 12, 2023. Shortly thereafter, Mother completed a six-
hour online parenting class, eight-hour drug and alcohol class, and eight-hour
domestic violence course. The children moved to a temporary placement on
December 7, 2023 but were removed approximately a week later because of
aggressive behavior. The caregivers in their second placement also requested
their removal after approximately a week. Accordingly, on December 22,
2023, the children moved to the Polinsky Children’s Center. The children
moved to a caregiver’s home in the new year.
Mother and Father’s supervised visits with the children were
staggered. The restraining order protecting Father from Mother was
dismissed on January 16, 2024. Two days later, on January 18, Father called
the social worker and expressed concern about entering the building,
describing Mother waiting outside in her car. Four days later, Mother
obtained a temporary restraining order, protecting her from Father. Father
similarly filed for and obtained a new temporary restraining order on
February 6. On February 15, Mother was still in the building lobby when
Father arrived for his visit. The following day, Mother was served with the
new temporary restraining order before her supervised visit with the
children. Mother asserted the injuries described and pictured in the
temporary restraining order were self-inflicted.
The Agency referred Mother to domestic violence classes, which she
agreed to receive. She completed her intake on January 17, 2024, but
finished only five sessions over three months. She was inconsistent in her
attendance and completing her homework, citing technology issues and being
too upset to participate. In April 2024, Mother announced she was quitting
the domestic violence group and requested individual therapy instead. She
participated in three individual domestic violence therapy sessions between

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April and June 2024. Mother stated that it took six of the first seven months
she was separate from Father to “ ‘adjust and get a grip.’ ” Although her
attendance in domestic violence programs was erratic, Mother was consistent
about accessing therapy and parent counseling. Mother expressed concern
about her ability to find housing, but rejected entering a sober living facility.
In spite of the progress Mother made with her mental health, she altered the
dose of her prescribed psychotropic medications while experiencing a
depressive episode, without the supervision of a competent medical
professional.
Father similarly participated in domestic violence therapy, alcohol
cessation support groups, and individual therapy. The Agency initially
recommended bypassing reunification services for Father because his
parental rights to the children’s half-siblings were terminated. However, in
May 2024, following a period of progress in which Father successfully
engaged in voluntary services, the Agency recommended Father receive
reunification services. After the social worker shared the Agency’s new
recommendation with Father, he disclosed he was arrested for misdemeanor
domestic violence against a friend.
Both parents were consistent with their visits to the children, but both
initially ignored requests to limit or omit food from their visits. The food and
beverages Mother and Father provided caused nausea, vomiting, diarrhea
and diaper rash. Mother admitted pulling the children’s foreskin back during
visits without reason while inspecting their bodies. She asserted she did this
due to her trauma. Mother continued to insinuate that the children might be
experiencing sexual abuse.
Although Mother and Father made some progress in their respective
voluntary services, the Agency did not believe it was safe for the children to

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return to either parent. The jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was
continued several times before being held in June 2024. At that hearing,
Mother and Father contested jurisdiction but submitted on the issue of
disposition. In support of her position, Mother submitted a series of exhibits
updating the court on her voluntary services and rested. In closing, Mother
argued that the allegations contained in the petition regarding her violence
towards Father were untrue, and that she made significant progress in her
voluntary services. The court found both Mother and Father made minimal
progress towards alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement. In accordance with those findings, the court sustained the
petition and found jurisdiction over the children under section 300,
subdivision (b).
DISCUSSION
We begin by observing that dependency jurisdiction is taken over the
child, not the parent. (§ 300; see In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393,
397.) “[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both.
More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent
bring [the child] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.” (In
re Alysha S., at p. 397.) When allegations in a dependency petition involve
both parents, “it is necessary only for the court to find that one parent’s
conduct has created circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to
assert jurisdiction over the child[ren].” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1491.) This is because the primary concern of the dependency
proceeding is “the protection of [the] children,” and the focus of the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings is therefore the “children, not [the] parents.”
(Ibid.) Thus, “[a]s a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by

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substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction.” (In re. M.W. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.)
In a dependency proceeding, the Agency must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of the petition
comes under the court’s jurisdiction. (§ 355.) A juvenile court may exert
dependency jurisdiction over a child if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm . . . , as a
result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of [his] parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300(b)(1).)
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.
[Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) On
appeal, the parent has the burden of showing that there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (In re T.V.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).)
To establish jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1), the Agency must show
“(1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) The third
element requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the
child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future. (In re
Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 111.) “The [juvenile] court may
consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re

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N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170.) However, standing alone, past
conduct is insufficient to establish a substantial risk of harm and “there must
be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe [the past conduct] will
reoccur.” (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564-565.) The court,
however, “ ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction’ ” and “[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of
future behavior.” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)
The Agency does not argue that the children suffered any physical
harm due to Mother and Father’s violence. Accordingly, we consider whether
the record contains evidence showing a substantial risk of serious physical
harm in the future.
The juvenile court looked not only to Mother’s violence during the two
incidents that precipitated the dependency case, but to multiple incidents of
domestic violence between the parents while they cared for their young
children. In the 10 months leading up to the October 2023 incident, police
visited the family on seven separate occasions. These calls culminated in two
incidents for which Mother was arrested. Although Mother denied attacking
Father with a knife, responding police officers discovered one and observed
Father’s injuries. The following month, the paternal grandmother witnessed
Mother strangling Father and recounted what she saw to the Agency and
police. As such, there are multiple witnesses that corroborate Mother being
violent towards Father. The court also considered Father’s May 2024 arrest
for domestic violence just weeks before the jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, which the petition was modified to include.
We observe that Mother resisted attending domestic violence group
therapy or completing the assigned homework before quitting the group
entirely. As to her individual domestic violence therapy, she attended only a

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handful of sessions in the three months leading up to the jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing. This is a promising start; however, as the court
observed, her progress towards mitigating the causes necessitating
placement was minimal. Any further participation after the hearing, while
laudable, would be inappropriate for us to consider in our review. (In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) Further, although Mother was consistent
in accessing mental health services and support, she also increased the
dosage of her psychotropic medication without the guidance or supervision of
a physician shortly before the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. We
conclude that ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that both
Mother’s and Father’s domestic violence endangered the children’s physical
health and safety and placed them at risk of serious physical harm.
Mother maintains, even now, that she was never the aggressor. In
doing so, she asks us to ignore the evidence proffered to the Agency regarding
two separate violent incidents, one involving the use of a weapon, and one
involving strangulation. She relies on an opinion from the New York Court of
Appeals, Nicholson v. Scoppetta (2004) 3 N.Y.3d 357, to argue that she, as a
victim of domestic violence, is not inherently neglectful. Similarly, in her
reply briefing to this court, Mother cites to cases in which jurisdiction was not
appropriate where the victim of domestic violence demonstrated that their
children were not endangered merely by their survivor status. She also urges
us to accept that her violent actions were merely a differential response to
the trauma she endured and not, themselves, domestic violence. This may be
one interpretation of the evidence, but it is not the only reasonable one. In
effect, Mother asks us to reweigh the evidence, which is something we cannot
do. Her arguments also disregard the fact that Mother was identified as the

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perpetrator in the two incidents that gave rise to this case and the finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
Mother denied attempting to stab Father or committing any violence
towards him during the October 2023 incident. She left the state, then
returned and strangled Father in November, an incident she again denies
despite the report of a direct witness. These were not the only incidents
Mother denied responsibility for; Mother also asserted that Father charged
into her lit cigarette and punched himself in the face as explanations for
injuries documented in his application for a temporary domestic violence
restraining order. Taken together, these reports demonstrate an escalating
pattern of domestic violence between Mother and Father, culminating in very
serious attacks using a weapon and a strangulation incident. Mother does
not acknowledge or recognize this escalating pattern. “One cannot correct a
problem one fails to acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
188, 197.) “[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether
persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court
supervision.” (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.) Police
intervention was not sufficient to dissuade Mother from further violence and
the juvenile court reasonably could conclude Mother would not be dissuaded
from violent acts around her children without an active dependency case.
Finally, even if we accept as true Mother’s claim that she has never
been the perpetrator in the family’s domestic violence, the fact remains that
the children were repeatedly exposed to violence between the parents.
Mother conceded that the children were exposed to violence in the home and
that she failed to protect them. Mother’s claims about Father’s violence
towards her bolster a jurisdictional finding. Father has a lengthy history of
domestic violence and dependency matters and was arrested for domestic

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violence approximately one month before the jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing. Father’s behavior, which Mother complains of, is a sufficient and
independent basis for finding jurisdiction because jurisdiction is taken over a
child, not a parent. “ ‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to prevent
risk, not ignore it.’ ” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1074, 1104.) The record, viewed most favorably to the juvenile court’s orders,
establishes that Mother’s history of physical abuse towards Father, her
acknowledged failure to protect the children, and her inconsistent
participation in a domestic violence cessation program constitute substantial
evidence that the children remained at risk of substantial physical harm.
Accordingly, the juvenile court appropriately assumed jurisdiction over them
under section 300(b)(1).
Mother’s claim regarding the dispositional orders is based on error with
the jurisdictional findings. Because the jurisdictional findings are supported
by substantial evidence, we need not address Mother’s argument regarding
those dispositional orders.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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