CourtListener 10295581•People v. Adams CA1/5
Testo completo
Filed 12/17/24 P. v. Adams CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168659
v.
CLIFFORD EDWARD ADAMS, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. SCR-745268-1)
Clifford Edward Adams appeals from his convictions for
murder, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and
reckless driving after he drove his car into a homeless
encampment, killing one victim and injuring another. He
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he premeditated
and deliberated over the murder and attempted murder; the trial
court’s decision to allow impeachment evidence concerning his
drug use; the court’s decision to sentence him under the Three
Strikes law; and the court’s order that, as part of his sentence, he
repay the district attorney’s office for the cost of impounding his
car. We direct the trial court to correct errors in the court’s
minutes and abstract of judgment with respect to the obligation
to repay the impoundment fees, but we otherwise affirm the
judgment.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
The killing occurred on the night of March 23, 2021, at a
homeless encampment on Roberts Avenue in Santa Rosa. Adams
drove his car into Michael Sullivan-Snell (known as “Big Mike”)
and ran over Kellie Jones, injuring Big Mike and killing Jones.
Adams knew both victims; he socialized with Jones and others at
the encampment, sold methamphetamine to Big Mike, and
bought marijuana from him. In the days before the crash, Big
Mike and Adams were involved in a dispute that culminated in a
physical altercation the evening of the crash, when Big Mike
punched Adams in the face and wrestled him to the ground at the
encampment. The fatal crash happened later the same night.
The prosecution’s theory was that Adams attempted to kill
Big Mike but accidentally killed Jones instead. A defendant who
tries to kill one person but instead kills a bystander is liable for
both attempted murder and murder. (People v. Concha (2009) 47
Cal.4th 653, 660.) To obtain convictions for the first degree
murder of Jones and the attempted murder of Big Mike under the
prosecution’s theory, the prosecution was required to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the attempted killing of Big
Mike was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” (Pen. Code, §
189, subd. (a); see also Pen. Code, § 664.)1
A jury ultimately found Adams guilty of the first degree
murder of Jones, with willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count
one). The jury also found Adams guilty of the attempted murder
of Big Mike (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count two) and
found that Adams acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation in committing that offense. The jury further found
Adams guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
subd. (a)(1); count three) and reckless driving (Veh. Code, §
23103, subd. (a); count four). The jury also found true allegations
that Adams personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon,
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Jones and Big Mike,
and proximately caused bodily injury to another person in
connection with the foregoing offenses.
B.
The dispute between Adams and Big Mike initially
concerned a designer backpack belonging to Adams’s girlfriend,
Catrina Thompson, that Big Mike took after she left it on the
ground when she was intoxicated. The backpack contained
various personal items. Although Big Mike knew the backpack
belonged to Thompson, he held on to it and waited for someone to
ask for the backpack. Big Mike ultimately removed the contents
of the backpack and gave the backpack to his daughter for her
birthday.
Thompson was “mad” about the backpack. When Adams
asked about it, Big Mike informed him that he no longer had the
backpack but he had its contents. Big Mike returned some – IDs
and credit cards – but not all of the missing items. In the days
leading up to March 23, the day of the crash, Adams contacted
Big Mike four or five times, asking him about compensation for
the backpack
On the evening of March 23, Thompson and Adams drove
to the Roberts Avenue encampment, saw Big Mike, and spoke to
him about the backpack. Big Mike became angry, reached
through the driver’s side window of the car, and punched Adams.
As a result of the assault, Adams had a three-inch, bloody gash
above his eye. Adams exited the car with a machete and began
grappling with Big Mike. Big Mike was 6 feet 7 inches tall and
about 100 pounds heavier than Adams, who was six feet tall. Big
Mike “[got] the best of [Adams],” wrestled him to the ground, took
the machete from him, and got on top of him. Adams had to ask
3
Big Mike to let him up, which he did. There were “a lot of people
around” who knew Adams and saw Big Mike take him down.
Angry, Adams drove off with Thompson in his car.
When Adams and Thompson returned to their residence,
Big Mike rode up on his bicycle and taunted the couple.
According to Thompson, Big Mike threatened them by shouting,
“I know where the fuck you live.” Adams and Thompson were
“angry” and yelling as Big Mike rode away.
After Big Mike left, Thompson and Adams spoke with
Thompson’s cousin, Robert Thomas, and told him what had
happened with Big Mike. Thomas recounted at trial that Adams
told him “he was going to go mess up this dude that just beat him
up, Big Mike.” And Thomas testified that Adams was “upset”
and looking for a gun, but Adams was unable to locate one.
Adams acknowledged telling Thomas he was going to “mess that
dude up,” referring to Big Mike, but testified he did not
remember asking him about a gun. Thomas, who was friends
with both Adams and Big Mike, offered to talk to Big Mike to
defuse the situation.
Between 45 minutes and two hours after the altercation,
Big Mike returned to the encampment. Subsequently, Adams,
Thompson, and Thomas all arrived at the encampment by car.2
Around the time that Adams drove up, Jones, a resident of the
encampment, was sitting on a mattress, coloring, and Big Mike
was sitting with her.
John Clay, Jr., an acquaintance of both Adams and Big
Mike, testified that after Adams drove up to the encampment, he
walked up to Adams’s car to say “hi.” Clay recounted that
Adams, who “still looked upset from the fight earlier that day,”
2 Adams and Thompson testified that Adams picked
Thomas up and drove him to the encampment, but Thomas
testified that he arrived in another friend’s car.
4
said to Clay, “I need your help tonight.” Clay took Adams to be
asking for help getting back at Big Mike. Clay declined, stating
that he had enough problems of his own. Clay told Adams, “it’s
not worth it, just over this little stupid little interaction or fight
between you and Mike to spend the rest of your life in prison.” At
trial, Adams denied speaking to Clay before the crash.
Adams drove slowly to the end of the cul-de-sac on Roberts
Avenue, made a U-turn, and stopped his car for “a few minutes”
as he waited for Thomas. Big Mike estimated that Adams sat in
his car for five to 10 minutes before the crash. While he waited,
Adams left his car in drive, with the engine running, headlights
on, and window closed. Adams’s car was “facing towards where”
Big Mike and Jones were, giving Adams an unobstructed view of
the two in his headlights. Big Mike and Jones were between 23
and 39 feet away from where Adams’s car was stopped.
According to Thompson, after Thomas went to try to talk to
Big Mike, Big Mike became agitated. Adams testified that Big
Mike was making aggressive gestures at him and “jumping” as if
he was going to come after Adams again. Adams recounted that
after Big Mike “stood up like he was coming [his] way,” his fists
balled, Adams “took off in the car.” Adams asserted that he felt
scared Big Mike was going to punch him again. Adams stepped
on the gas, trying to “get away from this dude.”
Adams drove his car “straight” into Jones’s campsite, where
Adams knew Big Mike had been “sitting an instant before.” The
car drove over some pallets, knocked Big Mike through a fence,
and landed on Jones, pinning her to the ground. According to
Clay, the car “was pointed right at [Jones] and [Big] Mike” and
“was accelerating the whole time until” impact. Big Mike
similarly testified that the car was accelerating and “coming
straight toward” him. And Thomas testified that Adams “[d]rove
straight at [Big] Mike.”
5
At trial, Adams testified that he intentionally hit the gas
pedal, but he did not intend to hit anyone with his car. He
testified that he was thinking clearly at the time, his judgment
and reasoning were not impaired by intense emotion, and he
never thought he had to use deadly force to save himself or
anyone else.
Immediately after the crash, Adams tried to put the car in
reverse, but was unable to back the car up. Adams fled the scene,
left town, and got a new cellphone.
The police subsequently recovered several weapons from
Adams’s car, including a hatchet, a machete, and two baseball
bats; the machete and hatchet were on the driver’s side seat.
C.
During the ensuing investigation, Thompson told police
that Adams’s “drug use the day of March 23rd and around that
time [¶] . . . [¶] . . . was increasingly excessive.” As a result of his
methamphetamine use, said Thompson, Adams was “jumpy,”
“erratic,” and “moody.” In addition, Thompson told the police
that when the couple was driving back to the encampment before
the crash, Adams “was extremely pissed.”
At trial, however, when cross-examined by the People,
Thompson denied making these statements to the police.
Thompson acknowledged that both she and Adams had used
methamphetamine earlier in the day on March 23rd. As for his
demeanor shortly before the crash, Adams seemed “spacey” to
Thompson and “kind of annoyed maybe” but was not “worked up.”
Over the defense’s objection, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to impeach Thompson’s testimony with the
statements she had made to police about Adams’s drug use. The
prosecution also introduced evidence of Thompson’s statement
that Adams had been “extremely pissed.”
6
D.
The prosecution argued that before crashing into Big Mike
and Jones, Adams decided to kill Big Mike because Big Mike had
humiliated him by taking him down in front of numerous
community members at the Roberts Avenue encampment.
The defense presented several alternative theories at trial.
Its primary argument was that the crash was an accident: Adams
had returned to the encampment hoping that Thomas could
defuse the dispute, but became scared that Big Mike would
attack him again, so he hit the gas pedal to try to get away from
him and unintentionally crashed into Big Mike and Jones. In
support of that account, the defense introduced expert testimony
by a forensic psychologist, Dr. Sabina Correa, who explained that
a person who believed he was in danger could experience a fight
or flight response, which could affect decision-making and cause
the person to flee a perceived threat of immediate harm. On
cross-examination, Dr. Correa testified that a person
experiencing a fight or flight response could also engage in goal-
oriented behavior, that a person’s emotions could influence his
behavior, and emotions like anger or embarrassment could
motivate a person to kill.
In the event that the jury concluded that Adams
intentionally sought to run Big Mike over with his car, the
defense also argued that Adams acted in self-defense, which
would render the killing or attempted killing lawful, or imperfect
self-defense, which would reduce his liability to a lesser offense.
In the alternative, the defense argued that Adams was provoked
and acted in the heat of passion, which would also reduce his
liability to a lesser offense.
E.
At sentencing, Adams requested that the trial court
exercise its discretion not to sentence him under the Three
7
Strikes law. The Three Strikes law creates a presumption in
favor of “harsher sentence[s]” for individuals with repeated
serious or violent felony convictions (prior “strikes”). (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428 [citing People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony)].) Section 1385,
subdivision (a), allows a trial court limited discretion to depart
from the Three Strikes sentencing scheme “in furtherance of
justice.” (See Carmony, at pp. 377-378; People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero).)
Adams’s criminal history included 21 prior felony
convictions between 1988 and 2019. For purposes of sentencing
under the Three Strikes law, the trial court found that Adams
had two strikes based on a 1988 robbery and 1993 offenses
involving robbery and assault with a firearm. His conviction
history also included several theft-related offenses; brandishing
an imitation firearm; being a felon in possession of a firearm;
drug possession; delivery of cocaine; larceny; assaulting a
government official or employee; escape from jail; and third
degree robbery. In addition, Adams had several parole or
probation violations.
In urging the trial court to strike his prior strikes, Adams
argued that his strikes were committed over 30 years before the
present offenses and that “he was becoming less violent, not
more,” given that his convictions in the last decade were limited
to non-violent theft and drug offenses. Adams maintained that
his recidivism risk was low given his age (56 at the time of
sentencing). In addition, Adams argued that his mental illness
(schizoaffective disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress
disorder) also served as a mitigating factor. Further, Adams
submitted a letter from his sister about his difficult upbringing,
and asserted in support of his request that he suffered a
traumatic childhood as the result of his mother’s neglect and
abuse, which led to him and his siblings abusing both drugs and
8
alcohol beginning when Adams was in elementary school. He
also argued that the present offenses were preceded by
provocation.
The trial court denied Adams’s request to strike his prior
strikes. The court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of 100
years to life imprisonment with a consecutive determinate
sentence of 14 years. The court imposed a $300 restitution fine,
suspended a second $300 restitution fine, and ordered that
Adams pay $1,373 in restitution to the victim compensation
board. Finally, the court ordered that Adams pay $11,899 to the
Sonoma County District Attorney’s office for “impound fees.”
DISCUSSION
A.
Adams contends that his convictions for first degree
murder and attempted murder must be reversed due to
insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
Reviewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419
(Halvorsen)), we conclude the jury’s verdict was supported by
substantial evidence.
An action is “ ‘deliberate’ ” when the actor thinks carefully
and weighs considerations for and against the potential action
before proceeding. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786,
862-863 (Memro).) And an action is “ ‘premeditated’ ” when the
action was “ ‘considered beforehand.’ ” (Id. at p. 863.) A person
can premeditate and deliberate quickly, in an abbreviated time
frame. (See ibid.; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117,
1127 (Perez).)
Our Supreme Court has identified three non-exclusive
categories of evidence that can suffice to establish premeditation
and deliberation: evidence of (1) planning activity, (2) motive, and
(3) the manner or method of killing. (People v. Morales (2020) 10
9
Cal.5th 76, 88-89 (Morales); see also, e.g., People v. Tafoya (2007)
42 Cal.4th 147, 172 (Tafoya); People v. Herrera (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 1456, 1462 & fn. 8, disapproved of on other grounds
by People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191; People v. Anderson
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson).) Planning activity, or
facts about the defendant’s actions prior to the killing, can show
that the defendant’s activities were directed toward or intended
to result in the killing. (Morales, at p. 89.) Evidence of motive –
e.g., facts concerning the defendant’s prior relationship or
conduct with the victim that support a motive for killing the
victim – could, when combined with evidence as to planning
activity or the method of killing, support an inference that the
killing occurred due to careful reflection rather than hasty
impulse. (Ibid.) In addition, in some circumstances the
particular nature of the killing can give rise to an inference that
the defendant must have acted with deliberation and forethought
to kill the victim, when combined with evidence of planning or
motive. (Ibid.) Courts have upheld findings of deliberation and
premeditation based on extremely strong evidence of planning
activity or based on evidence of motive in combination with
evidence of either planning activity or the method of killing.
(People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 849, fn. 1 (Haskett); see
also Anderson, at pp. 28-30.) The method of killing alone (for
example, an execution-style killing) can also establish that the
killer acted with deliberation and premeditation. (Tafoya, at p.
172; Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 863-864.)
Here, the jury’s verdict was supported by strong evidence of
motive as well as evidence of planning activity. As to motive,
Adams had been involved in a dispute over the course of several
days with Big Mike, who had stolen Thompson’s designer
backpack. Thompson, Adams’s girlfriend, was upset and angry.
The evening of the killing, Big Mike had sucker punched Adams,
leaving him with a bloody gash on his face, and then wrestled
him to the ground in front of Thompson and several other
10
onlookers who knew Adams. Big Mike had gone to the couple’s
residence and threatened them. The jury heard evidence that
when Adams was driving back to the encampment before the
crash, he “was extremely pissed.” Based on this evidence, the
jury could have reasonably concluded that Adams sought to kill
Big Mike in retribution for assaulting, threatening, and
humiliating him.
The prosecution also presented evidence that Adams
planned to kill Big Mike. Thomas testified that Adams asked
him about a gun and told him “he was going to go mess up” Big
Mike. (Cf. People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 681
[explaining that suspect’s “comment about killing everyone
reflected planning activity”].) In addition, Adams drove to the
encampment, a location he knew Big Mike frequented, with
several weapons (a hatchet, machete, and baseball bats) in his
car. (See People v. Francisco (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1192
[explaining that the defendant’s planning activity included
obtaining a gun and driving a car to look for a victim]; see also
People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 733 [recounting that
defendant’s planning activity included driving to the location of
the killing]; Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 850 [recognizing that
obtaining a weapon in advance of the killing constitutes planning
activity].) After arriving at the encampment, Adams asked Clay
for help, and Clay declined, with the understanding that Adams
was asking him for help getting back at Big Mike. Adams made a
U-turn and stopped his car with his headlights pointing toward
Big Mike and Jones. Adams admitted he sat in his car for a few
minutes, with the engine running and the gear shift in drive.
In addition, the manner of killing was, at a minimum,
consistent with a finding of premeditation and deliberation.
Several witnesses testified that once Adams’s car started moving,
the vehicle travelled straight toward the victims and accelerated
until the impact. The fact that the car travelled approximately
11
23 to 39 feet straight toward Big Mike supported the jury’s
conclusion that Adams acted purposefully to kill him.
The jury reasonably could have found that Adams wanted
to kill Big Mike, considered a few different methods, and then,
after he failed to obtain a gun from Thomas or help from Clay,
Adams settled on using his car. (Cf. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p.
1127 [evidence that the defendant sought out a second weapon
when the first weapon broke supported a finding of premeditation
and deliberation]). The jury could have inferred that Adams
positioned his car and kept his car in drive because he was
contemplating running Big Mike down with it. Further, shortly
before Adams stepped on the gas pedal, Clay warned him that
the dispute with Big Mike was not worth spending the rest of his
life in prison. The jury could have further inferred that during
the minutes that Adams spent sitting in his vehicle with the
motor running, watching Big Mike, Adams weighed his options,
considered the consequences, and resolved to run Big Mike over
with his car. (Perez, at p. 1127 [explaining that “premeditation
can occur in a brief period of time. . . . . ‘with great rapidity’ ”]; see
also Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 420-421 [concluding that
a 10-minute interval during which the defendant encountered
and killed two victims who were strangers to him was not too
brief a period to support jury’s finding of premeditation and
deliberation].) Adams testified that when he was sitting in his
car before the crash, he was thinking clearly, his reasoning and
judgment were not impaired, he knew where Mike was located,
he knew he was stepping on the gas pedal when he did, and he
acted intentionally when he hit the gas pedal. In light of the
evidence, the jury reasonably found that Adams acted with
deliberation and premeditation.
Adams contends that the fact that the killing occurred in
front of numerous bystanders who were able to identify him
supports a conclusion that he acted rashly, without
12
premeditation and deliberation. But the fact that “the location of
the killing was not ideal does not negate an inference that it was
planned.” (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 826
(Casares), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Dalton
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166.) Moreover, reversal of the judgment is not
justified simply because there may be competing inferences that
the jury could have drawn, but did not. (Casares, at p. 827; see
also People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 703.)
B.
Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the prosecution to impeach Thompson, a defense
witness, with evidence concerning Adams’s drug use. Adams
maintains that the evidence of his drug use should have been
excluded because it was not relevant to any issue in the case
other than Thompson’s credibility. We disagree.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Evidence Code
section 780 permits consideration of “any matter that has any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness” of a
witness’s testimony, including “[a] statement made by [the
witness] that is inconsistent with any part of [the witness’s]
testimony at the hearing.” (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (h).) It is
improper for a party to elicit otherwise irrelevant testimony
solely for the purpose of contradicting it, but whether to admit or
exclude impeachment evidence on a collateral matter is within
the trial court’s discretion. (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14
Cal.4th 668, 748 (Mayfield), abrogated on other grounds by
People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363; see also People v.
Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744.)
Here, Adams challenges the trial court’s decision to allow
the prosecution to impeach Thompson’s testimony with evidence
that his drug use “the day of March 23rd and around that time”
13
was “increasingly excessive,” which caused him to be “moody,”
“jumpy,” and “erratic.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence in the circumstances here. The impeachment evidence
concerned Adams’s mental and emotional state at the time, a key
issue at trial. His mental state was directly at issue given the
murder and attempted murder charges, which required proof of
intent to kill, premeditation, and deliberation. (See §§ 187, subd.
(a), 188, subd. (a)(1), 189, subd. (a).) The jury heard evidence
from Dr. Correa, the defense expert, that “emotions can motivate
a person’s behavior” and that “emotions such as anger or
embarrassment could bring a person to kill.” Both parties’
closing arguments sought to characterize Adams’s emotional
state at the time of the crash. The prosecution relied heavily on
evidence of the “emotional impact” of Big Mike’s actions on
Adams’s “state of mind,” arguing that Adams was angry and
embarrassed and sought revenge as a result. And the
prosecution argued that Adams made “a cold, calculated decision
even if it was a horrible, irrational, unreasonable decision.” The
defense described the conflict with Big Mike as “terrifying” and
“scary” for Adams. The defense also acknowledged that Adams
was “probably upset and vulnerable” and “was experiencing
significant anger after” being assaulted by Big Mike, but the
defense maintained that Adams’s anger did not mean he resolved
to commit murder. Thompson’s statements about the impact of
his drug use on his emotional state, combined with evidence that
Adams had done methamphetamine that day, had a tendency to
support the prosecution’s theory that Adams made an
unreasonable decision to kill Big Mike as retribution for
assaulting and humiliating him. If Adams was indeed “moody,”
“jumpy,” and “erratic” at the time, it would support a conclusion
that Adams was more prone to act on his emotions, including his
anger. Further, the evidence of Adams’s emotional state was
relevant not only to the deliberation and premeditation issues,
14
but also to the defense argument that he acted rashly, in the heat
of passion.
That Adams may have been moody, jumpy, and erratic was
also relevant to his complete self-defense argument. The defense
argued that Adams “reasonably believed that he was in imminent
danger” immediately before the crash, but evidence that his use
of methamphetamine made him moody, jumpy, and erratic at the
time could support a conclusion his assessment of the threat may
have been unreasonable, particularly given the defense’s
acknowledgment during its closing argument that Adams’s “li[fe]
of drug abuse” compromised his “ability to perceive events
accurately.”
Further, because Thompson was the only witness other
than Adams who was able to address his actions and demeanor
inside the car immediately before the crash, her credibility was of
critical importance; the impeachment evidence could have
assisted the jurors in evaluating her testimony. (See Mayfield,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 748 [affirming the trial court’s decision to
admit impeachment evidence where the “testimony concerned
defendant’s actions during the [relevant] time” and the evidence
could have assisted the jury in evaluating the testimony of the
only eyewitness].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
C.
Adams next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to dismiss his prior serious felony
convictions for sentencing purposes under section 1385,
subdivision (a), and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497. His
contention lacks merit.
In deciding whether to strike or vacate a prior serious
and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under
section 1385, subdivision (a), the trial court must consider
15
whether, because of the particular circumstances of the
defendant’s current conviction, prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and background, character, and potential for
rehabilitation, the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes sentencing scheme. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.
377.) A trial court’s decision not to depart from a Three Strikes
sentence will amount to an abuse of discretion only in “limited
circumstances,” such as where the court was unaware of its
discretion or relied on improper considerations, or where the
imposition of the Three Strikes sentencing scheme results in
“ ‘ an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result.’ ” (Id. at p.
378.)
Here, the trial court considered the applicable factors and
reached a decision that was neither arbitrary nor irrational. The
court found that Adams had two strikes, one based on a 1988
robbery and a second strike from 1993 involving robbery and
assault with a firearm. The court expressly considered his
particular “background, character, and prospects,” including his
sister’s letter discussing his difficult childhood. The court also
recognized that the two strikes were from “quite a long time ago.”
But the court emphasized that Adams, who had a total of 21
felony convictions, had “an extensive criminal history” between
the current offenses and his prior strikes, with the time in
between “filled with felony and misdemeanor conduct” as well as
supervision violations. His history “include[d] 11 separate felony
cases involving either felony drug convictions, property crimes or
weapons possessions.” The court noted that Adams had admitted
selling drugs recently and was convicted for such activity in 2017
and 2019, with the current offenses occurring just five months
after he was released from prison in connection with his 2019
conviction. The court observed that “the only gaps with Mr.
Adams’[s] [criminal] history [we]re periods of incarceration.” As
a result, his history “does not paint a picture to the Court of a law
16
abiding or reformed lifestyle,” and the court declined to strike his
prior strikes.
Adams points to several considerations potentially
weighing in favor of dismissing his prior strikes. For example, he
asserts that none of his felony convictions between his last strike
in 1993 and the current offenses involved violence or the threat of
violence. He contends that even without a Three Strikes
sentence, he likely would have received a lengthy term of
imprisonment. And he maintains that his age, upbringing,
mental illness, and other personal circumstances favor dismissal
of his prior strikes. But despite circumstances favoring his
position, the trial court’s conclusion that Adams fell within the
spirit of the law given his extensive history of felony convictions
was not unreasonable. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379
[explaining that the Three Strikes law is designed to address “
‘the “revolving door” career criminal’ ”].) Even if we might have
arrived at a different determination in the first instance, we must
nonetheless affirm where, as here, the sentencing court
considered the relevant circumstances and reached a decision
consistent with the law. (Id., at p. 378.)
D.
Finally, Adams contends that the trial court erred in
ordering him to pay $11,899 in restitution to the district
attorney’s office, even though the district attorney’s office is not a
victim entitled to restitution. We disagree that the court ordered
restitution to the district attorney’s office, but we remand for the
court to correct errors in the court’s minutes and abstract of
judgment.
At the sentencing hearing, the court ordered Adams to pay
“$11,899 . . . to the Sonoma County District Attorney's office for
the impound fees” incurred in connection with his car. It is
undisputed that the court’s order was authorized by Vehicle Code
section 22655.5, subdivision (d), which provides that “[i]n any
17
prosecution of the crime for which a vehicle was impounded” as
relevant here, as evidence of a crime or because it was used to
commit a crime, “the prosecutor may request, and the court may
order, the perpetrator of the crime, if convicted, to pay the costs
of towing and storage of the vehicle, and any administrative
charges.” The trial court did not regard the repayment of the
impound fees as victim restitution, because the court stated that
the “victim compensation and victim restitution” should be “paid
first,” before the impound fees. Although the trial court did not
expressly invoke Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (d),
we presume the court knew and followed the applicable law. (See
People v. Picazo (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 778, 802.)
However, as the People acknowledge, the court’s minutes
mistakenly state that “$11,899 restitution [is to be paid] to the
Sonoma County District Attorney’s office for car impound fees.”
The abstract of judgment, in turn, does not characterize the
obligation to repay the impound fees as restitution, but as the
People further acknowledge, it omits reference to the authorizing
statute, Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (d). We
therefore order that the minutes be conformed to the sentence
orally pronounced by the court and that the abstract of judgment
be clarified. (See People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222, fn.
14.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare amended minutes of
the June 20, 2023, sentencing hearing to clarify that the order to
repay $11,899 to the Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office for
car impound fees is not for purposes of victim restitution. The
court is further directed to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment clarifying that the defendant’s obligation to repay
$11,899 in impound fees is pursuant to Vehicle Code section
22655.5, subdivision (d), and forward a certified copy to the
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Adams (A168659)
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