CourtListener 10294484•People v. Brownell CA5
Testo completo
Filed 12/17/24 P. v. Brownell CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087334
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CMS0243)
v.
PAUL DAVID BROWNELL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Michael J.
Reinhart, Judge.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Paul David Brownell of multiple counts of lewd acts
upon a child, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison. Defendant argues
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he told a relative he was traveling to
Long Beach when he actually left for Redding as evidence of flight and in instructing the
jury that these facts could be used to support an inference of consciousness of guilt. We
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Kings County filed a second amended information on
June 28, 2023, charging defendant with a forcible lewd act upon a child under age 14
(Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and lewd acts upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a);
counts 2, 3). Defendant pleaded not guilty.
A jury convicted defendant of all counts on June 29, 2023. The trial court
sentenced defendant on December 13, 2023, to the upper term of five years in prison as to
count 1 and consecutive two-year terms as to counts 2 and 3, for an aggregate term of
nine years in prison. The court also reserved victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) and
ordered defendant to pay $300 restitution and suspended parole revocation restitution
fines (§§ 1202.4, 1202.45), $120 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8), and $90 in
criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 14, 2023.
FACTS
Laura S.2 lived with her fiancé, eight-year-old daughter N.M.,3 and four other
children who were between the ages of 4 and 14 years at the time of defendant’s trial in
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their first
names or initials. No disrespect is intended.
3 N.M. was six years old in January 2022.
2.
June 2023. Defendant, Laura’s grandfather, had been living with them for six years as
well. He would care for the children while Laura and her fiancé were working.
Laura was home in bed on January 14, 2022, when she heard N.M. speaking to
someone in Laura’s bathroom through an open window. When Laura asked, N.M. said
that she was speaking with defendant, which upset Laura because N.M. had been told not
to talk to anyone while in the restroom. N.M. said that defendant had asked if she wanted
him to sit and watch her. Laura instructed N.M. that no one should watch her while in the
restroom. Laura asked N.M. if “anything like this” had happened before, and N.M.
replied, “[N]o.” Laura asked N.M. if she was sure, and N.M. placed her hand on her
private part. Laura asked if defendant touched her, and N.M. said he touched her all the
time. N.M.’s eyes watered and she did not want to talk anymore.
Laura contacted her mother who instructed Laura to tell defendant to leave. Laura
told defendant what N.M. had said and ordered defendant to leave. Defendant attempted
to go to N.M. to speak with her. Laura did not permit him to speak to N.M., and
defendant went outside and told the other children of the accusations before he left the
residence. The next morning, Laura spoke with N.M. again and asked her whether
defendant had touched her inside her pants, but Laura did not recall the response. Laura
called the police that morning. Kings County Sheriff’s Deputy Eddie Torres met with
Laura. Although Laura did not recall everything she said to Torres, he testified Laura
advised him that N.M. said that defendant touched her inside of her pants. N.M. also told
Laura that defendant did not hurt her before she teared up, looked down, and said she did
not want to talk anymore.
N.M. testified that defendant did weird things to her, but she did not remember.
Then she testified that defendant touched her in places that he was not supposed to touch.
Defendant touched her private part (near the part used to go to the bathroom) while she
was on the couch with him. N.M.’s cousin and two-year-old sister were also in the room.
3.
N.M. was lying down near defendant, and he touched her private part with his hand over
her clothes and moved it around. N.M. felt weird and uncomfortable.
N.M. also testified that she touched defendant’s private parts one time by accident
while lying down on the couch with him. When she tried to move her hand, defendant
grabbed it and put it on his private part (that he used to pee), and she pulled it away
again. Defendant grabbed her hand again, placed it on his private part, and made her
hand move up and down. N.M. was six years old when this happened. N.M. testified
that she eventually told her mother when defendant talked to her through the bathroom
window, and she told her mother that defendant had touched her private part multiple
times.
N.M. described another time when defendant called her into the bedroom while he
was folding clothes and touched her private part.
When first interviewed by the police, N.M. was six years old and in first grade.
N.M. said that defendant made her do stuff that she did not want to do, and he would
touch her “there.” Defendant told her to touch his private part, and when she said,
“[N]o,” he made her do it by grabbing her hand, putting it there, and moving it up and
down. N.M. said that defendant stopped when her brother walked in. Defendant also
touched her private and moved his finger inside her. Defendant grabbed her hand so
N.M. would not tell her mother and told N.M. it was their secret. Defendant did these
things to her lots of times. On one occasion, he put his finger into her private part and
then took her hand and put it into his pants. She pulled her hand out and locked herself in
the bathroom. This happened again one day when she was having a good day, and that
made it the worst day.
N.M. finally told her mother after defendant looked at N.M. in the bathroom
through the window.
Laura’s sister, Samantha S., testified that she had conversations with defendant
around the time that N.M. disclosed what he had done to her. During the first
4.
conversation, Samantha called defendant while he was at her mother’s house. Defendant
told her that he intended to go to Long Beach. A few days later, Samantha again spoke to
defendant on the phone, and defendant said that he ran out of gas and was staying at a
homeless shelter, but he did not know where he was. Samantha suggested that defendant
open an application on his phone so that she could use it to see his location, but defendant
refused to do so and claimed that he did not know how. During a third conversation,
defendant said that he was still at the homeless shelter.
The parties stipulated that defendant was arrested in Redding on January 21, 2022.
Dr. Anna Washington, a licensed psychologist, testified about Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). CSAAS is an educational framework designed to
describe common reactions and patterns of victims of child sexual abuse and to dispel
certain myths people have about child sexual abuse. Five components of CSAAS are
secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted and
unconvincing disclosures; and retraction. Washington explained the reasons why
children may cooperate with the abusing perpetrator rather than telling anyone of the
abuse, including circumstances such as the perpetrators using grooming (establishing a
positive relationship with the child and escalating to sexual contact), intimidation, or
threats to ensure the child’s cooperation and secrecy. Children will not usually disclose
the abuse right away due to shame and fear of the consequences. Children may disclose
abuse incrementally and sometimes retract their statements if they experience negative
consequences from the disclosures.
Defendant testified that he did not commit the charged crimes. He heard N.M. in
the bathroom and inquired about what she was doing because she had previously gotten
into Laura’s makeup. N.M. did not respond because she was angry with defendant for
having asked her to pick up her room. He later testified that he never spoke to N.M.
because he could not see her in the bathroom but then testified that he could see her near
5.
the toilet. Defendant then explained that he did not speak to N.M. because he was upset
that she did not pick up her toys earlier.
Laura came outside thereafter and ordered defendant to leave, warning him that
her fiancé would kill him. Defendant denied having done anything and testified that
Laura never explained why she was upset. Defendant did not know what Laura thought
he did but believed it had something to do with him looking in the bathroom window. He
denied attempting to speak with N.M. and claimed he tried to enter her room because his
clothing was stored in her closet.
Defendant left as requested and went to stay with Laura’s mother. After a couple
of days, he left because Laura’s mother believed the accusations against him and was not
happy that he was there. He had also received a call from his daughter in Redding that
she had been in an accident and decided to go see her. His car broke down and ran out of
gas on the way. Defendant stayed in his car near a homeless shelter until he could “get
some money from somebody” for gas. Samantha told him that he was being investigated,
but he did not believe that he would be arrested.
The prosecutor questioned defendant as to why he did not tell Samantha where he
was going. Defendant said that he told Samantha that his car broke down, but he did not
know where he was. He only had directions to his daughter’s location because another
individual had programed the address into his phone. Defendant testified that did not tell
Samantha where he was going because Samantha did not like his daughter. He also did
not tell anyone he intended to visit his daughter in Redding because he did not intend to
stay. He later testified that he did not tell Samantha where he was going because he
hardly ever talked to her and “why would [he] tell her?”
Defendant explained that he initially told Samantha that he was going to Long
Beach because his daughter lived there and he did not realize his daughter had moved to
Redding. His daughter called him while he was staying with Laura’s mother, and he
decided to visit her because he was concerned with her safety. Defendant explained that
6.
he could not use the GPS on his phone to tell Samantha where he was because he was
driving at the time but then admitted that he had already ran out of gas and could have
looked at the GPS but did not. He also claimed that it was normal for him to travel
without notifying his family where he was going because there was no reason for his
family to know.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s flight.
A. Background
The prosecutor provided an offer of proof that Samantha would testify she had a
conversation with defendant in which he told her he intended to go to Long Beach.
During a second conversation, defendant claimed that did not know where he was but had
run out of gas and was staying at a homeless shelter, and he would not allow Samantha to
assist him in determining his location. The prosecutor argued that defendant’s action
could be construed as flight after having been accused of sexually assaulting N.M. and
permitted an inference that defendant was conscious of his own guilt.
After reviewing applicable case law, the trial court ruled that it would allow some
evidence regarding flight. “That’s going to be the testimony of [Samantha] and the arrest
in Redding .…” The court excluded testimony as to the investigative techniques and
efforts to locate defendant in Redding after finding that it had little probative value. The
court concluded, “I’m just the gatekeeper to see if there is sufficient basis and relevance
to allow it and that it’s not overly prejudicial regarding its probative value.· Those two
items of evidence shouldn’t take too long .… And the cases that I read … warrant the
introduction of that evidence and the flight instruction.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The prosecutor moved to admit evidence of defendant’s flight to Redding. After a
hearing, the court partially granted the motion while excluding evidence as to the
investigation which led to defendant’s arrest in Redding. The court found the proffered
7.
evidence probative to show consciousness of guilt and not unduly prejudicial under
Evidence Code section 352. Defendant contends the court erred.
“Flight is a factor tending to connect an accused with the commission of an
offense. [Citations.] Standing alone, it is not sufficient to establish guilt; but flight
immediately after the commission of an offense is a circumstance that may be considered,
with other facts in the case, as tending to show a consciousness of guilt.” (People v.
Moore (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 585, 600.)
“Evidence showing consciousness of guilt, such as flight …, is generally
admissible within the trial court’s discretion. The court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391.) We find no abuse.
C. Analysis
Laura testified that she told defendant of N.M.’s accusations and ordered him to
leave the house. Defendant then left and stayed with Laura’s mother. While there,
Laura’s sister, Samantha, spoke with defendant asked him what he planned to do.
Defendant said he intended to go to Long Beach. Thereafter, Samantha spoke to
defendant who indicated that his car ran out of gas. When asked where he was located,
defendant told Samantha that he did not know, and he did not cooperate in her efforts to
assist him in using his phone to determine his location. During a third conversation,
defendant told Samantha that he was at a homeless shelter. If believed, a jury could find
that this evidence showed that defendant left the area and deliberately avoided revealing
his location to avoid apprehension and, therefore, reflected defendant’s consciousness of
his own guilt.
Defendant argues that no such inference could be drawn in light of several facts.
First, he argues that he left Laura’s house because she ordered him to leave. However,
the inference of flight does not derive from the fact that defendant left Laura’s residence.
Rather, he left the area thereafter without advising any family member as to where he
intended to go. Defendant also argues that leaving the area could lead to an inference of
8.
flight only if defendant had other family members or living options in the area. While we
do not agree that such foundational facts are necessary before admitting such evidence,
we note that defendant voluntarily left the residence of Laura’s mother, where he had
been staying, and also testified that he initially intended to ask to stay with the pastor of
his church, thus evidencing that defendant did know individuals in the area who could
provide him housing. Defendant also argues that he was aware that his telephone could
be traced and that he communicated with Samantha anyways, evidencing he was not
attempting to hide his location. For these reasons, defendant argues that the evidence
fails to necessarily show consciousness of guilt.
However, “the existence of alternate explanations for the defendant’s behavior
does not necessarily defeat the court’s discretion to admit consciousness-of-guilt
evidence.” (People v. Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 391–392, citing People v.
Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243–1244 [instruction on flight as showing
consciousness of guilt permissible even though there was a possible innocent explanation
for his actions]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 845 [evidence of an escape
attempt admissible despite the possibility the consciousness of guilt might be ascribed to
a different crime].) “ ‘[T]he existence of explanations—other than consciousness of guilt
of the crime charged—for conduct which may be interpreted as flight is relevant to the
weight of the evidence showing flight, but not to its admissibility .…” (Anderson, at
p. 392; see People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.2d at p. 600 [for trial judge to determine
whether leaving area shortly after commission of crime constituted intentional flight];
People v. Bennett (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 244, 252 [evidence that Bennett departed from
the state a short time after the commission of the crime and remained away until
apprehended sufficient for flight instruction; weight and credence of Bennett’s
explanations for jury to determine]; People v. Peak (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 911
[evidence that Peak disappeared day indictment returned but returned a week later to self-
surrender could be used as evidence of flight and for the jury to determine whether Peak
9.
knew of indictment and his intent in leaving], disapproved on another ground in People v.
Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775–776; People v. People v. Rokes (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d
689, 693 [leaving area shortly after commission of crime sufficient evidence to warrant
flight instruction].)
We conclude that evidence of defendant’s conversations with Samantha were
sufficient to support an inference that defendant fled the area to avoid apprehension for
his lewd acts upon N.M., and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.
II. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant’s flight could
demonstrate consciousness of guilt.
A. Background
Both defendant and the prosecutor agreed to the court’s proposed jury instructions.
The court instructed the jury: “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was
committed or after he was accused of committing the crime[,] that conduct may show that
he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled[,] it is up to you to
decide the meaning and importance of that conduct, however, evidence that the defendant
fled cannot prove guilt by itself.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight
because there was no factual basis for it. We disagree.
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Frazier (2024)
16 Cal.5th 814, 950.) “ ‘The giving of [a flight] instruction is statutorily required when
flight evidence is relied upon by the prosecution.’ [Citation.] ‘ “In general, a flight
instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime
scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a
consciousness of guilt.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[F]light requires neither the physical act of
running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require,
10.
however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., second bracketed
insertion added.) “ ‘[T]he instruction [does not] require[] … a defined temporal period
within which the flight must be commenced .…’ ” (Id. at pp. 950–951, citing People v.
Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182 [flight instruction proper where “the evidence
introduced by the prosecution establish[ed] that [the] defendant left California in the days
immediately following the charged offenses”].) “Evidence that a defendant left the scene
is not alone sufficient; instead, the circumstances of departure must suggest ‘a purpose to
avoid being observed or arrested.’ [Citations.] To obtain the instruction, the prosecution
need not prove the defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, only that
a jury could find the defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt from
the evidence.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328.)
If there is evidence that defendant fled and such evidence is relied upon as tending
to show guilt, then a trial court should instruct the jury on flight in accordance with
section 1127c. (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943.) Section 1127c provides:
“In any criminal trial or proceeding where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon
as tending to show guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows: [¶] The
flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact
which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to
which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.”
C. Analysis
In this case, there was evidence that defendant left the area within a few days of
being accused of sexually assaulting N.M. When speaking with Samantha while still at
her mother’s residence, defendant stated that he intended to go to Long Beach. However,
he was later found and arrested in Redding. Additionally, defendant would not identify
his location during another conversation with Samantha and avoided her attempts to
assist him when he claimed that he did not know where he was located. Defendant also
11.
testified that he could have identified his location from the GPS information on his
phone. As we have already discussed, defendant’s flight rationally supported an
inference that he was conscious of guilt despite his explanations to the contrary. For
these reasons, it was proper to instruct on flight. (See People v. Bonilla, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 329; People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 943.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
12.
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.