People v. Dixon CA2/7

CourtListener 10292835Calctapp13 dic 2024

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Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Dixon CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B328947

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. TA136291-02)

ANTHONY D. DIXON, JR.

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Julie Caleca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Anthony Dixon, Jr. appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.951 (now section 1172.6). In 2016 a jury convicted
him on one count of second degree murder and three counts of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of
140 years to life. Dixon appealed, and we reversed the judgment
and directed the trial court to conduct a new trial. On remand,
pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Dixon pleaded no contest to
voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to a
prison term of 22 years.
In 2022 Dixon filed a petition under section 1172.6, which
the superior court summarily denied. Dixon argues the court
erred in finding he failed to make a prima facie case for relief.
Because Dixon is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Dixon on One Count of Second
Degree Murder and Three Counts of Attempted
Murder, Dixon Appeals, and We Reverse
One evening in May 2014 Dixon, who called himself a
“general” of a criminal street gang, drove a fellow gang member
and an associate to the home of Terrence Sims, a rival gang
member. Dixon’s two confederates got out of the car and fired

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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approximately 20 shots at the house. One of the bullets struck
Sims’s sister, instantly killing her, and another bullet struck a
man who was standing on the front porch of the house, injuring
him. At the time of the shooting, one of Sims’s fellow gang
members was sitting in a car parked in the carport by the house;
none of the bullets hit him.
Sims had just left his house on his bicycle. From down the
street, he heard the gunshots fired at his house, and he hid in a
nearby mortuary. When Dixon drove past him, Sims felt he was
“‘being shot at,’” but none of the bullets hit him. Dixon drove
away after the shooting. (People v. Dixon et al. (April 10, 2019,
B277759) [nonpub. opn.] (Dixon I).)
A jury convicted Dixon on one count of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and three counts of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegation he
committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to
promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members, within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Dixon to an aggregate prison term of
140 years to life. Dixon appealed, contending the trial court
erred in denying two motions he made under Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.
We agreed with Dixon that the court erred in denying one of the
motions, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for a new
trial. (People v. Dixon, supra, B277759.)

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B. The Trial Court Accepts Dixon’s No Contest Plea to
Voluntary Manslaughter and Sentences Him
In May 2021, as part of a negotiated disposition, Dixon
pleaded no contest to an amended charge of voluntary
manslaughter and admitted he had a prior conviction for a felony
that was a serious felony, within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a), and a serious or violent felony, within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Dixon to a prison term
of 22 years and granted the People’s motion to dismiss the
remaining counts.

C. Dixon Petitions for Resentencing Under
Section 1172.6, and the Superior Court Denies His
Petition
In May 2022 Dixon filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Dixon alleged he met the eligibility requirements
of section 1172.6, subdivision (a), and requested counsel. After
the court appointed counsel to represent Dixon, the People filed a
response, arguing Dixon was ineligible for relief because the trial
court did not instruct the jury on felony murder, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of culpability
that imputed malice to Dixon. Dixon did not file a reply.
The superior court held a hearing in January 2023 to
determine whether Dixon established a prima facie case for relief.
The court confirmed with the prosecutor that the trial court did
not instruct the jury on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Counsel for Dixon did not make
any argument and submitted on the petition. The court ruled
that, because the trial court had not instructed the jury on felony

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murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Dixon
was not eligible for resentencing. Dixon timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6 and the Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective 2019,
substantially modified the law governing accomplice liability for
murder, eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 468 (Arellano); People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 (Curiel); People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986 (Reyes); People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and significantly narrowing the
felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder
(§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see Arellano, at p. 467; People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong); People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
an individual’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). (Arellano, at
p. 468; Curiel, at p. 449; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Section 1172.6, as originally enacted, authorized an
individual convicted of felony murder or murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the
superior court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts if he or she could not now be convicted of
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of the
crime. (See Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 468; Curiel, supra,

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15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.) Effective 2022, the Legislature
amended section 1172.6 to apply to individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or manslaughter when the prosecution was allowed to
proceed on a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
Stats. 2021, ch. 551; People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
223, fn. 3; People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
The process under section 1172.6 “‘begins with the filing of
a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for
eligibility are met.’” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 468; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the
required information, the court must appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner, if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-
963; see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The prosecutor must
then file a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a
reply, and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 450.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463-464.) The court
may consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit

6
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971;
see Curiel, at pp. 463-464; People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Williams
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 386, review granted Sept. 11, 2024,
S286314.) If the record of conviction “‘“contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’”
(Lewis, at p. 971; see Williams, at p. 386.) Thus, if “‘“the petition
and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.”’”
(Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 469; see § 1172.6, subd. (c);
Curiel, at p. 460.)
If on the other hand, a petitioner establishes a prima facie
case for relief, the superior court must issue an order to show
cause, and the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, “at
which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder’ under state law as amended by Senate
Bill 1437.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; see § 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(3); Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 469; People v.
Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631-632.) We review de novo
an order denying a petition under section 1172.6 without issuing
an order to show cause. (People v. Estrada (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337; People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1193, 1200; People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 123.)

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B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Summarily
Denying Dixon’s Petition
Dixon argues nothing in the record of conviction refutes his
factual assertions regarding each of the requirements listed in
section 1172.6, subdivision (a). In particular, Dixon contends
that, although he pleaded no contest after the Legislature
amended the murder statutes in 2019, his plea occurred before
Senate Bill No. 775 “expanded” Senate Bill No. 1437 “to prohibit
attempted murder convictions based on imputed malice.” In
Dixon’s view, at the time of his plea, the People “could have still
proceeded on the now-invalid theory as to the attempted murder
charges.” The law, however, does not support Dixon’s hyper-
technical construction of section 1172.6.
As discussed, a petitioner must satisfy three conditions to
be eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6: “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3); see Reyes,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 297.) For a defendant who pleaded
guilty to manslaughter, “the most reasonable reading of the third

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criterion for establishing resentencing eligibility is that at the
time of conviction—i.e., the time the plea was entered—the only
way to a murder conviction was through an imputed malice
theory. As a matter of law, this cannot be true for a person
. . . who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time when
imputed malice theories had already been statutorily
eliminated.” (People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590.)
Because Dixon pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter in
2021, after the Legislature had enacted Senate Bill No. 1437,
Dixon cannot show he could not be convicted of murder “because
of” the legislative changes to sections 188 and 189 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)). (See Lezama, at p. 590 [where the defendant
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter after the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, the superior court did not err in
summarily denying the petition under section 1172.6]; Reyes, at
p. 298 [“When appellant entered his change of plea [in 2021], the
now invalid theories of murder liability had already been
eliminated. Consequently, appellant has already received the
benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437.”].)
In an effort to distinguish Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
583, Dixon argues the defendant in that case “was not charged
with attempted murder, and therefore, did not accept a plea to
voluntary manslaughter in lieu of going to trial at which he could
have been convicted of attempted murder under an invalid theory
of liability.” Citing section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2), Dixon
argues the prosecution in his case “would have been permitted to
proceed under an invalid theory of liability” for attempted
murder. Therefore, according to Dixon, he met the requirement
of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), because he could not
presently be convicted of attempted murder. People v. Gallegos

9
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434 (Gallegos), a case almost identical to
this one, rejected the same argument.
In Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 434 the defendant, like
Dixon, faced murder and attempted murder charges and pleaded
no contest to voluntary manslaughter after the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, but before the Legislature enacted
Senate Bill No. 775. (Gallegos, at p. 439.) The defendant filed a
petition for resentencing and argued “he could have faced
attempted murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he
proceeded to trial in lieu of entering a plea to voluntary
manslaughter in 2019.” (Id. at p. 444.) Therefore, according to
the defendant, “he met his prima facie burden by alleging he
could not be convicted of attempted murder due to ‘changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.’” (Gallegos,
at p. 444.) The court in Gallegos acknowledged the defendant’s
plea “arguably satisfies subdivision (a)(2) of section 1172.6: [H]e
entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in lieu of a trial at
which he could have been convicted of attempted murder . . .
under a now-invalid theory (as well as murder . . . under a valid
theory).” (Gallegos, at p. 444.) But, the court explained, when
the provision “is read in the context of the statute as a whole,”
the defendant’s argument failed. (Ibid.) The court held the
statutory language of section 1172.6, subdivisions (a) and (d),
which focus on “the individual conviction at issue,” reflect
“a statutory purpose to provide relief for specific convictions
obtained under a now-invalid theory of liability,” instead of relief
“based on dismissed charges separate and apart from the
conviction at issue.” (Gallegos, at p. 444.)
We agree with Gallegos. Section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2),
states as one of the three criteria for eligibility that the defendant

10
“was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder.” The Legislature listed the possible crimes the People
could have pursued (murder or attempted murder) to track the
specific conviction on which the defendant is seeking
resentencing (murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter). (See
People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162, 172 [“We do not
. . . consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look
to the entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their
scope and purposes.”].)
As the court in Gallegos observed, the legislative history of
Senate Bill No. 1437 makes clear the Legislature “intended
section 1172.6 to apply to those petitioners who entered a plea to
manslaughter only if, at the time the plea was entered, the only
way to a charged murder conviction was through an imputed
malice theory eliminated by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Gallegos,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 445; see Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1,
subd. (a) [Senate Bill No. 775 clarifies that persons “who were
convicted of . . . manslaughter under a theory of felony murder
and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are
permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theories”]; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19,
2021, p. 3 [“[t]his bill would allow a person . . . who was convicted
of manslaughter when the prosecution was allowed to proceed on
a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine to apply to have their sentence
vacated and be resentenced”]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep.
on Sen. Bill No 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19,

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2021, p. 7 [“If this bill passes, people who are serving a sentence
of manslaughter . . . that were prosecuted under a felony murder
theory or a natural and probable consequences theory will be able
to have their sentences recalled under the same standards as
people who have been convicted of first and second-degree
murder.”].) The legislative history indicates the Legislature
contemplated that a defendant convicted of manslaughter would
be eligible for resentencing where the prosecution obtained that
conviction by way of an imputed malice theory of murder. The
legislative history does not support Dixon’s argument he is
eligible for relief because the prosecution could have proceeded on
an imputed malice theory on his attempted murder counts, which
were unrelated to his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, a
crime that, in the People’s words, involved a “completed
homicide.”2 (See Gallegos, at p. 445; see also People v. Elmore
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133 [“Manslaughter, a lesser
included offense of murder, is an unlawful killing without
malice.”]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, pp. 5-6
[recognizing voluntary manslaughter “[is] often the subject of a
plea bargain in murder cases in exchange for dismissal of a
murder charge”].)

2 In Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 439 the People
amended the complaint to reduce the murder charge to voluntary
manslaughter, whereas here the trial court granted the People’s
motion to add the voluntary manslaughter charge as a separate
count. This distinction does not change the analysis because, had
the case proceeded to trial, the People would not have been able
to obtain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter by prosecuting
Dixon for attempted murder. Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder, but not of attempted murder.

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The gist of Dixon’s argument is that, to state a prima facie
case under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), the defendant can
assert that he could not presently be convicted of murder or that
he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder,
regardless of his actual conviction. This reasoning would produce
an absurd result when extended to other provisions of
section 1172.6. (See People v. Guillory (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326,
333 [“While courts generally defer to statutory language, we will
not do so if it would subvert the legislative intent, produce absurd
consequences, or render other parts of the statute surplusage.”].)
For example, at the evidentiary hearing the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant “is guilty of
murder or attempted murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3), italics added.) If the People were allowed to link
Dixon’s manslaughter conviction to his attempted murder
charges (as Dixon attempts to do here), they could prove Dixon is
guilty of attempted murder of a completely different set of victims
(instead of proving he is guilty of the murder of Sims’s sister), an
outcome inconsistent with the statute’s purpose of providing
relief for the actual conviction the prosecution secured through
now-invalidated theories. (See Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 444.) Because the record of conviction and the proper
interpretation of section 1172.6 refute Dixon’s assertion under
section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), Dixon is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law, and the superior court did not err in denying his
petition. (See Gallegos, at p. 445.)

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Dixon’s petition under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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