CourtListener 10292831•People v. Messer CA3
Testo completo
Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Messer CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100724
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. P16CRF0133-
2)
v.
JESSE DEAN MESSER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appointed counsel for defendant Jesse Dean Messer filed an opening brief asking
this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on
appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant filed a supplemental brief.
Having reviewed the record and defendant’s arguments, we affirm the judgment.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm, two counts of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and two
counts of possessing a firearm having been convicted of a felony. The jury also found
true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in committing both assaults.
Defendant requested a court trial on allegations regarding his criminal history, at which
the court reviewed certified records and found that he had previously been convicted of a
serious felony, making a criminal threat, and had served prior prison terms for five
separate prior felony convictions.1
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 41 years eight months
in prison, comprising the upper term of nine years for the first assault count, doubled due
to the prior serious felony conviction; the upper term of 10 years for the attached firearm
enhancement; two years for the second assault count (one-third of the six-year middle
term), doubled due to the prior serious felony conviction; one year four months (one-third
of the four-year middle term) for the attached firearm enhancement; eight months (one-
third of the two-year middle term) for one of the firearm possession counts, doubled due
to the prior serious felony conviction; a five-year enhancement for the prior serious
felony conviction under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a);2 and two one-year
enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court imposed but
stayed execution, under section 654, of the sentences for the two counts of discharging a
firearm at an occupied motor vehicle and imposed a concurrent sentence for the other
firearm possession count.
1 On this court’s own motion we incorporate by reference the record in defendant’s first
appeal in this case, People v. Messer (Oct. 9, 2020, C086503) (nonpub. opn.).
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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On appeal, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for the trial court
to strike the two one-year enhancements, which the Legislature had repealed after
defendant’s sentencing, and to exercise its newly granted discretion to consider striking
the five-year enhancement. (People v. Messer (Oct. 9, 2020, C086503) [nonpub. opn.]
(Messer I).) The trial court resentenced defendant, striking the two one-year sentence
enhancements and otherwise imposing the same sentence, for a total of 39 years eight
months in state prison. (People v. Messer (Mar. 4, 2022, C094223) [nonpub. opn.]
(Messer II).)
Defendant appealed again, and this court again vacated defendant’s sentence due
to intervening changes in the governing law and remanded for resentencing. (Messer II,
supra, C094223.) The trial court held another resentencing hearing at which defendant
argued: (1) the court could not select any upper term sentences because no aggravating
circumstances had been proven in compliance with current law; (2) the court should
select discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle as the principal count instead of
assault with a semiautomatic firearm; and (3) the sentence for one firearm possession
count should not have been doubled because of a pleading defect. The People responded
that: (1) the court could select upper term sentences based on defendant’s prior
convictions, which had been found true in a bifurcated court trial; (2) the court should not
select a lesser principal count; and (3) defendant had waived any argument regarding the
pleading defect. After acknowledging that the trial court had found the prior convictions
true, defendant asked the court to nevertheless exercise its discretion to select the middle
term sentence because of the age of the prior convictions.
The trial court selected the first count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm as
the principal count. The court then found that defendant’s prior convictions, which had
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt in a bifurcated court trial, justified imposing
the upper term sentence for the principal count and the attached firearm enhancement.
For the other assault count, the court imposed one-third of the middle term for the offense
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and the attached firearm enhancement, all to run consecutively. For one firearm
possession count, the court imposed one-third of the middle term, to run consecutively.
The court declined to strike defendant’s prior serious felony conviction and found
defendant had waived any challenge to how the People had pleaded the prior serious
felony enhancement with respect to the firearm possession count, so the court doubled the
sentences for these three offenses. The court also imposed a five-year enhancement for
the prior serious felony conviction.
The trial court imposed but stayed execution, under section 654, of the sentences
for the two counts of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle and for the other
firearm possession count. After a second hearing to clarify, the court determined
defendant’s aggregate sentence was 39 years eight months in prison. The court amended
the abstract of judgment to remove an order requiring defendant to pay a fee for
preparation of the probation report that the Legislature has repealed.
Defendant timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and
asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable
issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by
counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the filing of the opening
brief. Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising four claims.
I
Lower Term Sentence
First, defendant claims he should have received a lower term sentence, pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) because “the probation report shows [he] suffered
childhood abuse” and “is bipolar.” Defendant misunderstands the statute. Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) only applies if defendant’s “psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma” “was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd.
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(b)(6), (A).) The probation report does not show that any trauma defendant suffered
contributed to the commission of the offenses in this case. Rather, defendant stated that
“his behavior was an overreaction and that substance abuse played a part.”
In any event, defendant forfeited these claims by failing to ask the trial court to
impose a lower term sentence pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (People v.
Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043-1044.) “A party in a criminal case may not,
on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate
its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to the sentence at trial.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751.) Such an objection must fairly inform
the trial court and the prosecution of the basis for the objection so that the prosecution
can respond appropriately and the court can make an informed ruling. (See People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435 [interpreting the objection requirement in Evid.
Code, § 353]; cf. People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [claim forfeited where
defendant “raised no specific objections at the time of sentencing,” so trial court lacked
“a genuine opportunity to correct any errors it may have made”].) “A trial court’s
decision whether to apply [section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)] . . . depends on both factual
determinations and the exercise of discretion,” which means that defendant must raise the
issue in the trial court and develop a record in order to raise the issue on appeal. (Achane,
at p. 1044.) Defendant did not do so here, so he has forfeited the issue.
II
Ineffective Assistance
Second, to avoid forfeiture, defendant claims his attorney performed ineffectively
by not raising section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and asking for a lower term sentence. The
record does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. “Ineffective assistance of
counsel is particularly difficult to demonstrate on direct appeal, where we are limited to
the record from the trial court. ‘The appellate record . . . rarely shows that the failure to
object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more
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appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where
the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.’ [Citation.]
‘ “Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘ “If the record ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected ‘ . . .
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Acosta (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 701, 706.)
Here, defendant cannot establish that “there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation” for his counsel choosing not to seek a lower term sentence. For example,
counsel could have known that defendant would be unable to establish his self-reported
trauma convincingly or unable to establish that it contributed to the commission of the
offenses. Counsel could also have made a strategic decision to seek a middle term
sentence, sensing the court’s inclination to impose an upper term sentence. Accordingly,
defendant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
III
Dismissing the Five-Year Enhancement
Third, defendant contends the court should have dismissed the five-year sentence
enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) because mitigating factors
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) applied. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides
that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited
by any initiative statute.” (See also People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides, in pertinent part, “In exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
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circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
“[N]otwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their
discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to
the “furtherance of justice” inquiry.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1033.) “[I]n most cases, ‘if the trial
court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then it is hard
to see how dismissal would further the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the
applicability of any mitigating factors identified in [Penal Code section 1385,]
subdivision (c)(2).” (Ibid.)
Here the trial court declined to strike the enhancement because it found that
dismissing the enhancement “is not in the interest of justice” and that defendant’s
“criminal history and the facts and circumstances surrounding this case demonstrate that
[he] presents as a significant danger to public safety.” These findings justify the trial
court’s decision, “notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating factors identified in
[Penal Code section 1385,] subdivision (c)(2).” Accordingly, we reject this contention as
well.
IV
Section 654
Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred by not staying the sentence for one
of the counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm under section 654. Specifically,
defendant contends he had a single objective for both assaults, “to vent his anger at six
months of repeated baiting and taunting by the victim.”
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course
of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) A course of conduct is
indivisible “where the defendant ‘ “harbored a single intent.” ’ ” (People v. Mesa (2012)
54 Cal.4th 191, 199.) However, “a course of conduct divisible in time, although directed
to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment.” (People v.
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Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11.) “This is particularly so where the offenses are
temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and
to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the
violation of public security or policy already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 919, 935; People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1255.)
The law gives the trial court “broad latitude” in determining “whether section 654
is factually applicable to a given series of offenses.” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113.) We review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence
“ ‘in a light most favorable to the judgment,’ ” meaning we “ ‘presume in support of the
court’s conclusion the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640-641.) “This
standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” (People v. Venegas (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 32, 38.)
Here, the evidence shows defendant first fired at the victim while driving down the
road. The victim then drove into a parking lot and defendant drove down the road,
leading the victim to think defendant was gone. Defendant then went to a friend’s house
to drop off an ice chest. When the victim began to drive home, defendant returned,
blocked the victim from leaving, got out of his truck, and fired at the victim again. This
is substantial evidence that the two shootings were “temporally separated in such a way
as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before
committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy
already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.) Accordingly,
defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred by executing the sentences for
both counts of assault.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
Duarte, J.
We concur:
/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.
/s/
Wiseman, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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