People v. Godlock CA4/3

CourtListener 10292297Calctapp12 dic 2024

Testo completo

Filed 12/12/24 P. v. Godlock CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063107

v. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF0695)

JADON ROBERT GODLOCK, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel, Seth M. Friedman,
and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
In 2018, defendant Jadon Robert Godlock pleaded guilty to one
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count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) , one
count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and
one count of possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, subd.
(a)(1); count 3). He admitted he committed count 1 “willfully and unlawfully
and with the specific intent to kill” and that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim. He also admitted a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (d),
(e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)) and a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)
(1).)
Consistent with the stipulated sentence, the court sentenced
defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 26 years. In 2023,
defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court
summarily denied defendant’s petition for resentencing, and defendant
appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred by denying his
petition at the prima facie stage because his guilty plea did not establish
ineligibility under section 1172.6. We disagree with defendant’s contentions
and affirm the court’s order because the record of conviction establishes
defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
FACTS
As the factual basis for his guilty plea in 2018, defendant stated:
“In Orange County, California, on March 26, 2017 I willfully and unlawfully
and with the specific intent to kill, attempted to murder Victor A., a human
being. I also unlawfully possessed a firearm having been previously convicted

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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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of a felony and possessed ammunition when I was prohibited from doing so.”
At the plea hearing, defendant admitted a great bodily injury enhancement.
The court specifically asked: “And the great bodily injury enhancement as it
relates to count 1, the great bodily injury was inflicted, is that allegation true
or is it not true?” Defendant responded: “True.”
In his petition for resentencing filed in 2023, defendant averred:
“1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 2. I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which I could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [Citation.]
[¶] 3. I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.”
The court appointed counsel for defendant, received briefing from
the parties, and conducted a prima facie hearing. The court subsequently
denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. In a statement of decision, the
court held defendant was ineligible for relief on count 1 given the factual basis
for his guilty plea. The court emphasized defendant’s admission to attempting
to kill the victim “with the specific intent to kill established . . . he acted with
the mens rea sufficient to sustain the attempted murder conviction under the
law as it is currently amended.”

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DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the court erred by denying his petition because
his guilty plea was generic and did not exclude liability for attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. For the reasons
below, the court did not err.
Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of
murder “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed
to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . .”
(Id., subd. (a)(1).) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551 § 2) amended section 1172.6 to
expand resentencing eligibility to persons convicted of attempted murder. A
defendant convicted of attempted murder is eligible for relief under section
1172.6 only if that conviction was based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
Thus, a defendant convicted of attempted murder either as an actual
perpetrator or a director aider and abettor is not eligible for relief.
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204.)
In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief under section 1172.6, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–971.) “When the
petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the
record of conviction includes the facts ‘the defendant admitted as the factual
basis for a guilty plea.’” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211–
1212.) As our Supreme Court explained, “The record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly

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meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) “We independently review the trial court’s
determination that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief.” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 465.)
Here, the information alleged defendant “did unlawfully, and
with the specific intent to kill, attempt to murder Victor A., a human being.”
It further alleged defendant “personally inflicted great bodily injury on Victor
A., who was not an accomplice[,] during the commission and attempted
commission of the above offense.” (Italics added.) The information did not
reference the natural and probable consequences doctrine and did not
identify or charge any codefendants. It alleged only that defendant attempted
to murder the victim.
In his guilty plea, defendant admitted he attempted to murder
Victor A. with the specific intent to kill. At the plea hearing, he also admitted
the great bodily injury allegation under section 12022.7 – i.e., he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim “during the commission” of the
attempted murder. Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) states: “Any person who
personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice
in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an
additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three
years.” By enacting section 12022.7, “the Legislature intended to impose an
additional penalty for causing great bodily injury only on those principals
who perform the act that directly inflicts the injury, and that one who merely
aids, abets, or directs another to inflict the physical injury is not subject to
the enhanced penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d
568, 571, italics added; People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 418
[same].) Thus, defendant’s guilty plea admitted he personally and directly
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim and was the direct perpetrator of

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the attempted murder. In other words, his admissions conclusively establish
he was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(See People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448 [holding the
defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law where he admitted he
attempted to murder the victims by personally discharging a firearm at their
vehicle.)
Defendant relies on People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217
(Rivera) and People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967 (Eynon), but the facts
in those cases are distinguishable. In Rivera, the defendant pleaded no
contest to murder with malice aforethought. (Rivera, at p. 225.) As a factual
basis for the plea, the defendant stipulated to the facts contained in the
“transcript of the grand jury proceedings.” (Id. at pp. 225–226.) In Eynon, the
defendant pleaded guilty to premeditated first degree murder during a
robbery, admitting “‘I agree that I did the things that are stated in the
charges that I am admitting.”’ (Eynon, at p. 971.) The Courts of Appeal in
both cases concluded the defendants were not ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. (Rivera, at p. 239; Eynon, at p. 979.) Unlike the defendants in Rivera
and Eynon, defendant in the instant action admitted to committing an
attempted murder with the specific intent to kill and to personally inflicting
great bodily injury on the victim during the commission of the attempted
murder.
For the foregoing reasons, the record of conviction refutes the
allegations of defendant’s petition as a matter of law.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

I CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

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Moore, J., Dissenting.
Jadon Robert Godlock filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition
averring that he was convicted of attempted murder as an aider and abettor
under the former (now defunct) natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Godlock is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the record of conviction
conclusively establishes as a matter of law that he was convicted of attempted
murder as the actual perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor.
Here, the record of conviction shows: 1) Godlock was charged in
an information with attempted murder; 2) Godlock admitted in a felony plea
form that he “willfully and unlawfully and with the specific intent to kill,
attempted to murder Victor A., a human being”; and 3) Godlock admitted a
great bodily injury enhancement.
I agree with the majority’s analysis that the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that Godlock acted with the requisite intent to kill
(the mens rea). But it does not conclusively establish that Godlock committed
the requisite acts (the actus reus).

Under the former natural and probable consequences doctrine, it
is possible Godlock committed a target offense with the intent to kill (e.g., an
assault), but a coparticipant committed the foreseeable nontarget offense of
attempted murder. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268.)
Thus, I respectfully dissent, and would reverse the ruling of the
trial court and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
The majority contends that: “The information did not reference
the natural and probable consequences doctrine and did not identify or
charge any codefendants.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 5.)
But the majority’s contentions regarding the pleading are of no

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significance. A prosecutor is not required to specify the theory of liability in
an information. (See People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233 [“‘an
accusatory pleading charging murder need not specify . . . the manner in
which the murder was committed’”].) And there may have been any number
of coparticipants in the attempted murder that were separately charged. (See
People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339 [“we are aware of no
authority requiring prosecutors to try all codefendants together”].)
The majority further contends that: “In his guilty plea, defendant
admitted he attempted to murder Victor A. with the specific intent to kill.”
(Maj. opn., ante, p. 5.)
But the majority’s contention regarding Godlock’s intent to kill
(mens rea) does not conclusively establish that he committed the requisite
acts (the actus reus) as either the actual perpetrator, or a direct aider and
abettor. That is why an evidentiary hearing is required. (See People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 [“A finding of intent to kill does not, standing
alone, cover all of the required elements”].)
Finally, the majority contends that Godlock’s guilty plea to the
attempted murder charge, combined with his further admission that he
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, “conclusively
establish he was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 6.) I respectfully disagree.
“‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill [the mens
rea] and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing
the intended killing [the actus reus].’” (People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222,
224.) Conversely, a great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to Penal Code
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), requires personal infliction of great bodily

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injury committed with general intent. (People v. Estrada, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 338; People v. Guzman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761, 764.)
Here, Godlock admitted that he inflicted great bodily injury upon
the victim “during the commission” of the attempted murder. But if Godlock
was prosecuted for attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequence doctrine, then he may have inflicted great bodily injury upon the
victim during his commission of the target offense (e.g., an assault), while a
coparticipant committed “‘a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing
the intended killing.’” (People v. Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 224.)
The majority appears to assume that Godlock’s infliction of great
bodily injury was the actus reus, or the “‘direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.’” (People v. Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p.
224.) And while the majority’s factual assumption may be reasonable, it is
definitely not a matter of law that is conclusively established in the record.
In sum, the record of conviction does not “conclusively establish[]
every element of the offense” of attempted murder under a valid legal theory.
(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) Therefore, Godlock is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.

MOORE, J.

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