CourtListener 10291930•People v. Carrillo CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 12/11/24 P. v. Carrillo CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330152
(Super. Ct. No. 1333854)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
ALEJANDRO CARRILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Alejandro Carrillo appeals the judgment entered following
a resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.75.1 Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss firearm and gang enhancements in
furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385. We affirm.
Appellant’s Conviction and Original Sentence
In 2012 a jury convicted appellant of first degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189 subd. (a)); possession of a firearm by a
1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1));
possession of a controlled substance by a felon while armed with
a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)); possession of
a controlled substance in jail (§ 4573.6); and possession of a
“shank” while in custody (§ 4502, subd. (a)). The jury found true
gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and an allegation that
appellant had personally discharged a firearm causing death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court found true an allegation
that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of
former section 667.5, subdivision (b) (§ 667.5(b)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to a determinate term
of 13 years, followed by an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.
The determinate term included one year for the prior prison term
and six years for the gang enhancements. The indeterminate
term consisted of 25 years to life for the first degree murder
conviction plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Facts
The facts are taken from pages 2-3 of our December 15,
2014 unpublished slip opinion affirming appellant’s judgment of
conviction. (People v. Carrillo (Dec. 15, 2015, B245720.) We take
judicial notice of the slip opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459.)
“[Appellant] was the leader of the Southside Sureño
criminal street gang in Guadalupe [in Santa Barbara
County]. . . . All those connected with the Sureño gang used and
sold drugs.” Pedro Gonzalez was a member of the gang.
“Flores was the leader of the Westside gang in Santa
Barbara and a member of the Mexican Mafia. He controlled the
drug trade in Santa Barbara County. Flores claimed he was
2
authorized by the Mexican Mafia to order persons to be
murdered.”
“On February 13, 2010, [appellant] met with [another gang
member] and asked him to help him ‘smoke a paisa.’ While
there, [appellant] called Flores and was given permission ‘to take
care of’ Gonzalez.’”
Appellant and Gonzales argued at the home of another
gang member. “The argument ended when [appellant] shot
Gonzalez in the head. [Appellant] and [another gang member]
dumped the body in a field . . . .”
“Later, during an unrelated investigation, Flores told . . .
an undercover agent . . . that he paid Gonzalez $3,600 for
methamphetamine but that what Gonzalez gave him was not
meth. Flores [said] that he asked his associate ‘to kill a paisa in
Guadalupe who sold him some bunk dope.’”
“When [appellant] was arrested on February 28, 2010, [he]
was armed with a gun loaded with five hollow-point bullets and a
sixth spent cartridge.”
Procedural Background
In August 2022 appellant filed a request for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75. The request was based on the
invalidity of the former section 667.5(b) prior prison term
enhancement. In his resentencing brief, appellant argued: “The
question is whether . . . the court . . . should dismiss the section
12022.53 [firearm] enhancement in the interest of justice, giving
[appellant] a possibility of parole and redemption during his
anticipated lifetime.” “Additionally, the court can and should
consider whether . . . the interests of justice are truly served by
re-imposing the punishment for the section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1) [gang] enhancements . . . .” Appellant alleged that he had
3
suffered “childhood trauma” that had “contributed” to the
commission of the present offenses.
The People conceded the invalidity of the prior prison term
enhancement. They requested that the trial court “strike the
[enhancement] and [impose a new] sentence of 12 years
determinate followed by 50 [years] to life.”
The People opposed striking the firearm enhancement:
“[Appellant] took a gun to the head of Pedro Gonzalez and blew
his brains out by shooting him at close range in the face, before
dumping his body in a broccoli field. He murdered Gonzalez for
no other reason than a Westside Gang member, Ruben Flores,
told [appellant] to kill Gonzalez for selling Flores
Methamphetamine that was no good. The crime committed by
defendant was nothing short of ruthless and his execution of Mr.
Gonzalez deserves every day of the consecutive 25 to life sentence
for killing Gonzalez with a shot to his face.”
The People also opposed striking the firearm and gang
enhancements because of appellant’s violent conduct in prison:
“[Appellant] has continued to accrue rule violations throughout
his time in custody. [Record citation.] . . . [¶] On February 23,
2013, inmate Benton and [appellant engaged] in mutual combat
punching [each other] and [appellant] pled guilty to the rule
violation. [¶] On June 28, 2013, [appellant] was in possession of
[an] inmate manufactured deadly weapon that was 5 inches in
length. [Appellant was found guilty of possessing a deadly
weapon.] [¶] On February 6, 2014, [appellant] and a fellow
Sureno gang member attacked an inmate. The victim sustained
bruising and abrasions. [¶] . . . [¶] On June 6, 2016, [appellant]
was in possession of [] yet another deadly weapon. [Appellant
was found guilty of possessing a deadly weapon.] [¶] On
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September 5, 2016, [appellant] possessed two eye glass frames
that had been sharpened and altered as weapons. They were
approximately 5 ¼ inches in length. [Appellant was found guilty
of possessing a deadly weapon.] [¶] [On] December 21, 2017,
[appellant] was convicted of [violating] Penal Code section 4502,
possession of a weapon in prison and received a sentence of six
years in state prison consecutive to his sentence in this case.”
The trial court struck the one-year prior prison term
enhancement and resentenced appellant to a 12-year determinate
term followed by an indeterminate term of 50 years to life. In
explaining its refusal to strike the firearm and gang
enhancements, the court said: “[T]he Court invokes the public
safety exception [of] section 1385, which explicitly allows me to
entertain an enhancement if there is public safety issues, which I
think in this case are apparent. . . . [B]eing in a fight with a co-
defendant in prison and then getting convicted of having a knife
in prison is not things that the Court can disregard.”
Amendment of Former Section 667.5(b) and
Resentencing Procedure of Section 1172.75
“‘Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) Effective
January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2019, ch. 590) [(“SB 136”)] amended section 667.5 by
limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms
for sexually violent offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based
on prior prison terms served for other offenses became legally
5
invalid.’ . . .” (People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 445
(Escobedo).)
Section 1172.75 “‘establishes a mechanism to provide
affected defendants a remedy for those legally invalid
enhancements. . . .’” (Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.)
“‘“[T]he court shall review the judgment and verify that the
current judgment includes [such] a sentencing enhancement
. . . ,” and if so, “recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) . . .’” (Id. at p. 446.)
At resentencing “[t]he court shall apply . . . any . . . changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so
as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity
of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “By its plain terms,
section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the
trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Invoking the Public Safety Exception of Section 1385
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides that, in exercising
its discretion whether to dismiss an enhancement, “[p]roof of the
presence of one or more [statutorily specified mitigating]
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.”
Here, the relevant mitigating circumstances are set forth in
section 1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(B), (C), and (E): “(B) Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
6
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence
of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” “(E) The current offense is connected to . . . childhood
trauma.” Despite the “shall be dismissed language,”
“consideration of the mitigating factors in section 1385(c)(2) is not
required if the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety . . . .” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 297 (Mendoza).)
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review for
the trial court’s determination that dismissal of [appellant’s]
firearm [and gang] enhancement[s] would endanger public safety.
[¶] The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When,
‘“as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial
court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on
appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”’” (Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “‘The burden is on the party attacking
the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14
Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)
A trial court does not abuse its discretion “‘“where [a]
reasonable basis for the action is shown. . . .”’” (People v. Torres
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 550, 556.) A reasonable basis exists for the
trial court’s finding that dismissal of the firearm and gang
7
enhancements “would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) Appellant killed Gonzalez in an execution-style murder.
In the factual summary of their resentencing brief, the People
stated: “The pathologist located a single close-range gunshot
wound to [Gonzalez’s] head with an entry wound at the victim’s
left eye and an exit wound just below his skull on his right side.
No other significant marks or injuries were located.” The People
also stated that, after the shooting, appellant had boasted, “‘I
smoked that fool.’” In his resentencing brief, appellant accepted
the People’s factual summary. Instead of summarizing the
evidence, appellant said, “The court is familiar with the facts of
the case, which are also summarized in the Court of Appeal’s
unpublished opinion and in the People’s [re]sentencing brief.”
In refusing to strike the enhancements, the trial court
properly considered appellant’s violent conduct and possession of
weapons while in prison from 2013 through 2017. (See pp. 4-5,
ante; People v. Yanaga (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 619, 626-627.) In
addition, in May 2011 while appellant was in the Santa Barbara
County Jail, “deputies located a screwdriver approximately 3
inches in length, which had been broken and sharpened, hidden
in [appellant’s] anal cavity. Another inmate told deputies that
the ‘shank’ belonged to the ‘house’ and [appellant] was holding it
for them.” This was the basis for appellant’s 2012 conviction of
possession of a “shank” while in custody (§ 4502, subd. (a)).
A June 2023 psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Mary
Jane Alumbaugh, a clinical psychologist, supports the trial
court’s finding that striking the enhancements would endanger
public safety. Dr. Alumbaugh wrote: “[Appellant] will have to
eventually come to terms with the early losses and early trauma
that are at the core of his inability to maintain emotional
8
stability when under stress. He, unfortunately, has yet to address
these issues. This is no small matter and will take a significant
amount of time. He has not reached the point where he can look
at his choices and understand all the forces that were at play. At
this time he does not yet have the skills to manage the emotional
reactivity that can be so easily triggered. . . . He blames his drug
history for his criminal activity. The issue is far more
complicated and nuanced, with long term roots which have yet to
be addressed.” (Italics added.)
Dr. Alumbaugh continued: “Most of [appellant’s] attitudes
and actions are quite straightforward criminal thinking and
attitudes. He was early on socialized by the gangs into a criminal
lifestyle. . . . He may never be able to disassociate himself
completely from having an identity as a gang member . . . .”
(Italics added.)
The probation report for the 2010 murder also supports the
trial court’s decision not to dismiss the enhancements. When the
probation report was filed in October 2012, appellant was 29
years old. The report states, “Since [appellant’s] first arrest in
1996, he has used violence toward others, displayed prominent
gang related tattoos, and has expressed an unfailing devotion to
his fellow gang members to establish his reputation with the
community as a Guadalupe gang member. Despite the best
efforts of the Juvenile Delinquency Court, Adult criminal Court
and Probation, he has continually disregarded the law and the
Court, to choose a life of crime over all else. He has been given
every available assessed consequence for his illegal behavior
including probation, juvenile hall detention, the Counseling and
Education Center, three commitments to Tri-Counties Boot
Camp/Los Prietos Boy’s Camp, adult probation, county jail time,
9
and state prison as well as the opportunity to participate in
rehabilitative services, all to no avail. [¶] . . . [H]e is willing to do
anything . . . requested of him by fellow gang members.”
The probation report sets forth appellant’s juvenile and
adult criminal record, which includes crimes of violence. In 2000
he was continued as a ward of the juvenile court upon a finding
that he had committed misdemeanor assault in violation of
section 240. The offense was described as follows: Appellant and
a companion “approached the victim and asked where he was
from. [The victim apparently answered that he was from Santa
Maria.] [Appellant and his companion] then said, ‘Fuck guys
from Santa Maria’ and chased the victim. [Appellant] yelled to
the vehicle they had signaled earlier, ‘Run that motherfucker
over!’ The vehicle sped up and drove straight toward the victim,
who narrowly avoided being hit.” Appellant later “got into an
argument with the victim’s mother-in-law. . . . [Appellant]
brandished a knife and his companion threatened to kill the
victim because he was from Santa Maria.”
In 2001 appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation
of section 273.5, subdivision (a) (inflicting corporal injury upon a
spouse/cohabitant) and placed on formal probation for 36 months.
In 2005 he was convicted of the same offense, only this time it
was a felony. He was sentenced to state prison for the upper
term of four years.
Despite the evidence showing that the trial court
reasonably exercised its discretion, in his opening brief appellant
advances the following theory in an attempt to show that the
court abused its discretion: If the trial court had struck the
enhancements, he would have remained incarcerated for years
before becoming eligible for release under the 25-year-to-life
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sentence for first degree murder. Moreover, “appellant cannot
reenter society without a unanimous vote of three parole
commissioners and approval of the Governor.” “For these
reasons, this Court must find the trial court failed to find a
‘likelihood[]’ . . . that striking the gang . . . and firearm use . . .
enhancements would result in future ‘physical injury or [other]
serious danger to others.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2) . . . .)”
After appellant had filed his opening brief, the Court of
Appeal filed its opinion in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez). In his reply brief, appellant cites
Gonzalez in support of the above theory that he advanced in his
opening brief. In Gonzalez the court concluded that, in
determining whether dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety within the meaning of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), the trial court is required “to consider, among
other things, the date on which the defendant would be released
under the revised sentence, and, in the case of an indeterminate
sentence, the safety valve that exists due to the review by the
Board of Parole Hearings.” (Gonzalez, supra, at p. 229.) On the
other hand, “a trial court is [not] permitted to delegate its
judgment regarding a defendant's future threat to public safety to
the Board of Parole Hearings.” (Id. at p. 228, fn. 10.)
The Gonzales court held “that based on the plain language
of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the trial court erred because it
considered only whether Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the
public when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm enhancement
would ‘endanger public safety.’” (Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 230.) At the sentencing hearing the trial court
stated: “‘Isn’t it [i.e., isn’t the issue whether] . . . he currently at
11
the time of sentencing represent[s] a danger to society? That’s
how I read the law.’” (Id. at p. 223.)
If the trial court had struck the firearm enhancement,
Gonzalez’s sentence would have been reduced from 75 years to
life to 50 years to life. The appellate court observed, “[A]
sentence of 50 years to life would result in a potential release
from prison far into the future when Gonzalez is elderly . . . .”
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.)
Gonzalez is distinguishable. Unlike the trial court there,
the trial court here did not say that its refusal to strike the
enhancements was based on its finding that appellant currently
represents a danger to society. (See People v. Campbell (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 350, 383 [“‘When the record is silent as to the trial
court's reasons for declining to strike a prior strike, we presume
the court correctly applied the law’”]; Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“‘A judgment or order of the lower court
is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown’”].) Gonzalez does not
require the trial court to expressly state on the record that it
“consider[ed] . . . the date on which the defendant would be
released under the revised sentence, and . . . the safety valve that
exists due to the review by the Board of Parole Hearings.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 229.)
Appellant informed the trial court of “the safety valve”
provided by the Board of Parole Hearings. In his resentencing
brief appellant stated, “It is noteworthy here that, even with
dismissal of the enhancements, [appellant] can never reenter
society without a unanimous vote of three parole commissioners
and approval by the Governor.”
12
Gonzalez is also distinguishable because this is not a case
where, if the enhancements are dismissed, “a defendant who is
currently dangerous . . . has no prospect of release from prison
until he is elderly.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
Appellant was born in January 1983. Appellant has calculated
that, “due to [his] first-degree murder conviction alone, [he] is
ineligible for his first parole hearing until 2037.”2 At that time,
he would be 54 years old. In view of appellant’s history of violent
conduct and his failure to address the causes of that violence, the
trial court could have reasonably concluded that appellant would
endanger public safety if he were released while still in his fifties.
We Cannot Assume the Trial Court Was Unaware
of Its Sentencing Discretion under Section 12022.53
Appellant argues, “[T]he court failed to exercise informed
discretion when it failed to consider that it had the authority
under section 12022.53, subdivision (j), to impose a lesser
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) [10 years]
or (c) [20 years], rather than mechanically imposing the greater
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) [25 years to
life].” In People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692, our
Supreme Court held, “[T]he statutory framework permits a court
to strike the section 12022.53(d) enhancement found true by the
jury and to impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement
instead.”
The issue is forfeited because appellant failed to raise it in
the trial court. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [“the
waiver doctrine should apply to claims involving the trial court’s
2 We have not verified the accuracy of appellant’s
calculation.
13
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
choices”].)
Even if appellant had not forfeited the issue, we cannot
assume the trial court failed to consider whether to strike the
section 12022.53(d) enhancement and impose a lesser uncharged
statutory enhancement. In its resentencing brief, the People said
that, pursuant to Tirado, “the trial court has the discretion to
impose a lesser enhancement of section 12022.53(b) or (c) instead
of (d).” At the beginning of the resentencing hearing, the court
said it had “reviewed all of [the] papers” submitted by the parties.
In addition, the trial court is presumed to have been aware of its
sentencing discretion and to have followed the applicable law.
(Biscaro v. Stern (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 702, 708; People v.
Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
14
James F. Rigali, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Nancy Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Lauren N. Guber,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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