People v. Lopez CA4/3

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Testo completo

Filed 12/11/24 P. v. Lopez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062809

v. (Super. Ct. No. 07ZF0008)

VICENTE ERNESTO LOPEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Patrick H. Donahue, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.
Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 2005, Vicente Ernesto Lopez was the driver in a gang-related
drive-by shooting that left Jason C. seriously injured. He was later convicted
of the attempted murders of Jason (count 1) and three other individuals who
stood close by at the time of the incident (counts 2–4). In 2022, Lopez
petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking to have his
convictions for attempted murder vacated.1 After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied Lopez’s petition, concluding he was a direct
aider and abettor to the attempted murders. The court’s statement of decision
indicated it based its conclusion on counts 2 to 4 on a kill-zone theory.2
On appeal, Lopez contends the evidence did not support the
necessary findings that he knew the shooter intended to kill the alleged
victims and that he intended to assist the shooter in doing so. As explained
below, we conclude the evidence supported the court’s findings as to the
attempted murder of Jason. However, we conclude that Lopez cannot be
found liable for the attempted murders of the other three individuals under a
kill-zone theory—the only theory the court applied. Accordingly, we reverse
the court’s order in part and remand for further proceedings.

1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered Penal

Code section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For purposes of clarity, we refer to the statute as section
1172.6 throughout this opinion. All statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2 As discussed further below, the kill-zone theory is a theory for

establishing the intent to kill necessary for conviction of attempted murder.
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607 (Canizales).) It applies where
the defendant has a primary target and seeks to ensure the death of that
person by killing everyone in the area around them. (Id. at pp. 607608, fn. 5.)
In Canizales, our Supreme Court “reaffirmed” the theory “but articulated its
contours and limitations.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 192.)

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FACTS
I.

THE INDICTMENT
In 2007, Lopez was indicted for, inter alia, the attempted
premeditated and deliberate murders of Jason, E.A., Marcos B., and Jose C.
As relevant here, the indictment also charged Lopez with active participation
in the Devious Hoodlums (DH) criminal street gang. And it alleged that
Lopez committed the attempted murders for the benefit of DH.
II.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
In early December 2005, someone fired a gun at the residence of
Gustavo R. Two days later, Jason was sitting on his bicycle in front of a
school in Anaheim, talking with E.A., Marcos, and Jose. Jason and Jose stood
side by side, about one foot apart, while E.A. and Marcos stood about four to
six feet behind them. Jason was a member of the La Colonia gang, a rival of
DH.
At the same time, Lopez was driving in the area with three
passengers, Jorge Correa, Victor Tapia, and Andres Garcia. Correa was in
the front passenger seat and Tapia and Garcia were in the back passenger
seats. After Lopez drove by Jason and the others, Correa said, “‘There he is.
That is him.’” Lopez made a U-turn and stopped the car in front of Jason and
the others. Someone in the car yelled out, “‘DH,’” and Correa asked, “‘Where
are you from?’” Jason replied, “‘Colonia,’” while Jose raised his hands and
said, “‘I don’t bang.’” Tapia then pulled out a semiautomatic handgun.
Upon seeing the gun, Jose started running away. Tapia started
firing, and Jason ducked to the floor while the others ran. Tapia quickly fired
about five shots, striking Jason with one bullet that lodged in his spinal cord.

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There was no evidence that Tapia hit anyone else. Lopez drove away, let his
passengers out at a park, crashed the car into a garage, and left it there, later
claiming it had been stolen.
Garcia testified at trial. He admitted to being a gang member and
to having participated in “DH gang crime.” While he claimed he was
surprised by the shooting, he had told police that “‘it was for what they did to
[Gustavo]’” and that he thought it was part of an initiation of new DH
members. According to Garcia, Lopez did not grow up in the area and was not
around much, and he had never witnessed Lopez claim DH as his gang.
Anaheim Police Department Sergeant Juan Reveles testified as
an expert on criminal street gangs. Reveles explained that when gang
members ask, “‘Where are you from?’” they are trying to find out what gang
the other person is from or to present a challenge to rivals. This is called a
“hit-up.” Gangs expect their members to claim their gang in response to a hit-
up.
According to Reveles, gang crimes, or “missions,” are typically
undertaken in groups because each gang member serves a different function
in committing the crime. In a drive-by shooting, the shooter and the driver
are the two most important roles. In Reveles’s experience, gang members
would not take non-members to commit a gang crime. As for a gang’s guns,
they are the gang’s “prized possession[s],” and members are aware of where
the guns are and “whether somebody has them.”
III.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT, AND SENTENCE
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on
attempted murder principles, including the kill-zone theory. The court also
instructed the jury on principles of direct aiding and abetting and the natural

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and probable consequences doctrine. As relevant here, the jury found Lopez
guilty of all four counts of attempted murder. The jury found that the
attempted murders were premeditated and deliberate and were committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang. It also convicted Lopez of active
participation in a criminal street gang.
The trial court sentenced Lopez to 45 years to life in state prison.
We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v. Lopez (May 18, 2010,
G041006) [nonpub. opn.].)
IV.

LOPEZ’S SECTION 1172.6 PETITION
In 2022, Lopez filed a petition for relief under section 1172.6.
After appointing counsel for Lopez and receiving briefing, the trial court
issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, the prosecution offered the transcripts from
Lopez’s trial into evidence and relied on them exclusively. Lopez testified on
his own behalf. He claimed that he had never heard about DH before he was
arrested for the attempted murders. On the day of the shooting, he was
driving with Correa, Tapia, and Garcia to get some marijuana. He knew the
three men because he would occasionally smoke marijuana with them, but
they had never told him they were gang members. He also did not know there
was a gun in the car. At some point during the drive, someone in the car told
him to make a U-turn. Lopez complied, and either Tapia or Garcia told him to
pull over because they had to ask somebody something. He stopped the
vehicle, and “[s]omebody in the backseat started shooting somebody.” Lopez
did not hear anyone outside the car say anything.

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Lopez acknowledged that he knew Gustavo because he had
gotten arrested with him earlier in 2005, the year of the shooting. He had
also smoked marijuana with Gustavo at Gustavo’s house before.
At the close of the hearing, Lopez’s counsel argued, inter alia,
that the evidence was insufficient to convict Lopez of some of the attempted
murders under a kill-zone theory. Counsel cited Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th
591, and argued that this precedent “narrow[ed] the focus” of the kill-zone
analysis. He noted that at trial, the jury was permitted to apply the kill-zone
theory together with the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
emphasized that under current law: “[w]e can’t have a conviction for an
attempted murder based on natural and probable consequence on top of a kill
zone. There has to have been on Mr. Lopez’s part an intent to kill.”
The prosecution requested time to brief the issue and later
submitted a supplemental brief. In its brief, the prosecution agreed that
Canizales “considerably narrowed” the application of the kill-zone theory and
stated that its changes were reflected in the current version of the standard
jury instruction on attempted murder, CALCRIM No. 600. It contended that
Tapia’s actions satisfied Canizales and “complie[d] with the new language in
CALCRIM [No.] 600.” The prosecution therefore asserted: “[Lopez] is
ineligible for resentencing as the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt [that] he is guilty of [Jason’s] attempted murder . . . as an aider and
abettor under the current law. Additionally, he remains guilty of [the]
attempted murder[s] [of E.A., Marcos, and Jose] because he aided and
abetted Tapia’s shooting which resulted in a kill zone.”

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V.

THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
Following the hearing, the trial court denied Lopez’s petition. In
its written statement of decision, the court outlined the general principles
governing the crime of attempted murder and aider-and-abettor liability
under current California law. After surveying the evidence presented at trial,
the court found:
“. . . Lopez knew that he was with ‘DH’ gang
members who were going to retaliate for the shooting
at [Gustavo]’s house. . . . Further, Lopez was trusted
by the gang members in the car on this mission, and
knew that there was a gun in the car. [¶] . . . [¶] An
independent review of the evidence shows that Tapia,
when he shot five times into the compact group of
[Jason] and his three friends, he intended to kill
them beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence
further shows beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant Lopez knew that Correa would hit up the
victim, made a [U]-turn to allow Correa to do so, then
with knowledge that Tapia had a gun, stayed at the
curb to allow Tapia to . . . shoot five times. [¶] There
is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
Lopez aided and abetted Tapia in this attempt
murder. . . .

“It was argued that the court should rule on whether
the evidence presented would suggest a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt based on new CALCRIM
[No.] 600 instruction. [¶] . . . The evidence shows that
the only conclusion from the use of lethal force was
that Tapia intended to create a kill zone around
Jason . . . , the La Colonia gang member. Tapia was
only feet away from Jason[’s] . . . group. The members
were only feet from each other. From that close
distance, Tapia fired five shots from a semiautomatic
handgun, creating a kill zone and the four members
of the group were in the kill zone.”

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The trial court proceeded to address Lopez’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing and concluded his version was neither credible nor
reasonable. Lopez timely appealed the denial of his petition.
DISCUSSION
Lopez argues the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6
petition because the evidence did not support the findings that he knew
Tapia intended to kill the alleged victims and that he intended to assist him
in doing so. As explained below, we conclude the evidence supported the
court’s findings as to the attempted murder of Jason. However, we conclude
that Lopez cannot be found liable for the attempted murders of the other
three individuals under a kill-zone theory, the only theory the court applied.
I.

GOVERNING LAW
“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Until
recently, an aider and abettor could be found guilty of attempted murder
based on their participation in a different target crime, if attempted murder
was the natural and probable consequence of the target crime. (People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456.) The Legislature has recently
eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of attempted
murder liability. Effective January 1, 2022, a defendant convicted of
attempted murder under a theory of natural and probable consequences may
petition to have the conviction vacated. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); as amended by
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
If the petition states a prima facie case for relief, the trial court
must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether

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to vacate the conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that hearing, the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of attempted murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) The prosecution therefore must prove that the defendant personally
harbored an intent to kill. (People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 960.)
And if the prosecution contends the defendant is guilty as an aider and
abettor, it must also prove that the defendant “‘aid[ed] the commission of
th[e] offense with “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and
[with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) Under this standard, “we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the [ruling] and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th
643, 653.) “We presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact
the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People
v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
II.

ATTEMPTED MURDER OF JASON
The evidence sufficiently supported the trial court’s findings that
Lopez (1) knew Tapia intended to kill Jason and (2) intended to assist him in
doing so. Initially, contrary to Lopez’s assertion, the evidence supported the

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finding that he was an active DH gang member.3 On the day of the shooting,
he was driving with three members of the gang: Garcia, a self-admitted
member; Correa, who issued the gang challenge; and Tapia, who performed
the gang shooting. And Reveles testified that gang members typically would
not take non-members to commit a gang crime.
The evidence also supported findings that Lopez and his fellow
gang members were on a DH mission. Garcia told police he believed the
shooting was done as retaliation for the shooting at Gustavo’s house and as
initiation for new gang members.4 When Lopez drove by Jason and the other
alleged victims, Correa said, “There he is. That is him,” suggesting he had
identified a person who had been involved in the shooting at Gustavo’s house
or, at least, was a good target for retaliation.
As the driver, Lopez had one of the two most important roles in
the mission. Based on Reveles’s testimony that gang members know when
someone is carrying one of the gang’s guns, it was logical to conclude that
Lopez knew Tapia had a gun. After Correa’s sighting, Lopez made a U-turn
and stopped the car in front of Jason and the others, positioning Correa to
initiate the confrontation and Tapia to perform the shooting. Before the
shooting began, Jason identified himself as a member of a rival gang. Tapia

3 Although the jury found that Lopez was an active participant in

a criminal street gang, the Attorney General does not contend that this
finding precluded Lopez from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on
this point. We therefore do not consider this finding and instead rely on the
state of the evidence to reject Lopez’s argument.

4 Lopez contends there was no evidence that he knew about the

shooting at Gustavo’s house. But based on his gang membership, his role in
what Garcia said was a retaliation mission, and his close familiarity with
Gustavo, it was reasonable to infer that he knew about the incident.

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responded by firing about five shots, hitting Jason and lodging a bullet in his
spinal cord.
Thus, the evidence showed that Lopez: (1) was an active DH gang
member; (2) had an important role in a mission to retaliate against a rival;
(3) knew that Tapia had a gun; and (4) upon acquiring a target, positioned his
fellow members to initiate a confrontation, verify the target’s identity as a
rival, and shoot him. Under these circumstances, the trial court permissibly
found that Lopez knew Tapia would attempt to kill Jason and intended to
assist him in doing so.5 Accordingly, the court did not err in denying Lopez’s
petition as to his conviction for the attempted murder of Jason.
III.

ATTEMPTED MURDERS OF E.A., MARCOS, AND JOSE
A. Kill-zone Principles
The kill-zone theory is a “theory for establishing the specific
intent to kill required for conviction of attempted murder.” (Canizales, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) “‘[I]n a kill zone case, the defendant has a primary target
and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in
the area in which the target is located.’” (Ibid.) Thus, to convict a defendant
under the kill-zone theory, the trier of fact must find that the “defendant
intended to kill everyone in the kill zone as a means of killing the primary
target.” (Id. at pp. 607–608, fn. 5.) “[T]he kill zone theory does not apply

5 People v. Ware, (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, cited by Lopez, is

inapposite. There, our Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s
“membership in a group with violent aims and his association with
individuals who commit violent crimes” is insufficient to support a finding
that he specifically intended to commit murder or to enter an agreement to
commit murder. (Id. at p. 174.) By contrast, the evidence discussed above ties
Lopez’s conduct and mental state to the relevant crime and does not merely
concern his membership in a gang.

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where ‘the defendant merely subjected persons near the primary target to
lethal risk.’” (Ibid.)
“[M]ultiple factors bear on whether the circumstances of the
attack sufficiently show a defendant intended to create a kill zone around a
primary target.” (People v. Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 193.) These include
the weapon used, the number of shots fired (if a firearm is used), the distance
between the defendant and the alleged victims, the proximity of the alleged
victims to the primary target, and whether an alleged secondary target was
injured. (Id. at pp. 193, 205.) “The far more commonplace act of firing one or a
few shots at a group may supply the actus reus for a number of crimes. But,
standing alone, it does not support a conclusion that the shooter intended to
create a kill zone around the primary target in order to ensure that primary
target will die. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 193.)
B. Analysis
We conclude Lopez cannot be found liable for the attempted
murders of the E.A., Marcos, and Jose under a kill-zone theory. The evidence
does not support findings that Lopez (1) knew Tapia intended to create a kill-
zone to ensure Jason’s death and (2) intended to help him do so.
Initially, the Attorney General asserts that the trial court
addressed the kill-zone theory merely as an alternative theory after finding
that Lopez acted with a separate intent to kill each of the alleged victims. We
disagree. Below, the parties’ arguments on counts 2 to 4 focused on the
application of the kill-zone theory. As noted, while the prosecution argued
that Lopez was guilty of Jason’s attempted murder simply “as an aider and
abettor,” it contended he was guilty of the attempted murders of E.A.,
Marcos, and Jose “because he aided and abetted Tapia’s shooting which

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resulted in a kill zone.” (Italics added.) In doing so, it stated that the evidence
complied with the current version of CALCRIM No. 600.
The trial court’s analysis followed suit. After saying that Tapia
intended to kill “[Jason] and his three friends,” the court referenced the new
version of CALCRIM No. 600, alluding to the parties’ arguments about the
kill-zone theory. It stated that “the only conclusion from [Tapia’s] use of
lethal force was that Tapia intended to create a kill zone around Jason . . . ,
the La Colonia gang member.” The court included no other meaningful
discussion of either Tapia’s or Lopez’s intent to kill E.A., Marcos, and Jose.
Thus, the court’s statement of decision indicates that it relied exclusively on
the kill-zone theory to establish Tapia’s and Lopez’s intent to kill these three
alleged victims.
Turning to the merits of the trial court’s analysis, even assuming
Tapia attempted to create a kill zone around Jason, there is no basis for a
finding that Lopez was aware of Tapia’s intent and intended to assist him in
achieving that goal, as necessary for his conviction as an aider and abettor.6

6 Whether the evidence supported a finding that Tapia intended

to create a kill zone around Jason is, at least, subject to reasonable dispute:
though he fired at close range and the group was initially close together, he
fired only about five shots, at an open space, hitting only his intended target.
(See People v. Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 193, 204205 [finding evidence
insufficient to support kill-zone theory, in part because defendant fired only
three shots, into open area, hitting neither primary target nor alleged
secondary target].) Moreover, while Jason ducked when Tapia started
shooting, the others ran away. In fact, Jose started running when he saw the
gun, before Tapia started firing. This suggests the group was no longer close
together when Tapia was firing. But we need not consider whether the
evidence supported application of the kill-zone theory to Tapia’s conduct or
whether Lopez may even raise that issue in his section 1172.6 petition
because, regardless of Tapia’s intent, the evidence was insufficient to prove
Lopez’s required mental state under this theory.

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(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) The record reflects no common
plan to kill everyone in order to ensure Jason’s death. There was no evidence
that any discussion took place about the need to kill everyone around the
target Correa had identified. Nor was there expert testimony suggesting that
gangs typically used kill zones to ensure the death of a single target, either
generally or under the circumstances of this case. In short, there was nothing
tying Lopez to any attempt by Tapia to create a kill zone.
The statement of decision did not address this issue—it discussed
only Tapia’s actions and did not analyze how they related to Lopez’s state of
mind.7 The Attorney General does the same in his brief and offers no
discussion of evidence that could establish Lopez’s mental state under a kill-
zone theory. Because there was no evidence that Lopez intended to create a
kill zone around Jason, he could not be found liable for the attempted
murders of E.A., Marcos, and Jose under a kill-zone theory—the only theory
the trial court considered. Accordingly, we must reverse the court’s ruling as
to those counts and remand for further proceedings.
Like the trial court, Lopez does not address the theory that he
separately intended to kill all four individuals and intended to help Tapia do
so. We therefore do not decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support
Lopez’s liability under this theory for the attempted murders of E.A., Marcos,
and Jose. The trial court may consider this theory on remand.

7 As the Attorney General notes, the trial court was aware that

attempted murder liability required a finding that Lopez himself intended to
kill the alleged victims. Yet the absence of an explicit finding and explanation
by the court underscores the lack of evidentiary support for applying the kill-
zone theory to Lopez.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s denial of Lopez’s petition as to count 1 is
affirmed. The court’s denial of the petition as to counts 2 to 4 is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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