CourtListener 10291923•People v. Valdez CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 12/11/24 P. v. Valdez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333835
(Super. Ct. No. 21CR08280)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
ISAAC RICHARD VALDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Isaac Richard Valdez appeals from the restitution orders
entered after he pleaded guilty to sexual battery of an unlawfully
restrained person (Pen. Code,1 § 243.4, subd. (a)) and annoying a
child under the age of 18 (§ 647.6). The trial court ordered
Valdez to serve three years of formal probation, including 180
days in county jail. It also ordered him to pay over $1.2 million in
restitution to Jane Doe and her mother.
Valdez contends: (1) the restitution ordered for Doe’s future
mental health counseling was either unsupported by the evidence
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
or miscalculated, and (2) the restitution ordered for Doe’s past
economic losses should have been awarded to her mother and
should be reduced to conform to the evidence presented at the
restitution hearing. The Attorney General agrees with Valdez’s
contentions. We do too, vacate the trial court’s restitution order,
and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2022, prosecutors charged Valdez with two counts
of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)).
Six months later, they agreed to dismiss those charges if Valdez
pleaded guilty to sexual battery and annoying a child, served a
three-year probation term, and paid restitution to his victims.
Valdez took the plea, and agreed that the trial court could
“consider [the] facts underlying [the] dismissed counts [when]
determin[ing] restitution.” (See People v. Harvey (1979) 25
Cal.3d 754, 758.)
Prior to the restitution hearing Doe provided a victim
impact statement describing how Valdez’s offenses affected her.
The statement also set forth Doe’s belief that the abuse she
endured would require her to receive mental health counseling
for the next 40-plus years. She claimed that counseling would
cost $1,500 per month.
Doe attempted to take her own life the week before the
restitution hearing and was unable to attend. At the hearing
Doe’s mother provided documents showing that Doe had been
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and
depression after Valdez abused her. She bought Doe a therapy
dog to help with her panic attacks.
Doe’s mother said she paid for counseling for both herself
and Doe. Documents she provided to the court showed that Doe’s
2
treatments generally cost $500 every four weeks, with some
four-week periods costing as much as $560. Doe’s mother also
paid for a security system and entrance camera for Doe’s
apartment. She was required to use vacation time to attend
court proceedings, and incurred travel-related expenses.
The trial court determined that Doe was entitled to more
than $1.2 million in restitution: $400,000 for noneconomic
damages stemming from the dismissed lewd or lascivious acts
charges,2 $810,000 for the costs of future mental health
counseling (calculated at a rate of $1,500 per month for 45 years),
and nearly $12,000 for the costs of her therapy dog ($264), past
counseling sessions ($10,722), and holistic treatments ($905).
The court determined that Doe’s mother was owed more than
$16,000 in restitution for the security system, her own counseling
sessions, and expenses to attend court.
DISCUSSION
Legal principles
A crime victim is constitutionally entitled to restitution
from the person convicted of the crime(s) causing their losses.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) Such a victim is
entitled to “full restitution” of their economic losses, so long as
they show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they suffered
the losses “as a result of the defendant’s conduct.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f); People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.)
When seeking restitution, a victim must present “an
2 Restitution is permitted for noneconomic losses stemming
from violations of section 288. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) It may
be imposed for dismissed charges when a defendant executes a
Harvey waiver. (§ 1192.3, subd. (b).) Valdez does not challenge
the award of restitution for Doe’s noneconomic losses.
3
adequate factual basis for [their] claim.” (People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 664 (Giordano).) Once they put forth
prima facie evidence of loss, “the burden shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that
claimed by the victim.” (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
682, 691 (Prosser).)
“[A] trial court has broad discretion to choose a method for
calculating the amount of restitution,” but the method chosen
must be “rationally designed to determine the surviving victim’s
economic loss.” (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 663-664.)
The court also has “ ‘ “ ‘virtually unlimited discretion as to the
kind of information [it] can consider and the source[s] [from]
whence [that information] comes’ ” ’ ” when making its restitution
calculation. (Prosser, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 692.) We
review that calculation for abuse of discretion, and will uphold it
so long as the factual findings underlying it are supported by
substantial evidence. (In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094,
1098.)
Restitution awarded for Doe’s future mental health counseling
Valdez contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the
trial court erroneously awarded Doe $810,000 in restitution for
future mental health counseling because the amount was not
supported by the evidence. We agree.
The trial court said that it calculated the costs of Doe’s
future mental health counseling based on “the approximate life
span of . . . Doe, the current costs of [her] [m]ental [h]ealth
[c]ounseling[,] and the expectation of future costs.” But Doe was
a few days shy of her 20th birthday when the restitution hearing
occurred. And prosecutors provided evidence that the average
female lifespan is 79 years. That amounts to 59 years, not 45, for
4
Doe’s expected lifespan. Additionally, the documents provided to
the court showed that Doe’s counseling cost between $500 and
$560 per month, not $1,500. Using the highest of these figures
results in a cost of less than half the $810,000 calculated by the
court below. The matter must thus be remanded to rectify the
inconsistencies between the evidence provided and the court’s
calculation.
Restitution awarded for Doe’s past losses
Valdez contends, and the Attorney General again concedes,
the nearly $12,000 awarded to Doe for her past economic losses
(1) should have been awarded to her mother, who incurred those
losses, and (2) reduced to conform to the evidence proffered for
the restitution hearing. We agree. The documents presented at
the hearing show that Doe’s mother paid for the therapy dog,
Doe’s counseling sessions, and her holistic treatments.
Restitution for those costs should be paid to her, not Doe.
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) The documents also show that Doe’s
counseling sessions cost $10,577, not $10,722.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the October 13, 2023, restitution order
awarding Jane Doe $11,891 for economic losses for a therapy dog,
past counseling sessions, and holistic treatments is vacated, and
the trial court is directed to reduce this amount by $145 and
award it to Doe’s mother. The portion of the order awarding Doe
$810,000 for future mental health counseling is also vacated, and
the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a new
5
restitution hearing consistent with this opinion. In all other
respects, the order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
6
Patricia L. Kelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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