People v. Marroquin CA5

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Filed 12/10/24 P. v. Marroquin CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087284
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. PCF305430)
v.

NICHOLAS ANDRES MARROQUIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Juliet L.
Boccone, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Nicholas Andres Marroquin appeals following his resentencing for
three counts of attempted murder and four counts assault with a firearm, among other
offenses. In 2020, we issued our opinion in Marroquin’s first appeal. We vacated his
sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing at which time the trial court was to
exercise its then-new discretion to strike the Penal Code1 sections 12022.5,
subdivision (a)(1), and 12022.53, subdivision (c), firearm enhancements found true by
the jury. (People v. Marroquin (Mar. 16, 2020, F076530) [nonpub. opn.], 2020 WL
1242925, at pp. 1, 18 (Marroquin I).) We also directed that Marroquin be afforded the
opportunity for a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin)
so he could present youth-related factors for use at a future youth offender parole hearing.
(Marroquin I, at p. 18.)
Before Marroquin’s resentencing, the California Supreme Court decided People v.
Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado). In Tirado, the Court held that where a jury has
found true a firearm use enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), the trial
court has the discretion to strike it and instead impose a lesser, uncharged enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) or (c). (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 697,
700–701). On remand, the trial court reimposed the section 12022.53, subdivision (c),
enhancements without mentioning Tirado, and no Franklin proceeding was held.
Marroquin now contends his sentence must again be vacated and the matter
remanded for resentencing. He argues the trial court abused its discretion by being
unaware of its authority under Tirado to impose lesser firearm enhancements with respect
to the section 12022.53 enhancements. Alternatively, he asserts his trial counsel was
ineffective for not ensuring the court was aware of Tirado’s holding. Marroquin further
argues the trial court erred by failing to hold a Franklin proceeding and, in the
alternative, claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue such a proceeding.
We reluctantly conclude the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for
resentencing because the record is at least ambiguous as to whether the trial court

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
understood its discretion under Tirado to impose lesser firearm enhancements. Given
this conclusion, we need not address any arguments relating to Franklin.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2017, a jury convicted Marroquin of three counts of attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 3, 5 & 7), four counts of assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 2, 4, 6 & 8), one count of maliciously shooting at a person
from a vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c); count 9), one count of being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a); count 10), one count of being a felon in
possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 11), and one count of active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 12).2 As to all counts
except for count 12, the jury found that Marroquin acted for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B) & (5)). As to counts 3, 5, and 7, the jury found he
personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).3 As to counts 2, 4, 6, and 8, the
jury found he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).
On October 5, 2017, the trial court sentenced Marroquin to a total term of 54 years
to life in prison. On count 2, the court imposed a term of four years plus 10 years
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)), plus five years (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). On count 3, the
court imposed a term of 15 years to life plus 20 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), to run
consecutively to the term imposed on count 2. Marroquin received concurrent terms on
the remaining counts, which the court stayed under section 654.
On March 16, 2020, this court issued its opinion in Marroquin’s first direct appeal.
We reversed the section 186.22, subdivision (a), conviction (count 12) for insufficient
evidence. We remanded the matter for resentencing at which time the trial court was to

2 The crimes were committed on August 7, 2014.

3 The jury also found true as to these counts that he personally and intentionally
used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).

3.
exercise its discretion to consider striking the section 12022.5 and section 12022.53
firearm enhancements. After Marroquin was sentenced, Senate Bill No. 620 was enacted
to give trial courts the discretion to strike section 12022.5 and section 12022.53
enhancements. We also held, under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, that Marroquin was
to be afforded on remand “an opportunity to present evidence” of youth-related factors to
be considered at his future youth offender parole hearing.
Marroquin was resentenced on October 10, 2023. The trial court imposed a total
term of 41 years to life. On count 2, the court imposed a term of four years plus 10 years
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).4 On count 3, the court imposed a term of life with the
possibility of parole plus 20 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), to run consecutively to the
term imposed on count 2. The court imposed terms of life with the possibility of parole
plus 20 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) on counts 5 and 7 and ordered those terms to run
concurrently to the term imposed on count 3. The court stayed the terms it imposed on
counts 4, 6, and 8 through 11 under section 654.
On December 5, 2023, Marroquin, in propria persona, filed a notice of appeal.
FACTS
Below is a summary of the facts relevant to the proceedings on remand.
I. June 26, 2023, hearing
At a hearing on June 26, 2023,5 the trial court began by denying Marroquin’s
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, ruling he was ineligible for such relief as a
matter of law as the actual shooter.

4 Before the resentencing hearing, Marroquin filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus setting forth the amendments to section 186.22 by Assembly Bill No. 333. The
record does not say what happened in that habeas proceeding, but comments by the
sentencing court and Marroquin’s counsel indicate Marroquin’s petition was successful,
and that the gang enhancement findings were vacated. In any event, the prosecution
announced it was no longer pursuing those enhancement allegations and dismissed them.
5 Subsequent references to dates are to dates in 2023 unless otherwise stated.

4.
Marroquin’s counsel said that Marroquin had asked him “about other code
sections, basically, like SB 333 and AB 1333.”6 The court asked Marroquin which code
sections he was “concerned about,” and Marroquin said he “ha[s] intentions to apply for
AB 333, the newly and active provisions for the gang enhancements, which is retroactive
to not yet a final judgment.” Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 186.22’s definition of a criminal street gang.7 Marroquin also said he had been
“approved for SB 620 through my direct appeal. It’s been pending resentencing since
2021 or so, and they reversed one of my gang enhancements, 186.22.”
The trial court responded: “If it’s a gang issue, it doesn’t just go away, it can be
rescheduled for another trial. It’s not that you can’t get it—not that you just dismiss it,
but you can establish it by doing another trial on it. Do you understand that?” Marroquin
said he understood.
After a brief, clarifying discussion on the grounds on which the section 1172.6
petition was denied, Marroquin brought up his resentencing again. He said: “And in
regards to my direct appeal resentencing, like I said, I was approved through my direct
appeal for resentencing under SB 620 under the gun enhancements.” The court replied:

6 We assume counsel meant to refer to SB 620 and AB 333 in this sentence.

7 It “narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require that any gang be
an ‘ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons’ ”; it requires that
the pattern of criminal activity foundational to a criminal street gang “have been
‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members of the gang”; it also imposed further requirements
limiting the offenses on which a pattern of criminal gang activity could be predicated;
and it required that “for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, ... any
‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’ ” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169,
1206 (Tran), italics omitted.) Section 186.22, subdivision (g), specifies that “[e]xamples
of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to,
financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.”
Assembly Bill No. 333 also applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal as
of its effective date. (Tran, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.)

5.
“Right. And on that one, that—I addressed that last time we were in court, and I find that
the gun enhancement is appropriate and I’m not going to change that.”
The prior court hearing was on June 22, four days before the June 26 hearing. The
transcript of that hearing was not made part of the normal record on appeal. On our own
motion, we ordered the record augmented to include the transcript of that hearing. Senate
Bill No. 620 and the firearm enhancements were not discussed at all at that hearing.
The discussion then reverted to Assembly Bill No. 333, and Marroquin reiterated
his intent to apply for relief under the amended law. The trial court proceeded to the
firearm enhancements. The court said: “Like I said, at this point, the Court is ruling that
I believe the 12022.53 was the appropriate special allegation and that will remain. I’m
exercising my discretion by doing that. So in light of that, there’s no resentencing
required on that.”
The court then said it believed there were no other issues to discuss. The
following took place.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Franklin. We can talk about the
Franklin.
“THE COURT: Oh. The Franklin. [¶] How old were you when
you were convicted?
“[MARROQUIN]: 23.8
“THE COURT: So I will order that—I will grant you the Franklin
motion wherein the—all the records need to be preserved for you to be able
to utilize them later on. So that’s all I can say is the records—if they exist,
anything that exists now cannot be destroyed so you have ability to use
them in your Franklin hearing. Okay.”
A Franklin proceeding was never held, nor was Franklin even mentioned again in
the proceedings below.

8 Marroquin committed the offenses when he was 22 years old.

6.
After the trial court’s words about Franklin, defense counsel asked the court if it
had received Marroquin’s letter. The court said no. The clerk then said she had it but
had not yet given it to the court. The court then received the letter, heard no objection
from the prosecutor to its reading the letter, and read it.9 The court said:
“All right. Mr. Marroquin, it looks like you made the best of the situation you’re
in and that’s great. It’s going to go very well for you when you have your early parole
hearing. So continue on that track[.]”
The trial court next discussed the section 186.22, subdivision (a), conviction—the
gang participation conviction. The court noted that conviction was reversed and stated
that the prosecution could elect to retry it. The court asked the prosecutor what his office
intended to do, and the prosecutor asked for a continuance to “look into it.” 10
The hearing was continued to July 19.
II. September 8 hearing
After several more continuances, the next hearing was September 8. To begin the
hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that Marroquin had “a habeas regarding
AB333 that went up and was heard with Judge Fultz. We submitted on that. We’re not
pursuing the gang anymore.” The prosecutor said Marroquin “just needs to be

9 The letter was made part of the record. It was typed, two pages long, and
addressed to the sentencing judge. The introductory paragraph says the letter was
submitted “with hopes to have this honorable court consider its discretion under senate
bill 620.” In the letter, Marroquin describes the progress he has made in prison towards
his rehabilitation. Among other things, he had obtained his G.E.D. certificate, completed
multiple vocational programs, and developed a business plan in the event he is paroled.
10 The trial court was incorrect that Marroquin could be retried on this count. As
mentioned, we reversed the conviction because the evidence was insufficient that
Marroquin acted in concert with anyone else. This has always been an element of
section 186.22, subdivision (a). The evidential insufficiency was not created by a
postconviction change in the law, in which case the prosecution would be allowed to
retry the count. (People v. Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 375.) Retrial was barred by
double jeopardy principles. (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 853.)

7.
resentenced on what he was found guilty of without the gang allegations.” It was later
clarified that this meant a different judge of the superior court in a habeas proceeding
ordered the jury’s findings on the gang enhancement allegations vacated, and since the
prosecutor elected not to retry the allegations, they were dismissed.
Marroquin then said he wanted to address something about Senate Bill No. 620.
The prosecutor interposed: “[Marroquin] had filed a petition under SB620, but from my
notes, that I’m looking at from Mr. Sangree, indicated that that motion was denied.”
Marroquin said, “Yes. It was.” Then the court said, “So it was already denied and done.”
The trial court referred the matter to the probation department for preparation of a
new presentence report and set sentencing for October 10.
III. October 10 hearing
The probation department prepared and circulated a presentence report before the
October 10 hearing, which did not mention the trial court’s discretion under Tirado,
supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, to impose a lesser section 12022.53 enhancement. Neither the
prosecution nor the defense filed a sentencing memorandum.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties began with addressing issues not relevant to
those raised in this appeal. Then the prosecutor said:
“Also, just to make a record, one of the bas[e]s of the remittitur was
for the Court to exercise discretion on whether to impose those weapon
enhancements, and this Court has previously ruled on that, that given its
new discretion, it still would impose those enhancements. We’ve litigated
that previously, but I just wanted to make that part of the record today.”
The trial court replied, “And that is accurate.” The court pronounced the sentence
of 41 years to life, which included imposing the section 12022.53, subdivision (c),
enhancements on counts 3, 5, and 7.
At the hearing, defense counsel offered no comments or argument on Marroquin’s
behalf with respect to sentencing.

8.
IV. Notice of appeal
On December 5, Marroquin filed a notice of appeal in pro per.
DISCUSSION
I. Firearm enhancements
Marroquin argues his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for
resentencing because the record “strongly indicates” the trial court was unaware of its
discretion under Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 to impose a lesser firearm enhancement
with respect to the section 12022.53, subdivision (c), enhancements. He contends this
constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. Alternatively, he asserts his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the court was aware of its discretion under
Tirado. The People do not assert forfeiture, but they argue the record “confirms” the trial
court was aware of Tirado and chose not to exercise its discretion.
We find the record at least ambiguous as to whether the trial court understood its
discretion under Tirado. Accordingly, resentencing is required.
A. Background law
As we have explained, Senate Bill No. 620, effective January 1, 2018, amended
section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to give trial courts discretion to “strike or dismiss”
enhancements imposed under this section “in the interest of justice pursuant to
Section 1385.” In Marroquin’s prior appeal, we vacated his sentence and remanded the
matter for resentencing, at which time the trial court was to exercise its discretion to
consider striking the section 12022.5 and section 12022.53 enhancements. We issued our
decision on March 16, 2020, with the remittitur issuing on July 9, 2020.
In January 2022, before Marroquin’s resentencing, the Supreme Court decided
Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, holding that section 12022.53, as amended by Senate Bill
No. 620, “permits a court to strike [a] section 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) enhancement
found true by the jury and to impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement instead.”
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 692.) Thus, under Tirado, a trial court could either strike

9.
a section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement outright, or impose a lesser uncharged
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), or section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). This discretion also applies to section 12022.53, subdivision (c),
enhancements, allowing courts to impose a subdivision (b) enhancement instead.
B. Standard of review
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that
“informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ [Citation.] In such
circumstances, … the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record
‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it
had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391 (Gutierrez).)
A trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.) Remand is unnecessary if the trial court was
aware of its sentencing discretion or “if the record is silent concerning whether the trial
court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. Error may not be presumed from a silent
record.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229.) But this presumption is
rebutted when “the record is at the very least ambiguous as to whether the court
understood its” discretion. (People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 853.)
C. Analysis
The record here is ambiguous regarding the trial court’s awareness of its discretion
under Tirado. At the June 26 hearing, the court stated it found the section 12022.53,
subdivision (c), enhancement “appropriate” but provided no further explanation. At the
October 10 hearing, the prosecutor stated:

10.
“Also, just to make a record, one of the bas[e]s of the remittitur was
for the Court to exercise discretion on whether to impose those weapon
enhancements, and this Court has previously ruled on that, that given its
new discretion, it still would impose those enhancements. We’ve litigated
that previously, but I just wanted to make that part of the record today.”
The court responded that that was “accurate.”
The prosecutor’s remarks reflected a pre-Tirado understanding of the court’s
sentencing discretion, suggesting only a binary choice to impose or strike the
section 12022.53, subdivision (c), enhancements. Notably, Tirado was not mentioned
during the proceedings, raising legitimate doubt about whether the trial court understood
its expanded discretion to impose a lesser enhancement. This ambiguity rebuts the
presumption that the trial court was fully aware of its sentencing discretion.
Remand is required unless the record “clearly indicates” resentencing would be
futile. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424 (Salazar).) Here, the trial court’s
statements—that the firearm enhancement was “appropriate” and that it had previously
exercised its discretion—are consistent with the possibility that the court believed
reducing the enhancement could also be “appropriate.” Given this ambiguity, remand for
resentencing is necessary to ensure the trial court exercises its discretion with full
awareness of the law.11
II. Franklin proceeding
In our prior opinion, we directed the trial court to provide Marroquin an
opportunity to present evidence under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261. At the June 26
hearing, the trial court ordered all of the records in the trial court’s file to be preserved for
use at a future Franklin hearing. But no Franklin hearing was held, nor was the issue
raised again.

11 On remand, the trial court and the parties should also consider People v.
McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015.

11.
Marroquin argues the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Franklin proceeding
“as it was instructed to do by this court’s remittitur.” Alternatively, he contends that if he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to a Franklin proceeding, his counsel was
ineffective for not raising the issue again.
The People counter that Marroquin forfeited his right to a Franklin proceeding by
not pursuing it further. Even if not forfeited, they argue, citing In re Cook (2019)
7 Cal.5th 439, 458, that Marroquin can still seek a proceeding under section 1203.01 to
present evidence of youth-related factors.
Because we are remanding the matter for resentencing, we do not address the
parties’ arguments related to Franklin. Still, we would note that, contrary to Marroquin’s
assertion, this court did not order the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding on
remand. Rather, we directed the court to provide Marroquin the opportunity for such a
proceeding. This distinction is significant. In any event, on remand, Marroquin is to
again be afforded the opportunity to develop a record under Franklin relevant to his
future youth offender parole hearing.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing.

SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

12.

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