People v. Rodriguez CA2/3

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Filed 12/4/24 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes
of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B332170

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. KA066113)

DANIEL RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez. Reversed.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a jury convicted Daniel Rodriguez and a
codefendant of attempted murder. Rodriguez now appeals from
an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95.1 The trial court concluded Rodriguez failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing relief.
We reverse the order denying Rodriguez’s petition because the
jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and the record of conviction does not conclusively
establish that he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Underlying Offense2
One afternoon in April 2004, Rodriguez and Yesica Maribel
Cambero stopped in a van near a house in the Valinda area of

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We therefore refer to the statute as section 1172.6 for the
remainder of this opinion.

2 We derive the factual background relating to the
underlying offense from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the
judgment of conviction for both defendants. (People v. Cambero
(May 15, 2006, B180030) [nonpub. opn.] (Cambero).) “Prior
appellate opinions that are part of a section 1172.6 petitioner's
‘record of conviction,’ which were once admissible for whatever
weight the court wished to give them at a merits hearing under
former section 1170.95—including for their recitations of fact
[citation]—may now be considered only for their ‘procedural
history.’ ” (People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150,
1159–1160, fn. 5.) We, thus, reference the factual portion of the

2
Los Angeles County. Isauro Rodriguez3 was walking up to the
front door of the house. Rodriguez got out of the van and
approached Isauro with a revolver in his hand. Isauro ran away
and heard a gunshot. Rodriguez caught up to Isauro and shot
him several times. Rodriguez and Cambero then drove away in
the van. Two witnesses, including Cambero, testified that two
males had run from the van after the van passed a sheriff’s patrol
car in the wake of the shooting.
The Underlying Proceedings
The People charged Rodriguez and Cambero jointly with
attempting to murder Isauro. The amended information alleged
in count 1 that the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) As
to both the attempted murder, as well as a charge of unlawfully
driving a vehicle asserted only against Cambero, the amended
information charged both crimes with being committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) It further
alleged that “a principal and Defendant Rodriguez[4] personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm . . . caus[ing] great bodily
injury and [sic] death to Isauro Rodriguez” within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). Moreover, it was

Cambero appeal only “for background purposes and to provide
context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.)

3 For the sake of clarity we refer to Isauro by first name only.
No disrespect is intended.

4 This additional reference to Rodriguez by name was added
by interlineation, by means of an anonymous, undated
handwritten notation.

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alleged “that in the commission and attempted commission of the
above offense [referencing the attempted murder in count 1] a
principal in said offense was armed with a firearm[] . . . within
the meaning of . . . section 12022(a)(1).”
Rodriguez and Cambero were jointly tried. At trial, the
court instructed the jury on general principles of aiding and
abetting liability (CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01), the natural and
probable consequences doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02), attempted
murder (CALJIC No. 8.66), and attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (CALJIC No. 8.67). The court
further instructed the jury that although the evidence indicated
that an unjoined perpetrator “may have been involved in the
crime,” the jury should not discuss or speculate as to why that
person was not being prosecuted. (CALJIC No. 2.11.5.)
The jury convicted Rodriguez and Cambero of attempted
murder. It found true allegations that the crime was committed
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. On Rodriguez’s
verdict form, the jury also found true that, “in the commission
and [sic] attempted commission of [the crime of attempted
murder] . . . Daniel Rodriguez[] personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm” causing great bodily injury within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and that “a principal
in [the offense of attempted murder], Daniel Rodriguez, was
armed with a firearm” within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1). As reflected in Cambero’s verdict form,5 the
jury found true that “in the commission and [sic] attempted
commission of [the crime of attempted murder]” “a principal in

5 We grant respondent’s amended request for judicial notice
as to the jury’s completed verdict form for codefendant Cambero.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2)(C); Evid. Code, § 459.)

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said offense[] personally and intentionally discharged a firearm”
and that “a principal in [the offense of attempted murder], Daniel
Rodriguez, was armed with a firearm” within the meaning of
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The jury also found true the
gang allegations as to both defendants. The trial court sentenced
Rodriguez to 60 years to life. Rodriguez and Cambero appealed
the judgments entered against them. Another panel of this court
affirmed the judgments with modifications. (Cambero, supra,
B180030).
Rodriguez’s Petition for Resentencing
In 2022, Rodriguez filed a pro per petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, alleging he could not presently be convicted
of attempted murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189.
The People’s opposition attached the preliminary hearing
transcript, the jury instructions, and the verdict as to Rodriguez.
The opposition argued that Rodriguez was ineligible for
resentencing because the jury findings established that he was
the actual shooter and that he acted with the intent to kill. The
People also contended that the jury instructions and verdict
established that the jury did not convict Rodriguez based on any
theory of imputed malice. The opposition did not acknowledge or
address the fact that the jury was instructed on the natural and
probable causes doctrine.
Rodriguez filed a reply through counsel contending that the
court may not consider the preliminary hearing transcript
because it is not part of the record of conviction when the
defendant was convicted by a jury. Rodriguez also argued that
the record of conviction did not conclusively establish he was
ineligible for resentencing because the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and the jury

5
instructions and verdict did not foreclose the possibility that the
jury relied on that theory to find him guilty.
In July 2023, the trial court heard argument and denied
Rodriguez’s petition. The court noted that “the verdict forms for
the codefendant” indicated that the jury found true that
“Rodriguez possess[ed] the gun and discharg[ed] it or the
principal discharged the gun,” and that Rodriguez’s verdict form
reflected the jury’s true finding that Rodriguez “actually
possessed [the gun] and discharged it.” The court therefore
reasoned:
“Then if you go back to 8.67, the CALJIC
instruction, because Mr. Rodriguez is the would-be
slayer, he’s the one who fired the gun, he’s the one
who caused great bodily injury, the jury would have
had to have found that he had the intent to kill, and
because of that, just on the verdict forms themselves,
there is enough without going into the underlying
facts which, as the people point out, clearly show that
he was the one who was the one who had the intent
to kill, but I don’t even have to go there because the
record, verdict forms themselves show that the jury
had to have found that he was — was the would-be
slayer who had intent to kill.
“Because he is the would-be slayer, natural,
probable consequence would not apply to him
whatsoever because that only applies to [an] aider
and abettor, which is what they use[d] to get the
codefendant.”

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The court therefore concluded Rodriguez failed to make a
prima facie showing that he was eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6 and denied his petition.
Rodriguez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony
murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708
(Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The
bill amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, except
as stated in section 189, subdivision (e), “to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Among other
things, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded Senate Bill No. 1437’s
mandate by eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a means of finding a defendant guilty of attempted
murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) However, a principal in a murder
or attempted murder, including an aider or abettor, can still be
criminally liable if found to personally possess malice
aforethought, whether express or implied. (People v. Silva (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640.)
Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 created a procedure, now
codified at section 1172.6, to allow a person convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter under the former law to seek
resentencing if the person could no longer be convicted under
amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) A
defendant starts the procedure by filing a petition containing a

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declaration that, among other things, he or she could not
presently be convicted of murder under the current law. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) In relevant part, the statute
requires the court, “[a]fter the parties have had an opportunity to
submit briefings,” to “hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to
relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
“[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set
very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) At this stage,
“ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) “While the trial court
may look at the record of conviction . . . to determine whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief,
the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Ibid.)
Courts may not reject the petitioner’s allegations “ ‘on credibility
grounds’ ” or engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971–972.)
Rather, “[t]he record should be consulted at the prima facie stage
only to determine ‘readily ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime
of conviction and findings on enhancements.” (People v. Duchine
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56 [considering jury instructions and
verdicts to determine whether defendant made prima facie
showing of eligibility]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90,
106–111 [considering sentencing enhancements, jury

8
instructions, closing arguments, and verdicts at prima facie
stage].)
We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
II. Rodriguez is Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing
Because the Record of Conviction Does Not
Conclusively Show He is Ineligible for Resentencing
as a Matter of Law
Rodriguez argues that the record of conviction does not
establish that he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
We agree.
In his petition, Rodriguez alleged that he could no longer be
convicted of attempted murder because of changes to sections 188
and 189. Specifically, Rodriguez argues he is eligible for
resentencing because the jury may have convicted him under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. At the prima facie
stage, we accept these factual allegations as true unless the
record of conviction conclusively establishes Rodriguez is
ineligible for relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
At trial, CALJIC No. 3.00 instructed the jury that the
“principals” of a crime are “equally guilty,” “regardless of the
extent or manner of participation” and include direct
perpetrators as well as aiders and abettors. CALJIC No. 3.01
explained that the jury could convict a person of aiding and
abetting a crime if it found that the person aided, promoted,
encouraged, or instigated the commission of the crime. In
particular, CALJIC No. 3.02 instructed the jury that it could find
“the defendant” guilty of attempted murder if it found (1) that an
assault with a firearm was committed, (2) that “the defendant”

9
aided and abetted the assault, (3) that a co-principal committed
attempted murder, and (4) that the attempted murder was a
natural and probable consequence of the assault. The term
“defendant” was defined, through CALJIC No. 1.11, to mean
“each defendant.” CALJIC Nos. 8.66 and 9.02 instructed the jury
that “[e]very person” who commits attempted murder or assault
with a firearm is guilty of those crimes, respectively. Moreover,
though CALJIC No. 8.66 began by mentioning both defendants—
“Defendants are accused . . . of attempted murder”—it referenced
only a single defendant when describing who must harbor the
murderous intent, instructing that the jury must find that “[t]he
person committing the [direct but ineffectual] act harbored
express malice aforethought . . . . ” The jury was also informed,
through CALJIC No. 2.11.5, that “a person other than a
defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for which
that defendant is on trial.”
Together, these instructions allowed the jury to convict
Rodriguez of attempted murder if it found that Rodriguez aided
and abetted an assault with a firearm committed by another
person, that a coprincipal (such as the unjoined perpetrator)
committed attempted murder, and that the attempted murder
was the natural and probable consequence of the assault.
The court also instructed the jury on still-valid theories of
attempted murder based on direct liability (CALJIC No. 8.66)
and direct aider and abettor liability (CALJIC No. 3.01).
However, neither the instructions nor the verdict form indicates
what theory the jury relied on in finding Rodriguez guilty of
attempted murder. The record therefore does not foreclose
possibility that Rodriguez was convicted of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

10
Respondent argues that Rodriguez is ineligible for
resentencing relief because he was the only shooter, citing the
jury’s finding “only as to appellant” that he personally used and
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).) The trial court similarly concluded that this finding
established that Rodriguez was necessarily the sole “would-be
slayer.” We disagree. We acknowledge that the record before us
on appeal strongly suggests that the prosecution’s theory at
Rodriguez’s and Cambero’s trial was that Rodriguez, and not
Cambero, possessed and discharged a firearm. However, that
record does not include the trial transcripts and arguments of
counsel at trial, nor does it reflect the role (if any) of the
uncharged perpetrator.6 Indeed, the amended information
suggested through an undated, handwritten interlineation the
possibility that another “principal” in addition to Rodriguez
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. As such, the
record before us does not conclusively refute, without engaging in
impermissible “ ‘fact finding involving the weighing of evidence,’ ”
that Rodriguez was convicted under the alternative natural and
probable consequences theory, especially in light of the CALJIC
Nos. 2.11.5 and 3.02 instructions that were provided to
Rodriguez’s jury. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972).
Respondent asserts that it is “undisputed that there were
only two principals to the crime, and only one of them fired shots

6 “[A] charging decision does not establish any facts as a
matter of law. [Citation]. Moreover, we are aware of no
authority requiring prosecutors to try all codefendants together,
so [a] single charging document does not foreclose the possibility
of other people having been charged for related crimes.” (People
v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339.)

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at the victim.” However, the record before us is inadequate to
support this contention, which, as discussed, also does not include
the trial transcripts. To the extent respondent contends that the
preliminary hearing transcript could support that Rodriguez and
Cambero were the only principals and that Rodriguez was the
sole shooter, we disagree. To begin with, in assessing a section
1172.6 petition, the court may consult the record of conviction
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971), which includes the
preliminary hearing transcript when “the conviction resulted
from a guilty plea rather than a trial” and “the transcript
‘reliably reflect[s] the facts of the offense for which the defendant
was convicted.’ ” (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982,
988, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.)7 In contrast, where,
as here, the conviction resulted from a jury trial after a not guilty
plea, the preliminary hearing transcript is not part of the record
of conviction because it does not necessarily reflect the evidence
on which the verdict was based. (People v. Houck (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 350, 356–357.)8 Unlike a guilty plea after a
preliminary hearing, the transcript of which a defendant may
stipulate to as providing a factual basis therefor, a “plea of not
guilty puts in issue every material allegation of the accusatory

7 Our Supreme Court granted review in a similar case to
determine whether a trial court may rely on a preliminary
hearing transcript at the prima facie stage. (People v. Patton
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June 28, 2023,
S279670.)

8 On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred in
relying on the preliminary hearing transcript. However, the trial
court explained that its ruling did not depend on “the underlying
facts.”

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pleading . . . ,” which, in Rodriguez’s case, was the amended
information. (§ 1019.) And secondly, as discussed ante, the
transcript of Rodriguez’s preliminary hearing, as underscored by
the subsequently added language to the amended information
and CALJIC No. 2.11.5, suggests some involvement of an
additional unjoined perpetrator. Thus, although the record on
appeal includes the transcript of the preliminary hearing, our
decision is based solely on the amended information, jury
instructions and verdict forms.
Relatedly, we reject respondent’s argument and the trial
court’s conclusion that Rodriguez is ineligible for resentencing
because the jury’s findings under CALJIC No. 8.67 establish that
he intended to kill. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,
548 [an appellant convicted of attempted murder is ineligible for
resentencing if the record of conviction shows that he or she
harbored malice].) CALJIC No. 8.67 informed the jury that if it
found any defendant guilty of attempted murder, it must then
determine whether “the would-be slayer” committed that crime
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury found
this allegation true.9 Yet, as we have discussed, the record of
conviction does not establish as a matter of law, without engaging
in further fact finding involving the weighing of evidence, that
Rodriguez was the one and only shooter. Without the trial
transcript, we cannot eliminate the possibility that the jury may

9 This finding was the second one listed on the verdict forms
for Rodriguez and Cambero, right below the first finding that
each one was guilty of “attempted murder.” However, whereas
the first finding specifically listed Rodriguez and Cambero,
respectively, by name, the second did not, requiring only a
finding that “the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately and with premeditation . . . .”

13
have found that the unjoined perpetrator, and not Rodriguez, was
the “would-be slayer” who intended to kill. The jury’s finding
under CALJIC No. 8.67 therefore does not conclusively establish
that Rodriguez harbored the requisite malice. (People v. Whitson
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 33 [reversing denial of petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage because jury verdict did not
indicate which of two codefendants was the “would-be slayer” and
therefore a true finding under CALJIC No. 8.67 did not establish
that appellant intended to kill].)
Rodriguez argues that the jury’s finding that he personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury under section
12022.53, subdivision (d) is not dispositive of any particular
mental state, and, thus, does not justify denying a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage, citing People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 598: “Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) . . .
is . . . a general intent enhancement, and does not require the
prosecution to prove that the defendant harbored a particular
mental state as to the victim’s injury or death. [Citations.]”
Respondent, in turn, argues Rodriguez’s firearm enhancement is
not relevant to intent but rather to “show the jury could not have
relied on the natural and probable cause [sic] doctrine to convict
[defendant],” asserting “only one person had a firearm.” As such,
respondent claims Offley is distinguishable because, unlike
Offley, “it was undisputed that there were only two principals to
the crime, and only one of them fired shots at the victim.”
Respondent also relies on the jury finding as to Cambero that she
was only guilty of a principal’s gun use. As discussed, other than
the jury’s true finding that Rodriguez, and not Cambero,
personally discharged a firearm causing injury, respondent has
not provided an adequate record to support the conclusion that

14
Rodriguez was the one and only person who shot at the victim.
This conclusion cannot be made based on the record of conviction
before us without engaging in impermissible factfinding, which
we decline to do.
We also reject respondent’s argument and the trial court’s
conclusion that the natural and probable consequences doctrine
necessarily could not apply to Rodriguez. As we have discussed,
CALJIC No. 3.02 instructed the jury that it could apply the
natural and probable causes doctrine to “the defendant,” and
CALJIC No. 1.11 defined that term to include either defendant.
Although CALJIC No. 3.02 included several modifications, it was
not adjusted to apply only to Cambero, and the jury was not
prohibited from using it to find Rodriguez guilty of attempted
murder. Based on the record before us, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the jury relied on the abrogated natural and
probable consequences doctrine to convict Rodriguez.
Rodriguez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d), because the record of conviction
does not conclusively establish that he is ineligible for relief.

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DISPOSITION
The July 6, 2023 order denying Rodriguez’s petition for
resentencing is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed
to issue an order to show cause and to conduct further
proceedings as necessary under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS

BERSHON, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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