CourtListener 10287967•People v. Summers CA3
Testo completo
Filed 12/4/24 P. v. Summers CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099549
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
CRF120000548)
v.
DWIGHT ANTHONY SUMMERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2013, defendant Dwight Anthony Summers was found guilty of drug and sex
offenses involving a minor with enhancements for a prior drug offense and two prior
prison terms found true; defendant received 25 years in state prison. We affirmed the
judgment on appeal, but remanded for the trial court to state the statutory source of
1
certain assessments and ordered a correction to the abstract of judgment. (People v.
Summers (June 23, 2014, C073289) [nonpub. opn.] (Summers).)1
Following a resentencing proceeding under Penal Code2 section 1172.75,3 the trial
court struck all the enhancements and reimposed consecutive upper terms for each count,
making defendant’s new aggregate sentence 20 years in state prison. Defendant’s
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, asking this court to independently review the
record to determine if there are any arguable errors that would result in a disposition more
favorable to defendant.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief arguing: (1) the trial court denied him his
rights to due process and a fair trial at the resentencing proceeding because the same
allegedly biased judge who presided over his jury trial decided the resentencing petition
without recusing herself; (2) the court erred in considering factors in mitigation and did
not declare him a danger to the public before reimposing an upper term sentence; and
(3) cumulative error.
Having considered defendant’s supplemental brief, and finding no arguable error
that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we shall affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2011, defendant had been in a relationship with the mother of the 17-year-old
victim, D.S., for approximately 10 years and was a father figure to D.S. and his siblings.
1 We grant defendant’s request to take judicial notice of our unpublished opinion in his
prior appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 This statute was formerly section 1171.1, but it was renumbered under Assembly Bill
No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to section 1172.75. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
2
(Summers, supra, C073289.)4 At the age of 13, defendant’s own brother molested D.S.;
as a result, defendant’s brother was sent to prison. (Ibid.) When D.S. was 16, defendant
took him to a motel, showed him how to smoke crack cocaine, and then sodomized him;
D.S. did not report the sexual assault. (Ibid.) Although D.S.’s mother later kicked
defendant out of their home, he returned on one occasion under the guise of taking D.S.
to eat; on the way, defendant stopped at a hotel where he smoked crack with D.S., pushed
him on the bed, and sodomized him. (Ibid.) Because defendant greatly outweighed D.S.,
he was unable to fight back. (Ibid.) D.S. later reported the assault to his school
counselor, who called law enforcement. (Ibid.)
In 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of forcible sodomy of a minor 14 years of
age or older (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C)) and furnishing a controlled substance to a minor
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11353), and found true that the victim was at least four years
younger than defendant (Health & Saf. Code, § 11353.1, subd. (a)(3)) and that defendant
had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to
25 years in state prison, including the upper term of nine years for the controlled
substance offense, a consecutive upper term of 11 years for the sodomy offense (§ 667.6,
subd. (c)), three years for the age-related drug enhancement and one year each for the
prior prison term enhancements.
In July 2022, the trial court set the matter for a resentencing determination under
Senate Bill No. 483 after being notified by the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation that defendant’s judgment, which included two prior prison term
enhancements, may qualify for resentencing. At counsel’s request, the matter was
continued several times.
4 We summarize the pertinent facts from our prior opinion in Summers, supra, C073289,
affirming defendant’s judgment.
3
In September 2023, the People filed a resentencing brief urging the trial court to
resentence defendant to 23 years by striking the prior prison term enhancements but
leaving the remaining sentence intact. The People argued the court could find multiple
factors in aggravation based on defendant’s certified records of conviction.
Defendant filed a petition for resentencing, requesting that the trial court strike the
drug enhancement and the two prison prior enhancements because multiple
enhancements were alleged in the case, the enhancements could result in a sentence
exceeding 20 years, the current offense was connected to mental illness, and defendant
suffered from prior victimization or childhood trauma.5 Defendant argued the court
should impose a low term sentence given amendments to section 1385 and section 1170.
He attached the abstract of judgment, as well as prison records and certificates of
completion for courses taken while incarcerated.
At a resentencing hearing on September 25, 2023, defense counsel argued the trial
court should strike all enhancements so that defendant’s sentence did not exceed 20 years,
and urged the court to impose the low term based on defendant’s childhood victimization
and trauma. The prosecution argued for the upper term given defendant’s extensive
criminal history based on a certified 40-page RAP sheet showing that defendant had
numerous prior felony convictions, including at least 14 out-of-state felony convictions
and seven felony convictions in California.
The trial court found the facts of defendant’s offenses “egregious.” Based on
defendant’s certified record of convictions, the court found numerous aggravating factors,
including that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing
5 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1) amended section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider
when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest
of justice.
4
seriousness, that he had served several prior prison terms, and that he was on probation
and parole when he committed the offenses. The court found, little, if any, factors in
mitigation. While the court considered the issue of childhood trauma, it found that such
trauma did not contribute to the offenses; instead, the court noted that defendant
sodomized the victim as retribution against the victim’s mother when she refused
defendant’s request for anal sex.
Based on the circumstances in aggravation, the trial court reimposed the upper
term on both counts. After finding that defendant had done relatively well in prison,
citing his efforts to educate himself and address mental health issues as well as his work
ethic, the court struck the three-year drug enhancement and each of the one-year prior
prison term enhancements. Defendant’s total aggregate sentence was 20 years in state
prison.6 The trial court reduced the fines and fees given the new lower sentence and
awarded credits. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process and Right to a Fair Trial by an Unbiased Judge
Defendant first contends that the trial judge who presided over his trial and also
over the resentencing proceedings, was personally biased against him. He argues her
comments at resentencing show she intended to extract retribution against him without
properly considering factors in mitigation thereby depriving him of due process. He also
asserts the judge erroneously excluded evidence during trial, which precluded him from
putting on a complete defense thereby guaranteeing a conviction. And while he concedes
he did not seek recusal or otherwise raise a judicial bias claim below, he argues his failure
6 The trial court had originally imposed a consecutive eight-month term in a separate
criminal matter (case No. CRF11-253), but at defense counsel’s request, the court
resentenced defendant in that matter to a concurrent midterm of two years and reimposed
the same fees and fines.
5
to object should be excused because he was never advised of Judge Scrogins’ “monopoly
on hearings related to his underlying criminal action” and he had no notice that the case
was assigned to her for resentencing. None of his contentions are persuasive.
A defendant has a due process right to an impartial judge under the state and
federal Constitutions. (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 332-333.) The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge
with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of the case. (Bracy v.
Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904-905; Brown, supra, at p. 334.)
“ ‘If a judge refuses or fails to disqualify [themself], a party may seek the judge’s
disqualification. The party must do so, however, “at the earliest practicable opportunity
after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification,” ’ ” including
based on bias or lack of impartiality. (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 978; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Defendant may not go to trial before a judge
and gamble on a favorable result, and then assert for the first time on appeal that the
judge was biased.’ ” (Johnson, supra, at pp. 978-979.) Although a defendant who
objected to a judge’s participation in the proceedings and merely failed to pursue the
statutory appellate remedy under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 has been allowed
to raise on appeal a narrow due process claim (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993,
999-1000), a defendant who never objected to the judge may not do so. (Johnson, supra,
at p. 979.)
Here, defendant admittedly never moved to disqualify Judge Scrogins on the
ground of prejudice or bias, nor did he raise any bias or due process objections below.
Accordingly, defendant may not argue for the first time on appeal that Judge Scrogins
was biased during the resentencing proceedings.
Likewise, the fact that Judge Scrogins made evidentiary rulings against defendant
at trial cannot be raised for the first time in this subsequent appeal, especially where
defendant offers no justification for failing to challenge the allegedly erroneous
6
evidentiary rulings in his direct appeal of the judgment. (Summers, supra, C073289.)
“[W]here a criminal defendant could have raised an issue in a prior appeal, the appellate
court need not entertain the issue in a subsequent appeal absent a showing of justification
for the delay.” (People v. Senior (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) And, in any event,
“adverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are subject to review, do not establish
a charge of judicial bias.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112, disapproved
on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151, which was disapproved
on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Accordingly, we deem defendant’s claim of judicial bias to be forfeited or without
merit.
B. Mitigating Factors and Dangerousness Finding
Defendant contends the trial court failed to properly consider factors in mitigation
when resentencing him and did not declare him a danger to the public or state its reasons
for not imposing the low term.
We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (See
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377; People v. Strother (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 563, 571.) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion when it acts arbitrarily
and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the
scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all.” (People v.
Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.) We find no abuse of discretion here.
Section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1) now requires a trial court to strike a
prior prison term enhancement that is not based on a sexually violent offense (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a) [any prior prison term enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020, for a non-
sexually violent offense is legally invalid]; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375,
379-380), and resentence a defendant applying “the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council” and “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
7
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subds. (c), (d)(2).) “[U]nless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” the
court must resentence the defendant to a lower term than originally imposed after
eliminating any invalid enhancements. (Id., subd. (d)(1).) In doing so, the court may
consider postconviction factors such as a defendant’s disciplinary record and
rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated, a decreased risk of future violence given a
defendant’s age, time served, and diminished physical condition, and evidence of
changed circumstance such that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court
may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in
aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd.
(d)(4).)
As relevant here, since defendant was originally sentenced, the Legislature has
passed Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3), which amended section 1170,
effective January 1, 2022.7 As amended, section 1170 prohibits a trial court from
imposing an upper term sentence unless there are aggravating circumstances that justify a
term exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those aggravating circumstances
are stipulated to by the defendant, proven to a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt, or
relate to the defendant’s prior convictions and are based on a certified record of
conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3); People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742.)
Amended section 1170 also creates a presumption in favor of the low term if certain
enumerated mitigating factors are present, including if a defendant “experienced
7 The Legislature further amended section 1170, effective January 1, 2024, with changes
not relevant here. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 560, § 2.5.)
8
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence” if such trauma “was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A)), unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposing the
low term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (Id., subd. (b)(6).) Amended
section 1170 also requires trial courts to state on the record “the facts and reasons for
choosing the sentence imposed.” (Id., subd. (b)(5).)
In this case, the jury originally found true that defendant had served two prior
prison terms for felony convictions for possessing cocaine for sale and for petty theft with
a prior. After properly striking the prior prison term enhancements under section 1172.75
because they were not for sexually violent offenses, the trial court resentenced defendant
under current law, including amended section 1170, which defendant had extensively
briefed for the court.
Based on certified records of conviction as well as a lengthy certified RAP sheet
that showed seven felony convictions in California and at least 14 felony convictions
from out of state, the trial court found several factors in aggravation, including that
defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)),8 that he had served several prior prison terms
(rule 4.421(b)(3)), and that he was on probation and parole when he committed the
offenses (rule 4.421(b)(4)). That was appropriate. (See e.g., People v. Towne (2008)
44 Cal.4th 63, 70-71 [recognizing that aggravating circumstances that a defendant served
a prior prison term, was on probation or parole at the time of the offense, or that
probation or parole performance was unsatisfactory may be determined relying on the
defendant’s record of one or more prior convictions].)
8 Further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
9
In accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the trial court then weighed
these aggravating factors against evidence that defendant had suffered childhood sexual
trauma. The court found that even if defendant had been molested as a child, such trauma
did not contribute to the offenses as defendant sodomized the victim, at least in part,
because the victim’s mother had refused to have anal sex with defendant. (People v.
Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765 [recognizing that the mere fact a defendant
has suffered past trauma is insufficient for a presumptive low term under the statutory
text; instead, the trauma must be a contributing factor in the commission of the offense].)
Because the mitigating factor, if it existed, did not outweigh the multiple factors in
aggravation found by the court based on defendant’s certified records of conviction, and
given the egregious nature of the facts of the case—defendant forcefully sodomized a
young boy who considered him a father figure after giving him drugs, the court implicitly
found that a low term sentence was contrary to the interests of justice. We presume the
trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978), and we may not substitute our judgment on
how the circumstances should be weighed for that of the trial court. (See People v.
Strother, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
The trial court was not required to find defendant a danger to public safety under
section 1170’s plain language before determining that the aggravating factors outweighed
the potential mitigating factor of childhood trauma. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Nor was
the court required to find that defendant would endanger public safety under section
1172.75 as the court here lessened defendant’s sentence by five years from the original
25-year term. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“[r]esentencing . . . shall result in a lesser
sentence . . . unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety”].)
The trial court stated its reasons for reimposing the upper term on both counts
while striking the three-year drug enhancement under amended section 1385 and the two
10
one-year prior prison terms under section 1172.75. Defendant has failed to show the
court abused its discretion in resentencing him.
C. Cumulative Error
Defendant argues that reversal is required under the cumulative error doctrine.
The premise behind the cumulative error doctrine is that while a few errors may be
harmless taken individually, their cumulative effect requires reversal. (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009 [“ ‘[A] series of trial errors, though
independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of
reversible and prejudicial error’ ”].) Because we have found no individual errors, there is
no error to accumulate. We therefore reject defendant’s cumulative error claim.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
11
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.