CourtListener 10287026•Ritter v. Eclipse Recreational Vehicles CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 12/3/24 Ritter v. Eclipse Recreational Vehicles CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DARRICK RITTER,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064333
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2103777)
ECLIPSE RECREATIONAL OPINION
VEHICLES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Irma Poole Asberry, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
McMahon Lynch Law Firm, Robert J. Lynch and Matthew A.
Slater for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilson Turner Kosmo, Robert A. Shields, Alexi Rae Silverman;
Baute Crochetiere Hartley & McCoy, Mark D. Baute, Gina McCoy and
Artyom Baghdishyan for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
In September 2012, plaintiff Darrick Ritter purchased a trailer
manufactured by defendant Eclipse Recreational Vehicles, Inc. (Eclipse). The
trailer came with a one-year written manufacturer’s warranty.
In January 2018, Ritter noticed “the front of the vehicle felt like
it was opening and closing like a mouth when you are driving down the road,
where the wall is separating from the frame.” A dealer inspected the trailer
and “found problems with the welds on the passenger side.”
In October 2019, Eclipse told Ritter that it would attempt a
repair. But in March 2020, after inspecting the trailer, Eclipse said it could
not do the repairs, and refused to replace or repurchase the trailer.
In August 2021, Ritter sued Eclipse alleging three causes of
action: a violation of the express warranty, a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability, and a violation of the federal warranty act.
Eclipse filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, a motion for summary adjudication. The trial court granted the
motion for all three causes of action. Ritter filed an appeal.
In this review we “‘consider all of the evidence and all of the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, and must view such evidence and
such inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’” (Conway v.
County of Tuolumne (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013.)
We agree with the court’s ruling as to Ritter’s express warranty
claim. Ritter filed suit in 2021, well after the four-year statute of limitations
had expired, which accrued from the date of delivery in 2012.
But we disagree with the court’s ruling as to Ritter’s implied
warranty of merchantability claim. “The implied warranty of merchantability
may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale.” (Mexia
v. Rinker Boat, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1304 (Mexia).) Here, given
2
the evidence regarding a problem with welding, and viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Ritter, we find there is a reasonable inference that
the issue with the wall separating from the trailer’s frame was due to a latent
defect present at the time of the sale, thereby tolling the statute of
limitations. (See Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 646.)
Ritter’s remaining federal warranty cause of action is derivative
and depends on the validity of the two state claims, so it survives as to the
state implied warranty claim.
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s granting of Eclipse’s motion as
to Ritter’s express warranty claim (the first cause of action), but we reverse
as to the implied warranty claim (the third cause of action), and the federal
warranty claim (the second cause of action).
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about September 10, 2012, Ritter purchased a 2013 Eclipse
Attitude Trailer from Best RV Center in Turlock, California for about
$50,000. The trailer came with a written, one-year limited manufacturer’s
warranty. The warranty provided, in part:
“Eclipse Recreational Vehicles, Inc. (noted as Eclipse RV)
warrants the original owner that your new travel trailer or fifth wheel is
warranted under normal use to be free from manufacturing defects in
materials and workmanship for the period of one (1) year except as herein
limited. This warranty comes in affect [sic]the day of the first retail purchase
and only covers the first retail purchaser. [¶] This warranty is limited to
repairing or replacing any part(s) believed by Eclipse RV to be defective in
material or workmanship under normal use.”
3
Sometime in 2014, Ritter discovered issues with the trailer’s
bedroom sliding glass door. Ritter reported the issues to Eclipse; they were
able to resolve the problem without charge.
On or about January 2018, Ritter noticed as he was driving on
the freeway from Las Vegas that the siding of the trailer on the passenger
side was moving. Ritter said that “the front of the vehicle felt like it was
opening and closing like a mouth when you are driving down the road, where
the wall is separating from the frame. This issue had never arisen before and
it is my understanding that the issue was wholly and completely unrelated to
the previously [completed repairs].”
In 2018, Ritter said he repeatedly attempted to contact Eclipse to
repair the frame separation issue, but he “received little or no response.”
In 2019, Ritter took the trailer to Straight Line RV, a dealership
located in Springfield, Oregon, for an unrelated problem. When Straight Line
RV looked at the frame separation issue, “they found problems with the welds
on the passenger side.” “Straight Line RV determined that the issue was due
to cracking in the wheel chassis and upper deck frame and the walls, but was
unable to perform the necessary repairs.”
Straight Line RV contacted Eclipse and Lippert Components, Inc.
(Lippert), a trailer component manufacturer, to see if those companies could
complete the repairs. Lippert agreed to send a technician and agreed to
perform “goodwill repairs” if it determined the issues were due to problems
with its manufactured components.
On or about August 22, 2019, Lippert performed an inspection of
the trailer and determined that the frame separation issue was not due to a
failure of any of its components.
A representative from Lippert sent an e-mail to Danny Zacarias,
4
a representative from Eclipse. The e-mail stated: “In conversation with [our]
tech, he mentioned that the dealer had done a repairs to the front cap due to
impact damage which was submitted for an insurance claim. Is there by any
chance any pictures or information you can share with us? [Lippert] will
stand behind the original offer of goodwill repair to the upper deck repair
only, as mentioned in my previous email.”
Zacarias responded: “At this point we need to offer something for
the customer to get his unit back together? Did the Lippert tech take it apart
or did a dealer take it [apart.]”
On October 29, 2019, Ritter received an e-mail from another
representative from Eclipse. The e-mail stated: “Hi Darrick[:] [¶] I talked to
Danny this morning on your trailer. Danny has auth’d us to inspect trailer
once it comes in. You will need to set up transportation to get unit here, I do
have a transport company that we use. I can give you their contact
information. Right now we would be able to set up a date to do repairs,
looking mid January.”
In March 2020, Ritter brought the trailer to Eclipse’s facility in
Riverside, California. On March 9, 2020, after inspecting the trailer, Eclipse
informed Ritter “that they would not perform any repairs because the side
wall purportedly delaminated due to what they claim was ‘lack of
maintenance.’”
Court Proceedings
On August 20,2021, Ritter sued Eclipse alleging three causes of
action: a violation of Eclipse’s express warranty under the state Song-Beverly
Warranty Act (the Song-Beverly Act); a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act; and a violation of the federal
5
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.
On July 26, 2022, Eclipse filed a motion for summary judgment,
1
or in the alternative, a motion for summary adjudication.
On October 25, 2022, the trial court granted Eclipse’s motion. As
to Ritter’s express warranty claim, the court found that “the statute of
limitations bars this claim.” As to the implied warranty claim, the court
found that Ritter “provides no evidence that his defect is latent and existed
during the duration period[.] He provides no evidence that the statute of
limitations should be tolled.” As to Ritter’s federal warranty claim, the court
found that such claims “‘stand or fall with his express and implied warranty
claims under state law.’ Since it appears that the Song-Beverly claims fail, it
also appears this cause of action will fail too.”
II.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment “provide[s] courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 844.) The moving party bears
the burden to make a prima facie showing that no triable issue of material
fact exists. (Id. at p. 845.) If this burden is met, the party opposing the motion
bears the burden of showing the existence of disputed facts. (Ibid.)
1
“Generally, an order granting summary adjudication is an
intermediate order which is ‘reviewable on appeal from the final judgment in
the action.’ [Citation.] However, such an order is appealable if it effectively
disposes of the entire matter.” (Jacobs-Zorne v. Superior Court (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1064, 1070–1071.)
.
6
“A defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment either
by showing one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be stablished,
or by establishing an affirmative defense.” (Sacramento County Deputy
Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Sacramento (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1476.)
“The expiration of the applicable statute of limitations is one such complete
defense.” (Genisman v. Carley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 45, 49.)
“A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations carries its burden by
presenting evidence establishing that the plaintiff’s claim is time barred.
[Citation] ‘It then falls to plaintiff[] to counter with evidence creating a
dispute about a fact relevant to that defense.’ [Citation.] That is, the plaintiff
must submit evidence that would allow a ‘reasonable trier of fact [to] find in
plaintiff[’s] favor on the statute of limitations issue.’” (Genisman v. Carley,
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 49.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more
causes of action . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for
summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion
for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a
motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment/summary
adjudication de novo. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61,
65, 67–68.) Our review “‘must consider all of the evidence and all of the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, and must view such evidence and
such inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’” (Conway v.
County of Tuolumne, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.)
We shall analyze Ritter’s three causes of action in the following
order: A) the alleged violation of the express warranty; B) the alleged breach
7
of the implied warranty of merchantability; and C) the alleged violation of the
federal warranty act.
A. The Express Warranty
Ritter claims the trial court erred by granting Eclipse’s motion as
to his express warranty cause of action. We disagree.
The Song-Beverly Act generally “provides enhanced remedies to
consumers who buy new consumer goods accompanied by a manufacturer’s
express warranty.” (Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
334, 336.) “The Act regulates warranty terms, imposes service and repair
obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who make express
warranties, requires disclosure of specified information in express
warranties, and broadens a buyer’s remedies to include costs, attorney’s fees,
and civil penalties.” (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234
Cal.App.3d 205, 213 (Krieger).)
“The Act itself contains no express limitations period for a civil
action.” (Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 213–214.) Rather, the statute
of limitations under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the limitations
period as stated in section 2725 of the California Uniform Commercial Code.
(Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p.1306.)
“An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than
one year but may not extend it.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (1).)2 The
2
Further undesignated statutory references are to the California
Uniform Commercial Code.
8
four-year limitations period for a breach of an express warranty claim accrues
(begins to run) from the date of delivery. (Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco
Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 129 (Cardinal).)
Here, Ritter received the trailer on September 10, 2012. Eclipse’s
express warranty was for a period of one year. Applying the four-year statute
of limitations, which began to run on the date of delivery, the latest Ritter
could have filed the express warranty claim was on September 10, 2016. (See
§ 2725, subd. (1).) Ritter filed the instant lawsuit on August 20, 2021, nearly
five years after the statute of limitations had expired.
Thus, we find that the trial court properly granted Eclipse’s
motion as to Ritter’s express warranty cause of action because Eclipse
established a complete defense under the statute of limitations. (See
Genisman v. Carley, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 49.)
Ritter argues the statute of limitations was tolled under the
“future performance” exception. (See § 2725, subd. (2).) We disagree.
“A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.” (§ 2725, subd. (2), italics added.)
“Thus, under section 2725, the general limitations rule for a
breach of warranty cause of action is four years from the date the goods are
delivered (regardless of the date the buyer discovers the breach), unless the
‘warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery
of the breach must await the time of such performance . . . .’ (§ 2725, subd.
(2).) If the [future performance exception] applies, the accrual date is the time
the breach ‘is or should have been discovered.’” (Cardinal, supra, 169
9
Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)
The future performance exception “applies only when the seller
has expressly agreed to warrant its product for a specific and defined period
of time.” (Cardinal, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.) “California Uniform
Commercial Code section 2725 reflects the drafters’ intention to establish a
reasonable period of time—four years—beyond which sellers need not worry
about stale warranty claims. [Citation.] Nonetheless, ‘a buyer and a seller
can freely negotiate to extend liability into the future . . . [but] an express
warranty which makes no reference at all to any future date should not be
allowed to extend past the limitations period. . . .’” (Carrau v. Marvin Lumber
& Cedar Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 281, 291.)
Here, Eclipse’s express written warranty provided: “Eclipse
Recreational Vehicles, Inc. (noted as Eclipse RV) warrants the original
owner that your new travel trailer or fifth wheel is warranted under normal
use to be free from manufacturing defects in materials and workmanship for
the period of one (1) year except as herein limited. This warranty comes in
affect [sic] the day of the first retail purchase and only covers the first retail
purchaser.” (Italics added.)
Eclipse’s written express warranty did not explicitly—or
implicitly—extend its timeframe beyond one year, so the future performance
exception to the four-year statute of limitations does not apply.
Ritter argues that Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 205, compels a
different result. We disagree.
In Krieger, a buyer purchased a car from a dealer, who provided a
warranty, which stated “that all defects would be repaired for a period of 36
months or within the first 36,000 miles of use.” (Krieger, supra, 234
Cal.App.3d at p. 216.) Almost immediately, the buyer experienced problems
10
with the car. (Id. at p. 209.) Just over four years after the purchase, the buyer
sued the dealer for a breach of warranty and other related claims. (Id. at p.
210.) The trial court granted the dealer’s motion for summary judgment on
the basis that the statute of limitations had expired, but the Court of Appeal
disagreed and reversed. (Id. at p. 219.) The court found that there was an
issue of material fact as to when the statute of limitations accrued. (Ibid.)
The court reasoned that the action did not accrue on tender of delivery, but at
some later date based on the future performance exception. This ruling was
based on the terms explicitly included in the written warranty: the “period of
36 months or within the first 36,000 miles of use.” (Id. at p. 216.)
Here, unlike Krieger, Eclipse’s express warranty does not include
any language extending its coverage beyond one year; therefore, the statute
of limitations accrued from the statutory default date: the date of delivery.
(See § 2725, subd. (1).) The future performance exception does not apply, and
the Krieger opinion does not alter our analysis.
Ritter also cites the following language from Krieger: “A promise
to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of
express warranty of future performance . . . .” (Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d
at p. 217, italics added.) Based on this quotation, Ritter argues the e-mails
he received from Eclipse in 2019 “are an express warranty that [Eclipse]
would repair the vehicle.” (Italics added.) We disagree.
Under the Song-Beverly Act: “‘Express warranty’ means: [¶] (1) A
written statement arising out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good
pursuant to which the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer undertakes to
preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the consumer good or
provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance . . . .” (Civ.
Code, § 1791.2, subd. (a), italics added.)
11
To establish an express warranty under California’s Song-
Beverly Act, “the plaintiff must identify a ‘specific and unequivocal written
statement’ about the product that constitutes an ‘explicit guarantee.’” (T & M
Solar and Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Lennox International Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015)
83 F.Supp.3d 855, 875.)
Here, the e-mail from Eclipse’s employee Danny Zacarias stated:
“At this point we need to offer something for the customer to get his unit back
3
together? Did the Lippert tech take it apart or did a dealer take it part[.]” A
second e-mail from a different Eclipse employee stated: “Hi Darrick[:] [¶] I
talked to Danny this morning on your trailer. Danny has auth’d us to inspect
trailer once it comes in. You will need to set up transportation to get unit
here, I do have a transport company that we use. I can give you their contact
information. Right now we would be able to set up a date to do repairs,
looking mid January.”
We find these e-mails do not establish an express warranty.
To begin with, the e-mails sent by the manufacturer Eclipse were
sent in 2019, about seven years after Ritter had purchased the trailer from a
dealer in 2012. Therefore, the e-mails did not arise out of the sale of the
trailer, but arose seven years after the sale had concluded. (See § 1791.2,
subd. (a) [“‘Express warranty’ means: [¶] (1) A written statement arising out
of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good”], italics added.)
Further, the e-mails are not so specific and/or unequivocal as to
establish an explicit guarantee. They do not state that Eclipse is agreeing “to
preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the” trailer, “or provide
compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance.” (See § 1791.2,
3
Ritter was cc’d on the e-mail between Eclipse and Lippert.
12
subd. (a)(1).) Indeed, the first e-mail is in the form of a question: “At this
point we need to offer something for the customer to get his unit back
together?” And the second e-mail seems to merely indicate that Eclipse is
agreeing to “inspect” the trailer, and also to set up a date for future repairs,
depending on the outcome of its on-site inspection.
In sum, we find that the trial court properly granted Eclipse’s
motion as to Ritter’s express warranty claim.
B. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Ritter claims the trial court erred by granting Eclipse’s motion as
to his implied warranty of merchantability cause of action. We agree.
In addition to addressing express warranties, the Song-Beverly
Act also provides that “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in
this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s
implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.” (Civ. Code, § 1792.)
“‘Unlike express warranties, which are basically contractual in
nature, the implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law.’”
(Megaa RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1330.)
Consequently, the implied warranty of merchantability applies despite its
omission from a purchase contract. (See Ibid.)
“Merchantability” means that “consumer goods,” among other
things, “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (Civ.
Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a)(2).) The implied warranty “does not ‘impose a
general requirement that goods precisely fulfill the expectation of the buyer.
Instead, it provides for a minimum level of quality.’” (American Suzuki Motor
Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296.)
The Song-Beverly “Act is ‘“manifestly a remedial measure,
13
intended for the protection of the consumer; it should be given a construction
calculated to bring its benefits into action.”’” (Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966, 972.)
“The duration provision in the Song-Beverly Act provides that the
‘duration of the implied warranty of merchantability . . . shall be coextensive
in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer
goods, provided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable; but in no
event shall such implied warranty have a duration of less than 60 days nor
more than one year following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail
buyer.’” (Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1304.) The applicable statute of
limitations is four years under section 2725. (Id. at p. 1306.)
However, “[t]he implied warranty of merchantability may be
breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. [Citations.]
Indeed, ‘[u]ndisclosed latent defects . . . are the very evil that the implied
warranty of merchantability was designed to remedy.’ [Citation.] In the case
of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of
merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its
subsequent discovery.” (Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1304–1305.)
In Mexia, the plaintiff purchased a boat, but two years later its
engine corroded, and repairs were necessary. (Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1301–1302.) The plaintiff sued the manufacturer alleging a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability. (Id. at p. 1300.) The plaintiff alleged
that the malfunctions were caused by latent defects that existed at the time
of purchase. (Id. at p. 1301.) The trial court granted defendant’s demurrer
because the plaintiff did not point to any defects requiring repairs within a
year of the boat’s purchase (the period of the express warranty). (Id. at pp.
1301, 1308.) The appellate court reversed, finding that “the fact that the
14
alleged defect resulted in destructive corrosion two years after the sale of the
boat does not necessarily mean that the defect did not exist at the time of
sale.” (Id. at p. 1308.) The court concluded that because the plaintiff could
produce some evidence that the corrosion was the result of a latent defect
that existed at the time of sale, it was improper to dismiss the plaintiff’s
claim for breach of implied warranty. (Ibid.)
“Indeed, that a defect first appears after a warranty has expired
does not necessarily mean the defect did not exist when the product was
purchased.” (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 149.)
“This minimum guarantee in the implied warranty of merchantability
protects not only the vehicle purchaser, but other motorists, passengers,
pedestrians, and the public generally.” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1547.)
A “latent defect” is defined as: “A hidden or concealed defect. One
which could not be discovered by reasonable and customary observation or
inspection; . . . [¶] Defect of which owner has no knowledge, or which, in
exercising reasonable care, he should have had no knowledge. [Citations.] A
latent defect . . . is one not discoverable by inspection made with ordinary
care . . . .” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 883, col. 2.)
Here, Ritter bought the trailer in September 2012, and he did not
have any repair issues during the first year. In January of 2018, while
driving “on the freeway back from Las Vegas,” Ritter “first noticed that the
siding of the vehicle on the passenger side was moving.” Ritter “found that
the front of the vehicle felt like it was opening and closing like a mouth when
you are driving down the road, where the wall is separating from the frame.”
In 2019, Straight Line RV “found problems with the welds on the
passenger side that they said were causing the problems related to frame
15
separation on the passenger side. Straight Line RV determined that the issue
was due to cracking in the wheel chassis and upper deck frame and the walls
but was unable to perform the necessary repairs.” In March 2020, Eclipse
inspected the trailer, but informed Ritter “that they would not perform any
repairs because the side wall had purportedly delaminated due to what they
4
claimed was ‘lack of maintenance.’”
Based on the foregoing evidence, Ritter argues “that there is an
inference that the defect existed at the time of sale, given that the problem
was with the welds and that it had never happened before . . . and that the
facts must be liberally construed to support that inference.”
Conversely, based on the same evidence, Eclipse argues “a more
reasonable inference from the evidence is that any defect in the trailer
manifesting six years after purchase was most likely due to a lack of
maintenance and/or impact damage.” 5 (Italics added.)
“A summary judgment motion triggers a procedure in which the
4
All of the facts in this paragraph are taken from Ritter’s
separate statement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The record
indicates Eclipse made some evidentiary objections, but the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings are not included in the record. The facts in this paragraph
are the same facts relied on by Eclipse as stated in their respondent’s brief, so
we presume its evidentiary objections were not sustained.
5
Eclipse does not appear to dispute that a latent defect tolls the
statute of limitations under the “‘discovery rule.’” (See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 [“An important exception to the
general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a
cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the
cause of action”]; Mills v. Forestex Co., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 646
[homeowners’ breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability
claim against builder for latent defect in siding was subject to four-year
limitations period, which accrued from the date of discovery of the defect].)
16
parties pierce the pleadings to determine whether there are disputed facts
and thus whether a trial is necessary to resolve the dispute. [Citation.] Thus,
when a summary judgment is challenged, a reviewing court must examine
the facts presented by the parties to determine whether summary judgment
or summary adjudication was warranted.” (Silva v. See’s Candy Shops, Inc.
(2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 235, 260, disapproved on another ground in Donohue v.
AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58, 77.)
Here, we find that a trier of fact could reasonably draw an
inference that a defect in the siding existed at the time Ritter purchased the
trailer in 2012. We also find that a trier of fact could reasonably infer that the
defect was due to the welding issue identified by the dealer, and the defect
was “latent,” meaning that it was “one not discoverable by inspection made
with ordinary care.” (See Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 883.)
Thus, we find there are disputed issues of material fact regarding
(1) whether there was a latent defect, and (2) if so, when Ritter discovered it
(so as to begin the running of the four-year statute of limitations).
Eclipse may be correct that any defect causing the separation of
the wall from the trailer’s frame was due to Ritter’s lack of maintenance or
some intervening impact damage. But this is plainly a disputed issue of
material fact. In other words, this issue needs to be resolved by a fact finder
after an evidentiary hearing (e.g., a trial), rather than through a summary
judgment process.6 (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) [“summary
judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably
6
Indeed, Eclipse’s argument that their inference drawn from the
facts is “more reasonable” than Ritter’s inference drawn from the same facts
pretty much proves the point: a motion for summary judgment is not
appropriate as to the implied warranty of merchantability claim.
17
deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence
that raise a triable issue as to any material fact”].)
In sum, we find that the trial court improperly granted Eclipse’s
motion as to Ritter’s implied warranty claim.
C. The Federal Warranty Act
“The Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss), 15 U.S.C. sections 2301 et seq.,
authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or
express warranty. Magnuson-Moss ‘calls for the application of state written
and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law’ . . . .”
(Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824,
832–833, italics added.) As such, derivative “claims under the Magnuson-
Moss Act stand or fall with [the] express and implied warranty claims under
state law.” (Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 534 F.3d 1017, 1022.)
Here, Ritter’s implied warranty cause of action stands under
state law (as we have discussed in this opinion); therefore, that derivative
portion of Ritter’s federal warranty cause of action stands as well. 7
7
“Although the Magnuson–Moss Act creates a separate federal
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty, courts must look to the
relevant state law to determine the meaning and creation of any implied
warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (‘The term “implied warranty” means an
implied warranty arising under State law . . . in connection with the sale by a
supplier of a consumer product.’). As alleged in the Complaint, the first and
second causes of action rely on the creation of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness under California’s Song–Beverly Act.” (Gusse v.
Damon Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2007) 470 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1116.)
18
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment granting Eclipse’s motion for summary judgment
is reversed. The judgment granting Eclipse’s motion for summary
adjudication is reversed in part and affirmed in part. As to the first cause of
action (the express warranty claim), the judgment is affirmed. As to the third
cause of action (the implied warranty claim), the judgment is reversed. As to
the second cause of action (the federal warranty claim), the judgment is
reversed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Ritter.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
19
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