CourtListener 10286449•People v. Alonso CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 12/2/24 P. v. Alonso CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330510
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA155399-01)
v.
VICTOR ALONSO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Seth P. McCutcheon and William H. Shin, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Victor Alonso appeals from his judgment of conviction of,
among other offenses, two counts of attempted murder of a peace
officer (Pen. Code1 §§ 664, 187) and one count of second degree
robbery (§ 211), with multiple firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5,
subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)). At sentencing, the trial court
imposed a 20-year term on one of the firearm enhancements, and
stayed all other enhancements under section 654. On appeal,
Alonso contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the
trial court erred in staying the remaining firearm enhancements
because it was required to either strike them, or to impose and
stay them. We agree the matter must be remanded for the trial
court to decide whether to exercise its discretion to strike any of
the firearm enhancements, and if it declines to do so, to properly
impose and stay the enhancements in accordance with
section 12022.53, subdivision (f). We accordingly affirm the
judgment of conviction and remand for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at trial
On August 30, 2021, Anthony Viramontes met with Alonso
and another man, Christian Anthony Jaimes Lopez, to sell them
jewelry valued at approximately $20,000. Alonso and Lopez
arrived together in a Dodge Ram truck. After exiting the vehicle,
Alonso approached Viramontes, pulled a firearm from his
waistband, and said, “Give it to me or I’ll put you down.” While
Viramontes handed the jewelry to Alonso, Lopez took
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
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Viramontes’s car keys and cell phone. Alonso and Lopez then got
back in the truck and left.
Viramontes flagged down a passing patrol car that was
occupied by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies Jonathan
Cufley and David Escobedo. As Viramontes was reporting the
robbery to the deputies, he saw Alonso and Lopez drive by the
area. The deputies began pursuing the suspect truck in their
patrol car. After making a U-turn on a residential street, the
truck came to a stop, facing the patrol car head-on. From the
passenger seat of the truck, Alonso fired at least 27 shots at the
patrol car as the deputies took cover and returned fire. Thirteen
of the shots fired by Alonso hit the patrol car, and one struck
Deputy Cufley in the head, seriously injuring him.
While Lopez surrendered at the scene of the shootout,
Alonso fled on foot. Alonso went to his brother-in-law’s house,
and asked to borrow a vehicle. Later that night, Alonso led the
police on another high-speed chase while driving his brother-in-
law’s car. Alonso eventually crashed the vehicle into a wall, and
following a brief foot pursuit, he surrendered to the police.
During a search of the Dodge truck involved in the robbery
and shooting, the police recovered three semi-automatic firearms.
The police recovered a fourth firearm that Alonso discarded on
the street as he was fleeing the scene of the shootout. Alonso’s
DNA was found on each of the firearms and on a bag of
ammunition seized from the truck.
At trial, the parties stipulated that Alonso previously had
been convicted of a felony.
II. Jury verdict
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Alonso guilty
as charged of the attempted premeditated murder of Deputy
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Cufley (count 1), the attempted premeditated murder of Deputy
Escobedo (count 2), the second degree robbery of Viramontes
(count 3), reckless driving while fleeing a pursuing peace officer
(count 4), and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5). As to
count 1, the jury found that Alonso personally inflicted great
bodily injury on Deputy Cufley within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a). As to counts 1 and 2, the jury
found that Alonso personally used a firearm within the meaning
of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and section 12022.53,
subdivision (b), and that Alonso personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (c). As to count 3, the jury found that Alonso
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (b).
III. Sentencing
At sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court to
strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c). Defense counsel argued that such dismissal was
in furtherance of justice because multiple firearm enhancements
were alleged, application of each enhancement would result in a
sentence of over 20 years, and the underlying crimes were
connected to childhood trauma suffered by Alonso. The
prosecution asserted that the imposition of each enhancement
was warranted because the crimes were egregious and the result
of an unprovoked attack in which Alonso used multiple firearms.
After hearing the argument of counsel, the trial court
sentenced Alonso to an aggregate term of 30 years to life plus
26 years in state prison, calculated as follows:
As to count 1, the court imposed a term of 15 years to life
for the attempted murder of Deputy Cufley, plus consecutive
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terms of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and 20 years for the
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c).
The court stayed the sentences on the firearm enhancements
under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) pursuant to section 654.
As to count 2, the court imposed a consecutive term of
15 years to life for the attempted murder of Deputy Escobedo.
The court stayed the sentences on the firearm enhancements
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) and section
12022.5, subdivision (a) pursuant to section 654.
As to count 3, the court imposed a consecutive term of three
years for the robbery of Viramontes. The court stayed the
sentence on the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) pursuant to section 654. Although the court ruled
that it was also staying the sentence on the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), no such enhancement was
alleged by the People or found true by the jury as to count 3.
As to counts 4 and 5, the court imposed concurrent terms of
two years for each of those offenses.
Alonso filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Alonso raises two arguments regarding his
sentence. First, Alonso contends the trial court issued an
unauthorized sentence when it stayed all but one of the firearm
enhancements found true by the jury instead of imposing or
striking them. Second, Alonso claims the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to strike each of the firearm enhancements in
furtherance of justice under section 1385. The Attorney General
concedes the sentence was unauthorized because the trial court
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should have either stricken the remaining firearm enhancements
under section 1385, subdivision (c), or imposed and then stayed
the enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (f).
We agree that the trial court issued an unauthorized sentence
with respect to the firearm enhancements, and that the matter
must be remanded for resentencing.
I. Governing law
Sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 provide for an additional
term of imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the commission
or attempted commission of a crime. (People v. Gonzalez (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1118, 1124 (Gonzalez).) Section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) mandates a sentence enhancement of 3, 4, or
10 years for the personal use of a firearm in the commission of
any felony. Section 12022.53 establishes a tiered system of
sentence enhancements for certain enumerated felonies,
including attempted murder and robbery, that involve the use of
a firearm. Subdivision (b) of the statute requires a 10-year
enhancement for the personal use of a firearm; subdivision (c)
mandates a 20-year enhancement for the personal and
intentional discharge of a firearm; and subdivision (d) provides
for a 25-year-to-life enhancement for the personal and intentional
discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death to a
person other than an accomplice. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).)
While multiple firearm enhancements may be alleged and
found true by the jury, section 12022.53, subdivision (f) provides
that “[o]nly one additional term of imprisonment under this
section shall be imposed per person for each crime. If more than
one enhancement per person is found true under this section, the
court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that
provides the longest term of imprisonment. An enhancement
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involving a firearm specified in Section . . . 12022.5 . . . shall not
be imposed on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed
pursuant to this section.” Our Supreme Court has construed this
provision to mean that, “after a trial court imposes punishment
for the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with the longest
term of imprisonment, the remaining section 12022.53 firearm
enhancements and any section 12022.5 firearm enhancements
that were found true for the same crime must be imposed and
then stayed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) The Court
also explained that a stay in such circumstances is governed by
section 12022.53, subdivision (f), rather than section 654, “which
applies only to offenses punishable in different ways, not to
prohibited enhancements committed in the commission of an
unstayed offense.” (Gonzalez, at p. 1123, fn. 5.)
In addition, under section 1385, subdivision (c), the trial
court has discretion to strike or dismiss a sentence enhancement
“if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” This includes any
firearm enhancement otherwise required to be imposed under
sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53,
subd. (h); see People v. Johnson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074,
1085–1086.) “Ordinarily, an enhancement must be either
imposed or stricken ‘in furtherance of justice’ under . . . section
1385. [Citations.] The trial court has no authority to stay an
enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only
basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.”
(People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364; accord, People
v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 139.) The trial court’s failure
to either impose or strike an enhancement when it is required to
do so results in an unauthorized sentence. (People v. Vizcarra
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(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 432; People v. Flores (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 174, 187.)
II. Remand is required for the trial court to decide
whether to strike or impose each of the firearm
enhancements found true by the jury
In this case, the jury returned true findings on a total of
seven firearm enhancement allegations: (1) three enhancements
alleged as to count 1 under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and
12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c); (2) three enhancements alleged
as to count 2 under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and
12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c); and (3) one enhancement
alleged as to count 3 under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
At sentencing, Alonso’s counsel asked the trial court to
strike each of the firearm enhancements in furtherance of justice
under section 1385, subdivision (c). In pronouncing the sentence,
however, the trial court never expressly stated whether it was
declining to do so. Instead, the court imposed one 20-year term
on the section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement alleged as
to count 1, and then stayed all remaining firearm enhancements
alleged as to counts 1, 2, and 3. At the sentencing hearing, the
court indicated that it was exercising “its discretion” to stay the
remaining firearm enhancements. But in its minute order, the
court stated that the enhancements were stayed “pursuant to
Penal Code Section 654.”
The parties agree, as do we, that the trial court erred in
staying all but one of the firearm enhancements under
section 654, and that the matter must be remanded for
resentencing. As to each firearm enhancement found true by
the jury, the court was required to first decide whether to
exercise its discretion to strike any of the enhancements in
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furtherance of justice under section 1385, subdivision (c). Then,
for any of the firearm enhancements not stricken, the court was
required to impose the enhancement that carries the longest term
of imprisonment, and to impose and stay any remaining
enhancements that were found true for the same offense in
accordance with section 12022.53, subdivision (f). (Gonzalez,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1124.)
As to counts 1 and 2, this means that if the trial court
declines to exercise its discretion to strike any of the firearm
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c), then it must
impose a sentence on each firearm enhancement that it does not
strike, and must stay all but the longest firearm enhancement
imposed for each count under section 12022.53, subdivision (f).
As to count 3, however, there was only one firearm enhancement
found true by the jury. This means that if the court declines to
strike the firearm enhancement alleged as to count 3, then it
must impose the 10-year term required for that enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
Because we are remanding the matter for resentencing,
we need not address Alonso’s claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to strike each of the firearm enhancements
under section 1385, subdivision (c). We express no opinion as to
how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence is
vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing. On remand, the trial court must decide whether to
exercise its discretion to strike any of the firearm enhancements
found true by the jury under section 1385, subdivision (c), and if
it declines to do so, to properly impose and then stay the firearm
enhancements, as provided in section 12022.53, subdivision (f).
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
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