CourtListener 10284113•People v. Mendoza CA5
Testo completo
Filed 11/26/24 P. v. Mendoza CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087191
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F15906992)
v.
FERNANDO GARCIA MENDOZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. F. Brian
Alvarez, Judge.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Warda Ali-
Baloch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Fernando Garcia Mendoza was charged with two counts of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7,
subd (a) [counts 1–2]) and continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)
[count 3]). In connection with count 3, the information alleged he personally inflicted
bodily harm on a victim who was under 14 years of age (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(7), (j)(1)).
Prior to deliberation, the trial court—taking into account People v. Cross (2008) 45
Cal.4th 58 (Cross)—instructed: “A pregnancy without medical complications may
support a finding of bodily harm.” The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found
true the personal-infliction-of-bodily-harm circumstance. The court imposed 25 years to
life on count 1, a consecutive 25 years to life on count 2, and a consecutive life term
without the possibility of parole on count 3.
On appeal, defendant contends the aforementioned pregnancy instruction was
erroneous. Though we conclude this instruction was premised on a misunderstanding of
Cross’s holding, we affirm the judgment because the error was not prejudicial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jane Doe2 was born in 2002. She knew defendant—who is 33 years her senior—
since she was five or six years old. Defendant dated Jane’s mother and is the godfather of
two of Jane’s siblings. At trial, Jane testified defendant sexually abused her more than 50
times over a five-year span.
I. Facts underlying count 1
In March 2010, while Jane’s then-pregnant mother was in the hospital undergoing
labor and delivery “for a couple of days,” Jane and her siblings stayed home with
1 Subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the victim by a pseudonym to protect her privacy. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2.
defendant. At some point during this period, defendant inserted his penis into Jane’s
anus. The penetration “hurt” and Jane “felt like poop was gonna come out.”
II. Facts underlying count 2
Sometime in 2010 or 2011, defendant drove Jane and her brother to a vineyard
under the pretense of taking her to soccer practice. Defendant ordered Jane to “go in the
back seat” and Jane’s brother to stay in the front passenger seat and “watch in case”
“people from the fields come.” Defendant followed Jane to the backseat and removed
her shorts and underwear. Even though she repeatedly kicked him, he ended up on top of
her, “put his penis in [her] vagina,” and moved “back and forth.” Jane cried and “told
him to stop” because she “was hurting” and “bleeding.”
III. Facts underlying count 3
The following incidents of sexual abuse occurred between March 7, 2012, and
October 31, 2015:
At least once, defendant drove Jane to a field near a swap meet venue. In the
backseat of his van, he inserted his penis into her rectum, which “really hurt” her
physically.
Approximately two to four times, when Jane was around 10 years of age,
defendant took her to a hotel to engage in vaginal and anal intercourse. On at least one
occasion, he ejaculated.
At least twice, when Jane was around 12 years old, defendant drove her to a
location near a high school. In the backseat of his van, he “pulled down her shorts” and
“put his penis in [her] vagina.”
In April or May 2015, Jane—then 13 years of age—was at home when defendant
“came back” after “drop[ping] off [her] mom at the grocery store.” He took her “into her
mother’s bedroom,” “[p]ulled down her shorts,” “inserted his penis inside of her vagina,”
and ejaculated. Defendant would repeat this pattern—i.e., drop off Jane’s mother at the
3.
grocery store, return to the residence, and have sex with Jane—“two or three or four
times.” The last of these incidents took place in October 2015.
On November 3, 2015, Jane experienced severe abdominal pain. She went to the
bathroom because she “thought [she] had to poop.” However, after “pushing” “for ten
minutes,” “a baby came out.” Paramedics arrived at Jane’s home and extracted the
stillborn baby from the toilet. The size and weight of the baby indicated Jane had been
pregnant for 22 to 24 weeks. Meanwhile, Jane—whose umbilical cord “was still hanging
out”—was bleeding, “in pain,” “shaking” “like she had [a] fever,” and “crying.” She
“didn’t know [she] was pregnant . . . .” Jane was transported to a hospital, where she
delivered the placenta and bled “quite a bit.” She developed a fever and fundal
tenderness and was prescribed antibiotics and ibuprofen. Jane was discharged on
November 6, 2015.
DISCUSSION
I. The pregnancy instruction was premised on a misunderstanding of
Cross’s holding, but the error was not prejudicial.
a. Pertinent criminal statutes
“Any person who either resides in the same home with the minor child or has
recurring access to the child, who over a period of time, not less than three months in
duration, engages in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under
the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense, as defined in subdivision
(b) of Section 1203.066, or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, as defined in
Section 288, with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the
offense is guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years.” (§ 288.5,
subd. (a).)
4.
“ ‘Substantial sexual conduct’ means penetration of the vagina or rectum of either
the victim or the offender by the penis of the other or by any foreign object, oral
copulation, or masturbation of either the victim or the offender.” (§ 1203.066, subd. (b).)
“[A] person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon
or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual
desires of that person or the child, is guilty of a felony . . . .” (§ 288, subd. (a).)
Section 667.61, known as the One Strike law, “mandates indeterminate sentences
for defendants who commit certain sexual offenses under specified circumstances.”
(People v. Betts (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 294, 297.) Under the One Strike law, a person
convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age who personally
inflicted bodily harm on the victim shall be imprisoned for life without the possibility of
parole. (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(9), (d)(7), (j)(1).) “As used in this section, ‘bodily harm’
means any substantial physical injury resulting from the use of force that is more than the
force necessary to commit” a violation of section 288.5. (§ 667.61, subd. (k); see Black’s
Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) pp. 783–784 [“force” defined as “[s]trength or energy exerted;
the cause of motion or change”].)
b. Background
The prosecution moved in limine for the following jury instruction:
“If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 3, you must
then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that
the defendant personally inflicted bodily harm on [Jane] while she was
under 14 years old during the commission of or as a direct result of that
crime.
“A pregnancy without medical complications may support a finding of
bodily harm.”
The first paragraph modified the first paragraph of CALCRIM No. 3160 (Great Bodily
Injury). The second paragraph paraphrased the California Supreme Court’s holding in
5.
Cross that a pregnancy without medical complications resulting from unlawful but
nonforcible sexual conduct with a minor can support a finding of great bodily injury
within the meaning of section 12022.7. (See Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 60–61, 63–
66.) The trial court deferred its ruling.
After close of evidence, the following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: . . . . Okay, [CALCRIM No.] 3160 deals with a
pinpoint instruction and was an in limine motion raised by the People. This
is the time now to address that. The People’s initial request was to include
some language that the bodily harm should occur in the commission of or
as a direct result of that crime. I’m declining to give that language because
that language does not track the Penal Code for which this allegation
derives. Do the People want to be heard?
“[PROSECUTION]: No, Your Honor, I agree. The change – the
correction the Court made is appropriate.
“THE COURT: All right, now you’ve requested a pinpoint as
follows: ‘A pregnancy without medical complications may support a
finding of bodily harm.’ Make your record, please.
“[PROSECUTION]: That is based upon . . . Cross, supra, 45
Cal.4th 58 where the Court held that pregnancy even where it does not
result in medical complications if it results from unlawful sexual conduct
with a minor, it can support a finding of great bodily injury. I recognize
this is not – the allegation is not great bodily injury, it’s in a sense more
simple, it’s simply bodily harm or substantial injury. But I believe it’s – the
analysis would be equivalent.
“THE COURT: All right. Does Defense care to be heard?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’ll just make an objection for the
record.
“THE COURT: Okay. All right. I’m going to give that pinpoint
instruction, noting the objection for the record. There’s also the definition
of bodily harm, which the Court will give as this is the definition included
in [section 667.61, subdivision (k)]. ‘Bodily harm means any substantial
physical injury resulting from the use of force that is more than the force
necessary to commit the offense charged in Count Three,’ period. Does
anyone want to be heard further with regards to that definition?
6.
“[PROSECUTION]: No, Your Honor.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.
“THE COURT: All right. Then I’m going to give [CALCRIM No.]
3160 noting the objection to the pinpoint portion of that instruction. . . .[3]”
The court gave the jury the following modified CALCRIM No. 3160:
“If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 3,
you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the defendant personally inflicted bodily harm on [Jane] who
was under 14 years of age.
“Bodily Harm means any substantial physical injury resulting from
the use of force that is more than the force necessary to commit the offense
charged in Count 3.
“Committing the crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child, as
charged in Count 3, is not by itself the infliction of bodily harm.
“A pregnancy without medical complications may support a finding
of bodily harm.
“The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
that the allegation has not been proved.”
c. Analysis
On appeal, defendant does not challenge his conviction for continuous sexual
abuse of a child on count 3. Instead, he argues the personal-infliction-of-bodily-harm
circumstance finding must be stricken because the modified CALCRIM No. 3160
instruction “misstated the law” and prejudiced him.
i. Error
“In a criminal trial, the court must give an instruction requested by a party if the
instruction correctly states the law and relates to a material question upon which there is
3 The case citation in the quoted text was reformatted to conform with the general
rules of citation outlined by the California Style Manual. (See generally Cal. Style
Manual (4th ed. 2000).)
7.
evidence substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Anderson
(2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1279.) “Even without a request, the court is required to
give correct jury instructions on the general principles of law relevant to issues raised by
the evidence.” (Ibid.) “We review de novo the question of whether a jury instruction
correctly states the law.” (People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 465.)
No standard jury instruction covers the One Strike law’s personal-infliction-of-
bodily-harm circumstance in section 667.61. Thus, an appropriate instruction had to be
fashioned. CALCRIM No. 3160, which pertains to findings of great bodily injury (see
§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8), 667.61, subd. (d)(6), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8),
served as the template for the prosecution’s proposed instruction.
CALCRIM No. 3160 reads in relevant part:
“If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s]
________[,] . . . you must then decide whether . . . the People have proved
the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury on ________ <insert name of injured person> during the
commission . . . of that crime. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
“[Committing the crime of ________ <insert sexual offense charged> is not
by itself the infliction of great bodily injury.] [¶] . . . [¶]
“The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
that the allegation has not been proved.”
The modified CALCRIM No. 3160, ultimately issued to the jury, revised the foregoing
language. In the first paragraph, “great bodily injury” was replaced with “bodily harm,”
and the victim was specifically identified as “under 14 years of age.” In the second
paragraph, the definition of “[g]reat bodily injury” was replaced with section 667.61,
subdivision (k)’s definition of “[b]odily harm.” In the third paragraph, “great bodily
injury” was again replaced with “bodily harm.” Finally, between the third and final
8.
paragraphs, the following sentence was added: “A pregnancy without medical
complications may support a finding of bodily harm.”
We find nothing amiss with the changes to CALCRIM No. 3160’s first three
paragraphs, which better comport with the wording of section 667.61, subdivisions (d)(7)
and (k). On the other hand, to the extent the prosecution and the trial court believed
Cross stands for the proposition that a pregnancy without medical complications may
support a finding of the bodily harm circumstance of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(7),
they are mistaken.
In Cross, the 39-year-old defendant had sexual intercourse with the 13-year-old
victim multiple times. (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 61.) Thereafter, the victim became
pregnant, carried the fetus for 22 weeks, and underwent a surgical abortion with no
medical complications. (Id. at pp. 61–62.) The jury convicted the defendant of lewd
conduct in violation of section 288, subdivision (a) and—having been instructed “the
pregnancy . . . could be great bodily injury”—found true an allegation under section
12022.7 that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense.
(Cross, supra, at p. 63.) The defendant appealed and the Sixth Appellate District
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court granted the
defendant’s petition for review. It affirmed the appellate court’s decision (id. at pp. 63,
69), holding a pregnancy without medical complications resulting from unlawful but
nonforcible sexual conduct with a minor can support a finding of great bodily injury
within the meaning of section 12022.7. (See Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 60–61, 63–
66.) It described the relevant great bodily injury as “significant or substantial.” (Cross,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 66.)
Cross did not address the One Strike law’s bodily harm circumstance (§ 667.61,
subd. (d)(7)), the circumstance alleged in this case. Instead, Cross concerned the One
Strike law’s great bodily injury circumstance (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6)). In fact, Cross
predated the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1844 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.), which added
9.
subdivisions (d)(7), (j), and (k) to section 667.61; the subdivisions relevant here. (Stats.
2010, ch. 219, § 16.)
Section 667.61, subdivision (d)(7), states, “[t]he defendant personally inflicted
bodily harm on the victim who was under 14 years of age.” Subdivision (k) of section
667.61 defines “bodily harm,” not simply as a significant or substantial bodily injury, but
as “any substantial physical injury resulting from the use of force that is more than the
force necessary to commit [the underlying felony sex offense.]” (§ 667.61, subd. (k).)
Hence, in section 667.61, “great bodily injury” and “bodily harm” are not identical terms.
“[T]he trial court’s obligation is to state the law correctly.” (People v. Runnion (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 852, 858.) The language in the instruction regarding pregnancy was not
supported by the holding in Cross.
ii. Prejudice
“Where a jury is instructed on alternate theories of liability, one legally valid and
one legally invalid, a federal constitutional error has occurred. The defendant has been
deprived of his or her right to ‘a jury properly instructed in the relevant law.’
[Citations.]” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 580; see People v. Aledamat (2019) 8
Cal.5th 1, 7, fn. 3 [“ ‘alternative-theory error’ ”].) “We evaluate the prejudice of such
errors under the heightened standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . .”
(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 602.) “Under Chapman’s familiar standard, we
reverse a conviction ‘unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and
considering all relevant circumstances,’ the reviewing court ‘determines the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[A] reviewing court may hold
the error harmless where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to
make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would
support a valid theory of liability.” (In re Lopez, supra, at p. 568.)
Here, in addition to the legally invalid Cross-based pregnancy instruction, the
modified CALCRIM No. 3160 included language properly setting forth the elements
10.
required for a finding of personal infliction of bodily harm under the One Strike law:
(1) the accused personally inflicted a substantial physical injury on the victim; and (2) the
injury resulted from the use of force exceeding the force necessary to commit the
underlying felony sex offense. (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(7), (k).) The first element is
tantamount to a finding of great bodily injury. (Compare § 12022.7, subd. (f)
[“significant or substantial physical injury”] with § 667.61, subd. (k) [“any substantial
physical injury”].) It is the second element that differentiates the section 667.61 bodily
harm from great bodily injury.
We conclude the erroneous Cross-based pregnancy instruction was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence that defendant impregnated Jane still
constituted personal infliction of bodily harm under the One Strike law. First, pregnancy
“involves a significant bodily impairment primarily affecting a woman’s health and well
being” (People v. Sargent (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 148, 151) and “amounts to significant
and substantial bodily injury or damage” (ibid.), all the more so where—as here—the
victim is only 13 years old (see Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 61). Furthermore, as Jane’s
testimony showed, “[c]hildbirth is an agonizing experience” (People v. Sargent, supra, at
p. 152) and a stillbirth “speaks for itself” (ibid.; see People v. Meneses (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 1087, 1091 [“self-evident trauma”]).
Second, pregnancy is “[t]he state of a female after conception and until the
termination of the gestation.” (Stedman’s Medical Dict. Online (2014)
<https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id936d7f370ec11e4b9b9ea2bcc83d096/View/Full
Text.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0> [as
of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/HHU6-AJCX>.) Conception is the
“[f]ertilization of oocyte by a sperm.” (Stedman’s Medical Dict. Online (2014)
<https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id1278c6570ec11e4b9b9ea2bcc83d096/View/Full
Text.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0> [as
of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/RML7-LN7A>; see 1 Attorneys Medical
11.
Advisor, § 14:1 [“fertilization of the egg”] <https://www.westlaw.com/Document/
I06510e0ab2aa11d9927fe0461d5ad95f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&con
textData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/Q66B-2WPJ>.) Fertilization cannot commence without the deposit of
sperm in the vagina (see 17 Attorneys Textbook of Medicine (3d ed.) § 294.02
<https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/86205e91-3413-4407-8411-aafaec730882/
?context=1530671> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/P4PC-VVP6>),
a feat accomplished through emission and ejaculation (see 1 Attorneys Medical Advisor,
§ 11:6 <https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I065071d3b2aa11d9927fe0461d5ad95f/
View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=c
blt1.0> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/GK5M-DF5K>).4
“Continuous sexual abuse requires proof of at least three acts of substantial sexual
contact or lewd and lascivious conduct over a period of at least three months.” (People v.
Ogg (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 173, 182, citing § 288.5.) Penile penetration of a victim’s
vagina or rectum already constitutes substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (b);
4 “ ‘Ejaculation’ and ‘emission’ are the terms given to the series of events which
starts with the movement of sperm into the vas deferens, continues with the production of
semen and ends with expulsion of semen from the penis. As the two terms imply, these
events can be understood as occurring in two stages, each controlled by a different
section of the spinal cord. The first stage, emission, is stimulated by that portion of the
spinal cord labelled ‘L-1’ and ‘L-2’ (vertebrae in the lumbar region). During emission,
the epididymis, the smooth muscle in the walls of the vas deferens, prostate and seminal
vesicles contract in wavelike movements (peristaltic waves), which squeeze the fluid
along its path to the penis from the testes. [¶] The second stage, ejaculation, is
stimulated by the sacral region (below the lumbar region) of the spinal cord. During
ejaculation, the seminal vesicles, prostate and bulbourethral glands secrete their products.
When semen reaches the penis, muscles at the base of the penis (bulbocavernosus and
ischiocavernosus muscles) contract to propel semen out of the body.” (1 Attorneys
Medical Advisor, § 11:6, fn. omitted <https://www.westlaw.com/Document/
I065071d3b2aa11d9927fe0461d5ad95f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&con
textData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/GK5M-DF5K>.)
12.
see People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 340 [“force inherent in the act of
penetration”]), rendering unnecessary evidence of emission and ejaculation into the
vagina (cf. People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1079 [“Ejaculation . . . is not an
element of rape; all that is required is ‘sexual penetration, however slight.’ ”]). Lewd and
lascivious conduct “requires ‘ “any touching” of an underage child accomplished with the
intent of arousing the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the child.’ ” (People v.
Lopez (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229, quoting People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th
434, 452; see § 288, subd. (a).) Likewise, a violation of section 288 does not depend on
proof of emission or ejaculation into the vagina. (See People v. Pilgrim (1963) 215
Cal.App.2d 374, 379.) Neither mere penetration nor “touching with lustful intent”
(People v. Coontz (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 276, 279) can initiate the fertilization process.
Therefore, a pregnancy that results from continuous sexual abuse entails the use of force
exceeding the force necessary to commit this felony.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SMITH, J.
MEEHAN, J.
13.
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.