Bond v. Lilly CA4/1

CourtListener 10283269Calctapp25 nov 2024

Testo completo

Filed 11/25/24 Bond v. Lilly CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

GEOFFREY R. BOND, D082738

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00003481-CU-WT-CTL)
BRIAN LILLY, SR. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Keri G. Katz, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Garcia Hong Law, Valerie Garcia Hong, Christina G. Bernstein, and
Mark Simpliciano, for Defendants and Appellants.
Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian and Jill McDonell, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In a prior action, defendants Brenda Lilly and Brian Lilly, Sr. (the
Lillys) sued University of California, San Diego’s (UCSD) former men’s
rowing head coach Geoff Bond, associate athletic director Katie McGann,
athletic director Earl Edwards, and the Regents of the University of
California in federal court after their son Brian Lilly, Jr. (Brian), a UCSD
student rower, tragically died by suicide in January 2021. The Lillys alleged
that UCSD and the named administrators were to blame for their son’s
death. Around the time the Lillys filed their lawsuit, they and their attorney
provided interviews and statements to multiple news media outlets in which
they claimed that Bond was an abusive coach and caused Brian’s mental
health issues, as they alleged in their federal complaint. Bond then sued the
Lillys in state court for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, alleging that the Lillys’ statements to the media were false and
defamatory. The Lillys now appeal from the trial court’s order denying their
special motion to strike as a strategic lawsuit against public participation
(SLAPP) the two causes of action asserted by Bond against them. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 425.16.1)
The trial court found, and the parties agree, that the Lillys met their
initial burden of showing that the allegedly defamatory statements were
protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. The main question
presented on appeal is whether the trial court correctly found that the Lillys
failed to establish that their statements were protected by the fair and true
report privilege, which shields from liability fair and true communications to
the media of judicial proceedings or statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d)(1).) The Lillys contend that their
statements to the media about Bond were fair and true reports of the
allegations in their federal complaint. If some or all of the Lillys’ statements
are not privileged, we must further determine whether Bond has met his

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.

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responsive burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits of his
claims as to any unprivileged statements.
On de novo review, we conclude that the fair and true report privilege
applies to all but one of the allegedly defamatory statements made by the
Lillys, and Bond has not shown a probability of prevailing as to the
remaining statement. The trial court thus erred in denying the anti-SLAPP
motion, and we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background as Alleged in Bond’s Complaint
Geoff Bond was the head coach of the UCSD men’s rowing program
from October 2019 to January 2022. In 2019, UCSD student Brian Lilly
became a walk-on rower for the team.
In January 2020, rowing team captains reported to Bond that they had
been approached by several women who said one of their rowing teammates,
Z.B., had sexually harassed them. Brian became upset and suspicious about
the way UCSD was handling the complaints against Z.B., so Bond called a
meeting with Brian and a few others in the rowing program to discuss his
concerns. Brian was angry that Z.B. had not been kicked off the team. In
February 2020, there was an in-boat altercation between Brian and Z.B.
during practice, after which Bond pulled the two of them aside and instructed
them to control their behavior or leave the team.
In March 2020, UCSD’s rowing season ended due to the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Brian returned to live with his parents in New York.
At some point after returning home, Brian began to suffer from mental
illness, and his mental health continued to decline in the coming months. He
ultimately checked himself into a hospital to treat symptoms of schizophrenia
and a psychotic episode. Brian underwent in- and out-patient treatment.

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In June 2020, Brian responded to an anonymous UCSD survey
distributed to members of the men’s rowing team with a 23-page response
containing allegations about Bond with the goal, as understood by Bond, of
getting him removed as coach. In the survey response, Brian alleged
misconduct by Bond and referenced the perceived mishandling of the Title IX
complaints against Z.B.
In December 2020, Brian informed Bond that he was returning to
UCSD for in-person learning but would be opting out of the rowing program
for the winter quarter, with an intent to return for the spring season in April
2021. Brian returned to UCSD in or around late December 2020.
On January 4, 2021, Brian’s mother called Bond and informed him
Brian had died by suicide. Bond was heartbroken and offered Brenda his
condolences. On January 15, Brenda texted Bond with a link to Brian’s
obituary and later thanked him for the “beautiful flowers from UCSD men’s
rowing.” On January 16, Bond and other members of UCSD’s men’s rowing
team attended Brian’s funeral service, which was held via Zoom. After the
funeral, Bond texted Brenda, “[i]t was a beautiful service, Brenda. Thank
you for allowing us to join you.” Brenda responded, “Thank you for being part
of it.”
In June 2021, Bond was informed that UCSD was conducting an
investigation into Bond’s time coaching at the University of Pennsylvania.
However, they offered him a one-year contract renewal to continue coaching
the men’s rowing team, which Bond signed.
At some point after his contract renewal, Bond learned that Brian’s
parents had indicated their intent to file a wrongful death lawsuit against
UCSD and himself, among others. On September 30, 2021, the Lillys filed
their lawsuit in federal court, alleging in part that Bond caused Brian’s

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death. On or around September 30, October 1, and October 5, the Lillys and
their attorney made various statements about Bond’s allegedly abusive
conduct to news reporters that were quoted in three print news articles and
one news video.
In January 2022, UCSD terminated Bond, stating that they wanted to
take the rowing program in a different direction.
In December 2022, Bond filed his first amended complaint against the
Lillys and the Regents of the University of California. He asserted claims of
whistle-blower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 as well as
retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation in violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, §12900, et seq.) against the
Regents of the University of California, and claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and defamation against the Lillys.
B. The Lillys’ Anti-SLAPP Motion
The Lillys filed a special motion to strike the two causes of action
against them in Bond’s first amended complaint under section 425.16, known
as an anti-SLAPP motion. The Lillys claimed that Bond’s claims arose from
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(l), (e)(2) and (e)(4),
because their alleged conduct involved “statements ‘made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body,’ or statements
‘made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
issue of public interest,’ or ‘any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise
of . . . the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.’ ” They further argued that it was not probable
Bond would prevail on the merits of his claims and that his claims were
barred by the litigation privilege and the fair and true report privilege.

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Bond argued in opposition that the litigation privilege did not apply
because it does not extend to publications to the general public through the
press; the fair report privilege did not apply because the Lillys failed to show
that their original publication to the news media was made after they filed
their complaint, none of their statements expressly referenced the lawsuit,
and one of their statements was not contained in their complaint; the
evidence showed that the Lillys’ statements were false; and, in any event, the
Lillys conceded Bond’s prima facie case because their motion only contained
argument regarding the litigation and fair report privileges.
The Lillys argued on reply that Bond had failed to provide admissible
evidence that established a probability of prevailing on the merits and
reiterated that his claims were barred by the litigation and fair report
privileges.
C. Trial Court Ruling
The trial court held a hearing on the Lillys’ anti-SLAPP motion and,
shortly after, adopted its tentative ruling denying the motion. The court first
rejected the Lillys’ litigation privilege argument, finding that although the
content of the Lillys’ alleged statements was related to their lawsuit, they
failed to establish how their statements had a “functional connection” to the
lawsuit as required under Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134,
1146.
The trial court also agreed with Bond that for the fair report privilege
to apply, the Lillys were required to establish their statements to the news
outlets were made after they filed their lawsuit. The court found that “the
critical issue is not the contents of these publications, but the timing of the
statements made by the Lillys to the news media outlets . . . . In this
circumstance, to invoke the fair report privilege, the Lillys must establish

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that the initial publication to the news media outlets was made after the
Lillys filed their federal court action. Absent establishing the timing of the
Lillys’ alleged statements to the news media outlets, the court finds the Lillys
fail to meet their burden of establishing that Plaintiff’s Defamation and IIED
causes of action are barred by the fair report privilege.”
Finally, the trial court accepted Bond’s argument that the Lillys’ anti-
SLAPP “motion was limited to the litigation privilege and the fair report
privilege.” It therefore declined to address the question of whether Bond had
established a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims.
DISCUSSION
I
A. Anti-SLAPP Legal Principles
California’s anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a special motion to strike
any claim “against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 sets forth four categories of
protected activity: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before
a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or
(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right

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of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4).)
Our review of an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is de
novo and involves a two-step process. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061, 1067.) We first determine
whether the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from
activity protected under section 425.16. (Id. at p. 1061.) If the defendant
makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
the merits of the claim by establishing a probability of success. (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Our review at this second step is
similar to our review of a ruling on a summary judgment motion. (Ibid.) We
accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true and consider the defendant’s evidence
only to determine whether it defeats the challenged claim as a matter of law.
(Id. at p. 385.) Claims with at least minimal merit may proceed. (Ibid.)
The parties agree with the trial court that Bond’s claims arise from
protected activity. Bond did not dispute this point below, nor does he do so on
appeal. We therefore assume the Lillys met their burden at the first step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis and move directly to the second step to determine
whether Bond has shown that his claims have merit.
B. Probability of Prevailing
The Lillys contend Bond cannot establish a probability of prevailing on
his claims for several reasons. First, they argue that the fair and true report
privilege applies to the allegedly defamatory statements and therefore
precludes a finding for Bond on the merits. Second, even if the privilege does
not apply, Bond was a limited purpose public figure and was therefore
required to show that the statements were made with malice. Third, Bond
failed to establish that the statements were false. Finally, the allegedly

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defamatory statements were nonactionable opinion. The Lillys further argue
that because Bond’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is
derivative of his defamation claim, it must also fail.
We find the Lillys’ first argument to be dispositive as to all but one of
the allegedly defamatory statements. As to the one remaining statement, we
conclude that Bond has failed to show a probability of prevailing on either his
defamation or his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
1. The Fair and True Report Privilege
The Lillys contend Bond cannot prevail on his claims against them
because their allegedly defamatory statements are privileged under the fair
and true report privilege. Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d)(1), the
fair report privilege protects a “ ‘fair and true report in, or a communication
to, a public journal, of . . . a judicial . . . proceeding, or anything said in the
course thereof.’ ” (Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 768, 787
(Argentieri).) The fair and true report privilege is “absolute”—“that is, it
applies regardless of the defendants’ motive for making the report—and
forecloses a plaintiff from showing a probability of prevailing on the merits.”
(Ibid.) We thus analyze the Lillys’ claim of the fair and true report privilege
first. As the defendants, the Lillys bear the burden of proving the
applicability of the privilege. (Hawran v. Hixon (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256,
278.)
“In general, whether a privileged occasion exists within the meaning of
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), is for the court to decide; whether the
report of the official proceedings itself is ‘fair and true,’ provided reasonable
minds could disagree as to the effect of the communication on the average
reader or listener, is a question of fact for the jury.” (J-M Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 98 (J-M

9
Manufacturing).) That said, “case law indicates this decision is one of law
when, as here, there is no dispute as to what occurred in the judicial
proceeding reported upon or as to what was contained in the report.”
(McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 976; id.
at pp. 976–977 [reversing denial of summary judgment].) And although
determining whether a communication is privileged “may properly be left to a
jury in some instances, appellate courts have not been reluctant to decide the
fair report privilege applies as a matter of law when the undisputed facts are
insufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiff.” (J-M Manufacturing, at
p. 99.) As we will explain, we conclude this case is one where the privilege
applies as a matter of law.
Courts have liberally construed the fair report privilege. (J-M
Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) They have also construed
the phrase “judicial proceeding” broadly to include the filing of a complaint.
(Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 416, 432
(Healthsmart).) Although the fair report privilege is more often invoked by
news media defendants, it also protects those who, like the Lillys,
communicate information about a judicial proceeding to the media. (Id. at
p. 431.) “Indeed, the Legislature’s explicit purpose for enacting a 1996
amendment to [Civil Code] section 47, subdivision (d), was to protect such
intermediaries.” (Ibid.) The amendment was enacted to abrogate the holding
in Shahvar v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 653 (Shahvar) that an
attorney’s transmittal of a copy of a pleading to a newspaper was not
protected by the fair report privilege. (Healthsmart, at pp. 431–432; Stats.

1996, ch. 1055, §§ 1, 2, pp. 6641–6642.)2 The amendment codified “a type of

2 The Legislature’s intent in enacting this amendment was not only to
abrogate Shahvar, but also “to preserve the scarce resources of California’s
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‘bridge privilege’ between the litigation privilege and the fair report
privilege . . . to protect a third party who communicates this already
privileged material to the press.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1540 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 26, 1996, p. 5; see
also Healthsmart, at p. 432.) Fair and true communications to the media
about allegations in a complaint are thus covered by the privilege.
(Healthsmart, at p. 432.)
Bond does not dispute this principle, but he argues as an initial matter
that the Lillys were required to prove their communications to the media
were made after their complaint was filed. The trial court accepted this
argument, finding that to invoke the fair report privilege, the Lillys had to
“establish that the initial publication to the news media outlets was made
after the Lillys filed their federal court action.” Because they failed to do so,
the court found that the Lillys did not meet their burden of establishing that
Bond’s defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
were barred by the fair report privilege.
We disagree. The statutory language refers to a communication “of”
statements made in a judicial proceeding. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d)(1).) A
report to the media fairly and truthfully describing the allegations of a
complaint that is actually filed in court constitutes a communication “of”
statements made in a judicial proceeding—even if the report is made in
anticipation of the filing for a news story to be published later. “Liberally
construing the fair report privilege, as have prior appellate decisions” (J-M
Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 101), we conclude the statutory

courts, to avoid using the courts for satellite litigation, and to increase public
participation in the political, legislative, and judicial processes.” (1996 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 1055.)

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language does not include any timing requirement for the fair and true report
to the media.
One need only read the title of each news article at issue here to see
that the news outlets that published the Lillys’ statements did so because a
lawsuit was filed: “Lawsuit alleges bullying, abuse by UC San Diego rowing
coach led to student’s suicide” (Sept. 30, 2021 San Diego Union Tribune
article); “Lawsuit alleges that bullying and abuse by UC San Diego rowing
coach led to student’s suicide” (Oct. 1, 2021 La Jolla Light article); “Lawsuit
Claims Bullying, Verbal Abuse Led to UC San Diego Athlete’s Suicide”
(Oct. 5, 2021 NBC 7 San Diego article). It is clear from the record that the
Lillys made their statements to the reporters with the understanding that
the news outlets would be running stories about their complaint. Regardless
of exactly which day the Lillys made their statements, the fact remains that a
complaint was filed, the news articles were written about the allegations in
that complaint, and they were published the same day the complaint was
filed or within days after its filing. We are not aware of any authority
requiring proof of the precise timing of the alleged defamatory statements
made to news reporters about a complaint that is actually filed, and we do
not believe the timing is or should be dispositive so long as they were fair and
true reports of the allegations in the filed complaint.
This result is consistent with case law construing another related
provision of Civil Code section 47. In the context of the litigation privilege
within the same statute (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), courts have consistently
held that as long as the privileged statement has “some relation to an
imminent lawsuit or judicial proceeding which is actually contemplated
seriously and in good faith to resolve a dispute, and not simply as a tactical
ploy to negotiate a bargain,” the timing of the statement in relation to the

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filing of the complaint is not material. (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp.
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 36 (Edwards); see also Sylmar Air Conditioning v.
Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1059 [“[t]he
fact that cross-complaints had not yet been filed . . . is irrelevant” to the
question of whether the communications about the contents of the cross-
complaints that were ultimately filed were privileged].) This is so even
though “[t]he language of section 47(b) itself expressly applies only to
communications made ‘[i]n any . . . judicial proceeding’ ” and “includes
nothing about communications made in a prelitigation context, that is, before
suit is filed.” (Edwards, at p. 30.) We see no reason why this rule should not
apply to the fair report privilege as well. (See Grafton Partners v. Superior
Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 960 [“Ordinarily we interpret related statutory
provisions on the assumption that they each operate in the same
manner . . . .”].)
Our reading of the statute also promotes the intent of the 1996
amendment. As noted, the Legislature amended the law in 1996 for the
specific purpose of creating a “ ‘bridge’ between the litigation
privilege . . . and the fair report privilege” by protecting those who
communicate information about litigation to the media. (Healthsmart, supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 431–432.) To subject people to liability for fair and true
reports to the media just because they were made in anticipation of a lawsuit
that was actually filed, rather than after it was filed, would frustrate this
purpose. It would also undermine the goals of the 1996 amendment to
preserve court resources, prevent use of the courts for satellite litigation, and
increase public participation in the judicial process. (1996 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 1055.) We therefore conclude that, under these circumstances, the Lillys

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were not required to provide proof of the exact timing of their
communications to the media about the complaint they filed in federal court.
The question remaining before us, then, is whether the Lillys’
communications to the media were fair and true. As the Healthsmart court
explained, “ ‘[f]air and true’ in this context does not refer to the truth or
accuracy of the matters asserted in the judicial proceedings, but rather to the
accuracy of the challenged statements with respect to what occurred in the
judicial proceedings. . . . Thus, we are not concerned with either the merits of
[the Lillys’] allegations or the truth of [their] statements to the media about
[Bond], but rather the extent to which the . . . statements accurately
conveyed the substance of the allegations made in the [Lillys’] complaint.”
(Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 434.) To qualify as a fair and true
report of a judicial proceeding, a publication need not track the allegations
word for word. Rather, the privilege applies if the statements “reflect the gist
or sting” of the allegations. (Id. at p. 435.) The accuracy of the report is
measured by the “natural and probable effect the statements would have on
the average person reading, viewing, or listening to the report.” (Id. at
p. 434; see also Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 787.)
We have identified 15 separate statements made to the media by the

Lillys or their attorney3 that Bond alleges were defamatory. Each of these

3 The Lillys argue in a footnote that Bond’s defamation claim cannot be
based on any statement not made by the Lillys themselves because he is
required to prove they were the utterers of the defamatory statements. The
case they cite in support of this argument, McGarry v. University of San
Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, does not stand for this proposition. In any
event, Bond alleged in his complaint that the Lillys’ attorney was acting as
their agent. Given our conclusion that each of the allegedly defamatory
statements made by people other than the Lillys is privileged, however, we
need not decide the issue.

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statements appeared in one or more of three publications on the date the
Lillys filed their federal complaint or within days afterwards: the
September 30, 2021, San Diego Union Tribune news article, the October 1,
2021 La Jolla Light news article, and the October 5, 2021 NBC San Diego
news article and video. The Lillys argue that the statements clearly report,
summarize, or describe the allegations in their federal lawsuit, which was
filed on September 30, 2021, and the fair report privilege therefore applies as
a matter of law. The following chart compares the allegedly defamatory
statements with the allegations in the Lillys’ original complaint:

Alleged Statement Federal Complaint Allegation

1 “[Bond] fat-shamed ¶ 100: “Decedent, as described above, had
him. He called him previously struggled with serious weight
‘fat Brian’ multiple issues. Decedent[] struggled as he was
times.” pelted with consistent ‘fat’ jokes from Bond
and tried to maintain the narrow weight
limits the coach demanded of his rowers.”
¶ 151: “Bond repeatedly mocked and harped
on Decedent’s weight, preying on the 19-year
old’s extreme sensitivity about his weight.
Though Decedent overcame his weight
struggles and obesity from middle school,
and presented as a physically fit, Iron Man,
Bond often referred to him as ‘Fat
[Decedent’s name]’ [to] hurt and humiliate
Decedent.”

2 “[Bond] knew that ¶ 70 and fn. 2: “[Brian] struggled with a new
Brian had had a BMI that qualified Decedent as obese,
weight issue in his causing him to lose confidence and, sadly,
youth and that was some friends in his early teenaged years.
something that he had While he was eventually able to lose the
worked very, very weight, and keep it off, Decedent remained
hard on and was susceptible to body shaming throughout his
really proud of clean life. [¶] . . . [¶] Decedent shared the pain,
15
eating and he really and shame, he felt from his childhood obesity
espoused that because with his coaches and friends on the rowing
it changed his life.” team throughout his freshman year. Though
the obesity was in the rearview, Decedent
was clearly sensitive to his former unhealthy
stature, feeling inferior whenever reminded
of same. Unfortunately for Decedent, the
reminders came often from Bond, after the
relentless bully recognized the pain, he could
inflict from this sore spot.”
¶ 151: “Bond repeatedly mocked and harped
on Decedent’s weight, preying on the 19-year
old’s extreme sensitivity about his weight.
Though Decedent overcame his weight
struggles and obesity from middle school,
and presented as a physically fit, Iron Man,
Bond often referred to him as ‘Fat
[Decedent’s name]’ [to] hurt and humiliate
Decedent.”

3 “[Bond was] a repeat ¶¶ 28–29: “Bond would, again, leave a
offender, he had a seemingly prestigious position after a short
problem at UPenn and tenure as coach. Upon information and
that didn’t turn out belief, Bond lasted three years before being
well for Bond and it’s forced out of UPenn when approximately 25
documented.” of the rowers he coached threatened to quit
unless Bond was removed. . . . [T]he student
athletes at UPenn refused to continue to row
under Bond due to his verbal abuse. Bond
was a known bully within the UPenn rowing
program. He regularly made sexually
explicit, offensive remarks, and lobbed
politically incorrect insults at his rowers.”

4 “Then [Brian] became ¶ 144: “Bond, as well as the coaches and
persona non grata to captains who served at the head coach’s
Bond and then anyone pleasure treated Decedent as an enemy of
who was under Bond’s the rowing program [from late January 2020
control. [¶] [Brian] on]. The team leaders grew increasingly cold
was given the cold toward Decedent [throughout 2020] and
shoulder or if he got

16
any attention, it was alternated between treating him with
completely negative, outward hostility and cold ostracism.”
insulting and debasing ¶ 150: “Bond attacked Decedent with
him; make him feel consistent insults: calling him a ‘pussy’;
like he was not part of doubting Decedent’s ‘manliness,’ ‘testicular’
the team and not a fortitude or ‘testosterone levels’; claiming
real a man [sic] or a Decedent was weak, immature, and
real rower. questioning Decedent’s dedication to the
rowing team.”
¶ 152: “When Bond was not mocking
Decedent, or trying to make him vomit in
workouts, he was intentionally cold and
dismissive to the freshman, often suggesting
he should leave the team activity or sending
him away from a practice or a meeting. . . .
[T]he emotional banishment, ostracism, and
general disregard from Bond, as well as the
coaches and captains under his control, had
a severely detrimental impact on Decedent.”

5 “Brian Lilly had been ¶ 147: “In late January 2020, however,
demoted to a . . . Decedent was inexplicably and without
developmental boat notice placed for the first time, in the fourth,
even though his score bottom boat with rowers who had higher
was above that (worse) erg scores and far worse race
position.” performance than Decedent.
¶ 148: “Decedent, ever the solid teammate,
responded to the demotion by taking it as a
challenge, without complaint, and attempted
to inspire fellow members of the fourth boat.”

6 “The school failed ¶ 277: “The negligent hiring, and
Brian, OK. We don’t supervision, of Bond, by McGann, Edwards
want that to happen and Defendants, resulted in the constant
to anyone else. At this abuse and bullying of Decedent, and other
point, the best thing is rowing team members, by Bond and those
for Geoff Bond to be under his control.”
taken out of coaching.” ¶ 279–280: “Defendants compounded the
hiring failure by failing to appropriately
supervise Bond, particularly McGann and
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Edwards as the coaches’ supervisors, as
described further below. [¶] Defendants,
including McGann and Edwards, owed
Decedent, and all students, a duty to
maintain a safe environment, free from the
hostility, abuse, bullying, psychological
warfare and retaliation described herein.”
(See also ¶¶ 281–285, 291–300.)
¶ 292: “McGann and Edwards failed to
discipline Bond and otherwise permitted the
coach to terrorize and abuse the student
athletes at UCSD, including Decedent.” (See
also ¶ 276.)
Prayer for relief: “Plaintiff’s [sic] demand
judgment against Defendants as
follows . . . injunctive relief directing
University of California San Diego, Board of
Regents of University of California . . . to
terminate Geoff Bond[.]”

7 “[T]here was a pattern ¶ 223: “The adverse actions undertaken by
of mind games [by Bond . . . included without limitation: [¶]
Bond].” a. Subjecting Decedent, and other rowing
team members, to . . . mind games that were
detrimental to the student athlete’s well-
being.”
¶ 227: “[T]he frequent mean-spirited insults,
mind games, unfair relegation of Decedent
off the varsity boats and the emotional exile,
caused Decedent to experience severe
deterioration of his mental health . . . .”
¶ 235c: “Bond played frequent mind games
with Decedent, purposely confusing him, and
causing him physical pain.”

8 “So [Brian] finishes ¶ 103: “Bond consistently made team
the piece, his friend members feel like failures to enforce
gives him the paper compliance with his orders. A frequent
towels, he’s cleaning example was Bond’s encouraging Decedent,
up and you know what and others, to vomit during unnecessarily
18
coach Bond says, he grueling workouts. Bond first glorified
says to my son, rowers who worked out ‘so hard they puked,’
‘Throwing up is for then, after successfully inducing vomit, Bond
sissies.’ You want to would laugh and dismiss them as ‘pussies’
talk about breaking a for vomiting.”
kid down, after he was ¶¶ 106–107: “Decedent worked out on an erg
just working so hard rowing machine until he threw up on
that he threw up on November 25, 2019, seeking approval from
the machine.” Bond, after hearing of the rower from
Berkeley his coach glorified. [¶]
Immediately after Decedent vomited,
Bond . . . mocked the 19-year-old, derisively
laughing while saying ‘[t]hrowing up is for
pussies.’ ”

9 “It’s psychological ¶¶ 96–97: “Bond’s conduct in engaging in
torment. These kids constant bullying, abuse, and harassment
don’t know what to do. was severe, pervasive, and objectively
You know, they honor unreasonable. It went well beyond the realm
him. They want to do of even the most aggressive coaching. [¶]
everything that he The student athletes lived in fear of Bond’s
tells them to do.” constant, unprovoked rage-filled outbursts
that were peppered throughout practices
with the above demeaning words.”
¶ 103: “Bond consistently made team
members feel like failures to enforce
compliance with his orders.”
¶ 108: “Bond’s coaching ‘style’ was insulting,
demeaning, and rooted in a willful disregard
for his rowers’ health.”
¶ 163: “Decedent, again growing emotional,
informed Bond that ‘this feels like
psychological abuse[.]’ ”
¶ 258: “Bond bullied, harassed, and
psychologically abused Decedent so
thoroughly that Decedent, who never
suffered from mental health issues before his
freshman year, suffered from the worsening
mental health[.]”

19
10 “Brian did not have “Defendants’ conduct caused a deterioration
any mental health of Decedent’s mental health, including
issues before he met despair, paranoia, and confusion. Decedent
Geoff Bond.” experienced mental illness, warranting
hospitalization, for the first time in his life.”
¶ 76: “Decedent had no mental health issues
prior to his enrollment at UCSD.”
¶ 258: “Bond bullied, harassed, and
psychologically abused Decedent so
thoroughly that Decedent, who never
suffered from mental health issues before his
freshman year, suffered from the worsening
mental health[.]”

11 “Lilly’s parents said None
they . . . never
received condolences
from Coach Bond after
Brian Lilly’s death.”

12 “The Lillys . . . said ¶¶ 191–193: “In April of 2020, Decedent
their son reached out filled out an allegedly anonymous UCSD
to coaches and survey upon McGann’s request, to receive
athletics department feedback from the men’s rowing team
staff several times members. Decedent responded with twenty-
with his concerns three pages outlining Bond’s misconduct . . . .
about the team and Decedent’s survey response reiterated the
Bond’s alleged abusive concerns he shared on the phone with
and erratic behavior, McGann weeks earlier. [¶] Neither
including in a lengthy McGann, nor Edwards, nor any other
anonymous athletics supervisor at Defendant UCSD addressed
department survey, the coaches’ failure to report the sexual
but the school failed to misconduct allegations to Title IX, or their
address them.” abuse, bullying, and harassment, including
sexual harassment, by Bond, at any point in
time. [¶] McGann was aware of the abuse
by Bond . . . .”

20
¶ 292: “McGann and Edwards failed to
discipline Bond and otherwise permitted the
coach to terrorize and abuse the student
athletes at UCSD, including Decedent.”

13 “It bothers me every ¶¶ 90–91: “Bond was not an effective coach,
day to think my son teacher, leader, or mentor. He was a sadistic
was the victim of a bully; an angry, volatile man whose rage
bully predator coach.” surfaced often and unexpectedly. The rowers
were subjected to sexually inappropriate
comments, petty insults, and erratic
behavior. [¶] Bond would soon view
Decedent as an enemy . . . . Decedent’s
integrity incensed Bond, causing him to take
numerous adverse actions against the brave
teenager who stood up for what he believed
in. As time went on, Bond’s vitriol towards
Decedent became constant, and far more
intense than what his teammates
experienced.”

14 “Geoff Bond’s conduct ¶¶ 90–91: “Decedent, and his fellow
reveals he is not freshmen rowers, quickly learned what the
worthy of the lofty UPenn rowers had endured under Bond:
position of head Bond was not an effective coach, teacher,
coach . . . Bond did not leader, or mentor. He was a sadistic bully;
care to build this kid an angry, volatile man whose rage surfaced
up; he used his power often and unexpectedly. The rowers were
to break Brian down.” subjected to sexually inappropriate
comments, petty insults, and erratic
behavior. [¶] . . . Bond would soon view
Decedent as an enemy . . . . Decedent’s
integrity incensed Bond, causing him to take
numerous adverse actions against a brave
teenager who stood up for what he believed
in. As time went on, Bond’s vitriol towards
Decedent became constant, and far more
intense than what his teammates
experienced.”
¶¶ 96–97: “In rowing, as in other sports,
‘tough love’ and aggressive challenges can be

21
the norm, but Bond’s conduct in engaging in
constant bullying, abuse, and harassment
was severe, pervasive, and objectively
unreasonable. It went well beyond the realm
of even the most aggressive coaching. [¶]
The student athletes lived in fear of Bond’s
constant, unprovoked rage-filled outbursts
that were peppered throughout practices
with the above demeaning words. Bond
would intentionally target a single rower, or
coxswain, to publicly humiliate the student
in front of teammates, among others.”
¶¶ 101–102: “Bond harassed rowers and
mocked them with politically incorrect
remarks when they suffered physical
injuries, extreme exhaustion, or sickness
from workouts. On at least one occasion,
Bond screamed at a freshman walk-on for
seeking treatment from a team trainer for an
injury, and then screamed again at the walk-
on for following the team trainer’s
instructions. [¶] Bond pushed Decedent and
his teammates past their limits, exhibiting a
disregard for the rowers’ general well-being.”

15 “[Bond] was an ¶ 90: “Bond was . . . a sadistic bully; an
abusive bully who angry, volatile man whose rage surfaced
subjected his rowers to often and unexpectedly.”
terrifying temper ¶¶ 96–97: “In rowing, as in other sports,
tantrums, mean- ‘tough love’ and aggressive challenges can be
spirited insults, and the norm, but Bond’s conduct in engaging in
countless mind constant bullying, abuse, and harassment
games.” was severe, pervasive, and objectively
unreasonable. It went well beyond the realm
of even the most aggressive coaching. . . .
The student athletes lived in fear of Bond’s
constant, unprovoked rage-filled outbursts
that were peppered throughout practices
with the above demeaning words. Bond
would intentionally target a single rower, or

22
coxswain, to publicly humiliate the student
in front of teammates, among others.”
¶ 235: “The hostility and abuse described
herein included, but was not limited to, the
following: [¶] a. Subjecting Decedent, and
other rowing team members, to more
frequent and severe bullying and verbal
abuse consisting of personal attacks,
sexually charged insults and mind games
that were detrimental to the student
athlete’s well-being. The targeted bullying
and verbal abuse of Decedent by Bond
included sexually inappropriate insults
lodged at Decedent, calling him a ‘pussy,’ as
well as loudly questioning Decedent’s
‘manliness’, ‘testicular’ fortitude, and
insufficient ‘testosterone levels;’ Bond
attacked Decedent’s integrity, character, and
mental make-up, as he called the teenager
weak, untrustworthy and immature, then
unfairly challenged Decedent’s dedication to
the rowing team.”

We believe that these statements, with one exception we address below
(number 11 on the chart), sufficiently reflect the substance of the allegations
in the Lillys’ complaint to be considered fair and true. As the Supreme Court
has explained, a defendant is “permit[ted] a certain degree of flexibility/
literary license” when it comes to the statements. (Reader’s Digest Assn. v.
Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 262, fn. 13.) “[A] slight inaccuracy in
the details will not prevent a judgment for the defendant, if the inaccuracy
does not change the complexion of the affair so as to affect the reader of the
article differently than the actual truth would.” (Ibid. [cleaned up]; see also
Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1337
(Balzaga) [“[t]he privilege applies if the substance of the publication or

23
broadcast captures the gist or sting of the statements made in the official
proceedings”].) There can be no dispute that, with one exception, the above
statements made to the news outlets “were substantially similar to the
allegedly defamatory statements made in the [Lillys’] complaint” in the
federal action. (Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.)
Bond argues that none of the Lillys’ statements expressly mentions
their complaint or references their lawsuit, so they are not communications
about a judicial proceeding, and the privilege therefore does not apply. He
relies on Healthsmart, where the court explained there is “a critical difference
between communicating to the media what is alleged in a complaint and
communicating the alleged facts without reference to the complaint.”
(Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.)
We agree with Bond that Healthsmart is instructive here, but that does
not lead us to his desired result. In Healthsmart, one of the defendant
attorneys made allegedly defamatory statements in a television news report.
In his initial statement to the reporter, the defendant referred “to a
conspiracy among the hospitals and doctors that ‘we allege in the
complaint,’ ” but his subsequent statements did not mention the complaint or
allegations. (Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) However, the
news reporter identified the defendant as the attorney for the plaintiff in the
underlying lawsuit at the outset of the report, images of the complaint were
shown in the background, and the defendant’s statements were “interspersed
among the reporter’s frequent references to the [underlying] lawsuit.” (Ibid.)
The court therefore concluded that “[t]he average person watching the report
in its entirety would reasonably understand that [defendant] was referring to
the allegations in the lawsuit . . . .” (Ibid.)

24
We reach the same conclusion here. The key question is what natural
and probable effect the publication would have on the average reader or
viewer. Although the Lillys themselves did not expressly mention their
complaint, each of the three news articles is titled in a way that makes it
immediately clear to the reader that the article is about allegations in a
lawsuit. And as in Healthsmart, the Lillys’ “statements are interspersed
among the reporter’s frequent references to the [underlying] lawsuit.”
(Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) The San Diego Union Tribune
article, as an example, is replete with references to the Lillys’ lawsuit. The
words “lawsuit,” “claims,” “sued,” and “allegations” or “alleges” appear
approximately 24 times in the seven-page article. The article repeatedly
references the court action using phrases such as “according to the lawsuit,”
“the lawsuit states,” and the “suit further alleges.” As the court found in
Healthsmart, “[a]lthough some statements, when viewed in isolation, could be
understood to communicate the allegedly defamatory matter as facts, not
mere allegations of facts, when the media reports are viewed in their entirety
and in the context in which they were made, the only reasonable conclusion is
that the statements refer to allegations made in the [underlying] complaint.”
(Healthsmart, at p. 436.) Viewing the Lillys’ statements in the context of
each article in its entirety, we do not believe the Lillys were required to
preface each utterance with the incantation “the complaint alleges” for a
reader to understand they were describing the basis for their complaint.
Bond seeks to avoid this conclusion by distinguishing between the
“[t]wo levels of publication”: the Lillys’ publication of their statements to the
reporters and the reporters’ publication of the statements to the public. But
if we follow Bond’s reasoning, we must look at the natural and probable effect
of the Lillys’ statements on the average reporter hearing their statements.

25
No news reporter could reasonably understand the Lillys to be stating
anything other than allegations of facts when the reporter is interviewing
them about the allegations in the lawsuit they filed, for the news article that
is being written about that lawsuit.
To the extent Bond argues the average reader would take the Lillys’
statements as separate from the rest of the reporters’ statements in the news
articles and understand only the Lillys’ statements to be factual while
understanding the rest of the articles’ statements to refer to the allegations,
we reject this argument for the same reasons articulated by the Healthsmart
court and many other courts before it. “In evaluating the effect a publication
has on the average reader, the challenged language must be viewed in
context to determine whether, applying a totality of the circumstances test, it
is reasonably susceptible to the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff:
a defamatory meaning must be found, if at all, in a reading of the publication
as a whole. This is a rule of reason. Defamation actions cannot be based on
snippets taken out of context.” (J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th
at p. 100 [cleaned up]; see also Balzaga, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.)
For these reasons, we conclude that 14 of the 15 allegedly defamatory
statements attributed to the Lillys are protected by the fair and true report
privilege, and Bond is thus barred from litigating claims based on these
statements.
2. Whether Bond Has Shown Minimal Merit as to the Unprivileged
Statement
Our conclusion that all of the Lillys’ allegedly defamatory statements
but one are protected by the fair report privilege still requires us to
determine whether Bond has shown that his claims have minimal merit as to
the sole remaining statement: that the Lillys never received condolences from

26
Bond after their son’s death. Specifically, Bond claims that the following
statement in the NBC 7 news article is defamatory: “Since February, Lilly’s
parents said they haven’t heard any updates on the investigation and never
received condolences from coach Bond after Brian Lilly’s death.” This
statement was not included in the allegations of the federal complaint.
As an initial matter, we disagree with Bond that the Lillys forfeited
their right to argue that his claims lacked merit by failing to raise those
arguments until their reply brief below. Under the anti-SLAPP analysis,
once the Lillys demonstrated that Bond’s claims were based on protected
speech, the burden automatically shifted to Bond to demonstrate minimal
merit, and the trial court was required to undertake the step two analysis.
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) We are unpersuaded by the case Bond
cites in support of his contention. Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
181, 227–228, involved a belated argument from the defendants that their
anti-SLAPP motion should be granted because the plaintiff had failed to
adequately plead standing. It did not involve any argument as to the
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claims at issue, and it is therefore
inapposite.
Turning to the merits of Bond’s defamation claim, he was required to
set forth evidence admissible at trial demonstrating the publication of a false
statement of fact that has a natural tendency to injure his reputation or that

causes special damage.4 (J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at

4 The Lillys argue that Bond is a limited purpose public figure, and he
therefore must additionally prove that they acted with malice. We agree with
Bond that the Lillys forfeited this argument, as they did not raise it with the
trial court. (City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc.
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 685 [contentions or theories raised for the first
time on appeal are not entitled to consideration].)

27
p. 97.) We agree with Bond that the Lillys’ statement that he did not offer
condolences after Brian’s death is one of fact capable of being proved false,
and he submitted admissible evidence showing it could be false. But even if
the statement was false, we conclude that it does not have “a natural
tendency to injure” Bond’s reputation, and he is therefore not likely to prevail
on his defamation claim.
For defamation claims based on slander, a statement has a natural
tendency to injure if it: (1) charges a person with a crime or states they were
“indicted, convicted, or punished for a crime”; (2) imputes on a person “the
present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease”; (3) tends
to directly injure a person “in respect to [their] office, profession, trade or
business, either by imputing to [them] general disqualification in those
respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by
imputing something with reference to [their] office, profession, trade, or
business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits”; or (4) imputes on a
person impotence or a want of chastity. (Civ. Code, § 46; Regalia v. The
Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 367 (Regalia).) “A slander
that falls within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander
per se and requires no proof of actual damages.” (Regalia, at p. 367.)
Bond did not argue below or on appeal that the Lillys’ statement has a
natural tendency to injure (i.e., that it falls under one of the four categories
listed in Civil Code section 46), nor did he submit admissible evidence in
support of this element of his claim. The only category that could be relevant
here is in subdivision (3) of Civil Code section 46. We therefore must
evaluate the Lillys’ statement to determine if upon its face it “clearly
convey[s] a meaning” that fits within that category, and therefore is slander

28
per se. (Regalia, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 369–370.) We conclude that it
does not.
Most of the cases that fit within the category of injury to business
reputation “involve statements that reflect on the integrity and competence of
the plaintiff, the clearest being allegations of unethical activity or
incompetence. . . . ‘Courts seem to be looking for conduct that might be
deemed to reflect character or at least habitual misconduct rather than a
passing peccadillo.’ ” (Regalia, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 [reversing
judgment for plaintiff on defamation claim because the statement that
plaintiff was fired because other employees would not work for him is not
slander per se; that some employees do not want to work for someone,
without more, does not necessarily reflect adversely on the person].) We
recognize that a college rowing coach who does not offer condolences to the
parents of a deceased student athlete could be viewed as uncaring, which is
not necessarily a desired characteristic of a college coach. But we cannot say
it is a fact that reflects habitual misconduct or would disqualify Bond as a
coach such that it is defamation per se. Nor has Bond alleged any special
damage resulting from the statement. We therefore conclude that Bond has
not demonstrated a probability of success on the merits of his defamation
claim. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.)
We similarly conclude Bond’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is without merit. A party seeking to establish a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must show (1) extreme
and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (2) that
the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) that the
defendant’s outrageous conduct actually and proximately caused the extreme

29
emotional distress. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Conduct
is “outrageous” for purposes of this claim when it is so “extreme as to exceed
all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Id. at
pp. 1050–1051 [cleaned up].) Falsely stating that the plaintiff did not offer
condolences to the family of someone who died is not extreme and outrageous
conduct under this high standard. We conclude that Bond cannot prevail on
his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
II
The Lillys argue they are entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees and
costs, including those incurred on appeal, from Bond. Section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1) provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to
strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.”
This includes fees on appeal. (Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th
1400, 1426.) Accordingly, the Lillys are entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees, with the amount to be determined by the trial court on
remand.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is reversed. The Lillys shall
recover their costs on appeal. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to enter an order granting the Lillys’ anti-SLAPP motion and to

30
determine the appropriate amount of fees and costs to which the Lillys are
entitled under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

RUBIN, J.

31

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