CourtListener 10283254•People v. Duncan CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 11/25/24 P. v. Duncan CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B330236
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA009892)
v.
IAN SHAYNE DUNCAN,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
In 1993 Ian Shayne Duncan and codefendant Jude C.
DeJesus were convicted of first degree murder. The jury also
found true several special allegations, including as to Duncan
that the murder was committed during a robbery and a principal
was armed with a firearm. We affirmed the judgments. (People
v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 33-34 (DeJesus).)
In 2022 Duncan filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 After
appointing counsel for Duncan, the superior court denied the
petition, finding Duncan failed to make a prima facie showing he
was entitled to relief. Duncan contends on appeal that the jury
instructions given could have allowed the jury to convict him of
first degree murder without finding he had an intent to kill. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial and Duncan’s Conviction2
Duncan’s friend Corey Lohr testified Duncan was “an
admitted dealer in illegal weapons.” Lohr stated that in
February 1992 Duncan asked Lohr if he would kill someone for
$500. Duncan explained the victim was “some punk” who had
“ripped him off.” Lohr replied he needed to think about it.
Duncan brought up the subject multiple times over the next
week, telling Lohr he knew Lohr needed the money and
suggesting possible methods and locations for the murder.
During one conversation Duncan told Lohr the potential victim
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide a summary of the facts as set forth in DeJesus
for background only.
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was Justin Zeitsoff, whom Lohr had met at Duncan’s house a few
weeks earlier when Zeitsoff purchased weapons from Duncan.
When Lohr attempted to talk Duncan out of the murder, Duncan
repeatedly stated Zeitsoff “was a ‘punk’ whom he wanted dead.”
Lohr eventually told Duncan he would not kill Zeitsoff.
Duncan responded that, if Duncan had to do it himself, he would
give Lohr only $250 for helping to dispose of the body. Later that
day, DeJesus visited Duncan’s home and asked Duncan if he had
any jobs DeJesus could do. Duncan asked DeJesus to kill
Zeitsoff, and DeJesus agreed. Duncan then arranged to have
Zeitsoff come over to Duncan’s home that evening, telling Zeitsoff
he could pick up some weapons. Duncan told DeJesus that, when
Zeitsoff arrived, Duncan would have Zeitsoff stand in a particular
spot. Then Duncan would give DeJesus the signal to shoot
Zeitsoff.
Zeitsoff arrived at Duncan’s home around 9:30 p.m. on
February 19, 1992. Lohr went into the bathroom because he did
not want to see the murder. About a minute after Zeitsoff
entered the house, Lohr heard approximately six gunshots.
Duncan came to the bathroom door and told Lohr to stuff a rag in
Zeitsoff’s mouth because he was moaning. Lohr found Zeitsoff
slouched against a wall in the backyard. After Duncan took the
jewelry, clothing, and stereo equipment from Zeitsoff’s pockets
and car, Duncan instructed Lohr to help him move the body from
the backyard to the trunk of Zeitsoff’s car. They then drove
Zeitsoff’s car, with his body in the trunk, to another location.
Later that day, Duncan and DeJesus told Lohr that
DeJesus shot Zeitsoff once, Zeitsoff fell down, and Duncan and
DeJesus thought Zeitsoff was dead. Zeitsoff then got up and ran
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to the backyard where he tried to climb a wall. Duncan pulled
him down, and DeJesus shot him again.
Duncan and DeJesus testified in their defense. Duncan
denied asking Lohr or DeJesus to kill Zeitsoff. Duncan claimed
Zeitsoff came to his house unexpectedly on February 19 and they
argued briefly. At some point, Zeitsoff and DeJesus were
handling guns. DeJesus testified Zeitsoff pointed a gun at him
and DeJesus shot Zeitsoff in self-defense. However, DeJesus also
testified his gun fired accidentally. According to Duncan and
DeJesus, after being shot, Zeitsoff chased Duncan into the
backyard and DeJesus fired several shots at Zeitsoff in defense of
Duncan.
The jury found Duncan and DeJesus guilty of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). As to both defendants the jury found
true the special allegations the murder was intentional and
carried out for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and was
committed while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). As to
Duncan the jury found true the special allegations the murder
was committed during a felony (robbery) (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17))
and a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
As to DeJesus the jury found true the allegation he personally
used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Duncan to life without the
possibility of parole. We affirmed the judgment but remanded for
the trial court to determine the appropriate presentence credits
to be awarded to Duncan. (DeJesus, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 7-8, 33-34.)
B. Duncan’s Petition for Resentencing
On June 1, 2022 Duncan filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus seeking relief based on “the recent passage of . . . Senate
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Bill No. 1437” and arguing “the trial record fails to show that
Petitioner was either a major participant in perpetrator’s acts or
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.” The
superior court construed the petition as a petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95.
The superior court appointed counsel for Duncan, and the
People filed an opposition. In their opposition the People
explained the jury had not been instructed on felony murder or
the natural and probable consequences theory and argued
Duncan was ineligible for relief because the “jury’s special
circumstance findings show that it necessarily found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner, at a minimum, had the
intent to kill.” During oral argument Duncan’s counsel conceded
the jury had not been instructed on felony murder or the natural
and probable consequences theory. However, Duncan’s counsel
argued the wording of the instructions on aiding and abetting
and homicide could have allowed the jurors to impute malice to
Duncan based on his participation in the robbery.
Following oral argument, the superior court summarily
denied the petition for resentencing without issuing an order to
show cause. The court explained that absent instructions on
felony murder and the natural and probable consequences theory,
the jury would not have been able to find Duncan guilty of first
degree murder without finding an intent to kill. Accordingly, the
court found Duncan did not make a prima facie showing that he
was entitled to relief. Duncan timely appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Section 189, subdivision (e), now requires the People to prove
specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability:
The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although
not the actual killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill,
assisted in the commission of murder in the first degree (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in an
underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in
section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at
p. 708.)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure in former
section 1170.95, now codified in section 1172.6, for an individual
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
6
counts if the individual could not have been convicted of murder
under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189.
(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon a request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition, the court must determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (Id., subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
We review de novo whether the superior court properly
denied the petition at the prima facie review stage under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1, 14 [denial at the prima facie review stage “‘“is appropriate only
if the record of conviction demonstrates that ‘the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law,’”’ which ‘“‘is a purely legal
conclusion . . . we review de novo’”’”].
B. Duncan Is Ineligible for Resentencing as a Matter of Law
It is undisputed the jury found Duncan was not the actual
killer as evidenced by the true finding as to Duncan that a
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principal was armed and the true finding with respect to DeJesus
that he personally used a firearm. Duncan argues he is eligible
for resentencing because the jury instruction on aiding and
abetting (the only instruction given on derivative liability) and
the instruction on murder did not require the jury to find he
aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill.
Duncan’s contention lacks merit.
The trial court instructed the jury on direct aiding and
abetting with a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.01, which
stated in part: “A person aids and abets the commission of a
crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or purpose
of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
crime, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
the commission of the crime.”
The jury was instructed on the definition of murder with a
modified version of CALJIC No. 8.10, which stated in part:
“Every person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought or during the commission or attempted commission
of a robbery . . . is guilty of the crime of murder in violation of
Section 187 of the Penal Code.”
Duncan contends that given the language of these
instructions, the jury could have found his conviction for aiding
and abetting the murder was based on a finding he intended to
aid and abet DeJesus in the robbery and the murder occurred
during the commission of the robbery, without a finding of malice
aforethought. We agree that the jury, considering only these two
instructions, could have found Duncan guilty of aiding and
abetting murder without finding an intent to kill. The jury here,
however, found Duncan was guilty of first degree murder, which
8
required the jury to consider additional instructions regarding
malice, first degree murder, and second degree murder.
The court instructed the jury on the definition of malice
with CALJIC No. 8.11, which stated in part: “‘Malice’ may be
either express or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there is
manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. [¶]
Malice is implied when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an
intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life.”3
The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 8.20, which
stated in part: “All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree.” Regarding second
degree murder, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.30:
“Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested
an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is
insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.”
Based on these instructions, to find Duncan guilty of first
degree murder, the jury must have found Duncan aided and
abetted DeJesus in a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
with express malice aforethought. And express malice was
defined to require “an intention unlawfully to kill a human
being.” (CALJIC No. 8.11.) The trial court did not give any other
instruction pursuant to which the jury could have found Duncan
3 We have not included the brackets in the typed jury
instructions given to the jury.
9
guilty of first degree murder. Had the jury found Duncan
harbored only implied malice based on his intent to aid and abet
a robbery, as Duncan argues, then the jury was required to find
him guilty of second degree murder. Because the finding of first
degree murder necessarily meant the jury found Duncan
harbored an intent to kill, he is ineligible for resentencing. (See
People v. Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1256 [defendant
was ineligible for resentencing on first degree murder conviction
because “the jurors were instructed that they could only convict
Williams of first degree murder if they found he had committed
that crime as a direct perpetrator or based on aiding and abetting
either premeditated and deliberate malice aforethought murder,
or murder perpetuated by a drive-by shooting with intent to
kill”].)
Duncan’s additional argument that he was eligible for
resentencing because the special circumstances instruction was
ambiguous is unavailing. The jury was instructed with a
modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80, which stated in part: “If
you find a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first
degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following
special circumstances: are true or not true . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was either the
actual killer or an aider or abettor, but you are unable to decide
which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant with intent to kill aided and abetted an actor in
commission of the murder in the first degree, in order to find the
special circumstance to be true.”
Duncan relies on the decisions in People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 181 (Letner and Tobin) and People v.
Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 108 (Ervin), in which the courts
10
held the special circumstance instructions were ambiguous
regarding the intent required of an aider and abettor or a co-
conspirator. In Letner and Tobin, the jury was instructed with a
version of CALJIC No. 8.80 that was substantially similar to the
version given in this case. The instruction told the jury that “if it
determined one of the defendants was the actual killer, intent to
kill was not required” and that “if it could not decide whether one
of the defendants was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, it
must find intent to kill in order to make a true finding.” (Letner
and Tobin, at p. 181.) However, the jury was not informed what
intent they were required to find if they unequivocally found
defendant was an aider and abettor. “The omission of this third
alternative made the instruction ambiguous.” (Ibid.) “The flaw
in this instruction . . . is that it failed to instruct the jury
explicitly that, under then-existing law, an aider and abettor
must have had the intent that the victim be killed in order for the
special circumstance allegation to be true.” (Id. at pp. 180-181.)
While this same flaw was present in the version of CALJIC
No. 8.80 given here, unlike in Letner and Tobin, the jury in this
case could not have found the special circumstances allegations to
be true without finding Duncan had the intent to kill. In Letner
and Tobin, the jury was instructed on felony murder, which (at
the time) allowed the jury to find the defendants guilty of first
degree murder without finding intent to kill. (Letner and Tobin,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 168-169.) Thus, the finding of first
degree murder in that case did not necessitate a finding of intent
to kill, and the ambiguity in CALJIC No. 8.80 was relevant to
whether the jury found the defendants had an intent to kill. In
this case, as discussed, the jury’s first degree murder finding
11
necessarily included a finding of intent to kill, and any ambiguity
in CALJIC No. 8.80 is immaterial.
The Court of Appeal in Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 90
focused on a different ambiguity in the special circumstances jury
instructions. The Court of Appeal in that case reversed the trial
court’s order denying a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.95, concluding the jury’s felony-murder special
circumstance finding did not render the defendant ineligible for
resentencing. (Ervin, at p. 111.) The court explained, “The
felony-murder special circumstance generally requires the jury to
find a defendant aided and abetted ‘any actor in the commission
of murder in the first degree,’ while the current felony-murder
rule more specifically requires the jury to find a defendant aided
and abetted ‘the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree.’” (Id. at p. 106.) The court continued, “[G]iven the
prosecutor’s closing argument and the jury’s inconsistent
verdicts, it is possible the jurors misinterpreted the 1993
instruction to mean they could find the felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation true if they generally found Ervin aided
and abetted another in the commission of the robbery or burglary
(that ultimately led to the killing of a human being), rather than
a more specific finding that Ervin aided and abetted ‘the actual
killer . . . with the intent to kill.’” (Id. at pp. 108-109.)
Although CALJIC No. 8.80 as given here also referred to
aiding and abetting “an actor” in commission of a murder, the
issue does not affect Duncan’s eligibility for resentencing. As in
Letner and Tobin, in Ervin the jury had been instructed on felony
murder. (Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 102-103.) Thus, it
was possible the jury in Ervin found the defendants guilty of first
degree murder without finding they had an intent to kill. As
12
discussed, such a result was not possible in this case where the
only way the jury could find Duncan guilty of first degree murder
was to find he had an intent to kill.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Duncan’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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