CourtListener 10283248•People v. Hernandez CA4/1
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Filed 11/25/24 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083067
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1900590)
RUDY ANGEL HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Otis Sterling III and Matthew C. Perantoni, Judges. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanksi and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Rudy Angel Hernandez of carjacking, evading the
police, and resisting arrest. He raises just one issue on appeal—that he
was denied his right to a speedy trial. As we explain below, the trial court
reasonably found good cause to continue Hernandez’s trial because his
counsel was about to begin a seven-day trial in another matter. Moreover,
Hernandez has not shown any prejudice from the delay. Accordingly, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Late one night in March 2019, Maria Mendoza was getting into her
car—a Toyota Corolla—to head to work when she realized she could not find
her cell phone. Thinking it might have fallen inside the car, she unbuckled
her seatbelt and opened her door to give herself more room to look around.
As she leaned over to begin searching, she felt someone—Hernandez—grab
her left elbow and pull her out of her car. Hernandez quickly got into the car
and drove away.
Mendoza ran back inside her home, found her cell phone, and called
911. Within a few hours, the police were able to track down the Corolla using
its LoJack system. They found it unoccupied in the parking lot behind a local
casino. When Hernandez returned to the car and began driving away, the
police initiated a traffic stop. Although he attempted to flee, Hernandez was
apprehended after a short chase.
The prosecution charged Hernandez with carjacking (Pen. Code,1
§ 215, subd. (a)), evading the police (Veh. Code § 2800.2), and misdemeanor
resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). It was further alleged that Hernandez
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
suffered four prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1))
and three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a).)
A jury found Hernandez guilty on all three counts. Before sentencing,
the prosecutor dismissed two prior strikes and one prior serious felony.
Hernandez admitted the remaining prior conviction allegations. The court
then struck an additional strike and prior serious felony in the interest of
justice, leaving just one strike and one prior serious felony.
The court sentenced Hernandez to an aggregate term of 16 years, four
months in prison as follows: 10 years for the carjacking (the midterm of five
years doubled due to the prior strike), 16 months for evading the police (one-
third the midterm of two years, i.e., eight months, doubled), and five years for
the prior serious felony enhancement. It imposed credit for time served on
the misdemeanor offense.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez contends his case must be dismissed because he was denied
his right to a speedy trial. We disagree. The court reasonably continued
Hernandez’s trial when his counsel became engaged in a different trial for
another client and there were no other attorneys immediately available to
substitute in on his case. In any event, Hernandez has failed to demonstrate
that he was in any way prejudiced by the relatively short delay.
A. Speedy Trial Right: General Principles
Under the United States and California Constitutions, the criminally
accused are entitled to a speedy trial. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 15.) The speedy trial right is intended “ ‘ “ ‘(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ ” ’ ” (Elias
v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 926, 937 (Elias).)
3
The California Legislature enacted section 1382 to interpret and
implement the constitutional speedy trial right. (Elias, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 937; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 561
(Johnson).) The statute “provides that when a defendant charged with a
felony is not brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment on an indictment
or information (and the defendant has not expressly or impliedly consented to
having trial set for a date beyond that period), the criminal charges against
the defendant shall be dismissed unless there is ‘good cause’ for the delay.”
(People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 538 (Sutton); see also § 1382, subd.
(a).)
Section 1382 itself does not define “good cause.” (Sutton, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 546.) But case law has established “that, in general, a number
of factors are relevant to a determination of good cause: (1) the nature and
strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and
(3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to
result from the delay.” (Ibid.) In evaluating good cause, “a trial court must
consider all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, ‘applying
principles of common sense to the totality of circumstances . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
A trial court “has broad discretion to determine whether good cause
exists to” continue a trial. (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546.) We review
the trial court’s good-cause determination for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
“ ‘Discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all
circumstances being considered.’ ” (Elias, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 938.)
B. Additional Procedural Background
In this case, the prosecution filed the information on February 26, 2020
and Hernandez was arraigned the next day. At that point, the last day for
trial to begin was April 27. However, the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted
4
the proceedings. The court continued trial for three months pursuant to
general orders implementing emergency relief. When the parties next
appeared on June 26, the defense requested a continuance and Hernandez
waived time until July 27.
On July 10, 2020, Hernandez made a Marsden2 motion to replace his
public defender, which the court granted. The court appointed an attorney
for Hernandez from the conflict panel about one week later. Hernandez then
waived time to December 2 to give his new counsel time to prepare.
The parties announced ready for trial on November 2, 2020. But due to
the ongoing pandemic, all trials were suspended until March 2021. The court
continued the case until then. When the parties returned on March 4, 2021,
the prosecution announced ready, but the defense needed more time. The
court granted several continuances for the defense and Hernandez waived
time until August 2.
On July 29, 2021, Hernandez made another Marsden motion, which
was granted. He agreed to waive time to November 16 so that new counsel
could be appointed and get up to speed on his case. But on October 26,
Hernandez made yet another Marsden motion, which was also granted.
He then waived time to March 16, 2022. On February 16, 2022, he made
a fourth Marsden motion, then withdrew it and asked to represent himself
instead. The court granted this request, but at the end of May, Hernandez
changed his mind and asked the court to appoint new counsel. The court
again granted his request and appointed Hernandez his fifth attorney.
New counsel requested several continuances and Hernandez continued
to waive time until December 9.
2 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
5
On December 7, 2022, the parties announced ready for trial. The court
trailed the matter one day due to courtroom unavailability. The next day, the
prosecution again announced ready. Defense counsel advised the court that
she would be ready, except that right before Hernandez’s case was called, she
was sent out to begin a seven-day trial in the Banning courthouse for another
client, with a second case trailing for the same client (the Williams cases).3
Hernandez did not want to represent himself or waive any more time.
Defense counsel confirmed with the conflict panel that there were no other
attorneys available take over Hernandez’s case that day and begin trial the
following day. Counsel believed it was very possible that the Williams cases
would settle, though, so she asked the court to send Hernandez’s case out to
Banning as well, trailing the Williams cases. Alternatively, she asked the
court to trail Hernandez’s case one day in order to confirm her unavailability
and/or give him a chance to find another attorney.
The court ultimately felt that defense counsel’s contingent suggestions
required it to keep “too many balls in the air.” Given the circumstances that
counsel was about to begin a seven-day trial in another matter, there were no
other attorneys immediately available to substitute in on Hernandez’s case,
and courtroom availability was limited, the court found good cause to
continue trial two weeks until December 21, 2022. It believed the trial on
the Williams cases would be finished by then.
On December 20, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss
Hernandez’s case based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under section
1382 and the California Constitution. Relying on Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d
557, counsel contended it was the state’s fault that Hernandez was not
3 The last day for Williams’s trial to begin was December 8, 2022 and he
did not want to waive any additional time.
6
brought to trial by December 9, and an unjustified delay attributable to the
state cannot constitute good cause. In her view, trial was delayed because
there were no attorneys available to take over Hernandez’s case when she
was sent out to trial in the Williams cases, and there were no attorneys
available because everyone has “staggering caseloads” that have only grown
larger since the pandemic. Counsel asserted there was a chronic backlog of
cases and shortage of public counsel.
Trial was continued from December 21, 2022 to January 19, 2023,
based on defense counsel’s personal emergencies. The court heard the motion
to dismiss on January 19. It disagreed with defense counsel that the delay
was attributable to the “failure of the State to provide adequate attorneys
available and ready” to handle Hernandez’s case. Rather, it found the delay
resulted from a discrete scheduling conflict between the Hernandez and the
Williams cases.
As the court explained, this was not a situation where Hernandez and
Williams both exercised their rights to trial within the first 60 days of
arraignment, which happened to fall on the same date. Both clients had been
waiving time for quite a while. Indeed, in the court’s estimation, Hernandez
had entered nearly 40 time waivers since his case was first set for trial at the
end of 2020. Upon each continuance, the court allowed the parties to select
the date of their next appearance.
The Hernandez and Williams cases were both set for trial on October
27. On that date, both clients waived time and counsel agreed to bring both
cases back around December 8, 2022 which “did not have to happen.” The
court was sympathetic to the fact that scheduling a trial involved “a number
of moving parts.” But ultimately, the court found it was counsel’s
responsibility to avoid a conflict in the event both clients refused to waive
7
any more time. In other words, counsel could have avoided this issue by
simply choosing different dates.
For all these reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss.
Hernandez’s trial began later that afternoon.
C. The Trial Court Reasonably Declined to Dismiss
Hernandez’s Case
Maintaining his reliance on Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, Hernandez
insists that the court should have dismissed his case because the delay past
December 9, 2022 was due to a lack of available public counsel. In Johnson,
the defendant was arraigned on February 2, 2023 and his trial was set for
March 23. (26 Cal.3d at p. 563.) On that date, his public defender explained
that he would not be ready to try Johnson’s case until at least May 6 because
he was in the middle of trial in another case, and then had three other cases
to address that were older than Johnson’s. (Id. at p. 563 & fn. 2.) Over
Johnson’s objection—he did not waive any time—the court found good cause
to continue trial until May 6. (Ibid.) On May 6, his counsel requested
another continuance because he still had three other trials to complete before
Johnson’s. (Id. at pp. 563–564.) The court again found good cause to
continue trial over Johnson’s objection. (Id. at p. 564 & fn. 3.) Ultimately,
trial began 144 days after the information was filed. (Id. at p. 565.)4
The Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that a public defender’s
heavy caseload or busy calendar does not necessarily constitute good cause
to continue trial. (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 570–572.) Rather, good
cause depends on whether or not the issue is attributable to the fault or
4 Under the version of section 1382 in effect at the time of trial in
Johnson, “the statute’s 60-day period ran from the filing of the information or
the finding of the indictment, rather than from the date of the arraignment
(as is now the case).” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 548, fn. 9.)
8
neglect of the state—namely, the state’s chronic failure to provide enough
counsel for indigent defendants. (Id. at pp. 571–573.) The court explained:
“The state cannot reasonably provide against all
contingencies which may create a calendar conflict for
public defenders and compel postponement of some of their
cases. On the other hand, routine assignment of heavy
caseloads to understaffed offices, when such practice
foreseeably will result in the delay of trials beyond the 60-
day period without defendant’s consent, can and must be
avoided. A defendant deserves not only capable counsel,
but counsel who, barring exceptional circumstances, can
defend him without infringing upon his right to a speedy
trial. Thus the state cannot rely upon the obligations
which an appointed counsel owes to other clients to excuse
its denial of a speedy trial to the instant defendant.” (Id. at
p. 572, italics added.)
When a public defender requests a continuance based on their
commitment to other clients, the Johnson court recommended that the trial
court should first inquire whether counsel “could be replaced by another
deputy or appointed counsel who would be able to bring the case to trial
within the statutory period.” (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 572.) If “the
court cannot ascertain a feasible method to protect” the defendant’s speedy
trial right, it will have to grant a continuance. (Ibid.) “[U]pon a subsequent
motion to dismiss, however, the court must inquire into whether the delay
is attributable to the fault or neglect of the state; if the court so finds, the
court must dismiss.” (Id. at pp. 572–573.) On the record in that case, the
Supreme Court decided that the trial court erred because it failed to inquire
whether another attorney could take over Johnson’s case, and it made no
effort to determine whether the public defender’s congested calendar “arose
from exceptional circumstances” or from the “failure of the state to provide
defendant with counsel able to protect his right.” (Id. at p. 573.)
9
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Johnson decades later,
in Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th 533. In that case, “on the 60th day after
arraignment, the appointed counsel of one of two jointly charged defendants
was engaged in another trial that had extended longer than anticipated but
that was expected to be completed very shortly. For that reason, the trial
court found there was good cause to delay the trial of both defendants
(without their consent) on a day-to-day basis until the attorney’s other trial
was completed. Ultimately, the trial in the present proceeding commenced
on the 66th day after arraignment.” (Id. at pp. 537–538.)
The Sutton court reiterated that when appointed counsel is unavailable
to try one client’s case within the 60-day period because of a conflicting
obligation to another client, it is improper to delay trial “when it is the state
that realistically bears responsibility for counsel’s unavailability because of
its chronic failure to provide a number of public defenders or appointed
counsel sufficient to enable indigent defendants to come to trial within the
prescribed statutory period.” (48 Cal.4th at p. 552.) The court could not fault
the state for the delay in that case: “[Codefendant’s] counsel was unavailable
on the 60th day after [his] arraignment because another trial in which
counsel was engaged ran longer than anticipated. It is often difficult to
predict how long a trial will take, and unexpected events that prolong
another trial in which appointed counsel is engaged cannot fairly or
reasonably be laid at the feet of the state.” (Id. at pp. 552–553.) Indeed, “an
unanticipated extended duration of another trial” is “the type of contingency
that may occur even in a reasonably funded and efficiently administered trial
court system that handles a large volume of criminal cases.” (Id. at p. 554.)
10
The Sutton court also clarified Johnson’s distinction between “ ‘chronic
conditions’ ” and “ ‘exceptional circumstances’ ” in evaluating good cause in
this context. (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 554–555.) In referencing
“exceptional circumstances,” Johnson acknowledged “that even when a delay
is attributable to the state’s failure to provide sufficient resources to bring
all cases to trial within the statutory period, there can be instances in which
a trial court properly may find good cause for the delay under section 1382.”
(Sutton, at p. 555.) For instance, there may be “a large-scale riot or other
mass public disorder” that creates “an inordinate number of cases that
would overwhelm even a reasonably staffed public defender’s office.” (Id.
at pp. 554–555.) Johnson did not mean to suggest that the unavailability of
counsel can only constitute good cause when it is attributable to an
“ ‘exceptional circumstance.’ ” (Sutton, at p. 555.) Other circumstances that
the state is not responsible for—such as counsel’s “ ‘unexpected illness or
unavailability’ ” or their engagement in another client’s trial—may still
constitute good cause to delay trial under section 1382. (Sutton, at pp. 555–
557 & fn. 12.)
Here, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion. When defense
counsel became unavailable to try Hernandez’s case on December 8, 2022—
day 59 of 60—because she had just been sent out to trial in the Williams
cases, the court confirmed with counsel that there were no other attorneys on
the conflict panel available to step in and take Hernandez’s case to trial the
next day. Hernandez argues that the court should have sent his case to
Banning or trailed it one day, as his counsel requested, in order to make sure
that he could not be brought to trial by December 9. But those actions would
have resulted in his trial beginning on December 9 only if the Williams cases
settled or Hernandez found substitute counsel within one day. In our view,
11
the court sensibly found those predicate circumstances unlikely to play out,
so it would be a better use of limited court resources to reschedule
Hernandez’s case for December 21—when his counsel would be finished with
the Williams trial and available for his trial—instead of letting his case
linger on calendar day to day.
Moreover, the trial court reasonably determined that the state was not
at fault for defense counsel’s calendar conflict. Hernandez maintains that the
state failed to provide enough public counsel for indigent defendants, yet he
was appointed five different attorneys throughout the proceedings. The fact
that an attorney was not available the afternoon before the statutory period
would expire does not evince a systemic failure at the hands of the state. On
the record in this specific case, we agree that the delay is more fairly
attributed to the sudden unavailability of defense counsel, which is an
appropriate reason to continue a trial. (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 555–
557 & fn. 12.) The record shows that counsel expected the Williams cases to
settle. Minimally, we suspect she did not anticipate that both Hernandez and
Williams would simultaneously refuse to waive any more time after
consistently waiving time for many months. The reality that the Williams
cases did not settle and both clients exercised their speedy trial rights at the
same time is not necessarily defense counsel’s fault—as the trial court
12
recognized, choosing a trial date involves “a number of moving parts”—but it
is not the state’s fault, either.5
D. Hernandez Has Not Demonstrated Any Prejudice
Even assuming the trial court erred in finding good cause, we would
still affirm the judgment because Hernandez has not shown any prejudice by
the delay, which was relatively brief in light of the history of this case. If a
defendant seeks relief before trial from the denial of their right to a speedy
trial, they are not required to affirmatively show they have been prejudiced
by the delay. (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 574.) On appeal following
conviction, however, a defendant must show prejudice. (Ibid.)
In one short paragraph, Hernandez argues he was prejudiced because
his case “had already been continued dozens of times,” he “was well within
his rights to ‘put his foot down’ and insist that his case be tried in a timely
manner,” and his trial was continued 12 days past December 9, 2022 over
his objection. These points accurately recount the circumstances of the delay,
but they do not describe any harm resulting from the delay.
5 Hernandez writes in the conclusion of his argument that “it was the
lack of court appointed attorneys and the congestion of the court calendar that
caused the impermissible delay.” Beyond a stray reference to People v.
Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131—in which the Supreme Court held that a
trial court in Riverside County properly dismissed a case based on a lack of
available judges or courtrooms as the state had failed “over a considerable
period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of
Riverside County’s rapidly growing population and caseload” (id. at p.
1138)—Hernandez does not develop an argument that the delay in his case
was due to court congestion. We therefore do not address the point. (See
Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700
[“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it
may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is
unnecessary”].) In any event, in reviewing the transcript of December 8,
2022, the court never suggested there was no courtroom available to
Hernandez as of that date, just that availability was limited in general.
13
Hernandez does not argue, for instance, that had the trial court
dismissed his case based on a speedy trial violation, the prosecution would
have been unable to refile the charges against him. To the contrary, at the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, defense counsel acknowledged that the
prosecution could simply refile. (See Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 573
[“Under section 1387, the dismissal of a felony charge for lack of a speedy
trial is not a bar to further prosecution unless the charge has been previously
dismissed on such grounds”]; see also People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530,
557 [“Subject to certain exceptions, section 1387, subdivision (a) prohibits
renewed prosecution for the same offense if the matter has been dismissed
twice for speedy trial violations” (italics added)].) Nor does Hernandez make
any effort to explain how the delay affected his trial or defense. “Indeed,
[Hernandez] by his silence on this issue essentially concedes the absence of
prejudice.” (Johnson, at p. 574.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
14
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