Dow v. Burrell CA2/8

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Filed 11/22/24 Dow v. Burrell CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ANDREW DOW, B330855

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CHCV00604
v.

MELVIN JAMES BURRELL et
al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Michael Labrum and Michael Labrum for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Martin S. Kovalsky and Martin S. Kovalsky
for Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Andrew Dow purchased a house from Tonette
Wright. Unhappy with the purchase, Dow then sued Wright, her
real estate agent, and various companies with which the real
estate agent was connected. The trial court found against Dow
and awarded certain of the defendants attorney fees based on a
provision in the purchase agreement and Civil Code section
1717. Dow appeals this award. We affirm.
Wright listed her house in Canyon Country for sale with
the assistance of her broker Melvin Burrell. After a few
reductions in price and listing the property as a short sale, Dow
entered into negotiations with Wright and Burrell. The process
did not go smoothly, with Wright demanding a higher price than
that listed and refusing to move out on the agreed upon
date. After Dow took possession of the property, he discovered
allegedly undisclosed defects.
Dow sued Wright, Burrell, and Capital Executive Realty,
Inc., Lea Crest Realty, and Regal Services Group, escrow and real
estate brokerage companies Dow alleged were Burrell’s alter
egos. Dow obtained a default against Wright. Dow dismissed
Lea Crest at the beginning of trial. Trial then proceeded as to
Burrell, Capital Executive, and Regal Services, on claims of
breach of contract, breach of non-fiduciary duties, breach of
fiduciary duties, fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment,
and violation of the Unfair Competition Law. The trial court
found for Burrell and his entities on all counts and entered
judgment accordingly.
Burrell and his entities then moved for attorney fees under
the purchase agreement and Civil Code section 1717. Paragraph
25 of the purchase agreement states: “In any action, proceeding,
or arbitration between Buyer and Seller arising out of this
Agreement, the prevailing Buyer or Seller shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing Buyer

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or Seller, except as provided in paragraph 22A.” Section 22A
makes a party who refuses to adhere to the agreement’s
requirement of starting with mediation ineligible for attorney
fees. Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), states: “In any
action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the
party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party
specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” Thus, section 1717
provides a reciprocity of remedy where a contract only allows one
party to recover attorney fees. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128 (Reynolds Metals).) Case law expanded
this concept to non-signatories sued on a contract. (Ibid.) A non-
signatory sued on a contract including an attorney fees clause is
entitled to attorney fees if the signatory would have been entitled
to fees if that party prevailed. (Ibid.)
Applying this law, the trial court found Burrell and his
entities were entitled to fees. The trial court analyzed the
operative complaint and noted Dow brought the breach of
contract cause of action against all defendants, not just
Wright. Dow alleged that all defendants were “the agents and
employees” of each other and that “[a]t all times material herein,
each Defendant was the agent, servant and/or employee of each
of the remaining Defendants, and acting within the purpose,
scope and course of said agency, service and employment.” In the
breach of contract cause of action, Dow alleged breach of
paragraph 11A, which states: “Seller shall, within the time
specified in paragraph 14A, DISCLOSE KNOWN MATERIAL

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FACTS AND DEFECTS affecting the Property, including known
insurance claims within the past five years, and make any and
all other disclosures required by law.” Dow alleged
“DEFENDANTS represented, disclosed, and presented to
PLAINTIFF that there were no material facts or defects affecting
and adversely impacting the market value of the RESIDENCE.
PLAINTIFF discovered after taking possession of the
RESIDENCE after close of escrow that there were several
material facts and defects affecting the RESIDENCE and that
DEFENDANTS were well aware of or should have been aware
of.” “DEFENDANTS failed to timely disclose the material facts
and defects that DEFENDANTS were aware of or should have
been aware of as required by the AGREEMENT.” Dow prayed for
“attorney fees as allowed by contract and/or statute.”
Dow appeals.
Dow argues the trial court erred in allowing Burrell and his
entities to obtain attorney fees. We review the legal basis for an
attorney fee award independently. (Westwood Homes, Inc. v.
AGCPII Villa Salerno Member, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 922,
926.) We affirm.
Dow first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing
defendants to obtain attorney fees because they are not third-
party beneficiaries of the agreement. As Respondents point out,
this was not the basis of the trial court’s holding and neither the
trial court nor the respondents have claimed Burrell and his
entities are third-party beneficiaries.
Dow then asserts the trial court erred in finding he would
have been entitled to attorney fees if he had prevailed. None of
his arguments in this vein has merit.

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Dow argues the trial court misinterpreted the operative
complaint. He states that his allegation that all defendants were
agents of each other was mere “inartful” pleading, and he did not
intend to include Wright in the list. This argument fails. Dow
specifies in other causes of actions which specific defendants they
are against. The breach of contract claim, on the other hand,
says “Against All Defendants.” As discussed above, the
particular allegations in that cause of action relate to the conduct
allegedly breaching the agreement done by “Defendants.” Other
allegations in that cause of action identify specific acts done by
individual defendants, including that Wright entered the
agreement and that Burrell listed the property. Moreover, if
indeed Dow intended to bring the breach of contract claim only
against Wright, that cause of action should not have gone to trial
after Dow obtained default against Wright.
A non-signatory to a contract is entitled to attorney fees
under the contract if the signatory would be if they prevailed.
(Reynolds, supra, 25 Cal.3d 124 at pp. 128–129.) Here, Dow
alleged defendants should be liable for violating provisions of the
agreement. Not only did Dow bring the cause of action against
all defendants and include agency allegations, he included
descriptions of the defendants’ actions in the allegations specific
to the breach of contract cause of action and pursued the cause of
action even after Wright was no longer a party to the case. The
trial court correctly found that if Dow had prevailed, he would
have been entitled to attorney fees under the contract. Therefore,
Burrell and his entities were entitled to them when they
prevailed.
Relying on a section specific to real estate brokers at the
end of the agreement, Dow argues the agreement explicitly

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excludes at least Burrell from receiving attorney fees. That
paragraph states: “A. Real Estate Brokers are not parties to the
Agreement between Buyer and Seller.” The purchase agreement
identifies the seller’s listing firm as Lea Crest, signed for by
Burrell. As discussed above, this doctrine applies to non-
signatories. That Burrell is not a party to the agreement is
irrelevant. Dow still chose to sue Burrell for breach of the
agreement.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order and award costs to the respondents.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

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