CourtListener 10281551•People v. Rivera CA1/2
Testo completo
Filed 11/21/24 P. v. Rivera CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166280
v.
JOSE RIVERA, (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CRI-1778175)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jose Rivera filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6. The trial court issued an order to show cause and,
following an evidentiary hearing, denied the petition.
On appeal from the order denying the petition, Rivera contends (1) the
trial court applied the wrong burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing, (2)
the court abused its discretion in admitting a confederate’s hearsay
statements, and (3) the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a finding that he is guilty of murder under current California law.
We conclude Rivera’s first contention has merit, and therefore reverse
and remand to allow the trial court to decide the petition under the
appropriate standard of proof, which is whether the court finds, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Rivera is guilty of murder and attempted murder
under current law. We find no error in the admission of the confederate’s
1
hearsay statement, and we reject Rivera’s claim of the insufficiency of the
evidence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Charges, Plea, and Sentence
By a complaint filed in April 1998, the San Francisco District Attorney
charged Rivera and codefendant Marcelo Perez with one count of murder
(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and five counts of attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187; counts 2 through 6). As to the murder and three of the
attempted murder counts (counts 2, 3, 5), it was alleged that Rivera
personally discharged (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally used (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) a firearm in committing the offense. No firearm allegations were
made against codefendant Perez. The complaint alleged that on or about
April 15, 1998, Rivera and Perez killed Jesus Santos (count 1) and that on or
about the previous day, April 14, Rivera and Perez attempted to murder
James F. (count 2), John D. (count 3), Ariel C. (count 4), “Indio” or John Doe
No. 1 (count 5), and “Goose” or John Doe No. 2 (count 6).2
In 2001, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Rivera pleaded guilty to
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); amended count 1), admitting
personal gun use in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), three
counts of attempted murder (counts 2, 3, and 4), and one count of assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); amended count 5). Defense counsel
stipulated to a factual basis for the plea, and the trial court found a factual
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the attempted murder victims by their first names in
consideration of their personal privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4), (10).)
2
basis. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed, and Rivera was
sentenced to 29 years in prison.
Current Proceedings
Petition for Resentencing and Order to Show Cause
In March 2022, Rivera filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95,3 seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter and
attempted murder convictions on the ground he could not be convicted of
these offenses based on recent changes to the murder statutes. The
prosecution conceded Rivera’s petition made a prima facie case, and the trial
court issued an order to show cause and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.
The Prosecution’s Evidence at the Hearing on Resentencing
The prosecution argued Rivera was not entitled to relief because he was
the actual killer in count 1 and the actual shooter in counts 2, 3, and 4. For
the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented the following evidence: (1)
the reporter’s transcript of the preliminary hearing held April 30, 1999, (2)
the reporter’s transcript of the change of plea hearing on October 15, 2001,
and (3) a transcript of a police interview of Rivera conducted on April 19,
1998. As we will describe, the convictions arose from three incidents that
took place on April 14 and 15 in which Rivera, and his confederate Perez,
allegedly drove to the vicinity of Woodward Street in San Francisco and were
there involved with shootings against alleged members of the Norteño gang.
In one of the incidents, Jesus Santos, an apparent innocent bystander riding
a bicycle (and whose identity was unknown to Rivera) was shot and killed.
3 The statute was renumbered section 1172.6 without substantive
change, effective June 30, 2022, before the trial court denied the petition in
this case. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708, fn. 2 (Strong).) We will refer to the current statute in this opinion.
3
Preliminary Hearing Transcript
The preliminary hearing transcript consisted of the testimony of some
of the alleged victims and police officers (who, among other things, testified to
statements made by Rivera and Perez). Neither Rivera nor Perez testified at
their joint preliminary hearing.
James F., who lived on Woodward Street in San Francisco, testified
that, shortly before 2:00 a.m. April 14, 1998, he “got drawn into” a fight at
16th and Mission Streets and “slapped” “[s]ome girl or something.”4 He then
went home on foot. On Woodward Street, James saw his cousin, John D., and
stopped to talk with him in front of his house. A gray Nissan with tinted
windows turned onto Woodward from 14th Street and stopped in front of
them. The front passenger of the Nissan climbed out of the window and
“hung out the window and came over the roof.” James got down on the
ground and heard five or six shots. He could not identify the shooter. The
next day, April 15, James heard some shots when he was inside his house.
He looked outside to see if his friends were all right, and it did not appear
that anyone had been shot.
John D. testified he and his cousin James were standing inside the gate
of James’s house when “a little gray car” came by, and shots were fired at
them from the passenger side of the car.5 John saw that the gun was a
revolver. He was grazed in the left arm.
4 At the time of the hearing, James F. was on probation for drug sales;
he told a police officer he did not want to be a witness in this case.
5 In cross-examination, John D. testified that James F. was with
another person when he (James) arrived at his house. But John did not know
who the person was.
4
Uriel C. testified that he was visiting James F. and John D. at their
house on Woodward Street during the day on April 14, 1998 (that is, after the
2:00 a.m. shooting incident James and John described).6 His friend Indio was
there, too. He saw “a car roll up,” and “they just started shooting.” Five or
six shots were fired. Uriel described the car as “primer” colored. Someone
got out of the car; Uriel could not say if it was the passenger or the driver, but
he knew “[t]hey were Mexicans.” The shooting occurred in the afternoon. In
cross-examination, Uriel testified he, John, and James were all in the same
gang, and they are Norteños.
Rivera’s attorney stipulated that on or about 1:30 p.m. on April 15,
1998, Jesus Santos was shot and killed on Woodward Street near James F.’s
house.
San Francisco Police Officer Adriano Castro testified that on April 18,
1998, he stopped a gray Nissan on 16th Street. Codefendant Perez was
driving the car, Rivera was in the front passenger seat, and another
passenger, Gregory Sanchez, sat in the back seat on the passenger side. As
Officer Castro approached the car, he saw Sanchez pushing a magazine of a
handgun under the passenger seat. The three men were taken into custody.
In a search of the Nissan, Castro found a semiautomatic weapon under the
driver’s seat and a loaded magazine under the front passenger’s seat.
Officer Castro acted as Spanish language translator for police
interviews of Rivera and Perez; at the preliminary hearing he testified about
those interviews. In an interview with Perez on April 19, 1998, Perez told the
police that he, Rivera, and a woman named Marlene were “involved in an
altercation with some [N]orteños” at 16th and Mission around 1:30 in the
6 Uriel C. appears to be the person identified in the complaint as “Ariel”
C., the alleged attempted murder victim in count 4.
5
morning the previous Tuesday (April 14, 1998).7 Marlene was pistol-
whipped, and Perez and Rivera were hit. They learned the Norteños lived on
Woodward, and Rivera got a gun, but Perez “doesn’t know how he got it.”
They drove to “Woodward Alley” and saw three to five “Latin males” they
thought were the Norteños who had assaulted them on Mission Street. Perez
said “that Mr. Rivera told him to slow down. Mr. Rivera at this time stuck
half his body out the window, and [Perez] heard some shots.” Perez said he
was not sure whether the shots were coming from the men on the street or
Rivera. They drove away, and Perez told the police they returned to the
location two more times.
Officer Castro testified that Perez reported that he and Rivera drove to
the location again the same day at 1:30 p.m. (that is, about 12 hours after the
initial altercation). Rivera told Perez to wait for him, and Rivera got out of
the car. A few seconds later, Perez heard four or five shots, then Rivera
returned to the car and told Perez to take off. Perez said he did not see
Rivera or anyone else with a gun.
Officer Castro testified that Perez told the police he and Rivera drove
nearby the following day (April 15, 2018) around 1:30 p.m. They parked a
half a block away from Woodward Alley and walked to the corner of
Woodward and 14th. Perez stayed at the corner, and Rivera continued.
Perez told the police he “asked Mr. Rivera to come back several times,” but
Rivera continued walking. Perez “saw a gentleman on a bicycle come by him
on the same side of the street . . . . The gentleman[8] continued on his bicycle
7 Perez’s statements to the police were introduced through Castro’s
testimony. The quoted statements are from Castro’s testimony describing
what Perez told the police.
8 The fact that a man riding a bicycle was shot is repeatedly mentioned
in the witness statements, but the victim is not identified by name. In
6
north, and the next thing [Perez] heard was several shots.” Perez got scared
and ran to his car; Rivera ran to the car, too, and Rivera got in the driver’s
seat, and they drove away. Perez said he did not see anything happen to
anybody.
Officer Castro also testified about the police interview with Rivera. He
testified that Rivera’s “story was almost the same [as Perez’s] but with some
variations.” Rivera “was very vague” and “[t]here was a lot of confusion of
how many times they went up there” (“up there” apparently referring to
Woodward). Rivera said that in the first incident, they drove to Woodward
and “there were some shots exchanged between the [N]orteños and
themselves as they were driving by the first time.”9 Rivera told the police,
“the second time they drove by, . . . no shots [were] exchanged.” On a third
occasion, Rivera, Perez, and a third person called Goyo10 drove down
Woodward, and “the same [N]orteños that they had had the shootings with in
the past began to shoot at them.” Rivera said Goyo, who was sitting in the
back seat, shot about five rounds at the Norteños and Rivera shot twice. He
said the Norteños fired at them about seven times.
Castro testified that Rivera did not remember a bicyclist at first. But
Castro testified, “Towards the end of the interview [Rivera] remembers
context, it is apparent that the officers and Rivera and Perez understood that
the person on the bicycle was the murder victim in count 1, that is, Jesus
Santos.
9 Again, the cited testimony in this and the following paragraph are
from Officer Castro’s preliminary hearing testimony in which he described
what Rivera said; they are not verbatim quotes of Rivera’s statements during
the police interview.
10 Officer Castro testified that “Goyo” was Gregory Sanchez, who was
sitting in the back seat of the gray Nissan at the traffic stop on April 18,
1998.
7
seeing somebody on a bicycle and somebody on the bicycle being shot by
[Rivera] during the exchange of fire.”
Another police officer, James Miller, testified that he spoke with
codefendant Perez at the police station on April 18, 1998. Perez asked why
he was going to jail, and Miller told him a gun was found in his car.
According to Miller, Perez responded that the gun belonged to his friend,
“ ‘[t]he passenger that was sitting next to me.’ ” Miller testified that Perez
said, “ ‘He was supposed to tell you,’ referring to Mr. Rivera, ‘that the drugs
and the gun [are] his.’ ”11
Police Interview Transcript
A translated transcript of a police interview of Rivera was admitted in
evidence at the evidentiary hearing on the petition for resentencing. In his
interview with two police inspectors and Officer Castro (who, as we have
noted, was translating), Rivera said he wanted to tell them what happened.
Initially, he told the police he was on 16th and Mission with his cousin
(Perez) and Goyo when two or three Norteños “pulled the gun on me and the
girl” because he had a gold crucifix.12 Rivera said, “they started to take away
my . . . chain.” The Norteños “hit [the girl] in the face” with the “tip of the
barrel” and “they fired a . . . shot at me but it didn’t go off.”
Rivera referred to multiple incidents with the Norteños. He described
an incident where “we had a weapon” and “we took it out on them,” and “they
then started shooting at us.” Rivera said this occurred at 15th and
Woodward, and “we started shooting at each other.” He said the Norteños
11 Perez, but not Rivera, was charged with possession for sale of heroin
and cocaine.
12 Here, the quotes are from the transcript of Rivera’s interview with
the police in which Officer Castro acted as the translator.
8
fired first, and then Goyo shot back. The Norteños “had big weapons” and
“they fired about six or seven” shots. Goyo “fired about five” shots. Rivera
admitted that he also shot at the Norteños, stating, “I had a weapon,” “but I,
I only fired two shots.”
The police asked when the next shooting was. Rivera responded, “it
was when we ran into each other there on Fifteenth” and Woodward. Castro
confirmed, “The third time,” and Rivera responded, “Yes.” Rivera said the
Norteños shot at them, but, when asked whether he and his companions also
shot, he responded, “No, we didn’t shoot.”13
The police asked about the “last time on Woodward” “when you saw the
guy on the bicycle.” At first, Rivera said he “didn’t see . . . any guy, we shot at
each other, but from the car.” Later, however, he was asked to demonstrate
where people were on Woodward, and Rivera said, “The one with the bike
was here,” indicating on a diagram of the streets where Jesus Santos, the
victim in count 1, was at the time he was shot and killed. He said it “was not
intentional,” and “I didn’t want to hit anybody,” although he agreed he was
firing at the Norteños. (Underlining deleted.)
Trial Court Ruling on Petition for Resentencing
The evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 took place over two days.
The trial court heard argument and took the matter under submission on
13 The police asked Rivera, “And did you shoot the second time?” He
said, “Yes.” Asked who he shot at, Rivera responded, “No, well, I fired at the
car” the Norteños were in. He said he “didn’t hit anybody.” However, earlier
in the interview, Rivera said, “the first time we shot and then the second time
we didn’t anymore,” and “the second time” was when “we met on Sixteenth
street [and Valencia], the red car.” The police did not appear to follow up on
the red car reference.
9
August 8, 2022. At a hearing on August 29, 2022, the trial court announced
its ruling in open court, denying the petition for resentencing.
Before announcing its ruling, the court framed its task this way: “So
the issue for the Court is as to the murder charge, Count 1, is did Mr. Rivera
accept a plea offer in l[i]eu of the trial, and could [he] have been convicted of
murder, based on the information that allowed the People to proceed on a
theory of felony murder, natural, and a probable consequence theory, or so-
called other theory, in which malice is imputed based solely on participation
in the crime. [(Italics added.)] [¶] And the Court answers no to all those
questions. I don’t see a felony murder theory here. I don’t see a target crime,
so I don’t see a natural probable consequences theory, and I don’t see an[y]
other theory that would impute malice.” “Then as to the three attempted
murder convictions . . . .· The query here is, was the People’s theory of
attempted murder based on a natural and probable consequence doctrine?
That seems to be the limitation for the Court’s inquiry as to attempted injury,
and here again, it appears that the People’s theory that the defendant was
the actual shooter are supported by facts and circumstantial evidence in the
case.”
The court summarized the evidence and later stated, “So based on the
evidence that was provided as a basis for the plea to voluntary manslaughter,
the Court does not find that any of the parts of 1172.6, which discuss when
relief will be granted, fit this particular scenario. The Court instead finds
that Mr. Rivera appears to be the actual killer in the case, and if not,
certainly his actions were—he was directly participating in the shooting of
the bicyclist and therefore does not qualify for relief.”
10
DISCUSSION
A. The Applicable Burden of Proof and the Evidentiary Hearing
Rivera contends the trial court erred by applying the wrong burden of
proof at his section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. This contention has merit.
1. Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015;
Senate Bill 1437) eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the
felony-murder rule. (Pen. Code, §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as
amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, 3.)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.) Senate Bill 1437 also provided “a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (Ibid.)
The procedure for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the current law “begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 708–709.) The eligibility requirements are
listed in section 1172.6, subdivision (a).14 If a petitioner “has made a prima
14 The initial requirements for filing a petition and seeking relief under
section 1172.6 are: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been
convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
This section is preliminary to—and different from—the requirements of the
11
facie showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show
cause’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)),” after which, the trial court must hold an
evidentiary hearing. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 708–709.)
The evidentiary hearing is governed by section 1172.6(d)(3), which
provides in relevant part: “At the hearing to determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. . . . A finding that there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its
burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements
attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Italics added.)
The trial court’s role at an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6(d)(3) “is to act as an independent fact finder and determine, in the
first instance, whether the petitioner committed murder [or attempted
murder] under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123.)
2. Analysis
In this case, the prosecution conceded Rivera made a prima facie case,
and the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing.
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a petitioner is entitled to relief
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) (§ 1172.6(d)(3)), and may have been the source of the
analytical mistake in the trial court.
12
After the evidentiary hearing and before announcing its ruling, the
trial court stated that it was deciding the petition based on its determination
of whether Rivera “could have been convicted of murder . . . on a theory of
felony murder, natural, and a probable consequence theory, or so-called other
theory, in which malice is imputed based solely on participation in the crime”
and, similarly, whether “the People’s theory of attempted murder [was] based
on a natural and probable consequence doctrine.” But these preliminary
issues of prima facie eligibility for resentencing (see § 1172.6, subd. (a)) were
matters to be considered in deciding whether to issue an order to show cause
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c)). These considerations were not proper bases for denying
relief after the trial court issued an order to show cause and set an
evidentiary hearing. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d); People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 294 [once the court issues an order to show cause, “the
statute shifts the burden to the People,” and “[t]he question is whether the
petitioner committed murder under a still-valid theory”].)
Instead, at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court’s decision was
governed by section 1176.2(d)(3), which required the court to decide the
petition based on whether the prosecution met its burden of proving “beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder” (count 1) and
“attempted murder” (counts 2, 3, and 4) under current law. (§ 1172.6(d)(3),
italics added.) The trial court erred here because it failed to make these
determinations.15 It asked the wrong question, and, by applying the incorrect
legal standard, committed error.
15 Initially, the Attorney General argues Rivera forfeited his claim by
failing to raise it with the trial court. But defense counsel did raise the issue
of the proper trial court determinations under section 1172.6(d)(3). At the
evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor argued that Rivera could not prevail
because he did not meet the eligibility requirement of section 1172.6,
13
The Attorney General argues that the record in this case does not
overcome the presumption that the trial court applied the correct beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt burden of proof. We disagree. The trial court stated on the
record the standard it was applying to decide the petition, and its statement
was incorrect. This overcomes the presumption the trial court was aware of
and followed the applicable law.
Next, the Attorney General argues that any error was harmless
because the trial court’s “factual summary of events indicates how it viewed
the facts.” But the trial court’s statements about the evidence do not
demonstrate that it necessarily would have found Rivera guilty of murder
and three counts of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt had it acted
as an independent fact finder deciding whether Rivera was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as it was required to do under section 1172.6(d)(3). The
court noted “it was somewhat unclear” what happened in the second alleged
shooting incident and summarized, “Mr. Rivera says there were no shots fired
the second time; there was other evidence that there were shots fired, it was
far from clear.” The court described statements Perez and Rivera made to
the police but did not make any credibility determinations. And the court
found only that Rivera “appears” to be the actual killer.
On this record, we conclude there is a “ ‘ “ ‘reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility’ ” ’ ” that a more favorable result would have been
subdivision (a)(3), that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189 which were
effective January 1, 2019.” Defense counsel responded that the “order to
show cause hearing is governed by subdivision D3” of section 1172.6, and “the
issue, at this hearing, is whether there’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt
presented to this Court that sits as an independent fact finder by current law;
it’s not about what a judge could have done or might have done.”
14
reached had the trial court applied the correct standard of proof. (People v.
Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 944.) Under this circumstance, we will
remand the matter to allow the trial court to determine whether the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivera is guilty of murder
and three counts of attempted murder. (See People v. Arnold (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 376, 391 [where the trial court erred at the evidentiary hearing,
“it is appropriate to remand the matter for a new hearing to determine
whether the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is
guilty under a permissible theory of murder”].) We express no opinion as to
the outcome of the trial court’s review of the evidence under the appropriate
standard of proof.
B. Admission of Codefendant’s Hearsay Statements
As we have seen, codefendant Perez’s statements to the police were
introduced at the preliminary hearing through the testimony of Officer
Castro and Officer Miller. In briefing and at the evidentiary hearing on the
petition for resentencing, defense counsel argued Perez’s statements were
inadmissible hearsay for purposes of the petition. The trial court overruled
the objection, finding Perez’s “statements were so intertwined between
incriminating himself and incriminating his co-defendant,” that they were
admissible under the hearsay exception for declarations against penal
interest.16
16 Under section 1172.6(d)(3), the admission of evidence at the
evidentiary hearing is “governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that
is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated
evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.
However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing
15
Rivera contends the trial court erred in admitting Perez’s hearsay
statements at the evidentiary hearing on the petition for resentencing. We
review the court’s decision to admit evidence under a hearsay exception for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).)
While hearsay statements are generally inadmissible (Evid. Code,
§ 1200, subd. (b)), there are many exceptions to this rule, including an
exception for declarations against penal interest. (Grimes, supra, Cal.5th at
p. 710.)17 The focus of a hearsay exception “ ‘is the basic trustworthiness of
the declaration, and that question is entrusted to the trial court’s
discretion.’ ” (People v. Wilson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 271, 276.)
The hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest does not
apply to statements that are not “specifically disserving to the interests of the
declarant.” (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441.) Courts bar
“admission of those portions of a third party’s confession that are self-serving
or otherwise appear to shift responsibility to others.” (Grimes, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 715.) But whether a statement is disserving to the interests of
the declarant depends on the context in which it was made. (Ibid.) In
addition, our high court “permit[s] the admission of those portions of a
confession that, though not independently disserving of the declarant’s penal
as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception
to the hearsay rule.”
17 Evidence Code section 1230 provides in relevant part, “Evidence of a
statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness and the statement, when made, . . . so far subjected him to the risk
of . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.”
16
interests, also are not merely ‘self-serving,’ but ‘inextricably tied to and part
of a specific statement against penal interest.’ ” (Ibid.)
On appeal, Rivera does not dispute that Perez’s statements were “at
least in part, against his penal interest” because Perez admitted to driving
Rivera to and from three separate shooting incidents, arguably making him
an aider and abettor to any shooting Rivera committed.18 But Rivera
contends the portions of Perez’s statements that implicated Rivera were not
sufficiently reliable. (See People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 614 [a
declaration against penal interest “may, in light of circumstances, lack
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to qualify for admission”].)
We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in determining
that Perez’s statements inculpating Rivera were intertwined with (or
inextricably tied to) statements against his own penal interest. As Rivera
concedes, Perez’s account implicates himself as an aider and abettor in three
separate shooting incidents. “ ‘Evidence Code section 1230 only permits an
exception to the hearsay rule for statements that are specifically disserving of
the declarant’s penal interest. [Citation.] This is not to say that a statement
that incriminates the declarant and also inculpates the nondeclarant cannot
be specifically disserving of the declarant’s penal interest. Such a
determination necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said
and the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Tran (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1207, 1217.) Considering Perez’s statements and the
circumstances under which they were made, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion in determining the statements were admissible as
declarations against penal interest.
18 Nor does Rivera dispute that Perez was “unavailable” as required
under Evidence Code section 1230.
17
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Rivera contends the prosecution failed to offer sufficient
evidence to prove Rivera was guilty of murder under a still-valid theory.19 He
argues that his own statements to the police did not establish that he caused
the victim’s death or that he aided and abetted the killer or that he acted
with malice. If this claim had merit, then under section 1172.6, subdivision
(d), Rivera would be entitled to have his voluntary manslaughter conviction
vacated as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v. Underwood (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 303, 321–322 [reversing the denial of section 1172.6 petition
because no substantial evidence was presented that the petitioner was guilty
of murder under current law and directing the trial court to vacate the
petitioner’s murder conviction].) However, we conclude the record contains
sufficient evidence for the trial court to find Rivera guilty of murder under
current law on remand.
First, Rivera pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter of Jesus Santos
and admitted he personally used a firearm in committing the offense. A
guilty plea “ ‘amounts to an admission of every element of the crime and is
the equivalent of a conviction.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
451, 458.) While this does not mean Rivera is necessarily guilty of voluntary
manslaughter now, it does mean that Rivera has admitted that the killing of
Santos was a voluntary manslaughter and that Rivera, at the very least,
personally used a firearm in the commission of a target crime during which a
coparticipant committed voluntary manslaughter of Santos.20
19 Rivera does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the
three attempted murder convictions.
20 At the time he entered his plea, Rivera could have been convicted of
voluntary manslaughter on the theory that (1) he aided and abetted a
coparticipant in the commission of a target offense; (2) during the commission
18
Second, Rivera told the police that he and his confederates had
multiple confrontations with persons he believed were Norteños and that,
during one of the confrontations, he fired at the Norteños two times and his
confederate shot at the Norteños five times. He also said a person on a
bicycle was nearby during the shooting.
Taken together, this was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of
fact to find Rivera is guilty of murder under current law. A reasonable trier
of fact could find that Rivera was the actual killer and he acted with implied
malice. (§§ 187, subd. (a) [murder is an unlawful killing “with malice
aforethought”], 188, subd. (a)(2) [“Malice is implied when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart”]; People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
217, 231 [implied malice is “ ‘when a person willfully does an act, the natural
and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the
act poses’ ”].) Or a reasonable trier of fact could find that Rivera aided and
abetted his confederate in the killing and that Rivera harbored an intent to
kill. That he may have intended to kill only suspected Norteños and not the
victim would not negate a finding of malice. (See People v. Scott (1996) 14
Cal.4th 544, 546 [under “California’s common law doctrine of transferred
intent, a defendant who shoots with the intent to kill a certain person and
of the target offense, a coparticipant committed voluntary manslaughter; and
(3) under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have known that
commission of voluntary manslaughter was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the target offense. (See, e.g., People v.
Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 612–613 [instructing jury the defendant could
be found guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine where the target offenses were disturbing the
peace or assault or battery].)
19
hits a bystander instead is subject to the same criminal liability that would
have been imposed had ‘ “the fatal blow reached the person for whom
intended” ’ ”].)
By the foregoing, we do not mean to imply that Rivera is guilty of
murder. Our only conclusion is that the prosecution presented enough
evidence that the matter must be remanded for reconsideration under the
appropriate standard of proof required by the statute (§ 1172.6(d)(3)).
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to decide the petition
under section 1172.6(d)(3), applying the appropriate standard of proof.
20
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
A166280, People v. Rivera
21
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