People v. Nardini CA2/6

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Filed 11/19/24 P. v. Nardini CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333259
(Super. Ct. No. 2023006779)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

ANTHONY THOMAS
NARDINI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Anthony Thomas Nardini appeals from the judgment after
a jury convicted him of attempted willful, deliberate,
premeditated murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd.
(a); count 1), aggravated mayhem (§ 205; count 2), and assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury
found true allegations as to counts 1 and 2 that Nardini
personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and as to
all counts, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Nardini to life in
prison with the possibility of parole plus a determinate prison
term of four years.
Nardini contends the trial court: (1) precluded the jury
from considering evidence of intoxication regarding deliberation
and premeditation based on instructional error; (2) failed to
exercise its discretion to select the count on which to impose
sentence (§ 654); and (3) erroneously imposed a great bodily
injury enhancement for aggravated mayhem. We strike the great
bodily injury enhancement for aggravated mayhem. In all other
respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nardini is D.L.’s father. They rarely spoke to each other.
But their relationship was improving.
In March 2023, Nardini and D.L. went together to the
memorial for Nardini’s grandfather. That afternoon they got a
“little flask-sized bottle” of vodka and took a few sips while
driving. Around dusk, they went to the home of Nardini’s sister,
J.N. While they waited for her to come home, they almost
finished the bottle.
About 7:00 p.m., J.N. arrived home with her partner, S.D.
J.N. helped Nardini and D.L. finish drinking the bottle. Nardini
and J.N. then bought a fifth of vodka, and the three of them
drank a little more than half of it in the backyard patio.
D.L. was “pretty drunk.” Nardini was drinking as much as
D.L., but J.N. did not know if Nardini was more or less
intoxicated than D.L. The three also smoked marijuana. There
was conflicting testimony whether they ingested cocaine.
As they socialized on the patio, D.L. became emotional and
agitated. Around midnight he yelled at Nardini “really bad

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things about what kind of father he [was].” As Nardini sat in a
chair, D.L. hit him with his fist three or four times in the face
and head. Nardini did not fight back and “just sat there.” J.N.
tried to separate them but D.L. “brushed [her] off,” throwing her
onto a rock and bruising and scraping her hip.
Nardini got up and walked away. J.N. thought he went to
“cool off.”
D.L. was intoxicated, upset, crying, and walking back and
forth. S.D. talked to him for about 20 minutes and calmed him
down.
At around 1:00 a.m., Nardini’s truck got stuck in the mud.
When S.D. arrived to assist, he found Nardini’s speech coherent,
understandable, and not slurred. He attached a towing chain
and instructed Nardini to “give it just a touch bit of gas” when he
felt tension in the chain. Nardini did it “perfect” and S.D. pulled
the truck back onto the pavement. Nardini drove on the winding
road back to the house. S.D. drove behind him and believed
Nardini drove safely.
While S.D. and Nardini were gone, D.L. fell asleep on a
U-shaped couch in the living room. J.N. always slept on her
“spot” on another part of the couch because S.D. snored.
S.D. arrived back at the house and went to sleep in the
bedroom. Nardini stayed outside for a smoke.
When Nardini came into the house, J.N. showed him an
improvised bed she made for him on the floor next to the couch.
She told him D.L. was asleep.
J.N. was half asleep on the couch when Nardini shook her
shoulder. He asked her to give him her spot on the couch and
sleep with S.D., saying the foam mattress on the floor hurt his
back. Nardini was aggravated and “under the influence.” They

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argued about him taking her spot. About 10 to 20 minutes after
S.D. got in bed, J.N. went into the bedroom.
If there had been a conversation in the living room, it
would have been audible in the bedroom. But neither J.N. nor
S.D. heard any talking. About 10 minutes after J.N. entered the
bedroom, S.D. heard five to six muffled thuds. J.N. heard three
to five thumping sounds, then heard the back door open and shut.
J.N. and S.D. found D.L. lying on the couch twitching,
gurgling, and coughing with blood all over the pillow and couch.
Nardini was gone.
Sheriff’s deputies found a sledgehammer in the dirt in the
backyard with D.L.’s blood on it. The sledgehammer was not
where S.D. kept it, which was by the garage door, next to a
smaller four-pound sledgehammer. S.D. kept the larger
sledgehammer to break solid concrete.
D.L. blacked out before he hit Nardini while on the patio
and did not remember anything until he woke up in the hospital
ten days later. His blood alcohol level in the hospital was .297.
His jaw was fractured and wired shut. His cheekbone and other
bones in his face had multiple fractures. Permanent titanium
plates were put in his chin and cheek, and a gash in the back of
his head was stapled shut. His ear was split in multiple areas
and his inner ear was injured. At time of the trial, he had lost
almost all hearing in his right ear.
Pretext call
Later that morning, J.N. made a pretext call to Nardini
that was recorded by detectives. Nardini said D.L. “got what was
comin’ to him.” Nardini described how D.L. hit him in the head
on the patio and hurt J.N. and said, “So, yeah, I beat the fuck out
of him, dude. What else was I supposed to do?” “And this is what

4
he fuckin’ does to me, and then he hurts you. And yeah,
motherfucker needed an ass-whoopin’ is what the fuck he
needed.” He asked, “so he gets to beat up on me and then just go
to sleep like a baby, like everything’s cool?”
Nardini admitted he sent J.N. to the bedroom because he
knew what he was going to do and “didn’t want [her] to see that
shit.” He said he hit D.L. with a lock hidden in his hand and
“probably” with the hammer. He denied trying to kill D.L. but
was trying to “teach his ass a lesson.” During the call, Nardini
did not mention being intoxicated.
Miranda interview
Nardini was advised of his Miranda2 rights and was
interviewed by detectives. He said he, D.L., and J.N. shared “a
little half pint” of vodka, two or three shots each. At trial,
Nardini said it was a pint of vodka. Later they got a “big bottle”
of vodka and “everything got blurry.” They were drinking “a
little” when D.L. hit him in the head. Nardini then went outside
to “cool off” and “calm down” for 20 to 30 minutes. He sat in his
truck and thought about driving home but “thought about it for a
minute” and decided to “just go back and try to squash it.”
When Nardini was getting ready for bed, D.L. sat up and
“puffed up his little chest.” Nardini said, “Then when he shot me
that little look and I thought maybe he was gonna jump up
again.” Nardini said he then got what he thought was “an old
wooden stick” to protect himself. He “got to [D.L.] before he could
get me first.”
Nardini said J.N. and D.L. were “shit-faced” but Nardini
was “pretty good.” He said he had “a decent amount to drink” so

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

5
it was “a little blurry but . . . the gist of the situation is
completely clear.” He later said they were all drunk.
Appellant’s testimony
Nardini testified that he and D.L. arrived at the memorial
in the morning and each had a beer there. At J.N.’s house, the
three of them drank a pint of vodka and then part of a fifth of
vodka. They were “all drinking a lot” and were intoxicated.
After D.L. struck him, Nardini left to “cool down.” He took
the fifth of vodka with him, which was about a third full. His
truck got stuck and S.D. pulled him out. From the time Nardini
left the house until he returned was 20 to 30 minutes. Ten to 15
minutes later he asked J.N. if he could sleep in her spot because
he was “nervous laying down right next to [D.L.].”
After J.N. left the room, D.L. sat up. Nardini got nervous,
went outside, and grabbed what he thought was a stick from the
dirt right outside the door. He got the stick in case D.L. charged
at him. Nardini was “extremely drunk” and did not know the
stick was a sledgehammer.
D.L. attempted to stand up and Nardini pushed him down.
Nardini hit D.L. with the stick because he thought D.L. was
going to attack him. From the time Nardini was punched until
he hit D.L. was at most 40 minutes. Nardini said he kept a lock
in his truck for “emergencies,” but was confused when he said he
hit D.L. with it. Nardini said he never intended to kill D.L.
Nardini then drove from Simi Valley to Littlerock, California. He
woke up drunk, then finished the bottle from the night before.
DISCUSSION
Voluntary intoxication instruction
Nardini contends the jury was incorrectly instructed it
could not consider voluntary intoxication to determine whether

6
the alleged attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated.
We agree the instruction was erroneous but conclude the error
was harmless.
Attempted murder is punishable by five, seven, or nine
years in state prison. But if the trier of fact finds the attempted
murder was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” the
punishment is “imprisonment in the state prison for life with the
possibility of parole.” (§ 664, subd. (a); People v. Gonzalez (2012)
54 Cal.4th 643, 654.)
“A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a
request, on all general principles of law that are “ ‘ “closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47
Cal.4th 203, 246.) “Even if the court has no sua sponte duty to
instruct on a particular legal point, when it does choose to
instruct, it must do so correctly.” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1009, 1015.)
Here, the jury was instructed: “You may consider evidence,
if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited
way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether
the defendant acted with an intent to kill or to permanently
disable or disfigure someone.” The instruction concluded: “You
may not consider evidence of the defendant’s voluntary
intoxication for any other purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 625,
modified, incorporating language from CALCRIM No. 3426.) The
court erroneously deleted the bracketed language in CALCRIM
No. 625 that voluntary intoxication may be considered regarding
whether “the defendant acted with deliberation and
premeditation.”
The Attorney General concedes the instruction was

7
erroneous because voluntary intoxication can be considered to
determine if attempted murder is deliberate and premeditated.
(§ 29.4, subd. (b); People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)
We accept the concession. But we also agree with the Attorney
General that the error is harmless.
Erroneous jury instructions are subject to harmless error
analysis. (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 941
(Hendrix).) Errors of state law are harmless unless “it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) “ ‘ “ ‘[A]
“probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not,
but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Hendrix, at p. 944.) “[T]he question is . . .
whether the nature of the evidence leaves us ‘ “in serious doubt
as to whether the error affected the result.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 946.) In
evaluating whether an error is harmless or prejudicial, we may
“consider the strength of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 948.) A more
favorable result includes a reasonable probability that at least
one juror would have voted to find the premeditation allegation
not true, resulting in a hung jury. (Id. at p. 947 & fn. 6.)
However, errors under the federal Constitution are
harmless only if the prosecution can “prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24.) Under Chapman, “instructional error is harmless ‘where a
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
omitted element was uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence,’ ” but not where “ ‘the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with

8
respect to the omitted element.’ ” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th
400, 417.)
In Hendrix, the jury instruction erroneously stated that a
defendant’s mistake of fact could negate the specific intent
required for burglary only if the mistake was reasonable.
(Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 940-941.) Our Supreme Court
concluded it was unnecessary to decide whether to apply Watson
or Chapman. (Hendrix, at p. 944.) Similarly here, we need not
determine which test applies because we conclude the error was
harmless under either standard for the following reasons.
First, the elements and burden of proof for deliberation and
premeditation were explained to the jury:
“The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the
consideration for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act of
attempted murder.
“. . . A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without
careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not
deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold,
calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the
extent of the reflection, not the length of time.
“The People have the burden of proving this allegation
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.”
(CALCRIM No. 601, modified; see People v. Koontz (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1041, 1080.)
Based on these instructions, we conclude the jury was
required to consider whether attempted murder was impulsive or

9
the result of careful reflection.
Second, neither the record before us nor counsel’s argument
suggested that Nardini’s purported intoxication affected his
deliberation or premeditation. (See People v. Ivans (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 1654, 1661 [voluntary intoxication instruction not
required where evidence showed defendant was drinking but did
not “also show[] he became intoxicated to the point he failed to
form the requisite intent or attain the requisite mental state”];
People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715-716.) The defense
argued the facts were “clouded by alcohol” and challenged the
idea that Nardini “was so sober that he didn’t have blackouts,
that he didn’t get confused, that his judgment wasn’t clouded.”
But the defense did not argue that the attempted murder was
impulsive and did not mention deliberation or premeditation.
Counsel argued instead that Nardini struck D.L. in self-defense
without intent to kill. The jury rejected that theory.
Third, the evidence of deliberation and premeditation was
overwhelming. Nardini attacked D.L. after a cooling off period of
some 40 minutes. Nardini considered driving home but “thought
about it for a minute” and decided to “go back and try to squash
it.” When S.D. pulled out Nardini’s truck, he was coherent and
drove safely back to the house. He had additional time to
deliberate as he stayed outside for a cigarette. He went into the
room where D.L. was sleeping and insisted J.N. leave the room
because he knew what he was about to do and did not want her to
see it. He then went outside and armed himself with the large
sledgehammer. He repeatedly hit the sleeping D.L. in the face
with the sledgehammer.
Based on the totality of the instructions, the theory of the
defense, and the overwhelming evidence of deliberation and

10
premeditation, we conclude it is not reasonably probable that the
correct voluntary intoxication instruction would have resulted in
a different outcome. For the same reasons, we also conclude the
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
erroneous instruction did not contribute to the verdict.
Section 654 discretion
Nardini contends the trial court failed to exercise its
discretion to select the count on which to impose sentence. We
disagree.
At sentencing, the prosecution correctly noted the three
counts stemmed from the same facts and were subject to section
654. The prosecution asked the court to “determin[e] that
attempted premeditated murder is the primary charge.” The
court stated, ‘The law . . . puts some constraints on me from a
sentencing standpoint.” It then stated that in light of Nardini’s
prior record, the aggravating factors, and the brutality of the
crime, it could not find it in the interest of justice to grant
probation. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(6).)
The court then stated, “So that takes me to what the law
requires, and there’s not a lot of discretion that I’ve got in this
area. On Count 1, that is the controlling count, the 664/187(a),
attempted murder, the Court is going to sentence the defendant
to life with the possibility of parole.” The court declined to strike
the one-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) or the three-year enhancement for inflicting great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). For count 2, aggravated
mayhem, the court imposed life with parole, plus one year for use
of a deadly weapon and three years for inflicting great bodily
injury, all stayed pursuant to section 654. For count 3, assault
with a deadly weapon, the court imposed the midterm of three

11
years and three years for great bodily injury, all stayed pursuant
to section 654.
Section 654 previously provided: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall
be punished under the provision that provides for the longest
potential term of imprisonment.” (§ 654, subd. (a), as amended
by Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1, p. 2753.) It was amended effective
January 1, 2022, to provide that a criminal act punishable by
different provisions “may be punished under either of such
provisions.” (§ 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 441,
§ 1.) The amendment provides the trial court with discretion to
select the count on which to execute sentence. (People v. Jones
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45.)
In our view, the trial court’s statements do not show that it
misunderstood its discretion. The sentencing occurred almost
two years after the amendment’s effective date. We presume the
trial court knew the law and properly exercised its discretion.
(People v. Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492). “Thus,
we may not assume the court was unaware of its discretion
simply because it failed to explicitly refer to its alternative
sentencing choices.” (Ibid.) The trial court correctly observed
that its discretion was limited; attempted murder with
deliberation and premeditation (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a))
and aggravated mayhem (§ 205) each have only a single
sentencing option of life with parole. The only discretion for
those counts would be granting probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(6)) or
striking the deadly weapon or great bodily injury enhancements
(§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)), which the court
explicitly declined to do. We also conclude the court’s comments
about the “absolute brutality” of Nardini’s conduct clearly

12
indicate it would not impose a determinate sentence.
We also reject Nardini’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance because his counsel did not ask the court to impose
sentence on another count. Such a request would have been
futile. (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) Based
on what the trial court described as a “gruesome and horrific”
crime leaving the victim with “life changing” injuries, the
aggravating factors, and the court’s exercise of discretion to
impose the enhancements, we conclude the court would not have
imposed a determinate sentence if requested to do so.
Counsel advocated for his client by asking the court to not
impose the enhancements. Nardini and his wife both wrote
letters to the court asking for a sentence other than life in prison.
Nardini has not shown a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if counsel had repeated their request. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.)
Great bodily injury enhancement
The jury found true the allegation that Nardini personally
inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 2,
aggravated mayhem. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court stayed the
enhancement pursuant to section 654.
We agree the great bodily injury enhancement for count 2
must be stricken because great bodily injury is an element of
mayhem. (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1558-1560;
see People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1008.) Because the
trial court imposed the maximum sentence for count 1 and stayed
count 2 and its enhancements, we do not remand for resentencing
on other components of the sentence. (People v. Gastelum (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 757, 773 [no resentencing where maximum

13
sentence imposed].)
DISPOSITION
The great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a))
for count 2 is stricken. The clerk shall prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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