CourtListener 10277450•Voit v. Chaudhry CA6
Testo completo
Filed 11/19/24 Voit v. Chaudhry CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROBERT L. VOIT, H050733
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 2015-1-CV-285027)
v.
JAGTAR S. CHAUDHRY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
This appeal arises from an action filed by plaintiff Robert L. Voit against his
employer and company executives (defendants) for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.1
The trial court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and Voit appealed the
court’s order. A different panel of this court found that the order was a nonappealable
interlocutory order and dismissed Voit’s appeal.
After the matter returned to the trial court in 2020, the court held various status
conferences, specifically to review whether the parties had commenced arbitration
proceedings. In 2022, the trial court ultimately granted defendants’ request to dismiss the
case with prejudice for Voit’s failure to pursue arbitration.
1
On its own motion, this court takes judicial notice of both the record and its prior
opinion in Voit’s first appeal in Voit v. Chaudhry et al. (December 26, 2019, H043860
[nonpub. opn.]). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).)
Representing himself, Voit now appeals the dismissal order and again challenges
the trial court’s prior order granting defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. For the
reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Initial Proceedings and First Appeal
After initiating the underlying action in August 2015, Voit filed an amended
complaint against his former employer, Zscaler, Inc.; Jagtar Chaudhry (also known as Jay
Chaudhry), Zscaler’s co-founder and chief executive officer; and Kailash, the company’s
chief architect and co-founder, for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
In summary, Voit alleged that when he initially joined the company — previously
known as SafeChannel, Inc.3 — in 2008, Chaudhry represented, through Kailash, that
Voit would acquire company stock through his employment, and the stock would not be
diluted. In “justifiable reliance” on Chaudhry’s and Kailash’s promises, Voit
“ ‘continued to work for Zscaler and thereby continued to purchase equity in the
company and continued to contribute to the value of the equity he had already earned.’ ”
However, instead of acquiring an increasing amount of equity, as Voit believed, his
equity share was reduced through dilution from approximately .19 percent to .065
percent, effectively resulting in “ ‘a retroactive pay cut.’ ”
Defendants subsequently petitioned the trial court for an order compelling
arbitration, citing the arbitration clause in Voit’s at-will employment agreement and in
the employee handbooks published and distributed three separate times during the course
of Voit’s employment with Zscaler. Each of those documents referred to the company’s
arbitration policy. The “ ‘At Will Employment, Confidential Information, Invention
2
Our summary of the pertinent factual and procedural background includes some
information that we have taken from the prior opinion in Voit v. Chaudhry et al., supra,
H043860.
3
The company’s name was changed to Zscaler in August 2008
2
Assignment, and Arbitration Agreement” (Arbitration Agreement) contained the
following arbitration provision: “IN CONSIDERATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT
WITH THE COMPANY, ITS PROMISE TO ARBITRATE ALL EMPLOYMENT-
RELATED DISPUTES, AND MY RECEIPT OF THE COMPENSATION, PAY
RAISES AND OTHER BENEFITS PAID TO ME BY THE COMPANY, AT PRESENT
AND IN THE FUTURE, I AGREE THAT ANY AND ALL CONTROVERSIES,
CLAIMS, OR DISPUTES WITH ANYONE (INCLUDING THE COMPANY AND
ANY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, DIRECTOR, SHAREHOLDER OR BENEFIT PLAN
OF THE COMPANY IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH OR OTHERWISE) . . .
ARISING OUT OF, RELATING TO, OR RESULTING FROM MY EMPLOYMENT
WITH THE COMPANY OR THE TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH
THE COMPANY . . . SHALL BE SUBJECT TO BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER
THE ARBITRATION RULES SET FORTH IN CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE SECTION 1280 THROUGH 1294.2 . . . AND PURSUANT TO
CALIFORNIA LAW.’ ” The agreement further noted that any arbitration would be
“ ‘ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (“AAA”)
AND THAT THE NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR WILL BE SELECTED IN A MANNER
CONSISTENT WITH AAA’S NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES.’ ” Similarly, the employee handbooks issued and
distributed in 2008, 2011, and 2014, which employees were “ ‘required to read and
understand,’ ” included a statement of the company’s arbitration policy.
Voit responded to the petition to compel arbitration with a motion to disqualify
defense counsel from representing Zscaler and to require separate representation for each
of the named defendants, based on “ ‘multiple conflicts of interest that cannot be
waived.’ ” Voit also moved to strike defendants’ petition to compel arbitration, in whole
or in part, based on the conflicts of interest asserted in his motion to disqualify. Voit
3
simultaneously filed his opposition to the petition, arguing that the duties he sought to
enforce in his claims did not “ ‘result from’ ” his employment at Zscaler.
In May 2016, the trial court heard and issued a ruling on both matters. The trial
court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration
agreement between Voit and Zscaler covered all of Voit’s claims and was not
unconscionable. Accordingly, it stayed the action until the arbitration was completed. In
light of that order, the court also denied Voit’s motion to disqualify without prejudice,
adding, “ ‘Although the Court does not find any merit in the motion, Plaintiff may file the
motion with the arbitrator once appointed.’ ”
Voit subsequently appealed both orders. In December 2019, a different panel of
this court dismissed the appeal, finding that neither of the challenged orders was
appealable. (Voit v. Chaudhry et al., supra, H043860)
B. Proceedings Following Appeal
After the appeal was dismissed and the matter returned to the trial court, the court
held four status conferences between September 2020 and November 2021 to review the
status of the parties’ arbitration proceedings. While the parties indicated in June 2021
that they were prepared to proceed forward with arbitration, they had not commenced
arbitration by their subsequent appearance in November 2021. The trial court therefore
ordered that the parties commence arbitration immediately, and if they had not done so
by their next court appearance in March 2022, an order to show cause would be issued.
Accordingly, at the March 2022 court appearance, the trial court set the matter for an
order for show cause on September 29, 2022, for “plntff’s [sic] failure to pursue
arbitration” (capitalization omitted).
On September 29, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the order to show cause,
which was not reported. The minute order does not indicate whether the court first heard
argument from the parties prior to issuing any orders. The minute order only reflects that
“[p]laintiff failed to schedule court ordered arbitration, and [d]efendant's reqeust [sic] to
4
dismiss is Granted.” On November 18, 2022, the court subsequently dismissed the matter
with prejudice.4
Voit timely appealed from the order for dismissal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability of Order
As a threshold matter, defendants contend that Voit’s appeal should be dismissed
because he is merely attempting to “disguise” his appeal as one from the judgment for
dismissal when he is in fact challenging the order compelling arbitration, which remains
an interlocutory unappealable order. Defendants further argue that even if Voit’s appeal
is permissible because it is from a final judgment for dismissal, it should nevertheless fail
because he has not raised any challenged to the merits of the dismissal, and has therefore
waived any such arguments.
While it is true that orders compelling arbitration are generally considered
interlocutory and thus nonappealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 12945; see Wheeler v. St. Joseph
Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345, 353), Voit specifically indicated in his notice of
appeal that it was from a final judgment, as defined under section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(1), for “dismissal with prejudice,” and not from the order compelling arbitration.
Upon an appeal pursuant to section 904.1, a reviewing court may review “any
intermediate ruling, proceeding, order, or decision that involves the merits or necessarily
affects the judgment [or order appealed from.]” (§ 906.) It is undisputed that the trial
court issued an order compelling arbitration and stayed the proceedings. Furthermore, it
was Voit’s purported failure to engage in arbitration, as required by the order compelling
arbitration, which necessarily affected or led to the final judgment for dismissal.
Therefore, we conclude that the final judgment is properly before us on appeal.
4
As indicated by Voit in his notice of appeal, the order of dismissal was signed by
on October 20, 2022, but only filed on November 18, 2022.
5
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
5
As discussed in more detail below, we must determine whether the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the complaint for failure by Voit to diligently
prosecute the arbitration.6
B. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Dismiss the Case
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1281.4 provides, in relevant part, that once a court “has ordered arbitration
of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a
court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall … stay
the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to
arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” “ ‘Once a court grants [a]
petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the
twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction
over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action.
[Citation.] This is so, in part, because the whole point of contractual arbitration is to
obviate the need for an action at law.” (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1081, 1096, quoting Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796 (Brock)].) “This ‘vestigial jurisdiction’ [citation] consists of the
court being empowered to ‘appoint arbitrators if the method selected by the parties fails
(§ 1281.6); grant a provisional remedy “but only upon the ground that the award to which
6
Although Voit did not raise or argue this issue in the trial court or in his initial
briefs to this court, we are nonetheless free to consider since it involves an issue of law
on undisputed facts which may be raised for the first time on appeal. (See Tsemetzin v.
Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1341, fn. 6.) It
makes no difference that the issue was first raised on appeal by the court rather than the
parties, as long as the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to address it.
(Ibid.) Accordingly, prior to oral argument, we asked the parties to submit additional
briefing on whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. While Voit did not file a
supplemental brief in response to our request, we have received and considered
defendants’ supplemental brief.
6
an applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief” (§
1281.8, subd. (b)); and confirm, correct or vacate the arbitration award (§ 1285). Absent
an agreement to withdraw the controversy from arbitration, however, no other judicial
act is authorized. [Citation.] [¶] In the interim, the arbitrator takes over. It is the job of
the arbitrator, not the court, to resolve all questions needed to determine the controversy.
[Citation.] The arbitrator, and not the court, decides questions of procedure and
discovery. [Citations.] It is also up to the arbitrator, and not the court, to grant relief for
delay in bringing an arbitration to a resolution.’ ” (Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 912, 925, quoting Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 482, 487–488, fns. omitted (Titan/Value Equities).)
Appellate courts have routinely rejected parties' efforts to have courts overstep
their limited jurisdiction in cases that are stayed pending binding contractual arbitration.
(See, e.g., MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit Franchising, LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 643, 661
(MKJA, Inc.) [court cannot issue order lifting stay based upon party's claim that it cannot
afford contractual arbitration]; Finley v. Saturn of Roseville (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th
1253, 1259–1260 [order compelling review of decision by second arbitrator which was
provided for in arbitration agreement was unauthorized]; Titan/Value Equities, supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at p. 482 [order compelling arbitration to proceed under stated conditions
involving potential reinstatement to trial calendar was in excess of court's jurisdiction].)
Other courts of appeal have similarly concluded when a plaintiff fails to initiate
arbitration proceedings as ordered, the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction to dismiss the
case for failure to prosecute; instead, such relief can only be obtained through the
arbitration proceedings. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 737–738 (Blake),
overruled on other grounds by Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107, fn. 5;
Lew-Williams v. Petrosian (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 97, 107–109 (Lew-Williams).) In
Blake and Lew-Williams, the courts further noted that even if the plaintiffs failed to
initiate arbitration, the defendants could still obtain relief by initiating arbitration
7
proceedings in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules specified in the arbitration
agreements, and requesting orders for the arbitrator to control and expedite the
proceedings. (Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738; Lew-Williams, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at pp. 109–110.)
When the procedural facts are undisputed, as is the case in the instant matter,
determining whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction is a legal question subject to
de novo review. (See Lew-Williams, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 106; see also MKJA,
Inc., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 657 [applying de novo standard of review to determine
whether trial court had jurisdiction to lift litigation stay under § 1281.4 on the ground
plaintiff could not afford costs of arbitration].)
2. Analysis
a. The Trial Court Did Not Have Inherent Authority to Dismiss
For Voit’s Failure to Pursue Arbitration
In defendants’ supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction, defendants argue
that Lew-Williams, Blake, and Brock are inapposite to the instant matter because those
cases involved a dismissal for failure to prosecute the matter within the time limits
delineated in the Code of Civil Procedure. In contrast, because Voit’s complaint was
dismissed for his failure to pursue arbitration, not for failure to timely prosecute to
matter, the court retained “its inherent authority, consistent with the California
Arbitration Act, to dismiss the lawsuit for [Voit’s] willful disobedience of valid court
orders.” Citing Blake in support, defendants claim that the court had the authority to
reconsider and “change its prior orders” at any time prior to entry of judgment, thus
permitting the court to dismiss the matter for Voit’s failure to abide by the order
compelling arbitration.
We find defendants’ interpretation of Blake to be inaccurate. To explain, the
authority cited from Blake in defendants’ brief only discusses the court’s inherent power
to reconsider its prior orders before final entry of judgment, particularly if a change in the
8
law occurs. (See Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 738–739, fn. 10.) In Blake, the
plaintiff had filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s prior order compelling
arbitration based on a recent change in law regarding the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, and the appellate court found that the trial court retained inherent
jurisdiction to consider the motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008,
subdivision (c). (Id. at pp. 736, 738–739.) However, in the same paragraph, the appellate
court explicitly noted that in light of the arbitration agreement and the relief that was
available through the arbitration proceeding, “the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant
the motion to dismiss, and its order dismissing the action must be reversed.” (Id. at p.
738.)
We next consider defendants’ claim that the trial court retained inherent authority
to enforce its own order compelling the parties to arbitration, including through a
dismissal with prejudice. Defendants cite to sections 1287 and 1878 in support, as well as
a number of cases, including Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911 (Lyons), to argue
that it would be “inconceivable that a trial court has the jurisdiction and authority to issue
orders to compel arbitration but not the jurisdiction and authority to enforce such orders.”
Defendants also contend that a trial court’s inherent authority to issue orders compelling
arbitration and enforce them, including through a dismissal, is explicitly authorized by
the California Arbitration Act, which provides that: (1) arbitration agreements are
7
Section 128 provides, in relevant part, that every court shall have the power to:
“enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to
conduct a judicial investigation under its authority. [¶] … [¶] [and] compel obedience to
its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action
or proceeding pending therein.” (§ 128, subd. (a)(2) & (4).)
8
Section 187 provides that “[w]hen jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this
Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if
the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (§ 187.)
9
enforceable and irrevocable (§1281); (2) a court “shall order the petitioner and the
respondent” to arbitration if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists (§1281.2); and (3) a court retains continuing jurisdiction “to determine
any subsequent petition involving the same agreement to arbitrate and the same
controversy” (§ 1292.2).
As explained recently by the California Supreme Court in Estrada v. Royalty
Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 601, a trial court’s inherent authority to dismiss
claims is “tightly circumscribed” and only applies in two situations: “1) the plaintiff has
failed to prosecute diligently [citation]; or (2) the complaint has been shown to be
‘fictitious or sham’ such that the plaintiff has no valid cause of action.” (Ibid., quoting
Lyons, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 915–916.) Indeed, the Lyons court noted that the power to
dismiss on procedural grounds, as opposed to a full disposition on the merits, was not
broad and has “not been without reservation.” (Lyons¸ supra, at p. 916.) The Lyons court
therefore found that the trial court did not have inherent authority to dismiss a case for the
plaintiff’s failure to meaningfully participate in mandatory judicial arbitration because:
(1) there was no indication the plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute or that the
complaint did not present a valid cause of action; and (2) the Legislature had specifically
provided for other remedies, including attorney’s fees, for frivolous or delaying tactics.
(Id. at pp. 915–920.) Accordingly, Lyons provides no support for defendants’ argument
that the trial court retained inherent authority to dismiss based on Voit’s failure to comply
with the order compelling arbitration, and considering the California Supreme Court’s
recent analysis in Estrada, would in fact suggest otherwise.
Defendants also cite Preston v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1981) 126
Cal.App.3d 402 (Preston), in support of its argument regarding the trial court’s inherent
authority to dismiss. In Preston, the appellate court held that sections 1281.4 and 1292.6
should be read as granting the trial court jurisdiction to assist in moving a matter along
that had previously been ordered to arbitration, which included entertaining a motion by
10
the defendants to dismiss if the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
moving the dispute towards completion. (Preston, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 406).
However, the holding in Preston has been disagreed with and not followed in several
decisions. (See Lew-Williams, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 107–109; Brock, supra, 10
Cal.App.4th at p. 1804; Titan/Value Equities, supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 488, fn. 8; Nanfito
v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 315, 319, fn. 3 (Nanfito); Byerly v. Sale (1988)
204 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1316, fn. 3 (Byerly).) In fact, as noted by the court in Lew-
Williams, “[i]n the three decades since Brock was decided no published cases have
followed the principle enunciated in Preston and repudiated in Brock that a trial court
may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute the arbitration regardless of the stay, and
can terminate the arbitration.” (Lew-Williams, supra, at p. 108.) We agree with the
holdings in Lew-Williams, Brock, Titan/Value Equities, and other cases finding
considerable limitations to a trial court’s inherent authority under these circumstances.
As defendants provide no argument as to why the holding in Preston should apply over
the decisions in more recent cases, we assign little weight to the Preston decision in
reaching our conclusion.
Turning to the case at hand, it is undisputed that when the trial court granted
defendants’ order compelling arbitration in May 2016, it also stayed the action until
arbitration was complete, as required under section 1281.4. The stay was still in effect in
2022 when the trial court dismissed the matter. Therefore, defendants could only seek
such relief through arbitration proceedings, not the trial court. While we acknowledge
that Voit may have never initiated arbitration proceedings based on his own statements
that “he could not afford arbitration9” and “arbitration was impossible,” the record does
not indicate that Voit was the only party who could initiate arbitration during the
9
Notably, the trial court acknowledged Voit’s financial concerns when granting
the motion to compel arbitration and specifically ordered that arbitration fees not be
charged to him “under any circumstances.”
11
aforementioned stay. Defendants sought and obtained an order compelling the parties to
address this case through arbitration, yet chose not to initiate proceedings when Voit
failed to do so. We are not aware of any impediment to defendants initiating arbitration
proceedings on their own and seeking appropriate relief in that setting. For example, if
defendants initiated arbitration proceedings, they would have the ability to address any
potential lack of participation from Voit. The arbitrator would have the discretion to
dismiss arbitration if Voit failed to proceed with reasonable diligence and return the
matter to the trial court. The trial court would then have the power to lift the stay and
make further orders on how to proceed. (See Lew-Williams, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 109–110 [noting that when petitioners delayed in beginning arbitration, respondents
could have initiated arbitration proceedings on their own and requested relief in the
arbitration tribunal for any delay or lack of meaning participation].) Accordingly,
because the court only retained limited “vestigial jurisdiction” after issuing the order
compelling arbitration, we conclude that the court did not have inherent authority to
dismiss based on Voit’s failure to comply with the arbitration order.
In addition, although we acknowledge that the trial court granted the motion to
compel arbitration at defendants’ request, we would caution that a defendant’s failure to
initiate the arbitration process may, at some point, arise to post-order conduct
demonstrating waiver of its right to arbitrate. (See, e.g., Quach v. California Commerce
Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 584 [party may waive its right to arbitration by
“conduct that is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the contractual right as to lead a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the party had abandoned it.”].) Voit has not made
such an argument and we are not indicating that defendants’ conduct heretofore reflect
such a waiver. Nevertheless, a party who has sought and received a trial court order
compelling arbitration and has the ability to initiate the arbitration process should not be
allowed to unjustifiably sit on their hands when the arbitration forum is available to seek
redress.
12
b. The Record is Unclear if the Court Dismissed for Failure to
Timely Prosecute, Thus Requiring Remand
Generally, on appeal “ ‘[a] judgment or order . . . is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Even where an appellant affirmatively demonstrates
error, the California Constitution forbids reversal unless the appellant further
demonstrates that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §
13.) “ ‘Moreover, we will affirm a judgment correct on any legal basis, even if that basis
was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.] There can be no prejudicial error from
erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct.’ [Citation.]” (Wolstoncroft
v. County of Yolo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 327, 347.) However, where it is not clear
whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion using the correct legal
standard, it may be appropriate to remand a matter for the trial court to properly use its
discretion. (See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 158 [matter remanded to trial
court after finding that trial court abused its discretion, but “[i]t is uncertain whether the
trial court would have reached the same result using correct legal standards”]; F.T. v.
L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26 [“[a] discretionary order based on the application of
improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion
and is subject to reversal even though there may be substantial evidence to support that
order”; “[i]f the record affirmatively shows the trial court misunderstood the proper scope
of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to exercise
informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law”
(italics omitted)].)
Despite the limits on the trial court’s inherent authority to dismiss pending
arbitration, we recognize that a period of seven years passed between Voit filing his
complaint in 2015 and the trial court’s order for dismissal in 2022. To this point, we
13
requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue of whether the trial court
retained jurisdiction to dismiss the case for failure to timely prosecute within five years of
initiating the action, as required under section 583.360, or whether that period was tolled
under section 583.34010, because of the stay in proceedings.
In their supplemental briefing, defendants make two main arguments. First,
defendants contend that this court should follow the holdings in a number of cases that
have found dismissal to be appropriate after five years if a plaintiff fails to pursue
arbitration appropriately, including Preston, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 407, Lockhart-
Mummery v. Kaiser Foundational Hospitals (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 891, 896 (Lockhart-
Mummery), and Kuzmanoff v. Kron (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, Supp. 2–3
(Kuzmanoff). However, in making this argument, defendants do not acknowledge that a
split in authority exists as to whether a trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss a matter for
failure to prosecute under section 583.360, or similar provisions regarding time limits on
bringing a matter to trial (see, e.g., §§ 583.410–583.420 [allowing for discretionary
dismissal under specified circumstances].) As noted above, the holding in Preston has
been disagreed with and not followed in several decisions. (See Lew-Williams, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 107–109; Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1804; Titan/Value
Equities, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 488, fn. 8; Nanfito, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 319,
fn. 3; Byerly, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1316, fn. 3.) In addition, none of the cases
cited by defendants address the effect of a stay in proceedings on the five-year time
period as provided by the tolling provisions under section 583.340, subdivision (b). (See
Brock, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1797–1801 [challenging the holdings in Lockhart-
10
Section 583.340 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “In computing the time
within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be
excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: [¶] … [¶] (b)
Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.”
14
Mummy, Kuzmanoff, Preston, and similar cases because they did not properly discuss the
effect of the stay on the five-year time period].)
Second, defendants argue that the stay was only partial, and it was not impossible,
impracticable, or futile for Voit to bring the action to trial within five years. They claim
the stay was clearly partial because the arbitration agreement permitted the parties to
pursue provisional relief in court while arbitration proceeded, and the court continued to
hold status conferences even after issuing the stay. However, in reviewing the record, we
do not find support for defendants’ claim that the stay was only partial. The order
compelling arbitration stated that Voit’s entire “action” was to be stayed pending the
completion of arbitration and does not appear to stay only those issues subject to
arbitration. If the trial court reached a different conclusion while the case was pending
arbitration, that is not reflected in the current record.
Notwithstanding defendants’ arguments, it is simply not apparent from the record
that the trial court’s dismissal of the case was for failure to timely prosecute within the
mandatory five year limit as set forth in section 583.360. Furthermore, considering the
stay (whether partial or not) and related tolling provisions, it is also not clear whether
such a decision would be legally or factually supportable. The minute orders only
indicate that at the March 2022 court appearance, the trial court set the matter for an
order to show cause on September 29, 2022, for “plntff’s [sic] failure to pursue
arbitration” (capitalization omitted). Further, the minute order from the September 29,
2022 order to show cause simply states that “[p]laintiff failed to schedule court ordered
arbitration, and [d]efendant's reqeust [sic] to dismiss is Granted.” Similarly, the actual
order for dismissal indicates the basis for the dismissal was for Voit’s “[f]ailure to appear
and failure to pursue arbitration.” Accordingly, because the trial court did not
15
specifically indicate that it was dismissing for failure to prosecute under section 583.360,
it would be speculation for us to infer this from the current record and order for dismissal.
Since it is uncertain whether the trial court would have still dismissed the matter,
on the aforementioned statutory grounds and utilizing the correct legal standards, we
shall remand the matter to the trial court to allow the parties to argue this issue in the first
instance and for the court to exercise its informed discretion in determining whether
dismissal is appropriate.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order for dismissal is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with applicable law. The parties are ordered to bear their own
costs on appeal.
16
___________________________________
WILSON, J.
I CONCUR:
__________________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
I CONCUR IN JUDGMENT ONLY:
__________________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
Voit v. Chaudhry et al.
H050733
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.