CourtListener 10276710•People v. Sanchez CA4/3
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Filed 11/18/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063888
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1100417)
JESSE DANIEL SANCHEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial
notice granted.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, James M. Toohey, and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2012, a jury convicted Jesse Daniel Sanchez of second degree
murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm; it also found he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
or death. In 2023, Sanchez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6, which limits accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
During the prima facie hearing on Sanchez’s petition, counsel for
the prosecution and the defense agreed the jury was not instructed on the
felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any
other imputed malice theory. Based on counsels’ representations, the trial
court denied Sanchez’s petition.
Sanchez argues the trial court erred because the record did not
contain a copy of the jury instructions, and the court improperly relied on
counsels’ representations about those instructions. We are not persuaded.
Sanchez cites no authority barring the court from relying on counsels’
representations about the instructions given. And to the extent the court
erred, any alleged error was harmless. We have reviewed the jury
instructions and confirmed the jury was not instructed on any imputed
malice theory, so it is not reasonably probable there would be a different
outcome if the court had personally reviewed the instructions.
1 All further statutory references are to this code.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2012, a jury convicted Sanchez of second degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)).
The jury also found true that Sanchez personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury or death to another person (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced Sanchez to 15 years to life for the
murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court imposed a
two-year concurrent term for being a felon in possession of a firearm and
stayed the terms on the remaining enhancements. We affirmed the judgment
in 2014. (People v. Sanchez (June 30, 2014, G049900) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, Sanchez filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel for Sanchez and held a
prima facie hearing on his petition. During the hearing, the prosecutor
advised the court that his office provided defense counsel with copies of the
jury instructions and “[t]here’s nothing [in the instructions] regarding aiding
and abetting, natural and probable consequences, felony murder, conspiracy,
or any other theory by which malice could be imputed to the defendant.”
Sanchez’s counsel confirmed he had reviewed the instructions and stated,
“those instructions were not given. I’ll submit.”
The trial court denied Sanchez’s petition without further
discussion. Sanchez filed a notice of appeal.
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DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
Under prior law, a person who committed a murder in the
perpetration of certain enumerated inherently dangerous felonies was guilty
of first degree murder, even if the killing was unintentional or accidental.
(People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197; People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 94.) Additionally, a person who knowingly aided and
abetted a nonhomicide crime was guilty of any murder that was the natural
and probable consequence of the intended crime, irrespective of the aider and
abettor’s mens rea. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 845; People v.
Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-167; People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913,
920.)
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which limited the scope
of the felony-murder rule and eliminated natural and probable consequences
liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting. (See People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill’s stated purpose was “to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at
p. 958.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
extended the possibility of relief to individuals who were convicted of murder
pursuant to any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (See § 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).)
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An individual convicted under the former laws of murder may
petition for resentencing if his or her conduct would not constitute murder as
redefined under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petition is properly
pleaded, the trial court must appoint counsel, accept briefing by the parties,
and conduct a prima facie analysis of the petitioner’s eligibility for
resentencing. (Id., subds. (b)(3) & (c).)
The “trial court can rely on the record of conviction in
determining whether [a] prima facie showing is made.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 970.) But its inquiry is otherwise “limited”: it must accept the
petition’s factual allegations as true and assess whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if those allegations were proven. (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Lopez).) The court may not reject the petitioner’s
allegations on credibility grounds, engage in factfinding, weigh the evidence,
or exercise any discretion, unless the record contains facts refuting the
petition’s allegations, in which case the court may make a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner. (Lewis, at p. 971.) As the Supreme
Court observed, the prima facie bar is ‘“very low.”’ (Id. at p. 972.)
Even so, a prima facie showing is not made if the record of
conviction demonstrates the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) For example, if the jury
instructions show that jurors were not instructed on any theory of liability
affected by Senate Bill 1437, or if the record of conviction otherwise shows the
conviction was based on a theory of liability that remains valid under Senate
Bill 1437, the trial court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395.)
A determination that a petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo. (Lopez, supra,
5
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Any procedural errors made under section 1172.6
are subject to the Watson harmless error analysis, meaning the petitioner
must show there is a reasonable probability he or she would have obtained a
more favorable result had the trial court not erred. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 973, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
II.
ANALYSIS
Sanchez contends the summary denial of his petition was
improper because the trial court did not have the jury instructions in its
record; instead, the court relied on counsels’ representations about the
contents of those instructions. According to Sanchez, such a record is
insufficient to establish that his conviction remains valid under current law.
We find no error. As a preliminary matter, Sanchez cites no
authority barring a trial court from relying on counsels’ unanimous
representations regarding the contents of the jury instructions, and we have
found none. We agree, the better practice would have been for the court to
review the instructions. But in the absence of any statutory or case authority
requiring that review, if counsel on both sides agree about the contents of
those instructions, we see no harm in the court’s reliance on counsels’
representations. Indeed, a contrary rule would impede judicial economy.
In any event, the alleged error is harmless. During briefing in
this appeal, the Attorney General asked us to take judicial notice of the jury
instructions in the underlying trial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.) We
grant that motion, and after reviewing the jury instructions, we agree with
counsel below that the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural
and probably consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.
The jury instructions show Sanchez was prosecuted for second degree murder
6
with malice, making him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Sanchez cannot show a reasonable probability that the trial
court would have ruled differently had it personally reviewed the jury
instructions.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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