CourtListener 10276010•In re S.V. CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 11/18/24 In re S.V. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re S.V., a Person Coming B333745 consolidated with
Under the Juvenile Court Law. B335714
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
DK14946
DK14946B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
C.P.-S. et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant C.P.-S.
Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Defendant and Appellant V.V.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2015, S. was detained from her mother,
appellant V.V. (Mother), and her presumed father, J.F., following
the death of an infant sibling. Parental rights were terminated
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 in
September 2018.
This is the third appeal in this case. We remanded twice
for further proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25
U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.) (ICWA). In this appeal, C.P.-S., who in
2020 was found to be S.’s biological father, argues the juvenile
court erred when it declined to appoint counsel for him following
this court’s most recent remand.
At two hearings in 2023, C.P.-S. appeared and sought
counsel’s appointment to specially appear on his behalf and be
provided access to the juvenile court file to assess C.P.-S.’s
parental rights. The juvenile court denied these requests,
because parental rights had been terminated and the court’s
jurisdiction was limited to considering ICWA compliance. After a
1 All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
further ICWA inquiry, the juvenile court again found that ICWA
did not apply.
C.P.-S. and Mother appeal. Their sole contention is that
C.P.-S. was entitled to appointed counsel. We conclude there was
no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention to termination of parental rights
S. was born in February 2014, and came to the attention of
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) in December 2015 after Mother and J.F. were
arrested following the death of S.’s five-month-old sister.
According to the sustained petition, J.F. “wrapped [the infant]
tightly in a blanket, placed the child on the child’s stomach,
placed a blanket over the child’s head, and left the child” home
alone with S. and Mother’s six-year-old daughter, K. Mother was
aware that J.F. had wrapped and covered the baby. An autopsy
revealed the baby had fractured ribs and a lacerated liver due to
blunt force trauma to the abdomen inflicted by an adult. Her
death was ruled a homicide.
Investigations revealed that J.F. also physically abused K.
and S. by slapping and choking them, and Mother was aware of
the abuse. Mother and J.F. admitted they regularly left the
children home alone. K. reported seeing Mother and J.F. engage
in violent physical altercations.
The juvenile court sustained a petition under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (f) relating to the infant’s death, the
physical abuse and neglect of K. and S., and domestic violence
between Mother and J.F. At the disposition hearing on February
2, 2017, the juvenile court bypassed services for Mother and J.F.
under section 361.5.
3
In 2018 the children were thriving in the care of their
maternal grandparents. An adoption permanency assessment
was approved for the grandparents in June 2018. DCFS
recommended that parental rights be terminated with adoption
as the permanent plan.
At the section 366.26 hearing on September 5, 2018,
Mother submitted what she said was a DNA test showing that
C.P.-S. was S.’s biological father. The court found the evidence
inadmissible, noting that the document identified “mother,”
“child,” and “alleged father,” but did not identify them by name.
The court noted that J.F. had been deemed the presumed father
throughout the case, and although Mother was now claiming
C.P.-S. was S.’s biological father, the parties had not been
diligent in bringing this information to the court. There was no
“evidence that [C.P.-S.] could elevate his status to presumed.”
The court further explained, “Even if someone else is the
biological father for [S.,] at this point, they would just be
biological only. . . . I am not aware of anyone that has held
himself out as the parent of [S.] and received her into their home.
I am not aware of anyone that will be elevated to presumed for
her.” The juvenile court found the children adoptable and
terminated the parental rights of Mother, J.F., “and anyone else
that claims to be a parent to this child.”
B. First appeal and limited remand to address ICWA
Mother appealed the 2018 order. She argued that DCFS
failed to sufficiently inquire into J.F.’s claimed Native American
ancestry as it related to S.’s status as a potential Indian child.2
In May 2019, a different panel of this court accepted the parties’
2 On our own motion, we judicially notice Mother’s opening
brief in case no. B291379. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
4
stipulation to conditionally reverse the judgment with directions
to DCFS “to comply with its obligation to fully investigate [S.’s]
Indian ancestry . . . . The juvenile court is to re-appoint counsel
for the parents on remand to address the ICWA issue.”
Upon remand, the juvenile court reappointed counsel for
Mother and J.F. “for the limited issue of dealing with the ICWA
matter.” DCFS inquired into J.F.’s claims of Native American
heritage, and there was no indication S. was eligible for tribal
membership.
On November 14, 2019, C.P.-S. filed a request to change a
court order under section 388, seeking custody of S. because he
was related to her by blood, and asserting he had Cherokee
heritage. The section 388 request was rejected because parental
rights were terminated in September 2018. At a hearing on
November 26, 2019, C.P.-S. appeared and told the court that he
believed he was S.’s biological father. The court ordered a DNA
test. C.P.-S. also told the court that his grandmother was a
member of the Chickasaw tribe.
On January 27, 2020, the juvenile court found that C.P.-S.
was S.’s biological father. The court noted that although parental
rights had been terminated, C.P.-S.’s biological paternity was
relevant for an ICWA inquiry. DCFS reported that it received
negative responses from Cherokee tribes it had contacted.
On January 31, 2022, the juvenile court found that ICWA
did not apply and reinstated the order terminating parental
rights.
5
C. Second appeal and limited remand to address ICWA
Mother appealed again. She asserted that DCFS failed to
sufficiently inquire as to C.P.-S.’s Native American ancestry.3 On
August 9, 2023, a different panel of this court accepted the
parties’ stipulation to again conditionally reverse the judgment.
DCFS was ordered to interview C.P.-S. and any relevant
relatives, and to otherwise comply with ICWA. The order also
stated, “At a noticed hearing, with counsel for the parents
reappointed, the juvenile court is to ensure adequate inquiry and
any necessary notice has been made and make ICWA findings as
to the child. If the juvenile court finds the ICWA is not
applicable, the order terminating parental rights shall be
reinstated.”
The following day, August 10, 2023, the juvenile court
reappointed counsel for mother and J.F. “for the purpose of
addressing the ICWA inquiry and investigation.” At a hearing on
September 28, 2023, an attorney stated that he was representing
C.P.-S., who was also present. The attorney sought to specially
appear for C.P.-S. and requested access to the court file so he
could assess C.P.-S.’s rights. The court denied those requests
because reversal was limited to further ICWA inquiry, and the
court did not have jurisdiction to consider any issues beyond
ICWA. C.P.-S. told the court that he might have Blackfeet and
Choctaw ancestry. The court ordered DCFS to follow up on these,
and any other claims of Native American heritage by C.P.-S. or
relevant family members. When counsel began to argue that
C.P.-S. did not have notice of the dependency case and sought
visitation with S., the juvenile court stopped him. The court
3 On our own motion, we judicially notice Mother’s opening
brief in case no. B318455. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
6
noted that counsel had not been appointed to represent C.P.-S.
Instead, the court had appointed counsel for the parents of record
as required in the Court of Appeal’s order, and due to the limited
nature of the remand, “I don’t think I have authority to go beyond
that.”
DCFS reported on its continuing ICWA-related inquiries.
At a hearing on November 9, 2023, counsel again tried to
specially appear on behalf of C.P.-S. The court stated that it
allowed C.P.-S. and the attorney to be present at that day’s
hearing because they “may have further information on the
ICWA issue,” but no other issues would be considered. When the
court asked C.P.-S. if he had additional information relevant to
ICWA, C.P.-S. responded, “I don’t want to make any statements
on record without an attorney.”
On December 6, 2023, C.P.-S. filed a notice of appeal
seeking to appeal from the court’s orders of September 28 and
November 9, 2023 denying his request for legal representation.
On January 10, 2024, the juvenile court held that ICWA
did not apply, and reinstated the order terminating parental
rights. C.P.-S. was not present at the hearing. On March 7,
2024, Mother and C.P.-S. separately appealed the January 10
order. We consolidated the appeals.
DISCUSSION
C.P.-S.’s sole contention in these consolidated appeals is
that the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint counsel for him
in the proceedings following our second remand. He argues that
he was entitled to appointment of counsel as a result of this
court’s order on remand that counsel for S.’s parents be
“reappointed.” Mother joins in C.P.-S.’s arguments. There was no
error.
7
“‘The extent to which a father may participate in
dependency proceedings and his rights in those proceedings are
dependent on his paternal status.’” (In re D.P. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 689, 695.) “Dependency law recognizes four types of
fathers: alleged, de facto, biological, and presumed. [Citation.]
Only a presumed father is entitled to appointed counsel” and
other services. (In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 544; see
also In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120 [“‘Presumed
father status entitles the father to appointed counsel’”]; In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451 [“only a presumed, not a
mere biological, father is a ‘parent’ entitled to receive
reunification services under section 361.5”].) Under Family Code
section 7611, a person may be presumed to be the parent of a
child if married to the other parent or if “[t]he presumed parent
receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child
as their natural child.” Here, J.F. has been S.’s presumed father
for the duration of this case.
C.P.-S., is S.’s biological father, not her presumed father.
“A ‘biological or natural father is one whose biological paternity
has been established, but who has not achieved presumed father
status as defined in [Family Code section 7611].’” (In re Jason J.
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 932.) “[I]nterpreting ‘parent’ to
include a strictly biological father would introduce into the
dependency context fathers who had never demonstrated any
commitment to the child’s welfare. [Citation.] Indeed, such an
interpretation would arguably grant ‘reunification services to a
rapist or an anonymous sperm donor.’” (In re Zacharia D., supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Thus, “a biological father’s rights are limited
to establishing his right to presumed father status.” (In re A.S.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 362.)
8
Mother first asserted that C.P.-S. might be S.’s biological
father when her parental rights were terminated in 2018.
Neither did C.P.-S. appear in the case or claim biological father
status before parental rights were terminated. The case had
been pending for nearly four years when he filed his application
under section 388. The petition seeks custody of S., but fails to
allege any facts demonstrating presumed father status. (CT
1227-1229)
The juvenile court was never provided evidence to suggest
that C.P.-S. was a presumed father before it terminated all
parental rights. That order was not challenged, and it is now
final. (See, e.g., In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1148 fn. 16
[“Appealing on the basis of ICWA or Cal-ICWA inquiry error . . .
does not change the fact that parental rights have been
terminated even if Indian ancestry is discovered”].) When this
court ordered that counsel for parents be “reappointed” upon
remand, the juvenile court correctly interpreted the order to
mean that counsel be reappointed for the parents recognized
throughout the proceedings, Mother and presumed father J.F.
C.P.-S. asserts that he was entitled to counsel as a
biological parent with potential Native American ancestry. But
he cites no authority supporting his argument that his potential
ancestry warrants appointment of counsel, and we have found
none. “ICWA was enacted to protect tribal integrity and
sovereignty in its membership determinations.” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.) The statute does not convey a right
of counsel to a child’s relatives who claim Native American
ancestry. Indeed, non-parent relatives may be the primary
source of information regarding possible Native American
ancestry. (See ibid. [the Legislature has recognized that a child’s
9
“parents may not be the best source of information about a child’s
Indian ancestry”].) No authority suggests that such relatives are
entitled to counsel for purposes of completing an ICWA inquiry.
C.P.-S. relies upon In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
1426, to demonstrate the court’s error. In that case, the mother
appealed and the case was remanded for the limited purpose of
ICWA compliance. Upon remand, the mother was neither
provided notice of various hearings, nor appointed counsel. The
Court of Appeal held the juvenile court erred, because following a
parent’s appeal, “the appellant-parent must be given the
opportunity to participate in the proceedings on remand” and her
“participation would be of limited benefit without the assistance
of counsel.” (150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436.) Here, Mother and J.F.
were appointed counsel and fully participated in the case on
remand. Justin S. does not support a conclusion that a biological
father who did not participate in the case before termination of
parental rights is entitled to counsel upon limited remand for
ICWA compliance.
DCFS correctly asserts that C.P.-S.’s argument on appeal
fails to accurately convey the context of his requests in the
juvenile court. When C.P.-S. and his counsel attended the
hearings in September and November 2023, they attempted to
argue for visitation and asked for access to the case file to assess
C.P.-S.’s rights as a parent. The juvenile court was correct when
it concluded that our remand was limited to ICWA issues. (See,
e.g., In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1137; In re Terrance B.
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 965, 972.) Moreover, a juvenile court may
not allow access to the case file to non-parties. (See § 827, subd.
(a).) Thus, to the extent C.P.-S.’s contention extends beyond the
ICWA inquiry, the juvenile court correctly denied his requests.
10
Moreover, C.P.-S. has not demonstrated that any failure to
appoint counsel constituted reversible error. The denial of a
parent’s statutory right to counsel is reviewed under a harmless
error standard. (In re A.J. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 652, 665-666; In
re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 797.) Thus, “the test for
prejudice is generally whether ‘it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to [the appellant] would have been reached
in the absence of the error.’” (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234,
252, quoting People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
C.P.-S. asserts that because he did not have counsel or
access to the case file, he was “unable to raise significant
shortcomings with the ICWA notices.” He also notes that at the
hearing on November 9, 2023, he told the court that he did not
want to “make any statements on record without an attorney.”
But C.P.-S. makes no factual argument that the ICWA inquiry
was deficient. Indeed, he expressly states that he is not
challenging the adequacy of the ICWA ruling in this appeal.
Unless an appellant demonstrates error, we assume the lower
court’s ruling was correct. (See, e.g., In re J.F. (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 70, 79; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-
609.) C.P.-S.’s unsupported contention of prejudice is insufficient.
Thus, any possible error in failing to appoint counsel for C.P.-S.
was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
11
SIGGINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J. ZUKIN, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
12
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