People v. Mendoza CA4/2

CourtListener 10275111Calctapp15 nov 2024

Testo completo

Filed 11/15/24 P. v. Mendoza CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E082788

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF149675)

VICTOR JULIAN MENDOZA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Reversed with directions.

Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Warren J.

Williams and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
In 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the

Department) recommended that the superior court resentence Victor Julian Mendoza

under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (former § 1170(d)(1)).

(Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The court declined to follow the

Department’s recommendation, and Mendoza appeals from that order.

On appeal, Mendoza contends that he is entitled to a new hearing on the

Department’s recommendation because subsequent amendments to the statute (now

codified in section 1172.1) apply retroactively under the principles of In re Estrada

(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada). The People agree that remand for reconsideration

of the Department’s recommendation in light of the current version of the statute is

appropriate because the relevant statutory amendments clarified existing law. We agree

with the People, reverse the order rejecting the recommendation to resentence, and

remand for reconsideration of the Department’s recommendation under section 1172.1.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, the trial court sentenced Mendoza to 30 years three months in state prison

pursuant to a plea bargain in which Mendoza pled guilty to 12 felonies, including three

counts each of robbery (§ 211) and false imprisonment (§ 236)—one for each of three

victims—and one count of active gang participation (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). Mendoza also

admitted the truth of various sentencing enhancement allegations, including that he

personally used a firearm in the commission of each of the robbery offenses within the

meaning of subdivision (b) of section 12022.53 and that he personally used a firearm in

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the commission of each of the false imprisonment offenses within the meaning of section

12022.5.

In 2019, the Department sent a letter to the superior court recommending that the

court recall Mendoza’s sentence and resentence him under former section 1170(d)(1) in

light of the statutory amendment affording trial courts the discretion to strike or dismiss

personal use firearm enhancements. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).) The Department submitted

various documents along with its recommendation, including a cumulative case summary

and evaluation report that provided a brief summary of the underlying facts of the

commitment offenses and a description of the programs in which Mendoza participated

while in prison. In a written response, the People opposed resentencing and argued, in

the alternative, that if Mendoza were resentenced, then he should receive the same

sentence. Mendoza, represented by counsel, filed a brief in support of the Department’s

recommendation. A friend of Mendoza’s family wrote a letter in support of resentencing,

and Mendoza also wrote a letter to the court.

The court held a hearing on the matter in September 2020, at which the court

indicated that it had read all of the documents filed. Both the prosecutor and defense

counsel argued, and Mendoza addressed the court. The court took the matter under

submission and two weeks later declined to recall Mendoza’s sentence, finding that the

summary of the offenses revealed that Mendoza was the “poster child” for the firearm

enhancements.

3
Mendoza did not timely appeal. In 2023, he filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus to be excused from that failure under In re Benoit (1973)10 Cal.3d 72, 86-87,

which the People did not oppose. We granted the petition and gave Mendoza 20 days to

file a notice of appeal from the order denying him relief under former section 1170(d)(1),

which we would consider constructively timely. Mendoza filed a notice of appeal within

that 20-day period.

DISCUSSION

Mendoza acknowledges that section 1172.1 was not in effect when the trial court

declined the Department’s recommendation to recall his sentence and resentence him

under former section 1170(d)(1). He nevertheless argues that the amendments to former

section 1170(d)(1) (now codified in section 1172.1) apply retroactively under the

principles of Estrada. The People disagree about the retroactive application of section

1172.1 under Estrada but concede that the matter should be remanded for a new hearing

on the resentencing recommendation because the statutory amendments clarify former

section 1170(d)(1). We agree with the People that remand for reconsideration is

appropriate regardless of whether section 1172.1 is retroactive under Estrada, and we

accordingly do not decide the issue of retroactivity.

Former section 1170(d)(1) authorized a trial court at any time on the Department’s

recommendation to recall a defendant’s sentence and to resentence the defendant “in the

same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if

any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (Former § 1170(d)(1); People v. McMurray

4
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040 (McMurray).) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly

Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540) substantively amended and

redesignated the provision as (now-former) section 1170.03 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 2, 3,

3.1), which itself was recodified as section 1172.1 without substantive change (Stats.

2022, ch. 58, § 9; People v. Vaesau (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 132, 142). Section 1172.1

was further amended effective January 1, 2024, but not in any way relevant to the issues

on appeal. (Stats. 2023, ch. 131, § 157; Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; Stats. 2023, ch. 795,

§ 1.5.) Thus, the only relevant substantive differences for purposes of this appeal

between former section 1170(d)(1) and section 1172.1 were enacted by Assembly Bill

1540, which set forth specific procedures a trial court must follow in considering the

Department’s recall and resentencing recommendation. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1;

McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.)

Section 1172.1, like former section 1170(d)(1), authorizes a trial court at any time

on the Department’s recommendation to recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence the

defendant to a new sentence not greater than the original sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd.

(a)(1).) When the Department recommends recall and resentencing, the trial court is

“now required to hold a hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate), state on the

record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel

for the defendant.” (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040; § 1172.1, subds.

(a)(7)-(8)(A), (b)(1).) “There shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of

the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant currently poses

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an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of [s]ection

1170.18.”1 (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) In considering whether to recall and resentence, the

court is required to consider certain specified factors. (Id., subd. (a)(5).) If the court

resentences the defendant, the court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial

Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of

sentencing.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)

Relying on McMurrray, the People concede that remand is warranted because

Assembly Bill 1540 clarified existing law. (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 1041-1042.) “A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is

properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Carter v. California Dept. of

Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter).) Whether a statute clarifies

existing law is a question of statutory interpretation, which we independently review.

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)

In McMurray, the trial court summarily denied the Department’s recommendation

to recall and resentence under former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, supra, 76

Cal.App.5th at p. 1037.) The defendant appealed from that denial, and Assembly Bill

1540 became effective while the appeal was pending. (McMurray, at p. 1038.) The

1 “Section 1170.18, subdivision (c), defines an ‘“unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety”’ as meaning ‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of’ subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) of section 667. The eight
felonies listed in that provision are referred to ‘as “super strikes.”’” (People v. Lewis
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409.)

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Court of Appeal concluded that Assembly Bill 1540 applied to the defendant’s case

because it clarified former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, at pp. 1041-1042.)

Analyzing the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1540, McMurray reasoned that

“the Legislature repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill 1540 was intended to ‘make

clarifying changes’ to former section 1170(d)(1), including specifying the required

procedure and guidelines when the [the Department] recommends recall and

resentencing.” (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1041.) McMurray noted that

various passages in the legislative history demonstrated that Assembly Bill 1540 was

enacted in part to clarify the Legislature’s intent regarding former section 1170(d)(1),

specifically “that trial courts should accept [the Department’s] resentencing

recommendations.” (McMurray, at p. 1040.) McMurray further explained that the

legislative history indicated that Assembly Bill 1540 also was enacted for the additional

purpose of “clarify[ing] certain aspects of former section1170(d)(1) that the appellate

courts had incorrectly interpreted, including that, ‘when a sentence is recalled or

reopened for any reason, in resentencing the defendant trial courts must apply [“]any

changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.”’” (McMurray, at

p. 1041.)

We agree with McMurray’s analysis of the legislative history of Assembly Bill

1540 and therefore also agree with the conclusion that Assembly Bill 1540 was enacted

to clarify former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1040-

1041; People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1089-1090 [same]; People v. Braggs

7
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 817 [same]; People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074,

1078 [same].) We therefore accept the People’s concession and conclude that the

amendments to former section 1170(d)(1) apply to the trial court’s consideration of the

Department’s recall and resentencing recommendation even though the court’s ruling

predated those amendments. (Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 922.) We accordingly

reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the Department’s recommendation

under the current version of section 1172.1. (McMurray, at p. 1039.)

In addition, as the People correctly acknowledge, the abstract of judgment dated

December 20, 2018 (the most recent version included in the limited record on appeal)

indicates that Mendoza’s sentence is 30 years four months. That differs from the

sentencing minute order and the prior versions of the abstract of judgment, all of which

reflect a sentence of 30 years three months. It is possible that the discrepancy is a clerical

error that has already been corrected while this appeal has been pending, and it is also

possible that Mendoza will be resentenced on remand, resulting in a new abstract of

judgment and rendering the issue moot. In any event, on remand the trial court should

ensure that the operative abstract of judgment is free of clerical errors. (People v.

Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate court may order the correction of clerical

errors on its own motion]; see also People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [“Any

discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s

minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of clerical error”].)

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DISPOSITION

The order denying recall and resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded

to the trial court to consider whether to recall Mendoza’s sentence and resentence him in

accordance with section 1172.1.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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