CourtListener 10274230•In re J.G. CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 11/14/24 In re J.G. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re J.G. et al., Persons Coming B333717
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00852C-D)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE G. ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Debra L. Gonzales, Judge Pro Tem. Affirmed.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jose G.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Arianna V.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
Arianna V. (mother) and Jose G. (father) challenge the
juvenile court’s findings and orders terminating parental rights
over their children, J.G. and J.V.,1 under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300.2 Father argues the juvenile court
abused its discretion in denying his request for a bonding study,
and both parents argue the court erred in finding the parental-
benefit exception to the termination of parental rights did not
apply. The parents also argue the inquiry of the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was
insufficient. We affirm the court’s orders.
1 Father is the father of J.G. only and appeals from the order
terminating his parental rights over J.G. Mother is the mother of J.G.
and J.V. and appeals from the order terminating her parental rights
over both children.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
Mother and father are the parents of J.G. (born 2017). J.G.
has three maternal half-siblings: J.V. (born 2007), A.V. (born
2006), and B.V. (born 2005).3 Their father is deceased.
In October 2019, DCFS received a report that father went
to mother’s apartment, punched her on her back, and ran away.
The referral alleged there had been previous incidents of
domestic violence. A social worker interviewed J.V. about one
week after the incident. J.V. stated he had seen father hit
mother before “with his hands open” and push her. J.V. reported
an incident where father hit mother with “open hands” because
father was trying to take J.G. out of the home against mother’s
wishes.
In November 2019, J.G., J.V., and their siblings were
removed from mother and father. J.G., J.V., and their sibling
A.V. were placed with maternal aunt, L.O.4 A few days later,
DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging J.G., J.V., and their
siblings were at risk because of the parents’ history of domestic
violence in the presence of the children. At the detention hearing
in late November 2019, the juvenile court ordered the children
released to mother and detained J.G. from father. In December
2019, father appeared at a hearing for a temporary restraining
order sought by mother against him. The court ordered
monitored visitation for father with J.G. at the hearing.
3 A.V. and B.V. are not subjects of this appeal. In the sections
below, we summarize the facts and evidence relevant to mother’s and
father’s appeals, focusing on J.G.’s and J.V.’s histories.
4 Their other sibling, B.V. was placed with a different maternal
aunt, S.V.
3
J.V. told a dependency investigator he believed father was
using drugs because every time he went to the family’s home, “he
looks like he’s on something.” Two days after the hearing on
mother’s temporary restraining order, father tested positive for
amphetamines and methamphetamines. In January 2020, DCFS
filed a first amended petition adding an allegation regarding
father’s amphetamine and methamphetamine use and mother’s
failure to protect J.G. from father’s drug use. Father failed to
appear for many scheduled drug tests and tested positive three
more times during the dependency proceedings.
The social worker arranged for monitored visits between
father and J.G. to take place twice a week for three hours,
beginning in July 2020. During a visit with J.G. in September
2020, father admitted to the social worker he used “crystal meth”
two days before.
In November 2020, the juvenile court ordered J.G., J.V.,
and their siblings detained from mother after finding she failed to
comply with prior court orders. The court ordered monitored
visits for mother. J.G., J.V., and A.V. were again placed with
maternal aunt L.O. In December 2020, DCFS filed a second
amended petition adding allegations involving mother’s use of
illicit drugs.
DCFS reported mother visited with the children weekly
and was observed to have a strong bond with them. Father was
also visiting with J.G. weekly and was reported to be attentive to
her and her needs.
At the adjudication hearing held in February 2021, the
juvenile court sustained several counts of the second amended
petition, including the counts based on father and mother
4
engaging in violent altercations in the presence of the children,
mother’s drug use, and father’s substance abuse.
At the disposition hearing held the following month, the
juvenile court declared the children dependents of the court
under section 300 and ordered them removed from mother and
father. The court ordered reunification services for mother and
father. The court further ordered monitored visits for father with
J.G. and for mother with all the children.
B. First Reunification Period
In September 2021, DCFS reported father was having
visits with J.G. twice per week, monitored by paternal
grandmother. During a meeting with the social worker, father
stated it had been “hard for him to stay away from drugs and
that he had relapsed a couple of times.” DCFS reported father
was consistent with his visitation during this period.
At a hearing in September 2021, the juvenile court granted
mother unmonitored day visits with her three oldest children,
including J.V. The children reported visits were going well. In
November 2021, the juvenile court granted mother unmonitored
visits with J.G. and overnight visits with all children once DCFS
conducted a home assessment of mother’s apartment.
At the six-month review hearing in December 2021, the
juvenile court found the parents’ progress with their case plans
was not substantial but continued reunification services for them.
C. Second Reunification Period
In early December 2021, DCFS canceled mother’s overnight
visits because she had failed to comply with the juvenile court’s
orders. J.G.’s and J.V.’s caregiver, L.O., informed the social
5
worker that mother would sleep during visits with the children
while “the children [did] their own thing.” In February 2022,
DCFS reinstated mother’s overnight visits after she attended
individual therapy and appeared for drug testing.
Caregivers S.V. and L.O. reported mother had a habit of
leaving the children with maternal grandmother while she went
“out and about.” In March 2022, mother’s request to have the
children for their spring break from school was granted. When
S.V. went to maternal grandmother’s home one night during
spring break, mother was not there. J.G. and J.V. were sleeping,
and maternal grandmother was not aware mother had left the
home.
J.V. told the social worker that mother usually left him and
J.G. at maternal grandmother’s home without saying where she
was going. J.V. stated mother was not around much even when
they had visits with her. In April 2022, mother’s overnight visits
were cancelled for one month while these concerns were
investigated. DCFS noted in its report for the 12-month hearing
that J.G. and J.V. wanted to reunify with mother.
As to father, paternal grandmother continued monitoring
his visits with J.G. Father visited twice a week. At the 12-month
review hearing, the juvenile court found mother’s and father’s
progress with their case plans was substantial and continued
reunification services.
D. Third Reunification Period
The social worker met with mother’s children in late July
2022. A.V. told the social worker she and her siblings had not
spent time with mother at her apartment for an overnight visit
for at least a couple of months. J.V. said mother typically left
6
him and J.G. at maternal grandmother’s home and would not
return for a day or two, including on an occasion when he tested
positive for a “health virus.” J.V. told the social worker, “‘I don’t
want to go live with mom. She cannot handle all four children. I
want to live with my [maternal] aunt [M.M.] she will be there for
my sister [J.G.] and me.’” J.G. told the social worker she wanted
to live with mother because she “‘love[d] her’” and wanted to
“‘stay with [mother’s] friend.’”
A few days later, L.O. reported that J.V. chose to stay with
her and not go with mother for a weekend overnight visit. L.O.
also stated that mother tried to bring J.G. back a day early from
a weekend overnight visit. In August 2022, J.G. and J.V. were
placed in maternal aunt M.M.’s home.
Mother tested positive twice for methamphetamine in
October 2022. In November 2022, the juvenile court reverted
mother’s visitation back to monitored visits and rescinded
overnight visits. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine
again in late December 2022.
DCFS noted in its report for the 18-month review hearing
that J.G.’s and J.V.’s current caregiver, M.M., wanted to adopt
them and provide a permanent home. M.M. reported mother
consistently visited J.V. and J.G. on Fridays and some
Wednesdays.
As to father, paternal grandmother reported father had
consistent visitation twice a week with J.G. and spent quality
time with her. During an announced visit, the social worker
observed father engage and play with J.G. It was noted that J.G.
had told her caregiver that on some occasions during visits,
father was at work and she stayed with paternal grandmother.
7
At the 18-month review hearing on February 1, 2023, the
juvenile court found mother’s and father’s progress with their
case plans was not substantial and terminated reunification
services. Father’s counsel requested that a bonding study be
completed between J.G. and the parents. The court denied the
request because it did not think it was “necessary at this time.”
Mother and father each filed a notice of intent to file a writ
petition regarding the February 1, 2023, hearing. The matters
were deemed nonoperative after the parents’ counsel filed letters
pursuant to Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570,
and the parents failed to file supplemental briefs.5
E. Termination of Parental Rights
J.G.’s and J.V.’s caregiver, M.M., informed the social
worker mother was not consistent with weekend visitation but
did visit during the week. M.M. consistently stated there were no
changes in J.G.’s or J.V.’s behaviors and they did not appear
surprised when a visit was cancelled. J.V. said the visits with
mother were “fine,” and J.G. reported she did not remember what
she and mother did during visits. When J.G. was asked by the
social worker how visits with mother were, she responded,
“‘[F]ine, she gives cool toys.’”
In May 2023, father reported during a phone call that he
had not missed any visits with J.G., but when the social worker
asked father what days and times he visited, he was unable to
recall. Paternal grandmother whispered the times and days for
5 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our records
regarding the writ proceeding initiated by father and mother following
the court’s order setting a section 366.26 hearing (case no. B326791);
the proceeding was deemed a nonoperative writ in May 2023.
8
visitation to father. J.G. told her caregiver, assigned therapist,
and the social worker that father was not always present during
visits.
J.G.’s caregiver mentioned concerns to J.G.’s therapist
about J.G. having urinary accidents and coming back with
changed clothes after visits with father. J.G. told her therapist
that father tickled her in a room, and she urinated on herself.
The therapist noted J.G. appeared open to discuss other topics,
but she was obscure when discussing father or visits. About a
week later, the therapist met with J.G., and J.G. was again vague
about visits with father. J.G.’s caregiver told the social worker
that J.G. did not have accidents in the placement home. Father
denied tickling J.G. Paternal grandmother denied having any
knowledge of J.G. having urinary accidents during visits with
father.
In a status review report filed July 2023, DCFS noted that
J.G.’s and J.V.’s caregivers developed a loving relationship with
them, and the caregivers expressed their desire to provide the
children with a loving and stable home. J.V. twice told the social
worker he wanted to be adopted by maternal aunt M.M. J.G. was
too young to make a statement about permanency.
At a July 28, 2023, section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile
court ordered, at J.G.’s counsel’s request, that paternal
grandmother no longer monitor father’s visits due to concerns of
possible sexual abuse and paternal grandmother not always
being present during visits. The court continued the hearing.
After that, Father’s visits were moved to DCFS’s office, and
he visited twice per week. Father would arrive with food and
many toys for J.G., though the social worker repeatedly told him
J.G. did not have room for additional toys at her home. The
9
social worker noted that father seemed to have boundary issues,
and J.G. was aware that her father would buy her anything she
wanted. Father generally acted appropriately and was engaged
in activities with J.G. However, J.G. seemed to care more about
paternal grandmother than father. J.G. continuously asked for
paternal grandmother and was distressed by her absence, at
times crying. J.G. continually asked to call paternal
grandmother during and between visits. In contrast, J.G. would
say goodbye to father without issue and did not appear disturbed
when she did not see him. DCFS assessed that it did not appear
father had a significant relationship with J.G. outside of the
monitored visits.
J.G. expressed her feelings during a phone call with father
that occurred in October 2023. According to J.G.’s caregiver, J.G.
asked if she could see paternal grandmother. Father told J.G.
she could, but he could not be there. J.G. said, “‘I choose
grandma.’”
As time went on, there was evidence that J.G. also missed
father. At a visit in November 2023, J.G. told father that she
missed him while she was at school and cried, but she smiled
after she remembered she was going to see him.
Because father often catered to J.G.’s wishes, he sometimes
disagreed with her caregiver. In mid-November 2023, J.G.’s
caregiver reported that during a phone call, father asked J.G.
when the last time she showered was and when she was going to
shower again. The caregiver reminded J.G. she was going to
shower that night. J.G. said she did not want to, and father told
her she did not have to shower. The next day, the social worker
spoke with J.G.’s therapist. The therapist reported the
caregiver’s structure was appropriate and benefitted J.G. in
10
meeting her goals. The therapist opined that if father’s “poor
boundaries” were removed, J.G.’s behaviors would “overall
improve.”
F. Section 366.26 Permanency Planning Hearing
After several continuances and 10 hearings, the section
366.26 hearing was held on December 5, 2023.6 Father’s counsel
requested another continuance and argued a “bonding study
would be appropriate and beneficial in this case.”
The juvenile court denied the request for a continuance “for
a variety of reasons.” At the previous hearing, the court was
clear there would be no further continuances and father’s counsel
assured the court father would be ready to proceed. DCFS had
provided “very thorough reports of visitation both by mother and
father, and the quality of those visits.” The court indicated it did
not believe a bonding study was required for it to make its
determination. The court also stated father “should have made
[the request] many months ago” if he believed a bonding study
was necessary or beneficial.
Mother argued the parental-benefit exception to adoption
applied to her and both J.G. and J.V. Father argued the
parental-benefit exception to adoption applied to him and J.G.
The juvenile court admitted the stipulated testimony of paternal
grandmother that “if called to testify, paternal grandmother
would testify that the visits she monitored for father, father was
present and consistent for those visits.” The court also admitted
into evidence the stipulated testimony of J.G., which included her
6 A.V. and B.V. had other permanent plans and were not parties
to the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
11
statement that she loved her parents and wanted to keep visiting
them.
The juvenile court found mother and father did not
establish the parental-benefit exception applied. The court found
the parents maintained regular visitation, but neither
established a beneficial relationship with the children. And the
court determined that terminating the parent-child relationship
would not be detrimental to the children. The court found no
exception to adoption applied as to J.G. or J.V. and terminated
parental rights.
Mother and father appealed.
G. ICWA Proceedings
Mother filed a parental notification of Indian status
(ICWA-020) form in November 2019, indicating she had no
Indian ancestry as far as she knew. At the November 2019
detention hearing, the juvenile court noted it had mother’s
ICWA-020 form and found it had no reason to know ICWA
applied as to mother. DCFS inquired of mother in early
December 2019 regarding Indian ancestry, and mother denied
any knowledge of Indian ancestry pertaining to herself or the
children’s fathers.
In December 2019, father filed an ICWA-020 form,
indicating he had no Indian ancestry as far as he knew. At the
December 2019 hearing on mother’s temporary restraining order
request, the juvenile court noted father filed the form and found
ICWA did not apply in J.G.’s case. DCFS inquired of father
regarding any Indian heritage the next day, and father denied
any knowledge as to Indian ancestry. Father reported he was
born in Mexico.
12
In September 2022, the juvenile court ordered further
ICWA inquiry reports to be completed. In fall 2022, DCFS
inquired with the three maternal aunts who were or had been
caregivers—L.O., S.V., and M.M.—and with maternal
grandmother, and all denied Indian ancestry. Each maternal
aunt also completed an Indian ancestry questionnaire provided
by DCFS stating they had no information regarding any Indian
ancestry. In November 2022, the social worker interviewed
father regarding ICWA, and father again denied having Indian
heritage.
In July 2023, DCFS reported it spoke with “maternal and
paternal family members and inquired about ICWA,” and all
family members denied Indian heritage.
At the initial section 366.26 hearing on July 28, 2023, the
court directly inquired of father and paternal grandmother
regarding ICWA at DCFS’s counsel’s request. Father and
paternal grandmother each denied any Native American
ancestry. At the December 5, 2023, section 366.26 hearing, the
court again found there was no reason to know ICWA applied to
the children.
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Declining to Order a Bonding Study
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying his requests for a bonding study made on February 1 and
December 5, 2023. We are not persuaded.
13
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 730, a juvenile court
may appoint an expert to study the bond between a parent and
child. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1084.) A
bonding study can be relevant to determining whether the
beneficial parent-child exception to termination of parental rights
applies. (See In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 869.)
However, “[t]here is no requirement in statutory or case law that
a court must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to”
terminating parental rights. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 (Lorenzo C.).)
We review the juvenile court’s order denying a request for a
bonding study for an abuse of discretion. (Lorenzo C., supra, 54
Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) We ask “whether, under all the evidence
viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the
juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a
bonding study.” (Ibid.)
2. Father Forfeited His Challenge to the February 1,
2023, Denial of a Bonding Study
DCFS asserts father cannot challenge the February 1,
2023, denial of his bonding study request because he did not
challenge the order by a petition for extraordinary writ as
required by section 366.26, subdivision (l).7 Following the denial
7 Section 366.26, subdivision (l), states: “(1) An order by the court
that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any
time unless all of the following apply: [¶] (A) A petition for
extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner. [¶] (B) The
petition substantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged
and supported that challenge by an adequate record. [¶] (C) The
petition for extraordinary writ review was summarily denied or
14
of father’s request for a bonding study at the February 1 hearing,
where the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing was set,
father’s counsel filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.
Father, however, did not file a writ petition, and the matter was
deemed a nonoperative writ in May 2023.
Father did not acknowledge the bar of section 366.26,
subdivision (l), in his opening brief. Nor did he file a reply brief
to dispute DCFS’s contention that he cannot challenge the
February 1, 2023, denial in his appeal from the December 5,
2023, orders. Father has forfeited a claim of error by not
challenging the February 1 denial of his request for a bonding
study in a petition for extraordinary writ as required. (§ 366.26,
subd. (l); In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 247 [“All
court orders . . . made at a hearing in which a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing is set must be challenged by a
petition for extraordinary writ”].)
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Denying the December 5, 2023, Request for a Bonding
Study
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
denying his December 5, 2023, request for a bonding study
because the court relied solely on the description of visits
between August and November 2023 in making its decision. The
otherwise not decided on the merits.” “Failure to file a petition for
extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule, to
substantively address the specific issues challenged, or to support that
challenge by an adequate record shall preclude subsequent review by
appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to this section.”
(§ 366.26, subd. (l)(2), italics added.)
15
juvenile court denied father’s request because it found “there
[was] an abundance of information in the reports,” and it did not
believe a bonding study was required.
Monitored visits were ordered for father in December 2019.
There is ample evidence in DCFS’s reports about the quality and
nature of father’s relationship with J.G. The reports contained
detailed summaries of father’s visits with J.G. along with notes
and comments from different monitors, J.G.’s caregivers, and
J.G.’s therapist discussing visits prior to August 2023. When “the
parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12
months or longer, . . . the nature and extent of the particular
relationship should be apparent. Social workers, interim
caretakers and health professionals will have observed the parent
and child interact and provided information to the court.” (In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Further, the court admitted the stipulated testimony of
paternal grandmother concerning the visits she monitored, which
took place from at least September 2021 to July 2023. The court
also admitted the stipulated testimony of J.G. in which she stated
she loved father. To the extent father complains the reports
lacked sufficient detail of visits prior to August 2023, he fails to
explain why he could not have obtained additional evidence about
such visits through other means, such as his own testimony.
Father contends the juvenile court erroneously found he
should have made his request for a bonding study earlier, when
in fact he did request a bonding study at the February 1, 2023,
hearing. However, father did not reassert his request for a
bonding study at the ten hearings since his prior request was
denied. Moreover, father does not address the court’s concern
about the delay that granting the December 5, 2023, request
16
would have caused. The court had continued the December 5
hearing seven times, and father’s counsel represented father
would be ready to proceed. The court did not err in refusing to
further delay permanency for J.G. by ordering a bonding study.
(See In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197 [“Bonding
studies after the termination of reunification services would
frequently require delays in permanency planning”]; see also In
re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743 [continuances in
juvenile court are disfavored].)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court
could have “reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.”
(In re Lorenzo C., supra, at p. 1341.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Finding Father
and Mother Failed to Satisfy the Parental-Benefit
Exception
Mother and Father each argue the juvenile court erred in
finding the parental-benefit exception did not apply. We
disagree.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“After the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’” (In
re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Once the juvenile
court terminates reunification services and determines a child is
adoptable, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan
and terminate parental rights unless it finds doing so would be
detrimental to the child under a specified statutory exception.
17
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–
631 (Caden C.); see In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53
[“‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the
child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a
responsible caretaker’”].)
One of these exceptions is the parental-benefit exception,
which applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The three elements the parents must prove to establish the
exception are: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child
such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
“A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements” of the parental-benefit exception. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) The factual bases on which
the juvenile court determines detriment under the third element
are subject to substantial evidence; the ultimate weighing of facts
and determination of detriment is subject to abuse of discretion.
(Id. at p. 640.)
“When reviewing for substantial evidence, ‘“‘we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” (In re
A.P. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1142 (A.P.).) Where, as here,
18
parents contend the court erred in finding they did not meet their
burden of proof, we must determine whether “the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant[s] as a matter of law.
[Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,
1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4, 1010, fn. 7.)
Here, the first element of the parental-benefit exception is
not in dispute, as the juvenile court found mother and father each
met their burden to show regular visitation. Mother and father
argue the juvenile court erred in finding they did not satisfy the
second element and abused its discretion in finding that
termination of their parental rights would not be detrimental to
J.G. and J.V.
“[For] the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
“[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “‘[A] parent must demonstrate something
‘more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with
the child, or pleasant visits.’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 318–319.) “‘[F]or the exception to apply, the
emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that
19
of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or
friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt.’” (Id. at p. 319.)
Concerning the third element, “the court must decide
whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship
and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
The court must look to the effects on the child from severing the
relationship, which might include “emotional instability and
preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school,
insomnia, anxiety, or depression. [On the other hand,] a new,
stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and
preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source
of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on
balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.)
2. Mother Does Not Show the Juvenile Court Erred
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that continuing J.G.’s and J.V.’s relationship with mother would
not benefit the children. At the time of the section 366.26
hearing, J.V. was 16 years old. He did not object to the
termination of parental rights. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii) [a
child 12 years of age or older may object to termination of
parental rights].) J.V. reported he had no desire to go back to
living with mother and wanted to live with his maternal aunt
M.M. because he knew mother could not care for all her children.
After reunification services were terminated, he stated he wanted
to be adopted by M.M. This is evidence J.V. lacked a substantial
positive emotional attachment to mother.
J.G. was three years old when she was detained from
mother in November 2020 and spent the next three years out of
mother’s care. There was evidence that mother slept during
20
visits with J.G. and J.V. When mother had overnight visits, she
left the children with maternal grandmother while she went
elsewhere and did not return for a day or two. When mother
missed or did not show up for visits, there were no behavior
changes in the children.
In arguing that she established the children would benefit
from continuing a relationship with her, mother points to the
“quality” of visits “enhanced by the insights and tools she
acquired from services she received.” However, mother does not
cite to any evidence in the record that supports her argument.
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406–407 [“When an
appellant’s brief makes no reference to the pages of the record
where a point can be found, an appellate court need not search
through the record in an effort to discover the point purportedly
made. [Citations.] We can simply deem the contention to lack
foundation and, thus, to be forfeited”].)
Mother further argues the juvenile court abused its
discretion by not selecting legal guardianship as the permanent
plan given her consistent visitation and seven months of sobriety.
However, mother cites no authority to support her argument.
She, thus, forfeits the contention. (County of Butte v. Emergency
Medical Services Authority (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1196,
fn. 7 [contention not supported by citation to legal authority is
forfeited as improperly presented].)
3. Father Does Not Demonstrate the Juvenile Court
Erred
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that J.G. did not have the type of beneficial relationship with
father that warranted continuation. J.G. was two years old when
21
she was detained from father. By the time of the December 2023
section 366.26 hearing, she was six years old and had spent two
thirds of her life out of father’s custody. In the more than four
years between detention and the section 366.26 hearing, father
had only monitored visits with J.G. This weighs against finding
J.G. would benefit from continuing her relationship with father.
(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
In making every inference in favor of the order, there was
also evidence father’s visits had a negative impact on J.G. The
record indicates J.G. would urinate on herself during visits with
father, which J.G. attributed to father’s tickling. When J.G.’s
therapist asked her about these incidents, her therapist noted
J.G. was open in discussing other topics but obscure in discussing
father and visits. The therapist tried to speak with J.G. about
the incidents again a short time later, but J.G. remained vague
about visits.
When visits moved from paternal grandmother’s home to
DCFS’s office, J.G. repeatedly asked father about paternal
grandmother and cried heavily because she wanted to see her.
J.G. made her preference for grandmother clear when she said, “‘I
choose grandma.’” J.G.’s caregiver also reported that in between
visits, J.G. would not ask about father but would ask about
paternal grandmother. This evidence suggests J.G. developed a
strong bond with paternal grandmother, unlike her bond with
father, to whom J.G. would say goodbye at the end of visits
without issue. (See In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 692
[evidence that the “child experienced no distress at the end of
visits . . . tends to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that the
relationship was not so substantial that its severance would be
detrimental to the child”].)
22
In addition, a few weeks before the section 366.26 hearing,
J.G.’s caregiver expressed concerns with father encouraging J.G.
not to do what she was told in her placement home. When J.G.
would not talk or visit with father on a given day, J.G. would
follow directions and her daily routine without issue. J.G.’s
therapist reported J.G.’s caregiver’s structure benefitted J.G. in
meeting her goals; however, father disrupted her progress
because he did not set adequate boundaries for her behavior.
J.G.’s therapist stated that if father’s poor boundaries for J.G.
were removed, J.G.’s behaviors would improve.
In arguing no substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding, father primarily focuses on the positive aspects of
his visitation and takes issue with a particular social worker’s
reports of his visits. But in reviewing the juvenile court’s ruling,
we cannot reweigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations. (A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.)
“[F]requent and loving contact . . . is [not] sufficient to establish
the ‘benefit from a continuing relationship’ contemplated by the
statute.” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418; see
In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 318–319.) Thus,
father does not show the evidence compels finding a beneficial
relationship as a matter of law. (In re I.W., supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
Because father does not show the juvenile court erred in
assessing the second prong of the parental benefit exception, we
do not need to analyze the third prong: whether it would be
harmful to J.G. to sever the parental relationship with father in
favor of adoption. Nevertheless, father’s recitation of evidence
showing positive aspects of his visits does not establish the
juvenile court abused its discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
23
at p. 641 [“A court abuses its discretion only when ‘“‘the trial
court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination’”’”].)
Father does not show harm caused by terminating the parental
benefit would outweigh the benefit J.G. would receive from the
security and stability of adoption, was arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd.
C. Father Does Not Demonstrate DCFS Failed to
Conduct an Adequate Inquiry as Required by ICWA
Father contends the juvenile court and DCFS failed to
fulfill their duty of initial inquiry under ICWA. Specifically,
father asserts the court did not ask him or mother about Indian
ancestry at their first appearances or instruct them to provide
subsequently gained information. He also asserts DCFS made no
inquiry of paternal grandmother. DCFS argues the juvenile
court’s finding that ICWA did not apply is supported by
substantial evidence, as DCFS repeatedly inquired about mother
and father’s Indian ancestry and the court directly asked father
and paternal grandmother about their Indian ancestry. We agree
with DCFS.
Congress enacted ICWA “to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
standards for removal of Indian children from their families and
placement of such children ‘in foster or adoptive homes which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re Levi U. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195, superseded by statute on another
ground as stated in In re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932, 940; see
also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Whether ICWA applies depends on
24
whether the child who is the subject of the custody proceeding is
an Indian child.8 (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 90.)
“Under ICWA’s state analogue, the California Indian Child
Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; [citation]), courts and child welfare
agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125;
§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a
child is or may be an Indian child ‘can be divided into three
phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry,
and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re Y.W. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.) The duty of initial inquiry includes,
but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) “While this duty of inquiry is sometimes
referred to as the initial duty of inquiry, this is a bit of a
misnomer, as the duty ‘continues throughout the dependency
proceedings.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.)
“‘“‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under
the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if
8 An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an Indian
tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b);
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do
the same for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms,
such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In
re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1, disapproved on
other grounds in In re Dezi C. (2023) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18
(Dezi C.).)
25
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s
order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders and
findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in
favor of affirmance.’”’” (In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711,
719.) A court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is “subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).) The court’s “fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1141.)
In this case, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not
apply is supported by substantial evidence. In December 2019,
father, who was born in Mexico, signed an ICWA-020 form
denying any Indian ancestry. The court acknowledged receipt of
father’s ICWA-020 form at the hearing on mother’s temporary
restraining order request in December 2019. Father also denied
Indian ancestry on multiple occasions when DCFS inquired.
The juvenile court also inquired about father’s Indian
ancestry, at DCFS’s counsel’s request, at the initial section
366.26 hearing on July 28, 2023. The court asked paternal
grandmother about her Indian ancestry at the same hearing.
Regarding mother, mother filed an ICWA-020 form denying
Indian ancestry, which the juvenile court acknowledged receipt of
on the record. As with father, mother denied Indian ancestry on
multiple occasions. DCFS also inquired of three maternal aunts
and of maternal grandmother, all of whom denied Indian
ancestry. The parties identify no other extended relatives that
should have been asked about any Indian ancestry.
26
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the inquiry was adequate and ICWA does not apply.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
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