CourtListener 10272626•People v. Vincent CA3
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Filed 11/12/24 P. v. Vincent CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099435
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
LODCRFE20230002795)
v.
CEDRIC VINCENT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Cedric Vincent drove through an intersection without stopping at a stop
sign in Lodi late one night. A police officer pulled defendant over and discovered his
registration was long expired. The officer decided to impound defendant’s pickup truck.
Defendant got out of the truck and tried to flee. He was apprehended and searched,
resulting in the discovery of a partially loaded handgun.
Defendant moved to suppress the handgun and ammunition. The motion was
denied. A jury later found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a prior felony
1
conviction and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person and found true
allegations that he suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of the Three
Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd. (d), 29900, subd. (a)(1),
30305, subd. (a)(1).)1 The trial court struck one of defendant’s prior strikes and
sentenced him to six years on the felon-in-possession of a firearm count.
Defendant appeals, arguing the magistrate erred in denying the motion to suppress.
We agree and reverse.2
I. BACKGROUND3
A. Traffic Stop and Search
Lodi Police Officer Gerardo Ramirez was on duty in a marked patrol car on the
night of March 4, 2023. Around 11:20 p.m., Ramirez saw a Dodge Ram pickup truck
drive through an intersection without stopping at the stop sign. Ramirez activated his
overhead lights and followed the pickup truck a short distance. As he drove, Ramirez
radioed dispatch and learned the truck’s registration had expired in August 2019.
Officer Ramirez followed the pickup truck to the parking lot of a small strip mall.
The truck parked properly, and Ramirez approached the driver’s side. As Ramirez drew
near, he saw defendant’s face in the driver’s side mirror. Ramirez recognized defendant
from a prior arrest for armed robbery.
Officer Ramirez requested defendant’s license and registration. Defendant turned
them over. Lodi Police Officer John DeLeon arrived shortly thereafter. Ramirez
instructed DeLeon to stand near the driver’s side door. Defendant remained in the truck,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 In light of our reversal, we need not address defendant’s other contentions.
3 We derive our summary of the facts from the evidence presented at the hearing on the
motion to suppress.
2
with the engine on. Defendant wore a puffy jacket. He smoked a cigarette and spoke on
the phone with his wife.
Officer Ramirez returned to his patrol car to prepare a traffic citation. He ran the
truck’s license plate number through Department of Motor Vehicle records and confirmed
the registration had been expired since 2019. He also noted that defendant was
associated with an address some 2.2 miles away.
Officer Ramirez then returned to the pickup truck and asked defendant to step
outside. Defendant, who has mobility issues, gave Officer DeLeon permission to remove
a walker from his backseat. DeLeon retrieved the walker, and defendant seated himself
upon it.
Officer Ramirez said he wanted to pat search defendant. Defendant refused the
pat search and started leaning forward on the walker, as though to prevent a search. A
struggle ensued. Defendant stood and started to run.
Officers Ramirez and DeLeon tackled defendant around 15 feet away. Other
officers arrived and helped subdue defendant. They eventually gained control over
defendant and searched him. They found a Glock 26 nine-millimeter handgun with six
rounds in defendant’s jacket pocket. Defendant was arrested and taken into custody.
B. Charges and Motion to Suppress
Defendant was charged by complaint with possession of a firearm with a prior
felony conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)—count 1) and possession of ammunition by a
person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)—count 2).4 The
4 Defendant was also charged with carrying a loaded firearm as a person with a prior
felony conviction (§ 25850, subd. (c)(1)—count 3) and resisting a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)—count 4). However, both counts were later dismissed at the prosecutor’s
request in the interest of justice.
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complaint further alleged, as to both counts, that defendant had suffered two prior serious
felony convictions. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd. (d).)
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and ammunition. The motion was
heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing. We have already summarized much of
the testimony offered at the hearing. We now direct our attention to the testimony at
issue on appeal.
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Ramirez explained that he
decided to tow defendant’s truck upon returning to his patrol car and confirming that the
truck’s registration had expired. Ramirez elaborated on cross-examination that he relied
on Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (o), which gave him authority to tow, and
discretion whether to exercise that authority.
Defense counsel then asked: “So why did you decide to not let him drive his car
2.2 miles home with instructions not to drive it again until it was registered?” The
prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and the magistrate sustained the objection.
Defense counsel then asked whether Officer Ramirez was familiar with those
sections of the Lodi Police Department Manual (the Manual) dealing with the storage of
vehicles at arrest scenes.5 Ramirez responded he was. Defense counsel then asked
5 Neither defendant nor the prosecution provided the Manual to the magistrate.
Accordingly, we deny defendant’s request on appeal for judicial notice of those portions
of the Manual dealing with the storage of vehicle at arrest scenes. (See, e.g., Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [absent
exceptional circumstances, “[r]eviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of
evidence not presented to the trial court”]; Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 332, fn. 9 [declining to take judicial notice of
materials not before the trial court].) Nevertheless, as indicated in the text, Officer
Ramirez testified he was familiar with the relevant portions of the Manual, which gave
him discretion whether to impound the truck. Given that testimony, we consider whether
the exercise of discretion complied with the Fourth Amendment, without reference to the
Manual.
4
whether the Manual authorized him to leave a vehicle at the scene, so long as it was
lawfully parked. Ramirez responded in the affirmative. Turning to the decision to
impound defendant’s truck, defense counsel asked, “Okay. So why did you feel the need
to tow the vehicle?” The prosecutor objected, again on relevance grounds. The
magistrate asked defense counsel why Ramirez’s thought process was relevant, given that
he had discretion to impound the truck. Defense counsel responded, “They’re creating an
unnecessary situation where they’re trying to bootstrap a pat search onto something that
they don’t even need to do.” The magistrate responded, “But, again, they have discretion
to do it.” The magistrate then sustained the objection.
Following further witness testimony and argument, the magistrate denied the
motion to suppress and held defendant to answer. Shortly thereafter, the prosecution filed
an information charging defendant with the same counts and prior strikes, and further
alleging, as to count 1, that defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of
the crime. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) The information also alleged various
aggravating factors, including that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and he had served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).6 Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations. He later
filed a combined motion to set aside the information and renewed motion to suppress
pursuant to sections 995 and 1538.5, subdivision (i). That motion, too, was denied.
The matter was tried to a jury in August 2023. The jury found defendant guilty on
all remaining counts (counts 1 and 2) and found true the allegation that defendant was
personally armed with a firearm during the commission of count 1. In a bifurcated
proceeding, the jury found true the two prior serious felony allegations and aggravating
6 The information also alleged that defendant was on probation or parole when the crimes
were committed (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)), but the prosecution later struck
that allegation.
5
prior prison terms. The trial court struck one of defendant’s two prior strikes and
sentenced him on count 1 to the upper term of three years, doubled, for a total term of six
years in prison. The trial court imposed and stayed defendant’s sentence on count 2.
This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant advances two interrelated arguments. First, he argues the magistrate
erred in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Ramirez regarding his
reasons for impounding the truck. Second, he argues the evidence was not sufficient to
allow the magistrate to determine the reasonableness of the decision to impound the
truck. Both arguments are well taken. We will explain why in a moment, after we set
forth our standard of review and the governing law.
A. Standard of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
warrantless searches and seizures. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829.)
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution
bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure
was constitutionally permissible. (United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 177, fn.
14; People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)
Section 1538.5 establishes procedures by which criminal defendants may seek to
suppress illegally seized evidence. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940
(Romeo).) Ordinary rules of evidence generally apply to suppression hearings, with
exceptions not relevant here. (See Hewitt v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 923,
927 [“Evidence Code section 300 makes it clear that, except as provided by statute, the
Evidence Code applies to every evidentiary hearing in the state courts”]; and see
Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure (The Rutter Group 2023) § 6:19 [discussing hearsay
exceptions to the Evidence Code applicable to suppression hearings].)
6
“When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a
preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility
issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing appropriate
inferences. [Citations.] If the magistrate denies the motion and holds the defendant to
answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge
before the trial court by motion to dismiss under section 995 or in a special hearing.
[Citations.] At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the
preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing
(who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have
been presented at the preliminary hearing.” (Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
On appeal, we too “are ‘concerned solely with the findings of the [magistrate].’
[Citation.] After submission on the transcript at the special hearing, the appellate court,
like the superior court, is bound by the magistrate’s factual findings so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On review of the superior court ruling by
appeal or writ, a two-step standard of review applies. In the first step of our review, ‘we
in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination
of the magistrate.’ [Citation.] At this stage, we consider the record in the light most
favorable to the People since ‘all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most
favorable to the [superior] court’s disposition on the [suppression] motion.’ ” (Romeo,
supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) In the second stage, “we independently apply the law
to the factual findings [citations], determining de novo whether the factual record
supports the magistrate’s conclusion that the challenged search met the constitutional
standard of reasonableness.” (Id. at p. 942.)
B. The Community Caretaking Exception
“The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” (Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 862.) A
seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
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Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357.) One such exception is the
“community caretaking” function, which allows police officers to impound vehicles that
“ ‘jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’ ” (Miranda v.
City of Cornelius, supra, at p. 864.)7
Whether an impoundment is warranted by the community caretaking doctrine
“depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officers’ duty to prevent it from
creating a hazard to other drivers or being a target for vandalism or theft.” (People v.
Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.) “Police officers may exercise discretion in
determining whether impounding a vehicle serves their community caretaking function,
‘so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’ ” (People v. Torres
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 787 (Torres).) The community caretaking function does not
create “a generalized exception to the warrant requirement.” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7
Cal.5th 1034, 1050.) Thus, impoundment cannot be used as an excuse for a warrantless
search. (Torres, supra, at pp. 787-788; cf. People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867
[“Officers may not use an inventory search as ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence’ ”].)
7 Inventory searches are another “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.”
(Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) “An inventory search is the search of
property lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure
valuable items . . . and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.” (Whren v.
United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 811, fn. 1.) Inventory searches are also intended to
serve a community caretaking purpose. (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S.
364, 370.) Although the gun and ammunition here were not products of an inventory
search, impoundments and inventory searches often occur together, and the parties seem
to agree that many of the same authorities and legal principles apply.
8
In considering the validity of an impoundment, we ask whether the decision to
impound the vehicle was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. (People v.
Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 52.) “Factors relevant to whether a particular impoundment
is justified include the location of the vehicle and the likelihood it will create a hazard to
other drivers or be a target of vandalism or theft.” (Halajian v. D&B Towing (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1, 15; see also People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 762, 763
[impoundment served no community caretaking function where “[t]he car was legally
parked,” there was no particular “possibility that the vehicle would be stolen, broken into,
or vandalized,” and the car did not pose “a hazard or impediment to other traffic”].) The
prosecutor carries the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the impound decision.
(People v. Williams, supra, at p. 762.)
C. Limitation of Defense Counsel’s Cross-Examination
Defendant argues the magistrate abused his discretion by restricting defense
counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Ramirez. He maintains the cross-examination
was aimed at eliciting information concerning Ramirez’s reasons for impounding the
truck, and that information was relevant to determining whether the impound decision
was motivated by an improper investigatory purpose. The People respond that Ramirez’s
reasoning was irrelevant. The People are wrong.
We ordinarily do not inquire into an officer’s subjective motivations in Fourth
Amendment analysis. (See, e.g., Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904,
915 [“an officer’s motivations or intent are irrelevant to whether probable cause for a
search or seizure exists, as probable cause is determined objectively”]; see also Bond v.
United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338, fn. 2 [“the subjective intent of the law
enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer’s actions violate the
Fourth Amendment”]; Whren v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 813 [“we have been
unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of
individual officers”]; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (2011) 563 U.S. 731, 737, 736 [with limited
9
exceptions, the high court has “almost uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective
intent” because the Fourth Amendment “regulates conduct rather than thoughts”].)
But impoundments and inventory searches are exceptions to the general rule.
(People v. Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867; Blakes v. Superior Court, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 914-915.) “Unlike the probable cause determination, which rests
solely on an objective standard, the inventory search exception evaluates both the
objective reasonableness of the impound decision and the subjective intent of the
impounding officer to determine whether the decision to impound was ‘motivated by an
improper investigatory purpose.’ [Citation.] Such purpose renders a decision to impound
and the subsequent inventory search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.” (People v.
Lee, supra, at p. 867; see also Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 791 [“Inventory
search jurisprudence presumes some objectively reasonable basis supports the
impounding. The relevant question is whether the impounding was subjectively
motivated by an improper investigatory purpose”]; and see United States v. Anderson
(2024) 101 F.4th 586, 593 [impoundments and inventory searches are “the rare context
where the Fourth Amendment analysis is not purely objective—subjective motivations
are material”]; and United States v. Johnson (2018) 889 F.3d 1120, 1125 [“ ‘actual
motivations do matter’ ” in “administrative searches conducted without individualized
suspicion—such as drunk-driving checkpoints or vehicular inventory searches”].) Thus,
“courts will explore police officers’ subjective motivations for impounding vehicles in
inventory search cases, even when some objectively reasonable basis exists for the
impounding.” (Torres, supra, at pp. 787-788.)
Here, Officer Ramirez understood he had discretion whether to impound the truck
pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (o). Defense counsel’s questions
would have revealed Ramirez’s reasons for choosing impoundment, rather than some
other outcome, such as allowing defendant to drive home (some 2.2 miles away), with
instructions not to drive the truck again until properly registered. That Ramirez was not
10
required to exercise his discretion one way or another does not make that testimony
irrelevant. Ramirez could have testified he decided to impound the truck because he
knew defendant to be a felon and believed he might find evidence of crime in the truck.
Such testimony would have established an improper investigatory pretext, which could
have invalidated the impound and search. (Blakes v. Superior Court, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 914-915.) The magistrate erred in limiting the scope of defense
counsel’s cross-examination.
D. Reasonableness of the Impound Decision
Having found error, we must determine whether the impound could be considered
constitutionally reasonable even assuming the presence of an improper investigatory
motive. Assuming Officer Ramirez had an objectively reasonable community caretaking
rationale for impounding defendant’s truck, we still cannot exclude the possibility, that he
also had an impermissible motive, unrelated to community caretaking. “Importantly, ‘the
mere presence of a criminal investigatory motive or a dual motive— one valid, and one
impermissible—does not render an administrative stop or search invalid; instead, . . . [the
Court] ask[s] whether the challenged search or seizure would . . . have occurred in the
absence of an impermissible reason.’ ” (United States v. Magdirila (9th Cir. 2020) 962
F.3d 1152, 1157.) Thus, the question presented is whether the impound would have
occurred regardless of Ramirez’s subjective intent. (Ibid.) That question cannot be
answered on the record before us.
As previously discussed, Officer Ramirez testified Vehicle Code section 22651,
subdivision (o) gave him authority to impound the truck, and discretion whether to
exercise that authority. He similarly testified the Manual authorized him to leave a
legally parked vehicle at the scene of arrest. The evidence thus established that Ramirez
had discretion to impound the truck and recognized as much. There was no evidence
Ramirez’s discretion was guided by any standardized policy that would ensure
impoundment was not “ ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
11
incriminating evidence.’ ” (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 788; and see id. at p. 789
[“The relevant issue is the deputy’s motive for impounding the truck—did he impound
the truck to serve a community caretaking function or as a pretext for conducting an
investigatory search?”].)
With no explanation for why Ramirez decided to impound the truck, and evidence
he recognized defendant as a felon, there was at least some possibility the impound
decision was motivated by an improper investigatory purpose. Such a purpose would not
necessarily invalidate the impound. (United States v. Magdirila, supra, 962 F.3d at p.
1157.) But the magistrate could not meaningfully consider whether the impound would
have occurred absent any such improper purpose without hearing Ramirez’s subjective
reasoning process and assessing his credibility. And the magistrate’s incomplete analysis
hampers our own review.
Although we independently determine whether the impound decision was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, we rely on the magistrate’s factual
findings. (People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 255.) “We normally imply in favor
of the magistrate’s order every finding that is supported by the evidence, but this rule
‘operates only where it can be presumed that the court has performed its function of
weighing the evidence. If analysis of the record suggests the contrary, the rule should not
be invoked.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, of course, the record shows the magistrate did not consider
Officer Ramirez’s subjective intent and made no findings on that issue. Consequently, we
cannot presume the magistrate considered the issue and resolved it against defendant.
As we have explained, the magistrate erroneously excluded relevant evidence. We
do not know what Officer Ramirez would have said about his subjective motivation for
impounding the truck and are therefore unable to say the evidence is susceptible to only
one reasonable interpretation. We therefore conclude the matter must be remanded for a
new hearing on the motion to suppress. (People v. Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 391.)
Given this conclusion, we need not address defendant’s other arguments.
12
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
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