People v. Durden CA1/2

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Filed 11/8/24 P. v. Durden CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165711
v.
JAMEL DURDEN, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05-201323-3)
Defendant and Appellant.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jamel Durden was convicted of
attempting to evade a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, §
2800.2).1 On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court improperly admitted into
evidence his pretrial statements that were obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (2) the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and (3) the
cumulative effect of these alleged errors requires reversal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Charge
In October 2020, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an
information charging defendant with one count of attempting to flee a peace

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

1
officer while driving recklessly, in violation of section 2800.2. The
information also alleged defendant had suffered a prior serious or violent
felony conviction in 2009. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds.
(b) & (c).)
The Trial
Prosecution Case
At 9:22 p.m. on September 5, 2020, Deputy Evan Cubit of the Contra
Costa County Sheriff’s Department was patrolling eastbound on State Route
4 with his partner, Deputy Maurice Lewis. They were both in uniform, and
in a fully marked sheriff patrol vehicle. They then saw a Mercedes drive past
them at approximately 85 miles per hour, 20 miles over the posted speed
limit. Deputy Cubit activated his emergency lights on his patrol vehicle and
began the process of a traffic stop.
The driver of the Mercedes—later identified as defendant—initially
obeyed Deputy Cubit’s directions and pulled over to the right shoulder.
Deputy Lewis exited the patrol vehicle and approached the Mercedes for a
traffic stop. A few seconds after Deputy Lewis reached the front passenger
window and shined his flashlight into it, defendant accelerated and took off
driving.
Deputy Lewis quickly returned to the patrol vehicle. Deputy Cubit,
who still had the emergency lights on the patrol vehicle, activated his siren
and pursued defendant. To catch up to defendant, Deputy Cubit had to drive
approximately 110 miles per hour. Defendant swerved back and forth across
the four lanes of traffic at least seven times, while Deputy Cubit pursued him
at speeds between 110 and 120 miles per hour.
The chase continued for nearly five miles until defendant reached the
Loveridge exit, which had an approximately 90-degree turn to it. As
defendant was exiting, the lights on his vehicle were turned off. Because

2
defendant exited the off-ramp at about 90 miles per hour, he could not
negotiate the 90-degree turn. He lost control of his car, sped through a red
traffic light, and flew straight across the intersection and across a median,
finally crashing into an iron fence. Deputy Cubit called an ambulance for
defendant.
After the crash, Deputy Cubit parked his patrol vehicle, exited it, and
saw defendant get out of his car, run away, and jump over the iron fence.
Deputy Cubit pursued defendant on foot and managed to apprehend him.
Deputy Cubit testified that defendant committed at least four traffic
violations during the pursuit. (See §§ 22349 [driving over maximum speed
limit], 22107 [switching lanes without signaling], 24250 [turning vehicle
lights off during darkness], 21453, subd. (a) [failing to stop at red light].)
Deputy Cubit handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of the
patrol vehicle. Deputy Cubit interviewed defendant, who stated he fled
because he had a warrant out of Los Angeles County and did not want to go
to jail. The conversation lasted about five minutes.
Defense Case
Defendant testified he grew up in the Alemany Housing Projects in San
Francisco. He witnessed a lot of violence, including police violence.
Defendant saw the police regularly harass people. Defendant was arrested at
least three times as a teenager. During those arrests, he was “roughed up”
by police.
Defendant admitted that on September 5, 2020, he was driving his
Mercedes over the posted speed limit. Defendant saw the red and blue lights
coming from the patrol vehicle behind him and pulled over. But defendant
did not put his car in park; instead, he kept his foot on the brake while
Deputy Lewis walked over. When Deputy Lewis approached the front
passenger side of the car, defendant hit the gas pedal because he was

3
“nervous” and “scared” that he “could possibly be the next person harmed by
the police.” Defendant testified that “[i]t was just impulse” that led him to
pull back into traffic. However, he testified that when he pressed on the gas
pedal he knew what he was doing “[t]o a certain extent.”
After defendant drove off from the officers, he knew he was passing all
the other traffic around him for approximately five miles. He also admitted
that he repeatedly weaved in and out of the lanes of traffic at high speeds.
Defendant testified, “I wanted to get away from the deputies” and “I was
trying to get away.”
Defendant admitted that when he took the Loveridge exit, he turned off
his vehicle’s lights because he wanted to lose the deputies behind him.
Defendant saw the red traffic light in front of him but that he “was going too
fast to try to stop at a red light.” Instead of stopping at the red light,
defendant tried to make a right turn. He lost control of his vehicle, went over
the center median, and crashed into a fence.
Defendant got out of his car and looked around for a good place to hop
the fence. He then hopped the fence and ran away. About 30 seconds later,
one of the deputies caught him.
Defendant said that he spoke to Deputy Cubit while in the back of the
patrol vehicle, but denied telling Deputy Cubit why he had fled.
Rebuttal
Deputy Cubit testified that defendant was cooperative after being
placed in handcuffs. Before taking defendant’s statement in the patrol
vehicle, Deputy Cubit read defendant his Miranda rights and asked him if he
understood each of the rights, to which defendant replied, “yes.”
While giving his statement, defendant appeared emotional but “spoke
very concise, very clear,” and “was very articulate in his answers to the
questions that [Deputy Cubit] was asking.” Deputy Cubit did not threaten

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defendant, and he did not have his weapon out.
Deputy Cubit reiterated that defendant told him that he fled because
he had a warrant for his arrest. Defendant also mentioned having a few
drinks earlier in the day. Defendant further stated that he could have killed
somebody during the incident. He was extremely apologetic.
The Verdict and Sentence
On October 26, 2021, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the sole
charged count of attempting to evade a peace officer while driving recklessly.
Following a bifurcated trial the next day, the jury found true the special
allegation that defendant had been convicted of a prior serious or violent
felony.
On February 25, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to four years
in state prison.
This appeal followed.2
DISCUSSION
Admission of Defendant’s Pretrial Statements
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting his pretrial
statements to law enforcement because he did not voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waive his Miranda rights before making the statements.
We disagree.
Additional Background
Citing Miranda, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of his statements to Deputy Cubit on September 5, 2020. On day three of

2 Defendant did not file his notice of appeal within the 60-day deadline

to appeal (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a)), but this court deemed the
notice timely filed on February 28, 2022 under the doctrine of constructive
filing.

5
trial, the trial court held a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to
determine the admissibility of the statements.
During that hearing, Deputy Cubit testified that on September 5, 2020,
after defendant crashed his vehicle into a fence, he attempted to flee on foot.
Deputy Cubit pursued defendant and tased him two times. Defendant was
apprehended, handcuffed, and placed into the back of Deputy Cubit’s patrol
vehicle.
Deputy Cubit advised defendant of his Miranda rights by reading off a
department-issued card that listed those rights. After advising defendant of
each of the Miranda rights, Deputy Cubit asked defendant, “ ‘Do you
understand this right?’ ” and defendant replied, “ ‘yes.’ ” Based on Deputy
Cubit’s observations, defendant appeared to understand the rights of which
he was advised.
Defendant then proceeded to answer Deputy Cubit’s questions about
the incident. During the interview, defendant did not appear to be visibly in
pain. He also spoke coherently. Defendant did not request a lawyer or say
that he did not want to talk to Deputy Cubit at any point.
After the interview, Deputy Cubit asked defendant if he was in pain,
and defendant replied that his foot hurt. Defendant was not limping. It
turned out that defendant sustained a chip fracture to his foot, as well as a
small puncture underneath his arm from the dart of the taser. Defendant
was taken to the hospital after the interview.
Deputy Cubit did not record his interview with defendant. Deputy
Cubit was not issued a body-worn camera or dash cam. Although he had a
department-issued smart phone, he had never used it for recording
statements, and was unsure if it had the capability to do so.
Following this testimony and arguments of counsel, the trial court

6
ruled on the motion in limine as follows:
“[T]he statement was taken on September 5th by Deputy Evan Cubit in
the back of a patrol car, while the defendant was in handcuffs. He was
advised of his Miranda rights from a department-issued card. Read them
verbatim from that card. And then he affirmatively understood each of those
rights. And, thereafter, began speaking with Deputy Cubit.
“At no point did the defendant ask for a lawyer or ask to terminate the
discussion. And no statements were elicited by Deputy Cubit before the
defendant was provided his Miranda rights. During the ensuing discussion,
the defendant was speaking coherently. And based upon the opinion of
Deputy Cubit, he appeared to understand his rights.
“The statement that was thereafter elicited, although not in the record,
was not recorded. Deputy Cubit does not have a department-issued recording
device, nor does he wear a body worn camera. After the statements were
elicited, the defendant was taken to the hospital after a crash.
“The Court can infer that as a result of the crash, the defendant had an
injury to his foot. And as the deputy testified, had been indeed tased two
times. At the time of the discussion or interview, the defendant did not
appear to be in visible pain, although he did state afterwards that his foot
hurt, although, he was not limping.
“The defendant also had one small puncture wound from a TASER dart
under his arm after being tased by Deputy Cubit. That was all done prior to
the arrest, and prior to the interview that the Court has noted.
“Deputy Cubit later learned that the defendant had sustained a chip
fracture to his foot. Although the defendant did not request any medical
attention before Deputy Cubit interviewed him.
“So, those will be the Court’s findings of fact. And as I noted

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previously, Miranda rights would be required under those circumstances.
The question becomes whether or not the defendant’s waiver of those rights
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
“The Court finds, based upon the totality of the circumstances in this
case, that the defendant adequately understood his rights. And, thereafter,
by responding to questions from Deputy Cubit, voluntarily answered
questions . . . from the deputy . . . .
“So, on that record, the Court will find that the waiver was knowing,
voluntary, and that the subsequent statements were also, indeed, voluntary.
And the Court will deny motion in limine number 8 at this time.”
As mentioned, later at trial Deputy Cubit testified that defendant
stated he fled because he had a warrant for his arrest and did not want to go
to jail. Defendant also mentioned he had a few drinks earlier in the day.
The Law
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that a suspect in a criminal case “may not be compelled to be a witness
against himself in any respect.” (Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564,
574.) To implement this “prohibition against compelled self-incrimination”
(People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 647), the United States Supreme
Court in Miranda devised the following “prophylactic” rule (Michigan v.
Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 446): “Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Miranda, supra, 384
U.S. at p. 444.)
A defendant may waive his or her rights under Miranda, provided law
enforcement “obtain[s] a waiver that is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 478–479.)” (People v. Molano (2019) 7

8
Cal.5th 620, 648 (Molano).) This inquiry has two dimensions. “ ‘First, the
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it
was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Only if the “totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude
that the Miranda rights have been waived.’ [Citation.] The prosecution must
demonstrate the validity of a suspect’s waiver by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 648.)
We have held that “ ‘[i]n reviewing Miranda issues on appeal, we
accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences as well as
its evaluations of credibility if substantially supported, but independently
determine from the undisputed facts and facts found by the trial court
whether the challenged statement was legally obtained.’ ” (People v. Vance
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1211 (Vance).)
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Motion
In Limine To Exclude His Statements on Miranda Grounds
We first address defendant’s claim that he did not voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights. “ ‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of “ ‘a
rational intellect and free will.’ ” [Citation.] The test for determining
whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “will was
overborne at the time he confessed”. . . . In determining whether or not the
accused’s will was overborne, “ ‘an examination must be made of “all the
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th
318, 346–347.)

9
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that under the
totality of the circumstances, defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights. That evidence is supplied by Deputy Cubit’s testimony that when
defendant was read his Miranda rights, he verbally affirmed that he
understood, and by all indications appeared to understand, those rights.
Defendant did not appear to be visibly in pain. And he was not limping.
Defendant did not mention his foot hurt until after the interview, when
Deputy Cubit asked him whether he was in pain. Defendant also did not
mention any pain he felt from being tased; he did not mention the taser at all.
There was no indication he asked for medical attention before or during the
interview. Further, at no point did he state he wished to stop speaking to
Deputy Cubit. Nor did he ask for a lawyer. Additionally, there was no
evidence that Deputy Cubit threatened or pressured defendant to elicit his
statements. On top of all that, defendant spoke coherently when being
Mirandized and gave a detailed statement of what happened during the
incident.
The trial court could and did reasonably conclude under the totality of
the circumstances that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
There is no evidence that any pain or injuries defendant had experienced
from the use of the taser or his foot fracture had affected his ability to
understand what he was doing or had “overborne” his will. (People v.
McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 346–347.) Rather, the record supports
the inference that defendant freely made the rational choice to offer his side
of the events to Deputy Cubit.
Defendant nonetheless argues he did not voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights. He notes that before waiving his Miranda rights, he injured
his foot, was tased twice, was handcuffed, and was then placed in a patrol

10
vehicle. He argues “[h]e was suffering its traumatic physiological and
emotional impacts” from being stunned by a taser. Defendant then
acknowledges that “[t]he trial court credited Deputy Cubit’s testimony that
[defendant] was not in visible pain.” However, defendant contends “this
finding is contrary” to several federal cases primarily in the Fourth
Amendment context that have described the painful effects inflicted by a
taser. Defendant maintains that “[b]ased on the timing and sequence of the
events, the taser attacks were a motivating cause of [his] decision to talk to
Deputy Cubit after being advised of his Miranda rights.”
Defendant is essentially challenging the credibility of Deputy Cubit’s
testimony described above. Defendant misunderstands our role in conducting
substantial evidence review. The credibility determination was resolved
against defendant and we are not entitled to second-guess it. (See Vance,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.)
Further, the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
show defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights does not run afoul of
the federal cases he cites. None of the cited cases involved a claim of a
Miranda violation—much less support the proposition suggested by
defendant that the discharge of a taser gun, without more, prevents a
defendant from voluntarily waiving his or her Miranda rights.
More on point are the cases from other jurisdictions that are cited by
the People. Those cases held that the use of taser did not invalidate a
Miranda waiver where such use was not shown to diminish the defendant’s
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of waiving his or her
Miranda rights. (See, e.g., United States v. Patterson (M.D.Florida, June 22,
2009, Case No. 3:09-cr-7(S1)-J-32TEM) 2009 WL 10670083 at *6 [rejecting
the defendant’s argument that “the Taser discharge and his alleged

11
intoxication interfered with his mental capacity to appreciate the
consequences of waving his [Miranda] rights”]; United States v. Mack
(M.D.La. Mar. 6, 2009, Case No. 07-238) 2009 WL 580430 at *2–3 [Miranda
waiver was voluntary where the defendant was tased three times, but the
record showed he could understand and comply with commands and
understood his rights]; Davis v. State (Nev.App. 2020) 474 P.3d 848 [2020 WL
6197302 at *3] [Miranda waiver voluntary where defendant had been tased,
suffered smoke inhalation, and had a head injury because the injuries “were
not shown to have affected her ability to understand what she was doing.”].)
Likewise here.
Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that defendant voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights is legally sound and supported by the record.
We next address defendant’s argument that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights.3 Defendant acknowledges “the trial
court credited Cubit’s testimony that [defendant] spoke coherently and
appeared to understand his rights.” However, defendant asserts “this finding
conflicts with scientific research,” namely a study that he claims shows “a
taser attack adversely affects cognitive abilities.” And here, defendant
contends he “was cognitively impaired when advised of his rights.”
Defendant thus maintains he “lacked the full capacity of knowingly,
intelligently, and impliedly waiving his rights by speaking to the deputy.”
Defendant’s challenge is, once again, nothing more than a request for
us to reweigh the evidence and make credibility findings. We decline the
invitation. The trial court was entitled to, and did, credit Deputy Cubit’s

3 The People argue defendant forfeited this contention by not raising it

in the trial court. We need not decide the issue because assuming the claim
was not forfeited, we conclude it lacks merit.

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testimony that defendant verbally affirmed he understood his Miranda rights
after being advised of them, appeared to understand and appreciate his
rights, spoke cogently and coherently, and did not appear to be in pain. This
testimony supplies substantial evidence to support the finding that defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
In sum, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in limine to
exclude his statements to Deputy Cubit.
Any Error In Admitting Defendant’s Statements Was
Harmless
Assuming the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s statements, we
agree with the People that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, because independent evidence overwhelmingly supports the guilty
verdict. (See People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1166 [“We
review Miranda error under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’
standard propounded in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
[(Chapman)].”)
A conviction for the sole charged crime of evading a peace officer while
driving recklessly (§ 2800.2) requires proof of the following elements: (1) a
peace officer in a car was pursuing defendant; (2) defendant, who was also in
a car, willfully fled from, or tried to elude the officer, with the intent to evade;
(3) defendant either: (a) drove with willful or wanton disregard for the safety
or persons or property, or (b) committed at least three traffic violations
during the pursuit; and (4) specific requirements identifying the peace officer
as law enforcement are met. (CALCRIM No. 2181; § 2800.2, subds. (a)–(b).)4

4 Section 2800.2 states in relevant part: “(a) If a person flees or
attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and
the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be

13
Defendant argues that “the sole issue at trial was whether [he] acted
willfully” as stated in element two.5 As the jury was instructed, “Someone
commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is
not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or
gain an advantage.” (CALCRIM No. 2181; accord, Black’s Law. Dict. (12th
ed. 2024) p. 1922, col. 1 [“The word ‘wilful’ or ‘wilfully’ when used in the
definition of a crime, it has been said time and again, means only
intentionally or purposely as distinguished from accidentally or negligently
and does not require any actual impropriety . . . .”].)
The defense theory at trial was that defendant did not “willfully” evade
the deputies, but instead acted “impuls[ively]” out of his fear of police.
Defendant gave testimony in support of this theory. According to defendant,
to rebut this theory, the prosecution “relied entirely on Cubit’s testimony
about [defendant’s] custodial admissions.” Defendant then asserts the
question of willfulness presented a “close” question because it “ ‘hinged on a
credibility contest’ between the defense theory and prosecutor’s theory and
the credibility of Deputy Cubit and [defendant].” And since the case was
close, defendant maintains that any error in admitting his statements into

punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or by confinement in the
county jail for not less than six months not more than one year. The court
may also impose a fine . . . or may impose both that imprisonment or
confinement and fine. [¶] (b) For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to,
driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during
which time either three or more violations that are assigned a traffic
violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage to property
occurs.”
5 Defendant apparently did not argue the People failed to prove the

other elements of a section 2800.2 offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

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evidence was not harmless. We are unconvinced.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the evidence supporting defendant’s
guilt was not “close,” but was strong in many respects. Initially, we disagree
with defendant’s argument that the prosecution relied exclusively on
evidence of his confessions to prove that he willfully fled the deputies. The
prosecution also relied on other circumstantial evidence, much of which was
undisputed.
That evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that defendant
intentionally drove in a manner to evade the deputies pursuing him:
defendant stepped on his gas pedal and drove off after being pulled over; led
the deputies on a high-speed chase for nearly five miles, ignoring sirens and
flashing lights of the patrol car; repeatedly weaved through lanes of traffic at
high speeds; exited an off-ramp with a 90-degree turn at approximately 90
miles per hour; turned off his car lights while doing so; drove through a red
light and across a center median; and crashed his car into a fence before
running away from the deputies and jumping over the fence.
Although the defense argued defendant did not act “willfully” because
he had acted out of “impulse” and “fear” of police, his subjective fear was not
a defense to the crime of evading a police officer, as the prosecutor pointed
out in closing argument. Such evidence may have showed defendant’s alleged
motive for fleeing, but it did not tend to negate evidence that he intentionally
and purposely drove in a reckless manner to evade the deputies. The trial
court’s comments during a discussion with counsel outside the jury’s presence
aptly articulate why. For example, the court recounted defendant’s
testimony that he drove off from the deputies after being pulled over and that
he “was just thinking about getting away at the moment.” The court then
observed: “Implicit in [defendant’s] answer is a deliberation and thinking, a

15
degree of willfulness, an acting with a purpose. Granted, he is certainly
contending that [he] acted out of fear. But that question and answer evinced
to this Court that there was sufficient deliberation based on the defendant’s
statement of willfulness, in that he acted willingly and on purpose, albeit, out
of fear.”
The following testimony during defendant’s cross-examination further
illustrated the trial court’s point:
“Q. Mr. Durden, you said you didn’t intentionally pull back into
traffic, right?
“A. Correct.
“Q. It was your foot that hit the gas pedal, right?
“A. Correct.
“Q. You knew that you were hitting the gas pedal, right?
“A. Correct.
“Q. You knew when you hit the gas pedal, your car goes forward?
“A. Correct.
“Q. Right. And . . . I believe you said, and correct me if I’m wrong,
that you did all of those things because you were afraid?
“A. Correct.
“Q. And you knew what you were doing when you pressed the gas
pedal?
“A. To a certain extent, sure.”
In sum, regardless of defendant’s alleged fear, and disregarding
evidence of defendant’s statements to Deputy Cubit, the record contains
overwhelming evidence that defendant intentionally drove in a reckless
manner to evade the deputies. Accordingly, any error in admitting
defendant’s pretrial statements into evidence was harmless beyond a

16
reasonable doubt.
Admission of Defendant’s Prior Convictions
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his
prior convictions for driving on a suspended, revoked, or invalid license.
Additional Background
During direct examination by his attorney, defendant testified as
follows:
“Q. Now, I want to ask you about some things that happened in your
past. You had an issue when you were about 21 years old, in where you --
that resulted in you getting convicted of a robbery; is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And then . . . [¶] . . . [i]n 2018, you had an incident that led to you
getting a misdemeanor case for a car burglary, right?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now . . . have you done anything to try to change your life
since . . . let’s talk about, first, that robbery incident?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Relevance.
“THE COURT: Sustained.
“BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
“Q. . . . [A]re you still the same person who got that robbery
conviction?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Relevance.
“THE COURT: Let’s talk at side-bar.
“{Side-bar conference out of the presence of the jury.}
“THE COURT: Objection sustained. But you can rephrase
. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
“Q. So, you got those cases when you were younger, right?

17
“A. Yes.
“Q. And are you the same person as you were back then, or are you
are you a different person now? Live a different life now?
“A. I’m a way better person than I was back then.”
Outside the jury’s presence, the parties discussed the above testimony.
To impeach defendant’s testimony “about his character since 2013,” the
People asked to introduce evidence of defendant’s three prior convictions for
driving on a suspended, revoked, or invalid license (§ 14601.1) in 2014, 2018,
and 2019. The People asserted defendant’s testimony “opened the door” to
evidence of the section 14601.1 convictions.
The trial court stated the “question is whether the jury is left with the
false impression that the defendant’s a way better person now than he was
then, and implying there has been no other run-ins with the law. And the
fact of three other misdemeanor convictions in the record from 2014, 2018,
and 2019, counsel differently.” Thus, over defense counsel’s objections, the
court allowed “the People to probe and ask briefly on cross, based upon the
defendant opening the door to the existence of [the] three convictions.”
During cross-examination, the prosecutor covered the events of
September 5, 2020 and then asked defendant whether that date was the first
time he had driven without a valid driver’s license. Defense counsel objected
and following a sidebar conference, the prosecutor asked defendant: “Sir,
you’ve been convicted of three misdemeanor driving on a suspended, revoked,
or invalid license since 2014, right?” Defendant responded, “Yes.”
Any Error In Admitting Evidence of the Prior Convictions Was
Harmless
Relying primarily on Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (i),
defendant argues the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to offer
rebuttal evidence of his three prior section 14601.1 convictions to counter his

18
testimony. We conclude that any error was harmless.
Evidence relating to the credibility of a witness is relevant. (Evid.
Code, § 210.) Evidence Code section 780 provides in pertinent part: “Except
as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in
determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing,
including but not limited to any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (i) The existence
or nonexistence of any fact testified to by him . . . .” Thus, “a witness who
makes a sweeping statement on direct or cross-examination may open the
door to use of otherwise inadmissible evidence of prior misconduct for the
purpose of contradicting such testimony.” (Andrews v. City and County of
San Francisco (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 938, 946; see People v. Lang (1989) 49
Cal.3d 991, 1017 [“[e]vidence tending to contradict any part of a witness’s
testimony is relevant for purposes of impeachment”], abrogated on another
ground in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.)
According to defendant, he did not open the door to evidence that he
had been convicted of driving on a suspended, revoked, or invalid license in
2014, 2018, and 2019 (§ 14601.1). As noted, the trial court admitted this
evidence, reasoning that defendant’s testimony left the jury with the false
impression “that he’s been completely law abiding since 2013” when he was
convicted of robbery. (Italics added.) Defendant, however, argues that he
never testified he was a “way better person” at the time of trial than he was
“since 2013.” He says that he instead testified that he was “a way better
person” since the 2013 robbery conviction and the 2018 burglary conviction.
Defendant contends that “because [he] never claimed to have been licensed or
completely law abiding since 2013, the impeachment evidence did not
contradict any false testimony.”

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The People have a different interpretation of defendant’s testimony.
They note that the jury heard trial counsel ask defendant: “[A]re you still the
same person who got that robbery conviction?” Following a relevance
objection and a sidebar conference, trial counsel then asked: “So, you got
those cases when you were younger, right?” Defendant confirmed and then
trial counsel asked: “And are you the same person as you were back then, or
are you . . . a different person now? Live a different life now?” Defendant
then responded, “I’m a way better person than I was back then.”
The People argue, “[t]his full colloquy opened the door to impeachment
via [defendant’s] prior misdemeanor convictions.” The People then assert:
“While it is true that in the second iteration of the question, trial counsel
referenced ‘those cases,’ rather than just the robbery conviction as in the
original question, the premise of the question only makes sense if it was
aimed at the 2013 robbery conviction given trial counsel’s reference to
[defendant] having been ‘younger’ at the time at which the question was
aimed. And while of course [defendant] was ‘younger’ in 2018 than he was in
2020 when he committed the instant offense, that small difference in time is
not a reasonable basis for the question that trial counsel actually asked. If
that were insufficient, [defendant’s] response made absolutely clear that he
was referencing his 2013 conviction in his own testimony; he explicitly
claimed that he was now ‘a way better person than [he] was back then.’
[Defendant’s] reference to ‘back then,’ again only makes sense in connection
with the 2013 robbery conviction, not the 2018 burglary conviction given the
proximity in time between the latter prior conviction and the offense for
which he was then on trial.”
The parties’ competing arguments highlight that due to defense
counsel’s questioning, there is some ambiguity in defendant’s testimony as to:

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(a) what time frame defendant was referring to when using the phrase “back
then”; (b) whether he thus “ ‘ “paint[ed] an overall picture” that he had been
completely law abiding since 2013’ ”; and (c) whether the defense
consequently opened the door to evidence that he had been convicted of
section 14601.1 offenses in 2014, 2018, and 2019.
We need not resolve this question. Even assuming the trial court erred
in admitting the impeachment evidence, any error would be harmless under
any standard.6
As the People point out, the reference to defendant’s section 14601.1
convictions was limited to a single question at trial. The prosecutor asked
defendant to confirm the fact of those convictions, without asking him any
details about them. The prosecutor did not mention this evidence ever again
to the jury. Thus, the record shows that the reference to the prior convictions
represented a very small fraction of the entire trial. Moreover, as discussed
above, there was independent, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Given these circumstances, we conclude that a more favorable result would
not have been reached absent the purported evidentiary error.

6 Defendant argues we should assess prejudice under the Chapman

standard applicable to federal constitutional error, rather than the
reasonable probability standard in People v. Watson 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson) applicable to state law error, because the admission of the evidence
violated his due process right. Defendant’s constitutional claim is forfeited
because he did not raise it in the trial court. (See D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 625, 632, citing People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436;
People v. Cardona (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 516, 523.) In any event, we
conclude the error was harmless under either the Chapman or Watson
standard.

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Claim of Cumulative Error
Finally, defendant contends that even if the individual errors at trial do
not require reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair
trial. We disagree. Because we have found either no error or harmless error,
“[w]e find no reversible error by considering the claims cumulatively.”
(People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 408.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P.J.

MILLER, J.

(People v. Durden A165711)

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