People v. Gonzalez CA4/1

CourtListener 10265722Calctapp5 nov 2024

Testo completo

Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082775

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD299224)

NICKOLAS GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
with directions.
Anna M. Jauregui-Law, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Collette C. Cavalier and James
Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After Nickolas Gonzalez pleaded guilty to one count of felony vandalism

(Pen. Code,1 § 594, subds. (a),(b)(1)), the court placed him on two years’
formal probation, ordered him to pay restitution, and imposed various
probation conditions including a warrantless electronics search condition,
alcohol conditions, a no-contact condition, and a condition for probation
approval of residence and employment. The court also imposed a $30
criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) and a $40 court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) as part of the conditions. The
court dismissed another count for misdemeanor possession of burglary tools
(§ 466).
Gonzalez challenges his probation conditions on various grounds,

including under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent),2 more fully
described below. To the extent his counsel did not object to the conditions, he
maintains he received ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to properly
preserve the issue. He contends the criminal conviction and court operations
assessments should be deleted as unlawful probation conditions and imposed
in a separate order. The People concede the latter point. We reverse the
judgment in part and direct the court to strike that portion of Gonzalez’s
probation condition requiring him to submit his “computers” and “recordable
media including electronic devices” to warrantless search, including the
court’s requirement that he turn over passcodes. We will also direct the court
to modify Gonzalez’s alcohol-related conditions to either eliminate residential
treatment as an option or specify that they include residential treatment only

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Superseded by Proposition 8 in 1982 on other grounds as stated in
People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, fn. 6.

2
if ordered by the court. Finally, we direct the trial court to impose the $40
court operations assessment and $30 criminal conviction assessment in
separate orders. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2023, prosecutors charged Gonzalez and a codefendant,
Damian Tejeda, with felony vandalism after police caught the men trying to
break into a bank automated teller machine (ATM). Gonzalez eventually
pleaded guilty to the vandalism count, agreeing he “maliciously damaged
property of another, an ATM with the value of the damage approximately

$10,000[.]”3 Gonzalez’s probation officer reported that Gonzalez and Tejeda
pulled up in a truck near the ATM, removed two plywood boards and placed
them near the ATM, then Gonzalez worked with a prybar to force the ATM
open while Tejeda waited in the truck’s driver’s seat. Officers responding to a
witness report interrupted them during the incident. They found the ATM’s
screen monitor removed and its cash dispenser bent.
During the sentencing hearing, Gonzalez’s counsel asked the court to
“consider reducing, but not staying or eliminating” certain fines. Counsel
also asked the court not to impose some probation conditions. He asked the
court to eliminate a condition that Gonzalez have no contact with Tejeda,
telling the court that Tejeda was Gonzalez’s employee, they worked together
and Tejeda facilitated clerical work at Gonzalez’s business. He argued that
with the condition in place, “Tejeda would not have the job and ability to
continue paying what is expected to be a large amount of restitution, and Mr.
Gonzalez would have to replace an employee.”

3 The written plea form indicates that the factual basis for his plea was
that Gonzalez “maliciously damaged property valued over $400” and that
“restitution is approximately $10,000.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
3
Counsel also asked the court to not impose a “computers, recordable
media or electronic devices” provision in one of the search conditions, stating
he did not believe it had a nexus to the case. He similarly asked the court to
not impose certain alcohol-related conditions because, absent a nexus
between the crime and alcohol, “There’s no evidence in the probation report
or elsewhere that Mr. Gonzalez was under the influence of alcohol or that he
has an alcohol problem.” Counsel then submitted on the probation terms.
The trial court denied Gonzalez’s request to strike the no-contact

condition with respect to Tejeda.4 It retained the electronic device portion of
the search condition, stating it “will include all electronic devices and pass
codes to those devices to make sure that the defendant is absolutely not in
contact with . . . Tejeda, not directly, not indirectly or by texting and on any
social media together.” However the court struck two of the alcohol-related

conditions, stating it did not “see a nexus with alcohol or drugs . . . .”5 It
placed Gonzalez on formal probation and ordered conditions of probation
requiring Gonzalez to:
“Have no contact with the [codefendant] Damien Tejeda” (condition 6g);

4 The court stated: “With regards to contact with the codefendant,
it’s ludicrous to even ask [to not impose it]. You and this individual, your
codefendant, come up with this brilliant plan to break into an ATM, caused
thousands of dollars worth of damage so you guys can both, together, steal
the money. And you want this court to allow you to still have contact with
him and work together? Absolutely not.” (Some capitalization omitted.)

5 These were condition 8b, which prohibits knowingly using or possessing
alcohol if directed by the probation officer, and condition 8h, prohibiting a
person from being in places where he or she knows or is informed by a
probation officer that alcohol is the main item for sale except in the course of
employment.
4
“Submit [Gonzalez’s] person, vehicle, residence, property, personal
effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to
search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable
cause, when required by [his probation officer] or law enforcement officer”
(condition 6n);
“Attend ‘Self-help’ meetings . . . if directed by [his probation officer]”
(condition 8c);
“Submit to any chemical test of blood, breath, or urine to determine
blood alcohol content and authorize release of results to [his probation officer]
or the court whenever requested by the [probation officer], a law enforcement
officer, or the court ordered treatment program” (condition 8f);
“ . . . [N]ot drive a motor vehicle unless licensed and insured as
required by the State of California” (condition 8i);
“. . . [N]ot knowingly use or possess any controlled substance without a
valid prescription and submit a valid sample for testing for the use of
controlled substances/alcohol when required by the [probation officer], law
enforcement officer, or treatment provider” (condition 9c);
“Obtain [his probation officer’s] approval as to [his] residence [and]
employment” (condition 10g);
“Enroll in [and] adhere to substance use treatment & recovery services,
as clinically indicated if directed by [his probation officer]” (condition 14a);
and
“Participate in a substance use level of care assessment within [seven]
business days if directed by [his probation officer]” (condition 14b).
The court modified the search authorization in condition 6n to “not
extend to medical/legal information, financial accounts or transactions, or to
any data created before the acceptance of this probation grant.”

5
The order granting probation states that as a “term[ ] and condition[ ]
of probation . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The defendant shall pay” a $40 court
operations assessment (condition 2b) and a $30 criminal conviction
assessment (condition 2c).
Gonzalez appeals the judgment. (People v. Patton (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 934, 943 [defendant who pleads guilty and waives right to appeal
“ ‘any sentence stipulated herein’ ” may nevertheless attack probation
conditions on appeal without obtaining certificate of probable cause because
scope of waiver did not encompass yet-to-be-determined probation
conditions].)
DISCUSSION
I. General Principles and Standard of Review
“[S]tate law authorizes the sentencing court to impose [probation]
conditions . . . that are ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done,
that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury
done to any person resulting from that breach, and . . . for the reformation
and rehabilitation of the probationer.’ (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Accordingly, . . . a
sentencing court has ‘broad discretion to impose conditions to foster
rehabilitation and to protect public safety . . . .’ [Citation.] But such
discretion is not unlimited: ‘[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose
specified in the statute,’ and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must
be ‘ “reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or
to future criminality.” ’ ” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 402-403.)
A reviewing court may not invalidate a probation condition “unless it
‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2)
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent,

6
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486; People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 789-
790.) “The Lent test ‘is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before
a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118.) “As such, even if a condition of probation has no
relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves
conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the
condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (People v.
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380.) “ ‘[A] reviewing court will disturb the
trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if,
under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is
wholly unreasonable.’ ” (People v. Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 984; see also
People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403.)
II. Forfeiture and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We begin with those conditions of probation Gonzalez’s counsel left
unmentioned at the sentencing hearing, that is, the alcohol-related conditions
of 8c, 8f, 8i, 9c, 14a and 14b as well as condition 10g requiring probation
officer approval of Gonzalez’s residence and employment. Normally, counsel’s
failure to object to probation conditions as unreasonable or as applied to the
defendant forfeits a defendant’s right to raise appellate challenges to those
conditions. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 [“It is settled
that failure to object and make an offer of proof at the sentencing hearing
concerning alleged errors or omissions in the probation report waives the
claim on appeal”; “[n]o different rule should generally apply to probation
conditions under consideration at the same time”]; People v. Patton, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 936 [“An as-applied constitutional challenge [to a probation
condition] is forfeited unless previously raised”].) “A timely objection allows
the court to modify or delete an allegedly unreasonable condition or to

7
explain why it is necessary in the particular case. The parties must, of
course, be given a reasonable opportunity to present any relevant argument
and evidence. A rule foreclosing appellate review of claims not timely raised
in this manner helps discourage the imposition of invalid probation
conditions and reduce the number of costly appeals brought on that basis.”
(Welch, at p. 235.) By accepting terms without objection, a probationer
deprives the trial court of an opportunity to clarify or narrow the conditions if
appropriate, or at a minimum, make a better record to support its decision,
consistent with the forfeiture rule’s rationale.
Alternatively, Gonzalez advances claims of constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel. To establish such a claim, he must show (1) his
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance was
prejudicial, that is, “ ‘ “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.
[Citation.] ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) “ ‘Unless a
defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial
strategy.” ’ ” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)
“ ‘[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result
of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be
followed.’ ” (People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67, 75-76.)

8
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
A. Alcohol and Drug-Related Conditions
Gonzalez acknowledges his counsel did not object to conditions 8c, 8f
and 8i as to self-help meetings, tests for blood alcohol content, and requiring
license and insurance for driving a motor vehicle; condition 9c requiring him
to submit to alcohol and drug testing; and conditions 14a and 14b concerning
substance abuse assessment and treatment. He argues the conditions have
no nexus to his crime, which did not involve alcohol or drugs; there is no
indication he has an alcohol or drug use problem or had past criminal
offenses involving such substances; and because the trial court found no
nexus between the other alcohol-related conditions to which his counsel did
object, nothing further was needed to preserve his appellate challenge. As for
his ineffective assistance claim, Gonzalez contends that given his counsel’s
Lent objection to the two other alcohol and drug-related conditions and the
court’s agreement to strike them as lacking a nexus to his crime, the record
affirmatively discloses his counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his
omission. Gonzalez further contends the conditions violate his constitutional
rights to liberty and privacy as well as the separation of powers doctrine, by
delegating the decision-making discretion to nonjudicial persons.
1. Lent Challenge
We address Gonzalez’s Lent challenge on the merits “ ‘to show counsel
was not constitutionally ineffective by failing to make a futile or meritless
objection.’ ” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) Initially, we

9
observe that the requirement to attend self-help meetings if directed by his
probation officer appears broad. But it falls within conditions categorized as
alcohol or drug-related, and when analyzing probation conditions, we
consider their context and use common sense. (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129.) Under his plea agreement, Gonzalez agreed the
court could “consider . . . the entire factual background of the case, including
any unfiled, dismissed or stricken charges or allegations or cases.” The
record shows that while Gonzalez has no prior criminal history, his probation
report indicates he began consuming alcohol at age 16 and marijuana at age
15, though he claimed to have stopped using marijuana four years later. He
reported using cocaine at age 18, and last used it at age 19. Gonzalez self
reported that he did not have drug or alcohol addiction issues.
We cannot say, given Gonzalez’s early alcohol use and his decision at
age 23 to commit a crime causing serious damage and monetary loss to a
business, that the court abused its discretion by imposing a requirement he
attend alcohol-related self-help meetings at his probation officer’s direction,
which we presume will be exercised reasonably, not “ ‘irrationally or
capriciously . . . .’ ” (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 383; accord,
People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 996 [court will “presume a
probation officer will not withhold approval for irrational or capricious
reasons” and “cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the
authority granted to the officer by the court”]; In re Hudson (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [“we will not assume that [a probation officer] will
unreasonably withhold permission for legitimate computer and Internet
usage”].) And delegating details of such assistance to the probation officer is
a pragmatic necessity because a trial court “is poorly equipped to

10
micromanage selection of a [treatment or counseling] program.” (People v.
Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.)
As for the other conditions, we conclude counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to them. While Gonzalez
denied having any issues or addiction with alcohol or drugs, and denied he
would benefit from substance abuse treatment or support, his counsel could
have reasonably believed in the face of his early alcohol and drug use that it
was for the probation officer to assess the benefit of such treatment so as to
minimize any future criminality and that, given Gonzalez reportedly had no
substance abuse issues, the burden on him of submitting to testing and
substance abuse assessment would be minimal. Further, counsel could have
reasonably elected to focus on more onerous conditions, knowing that if the
probation officer in the future ordered Gonzalez to comply with these
conditions in an unreasonable manner, he could challenge the manner in
which the condition has been implemented. (See People v. Keele (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation
officer’s actions and power to modify conditions of probation].) We therefore
reject Gonzalez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
2. Asserted Violation of Liberty and Privacy
Gonzalez contends we may consider de novo whether the alcohol and
drug-related probation conditions encroach on his rights to liberty and
privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. According to
Gonzalez, the conditions violate these rights because “they sweep too broadly
and they have no rational connection to the offense and to future criminality.”
We note that a probationer “has a diminished expectation of liberty and
privacy as compared to an ordinary citizen.” (People v. Garcia (2017) 2
Cal.5th 792, 810.) In any event, because this claim turns on case-specific

11
facts and the sentencing record, his counsel forfeited it by failing to object on
this ground. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [constitutional
challenges may be forfeited where they “ ‘do not present “pure questions of
law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record
developed in the trial court” ’ ”]; see also People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 398, 403, fn. 5.) Even if we were to consider the point, Gonzalez for
support cites one case generally stating that a probationer has the right to “a
significant degree of privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . .” (People v. Pointer (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d
1128, 1137.) The argument is so cursory and undeveloped that we would
reject it as lacking demonstration of error.
3. Separation of Powers Argument
“ ‘The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise
either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.’ (Cal. Const.,
art. III, § 3.) Although the separation of powers doctrine ‘does not prohibit
one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is
violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the
inherent functions of another.’ [Citation.] ‘Separation of powers does not
mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be
impracticable, if not impossible.’ ” (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212.)
Under this doctrine, “judicial powers may not be delegated to
nonjudicial officers. [Citation.] While the probation officer may properly
specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it
is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on
the probationer.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902; see also In
re D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 209, fn. 4.) But “ ‘the court’s order cannot be

12
entirely open-ended.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1351, 1358-1359.)
Gonzalez challenges conditions 8f, 9c, 14a and 14b that he participate
in substance abuse assessment, enroll in and adhere to substance abuse
treatment, and submit to drug and alcohol testing on the ground they violate
the separation of powers doctrine because the “open-ended language” in them
delegate to nonjudicial persons the discretion to decide whether he is to
attend an outpatient or residential program or submit to testing. He argues
“[a]ll of these were ordered despite the court’s specific finding that no nexus
existed with alcohol and drugs.”
Gonzalez relies in part on People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897,
involving a defendant who pleaded no contest to identity theft who was
placed on a probation condition providing she was “ ‘to participate in any
treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by
the probation officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 902, italics added.) The defendant in Smith
argued that the condition improperly delegated judicial authority to the
probation officer “because it allow[ed] the . . . officer to decide whether she
will be required to attend any treatment, counseling, or therapy program and
it fails to provide her with notice of the nature of the treatment, counseling,
or therapy required.” (Id. at p. 901.) She also contended, as does Gonzalez
here, the condition violated the separation of powers doctrine because it
delegated to the probation officer the discretion to decide whether she must
attend a residential as opposed to an outpatient program. (Id. at p. 903.)
The Court of Appeal agreed to the extent the condition gave probation
the discretion to decide whether the defendant was to attend residential

13
treatment. (People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901, 903.)6 “A
residential program can impose far greater burdens on a person’s liberty
interests than an outpatient program. . . . Unlike outpatients, participants
in residential programs may be confined to the treatment facility for the
duration of the program, separated from family and friends, and unable to
maintain a job.” (Ibid.) Given the “significant liberty interests at stake,”
Smith held that a court, not probation, must decide whether to require a
defendant to attend residential treatment. (Ibid.)
The Smith court, however, did not invalidate the condition in its
entirety but remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to either
“strike the words ‘including residential’ or to specify that the court requires
[defendant to] undergo residential treatment.” (People v. Smith, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 905.) Thus, the problem was not the requirement that the
defendant participate in treatment as directed by probation, but the specific
inclusion of language authorizing possible residential treatment.
To the extent Gonzalez’s challenge turns on the fact the conditions have
no nexus to his crime, it is forfeited for his counsel’s failure to raise it and
give the court the opportunity to limit or modify the conditions. But treating
this separations of powers challenge as one of law, we observe that unlike in
People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897, the conditions challenged by

6 The court rejected the defendant’s argument as to improper delegation
of the type of counseling, treatment or therapy and notice: “The treatment
condition must be considered alongside the assessment condition, which
provides that Smith must ‘complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow
through with treatment as directed by probation.’ This is consistent with the
court’s oral comments that Smith needed treatment for her substance abuse
problem.” (People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 902-903.) The
appellate court found the condition “passes muster” when considered in light
of the assessment condition and the court’s comments. (Id. at p. 903.)

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Gonzalez here do not expressly provide for residential treatment. But
because the conditions are broad enough to possibly encompass such
treatment we will order the trial court to modify the conditions to either
eliminate residential treatment as an option or specify that they include
residential treatment only if ordered by the court. (Accord, People v. Smith,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 905.) Further if, at some point, the probation
officer exercises the delegated authority to select a program that Gonzalez
believes is unnecessary or inappropriate, he can seek judicial intervention by
moving to modify the probation order to ensure that the program is necessary
and properly related to his rehabilitation. (See People v. Penoli, supra, 46
Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)
B. Residence and Employment Condition
Gonzalez contends probation condition 10g, requiring him to obtain
probation officer approval of his residence and employment, is
unconstitutionally overbroad and violates his constitutional rights to travel
and association. According to him, it impermissibly infringes on his rights as
did the residence approval condition in People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
937, in that it gives the probation officer “unfettered discretion” or “broad
power over his living and working situation” and permits the officer to
disapprove his residence or employment “for any reason or no reason at all.”
He asks us to strike the condition or modify it to state he must “[k]eep the
probation officer informed of place of residence and employment and give
written notice to the probation officer within twenty-four (24) hours prior to a
change in residence.”
Gonzalez styles his challenge as a facial one, not requiring
consideration of his sentencing record, such that his counsel did not forfeit
the argument. Because he makes an alternative ineffective assistance

15
argument (albeit cursory), we will address his arguments on the merits, and
conclude the condition is not facially unconstitutional.
“ ‘A [probation] restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad . . . if it (1)
“impinge[s] on constitutional rights,” and (2) is not “tailored carefully and
reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and
rehabilitation.” [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth
challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the
restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional
rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.’ ”
(People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 656-657.)
Under appropriate circumstances, a trial court may validly impose
residence and employment approval conditions. (See, e.g., People v. Arevalo,
supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 657 [residence]; People v. Burden (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 1277, 1280-1281 [employment].) Gonzalez has not shown such
conditions are invalid in all applications (People v. Patton, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 946 [facial challenge to a probation condition is a claim that
a condition “cannot have any valid application”]); he merely speculates his
probation officer will act unreasonably in approving his residence or
employment. As we have stated, we must presume to the contrary that a
probation officer will reasonably exercise the discretion afforded him or her
by a probation condition and will not arbitrarily restrict a probationer’s
freedoms in a manner not tailored to rehabilitative or safety purposes.
(People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 383 [challenged probation condition
did not “ ‘authorize a probation officer to irrationally or capriciously exclude a
pet’ ”]; Arevalo, at p. 658 [the “condition here presumes a probation officer
will not withhold approval for irrational or capricious reasons”]; In re

16
Hudson, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) And because the officer may not
act in an arbitrary or capricious manner (Arevalo, at p. 658; Olguin, at p.
383), we reject Gonzalez’s claim the probation condition gives the probation
officer unfettered discretion.
Gonzalez’s reliance on People v. Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 937 is
unavailing. The defendant there did not advance an overbreadth challenge.
His challenge was that the residence approval condition—designed to prevent
him from living with his parents—generally infringed on his constitutional
rights and was unreasonable under Lent in part because his probation report
did not suggest his home life contributed to the crime of which he was
convicted or was reasonably related to future criminality. (Bauer, at p. 944.)
The appellate court agreed the condition violated Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481,
and also impinged on the defendant’s constitutional right to travel and
freedom of association. (Bauer, at p. 944.) According to the court, the
condition was extremely broad since it gave the probation officer the power to
forbid the defendant “from living with or near his parents—that is, the power
to banish him.” (Ibid.) Gonzalez’s condition is not like that in Bauer.
III. Electronics Search Condition
A. Lent Challenge
After the court ordered the electronics search condition over his
counsel’s Lent objection, Gonzalez’s counsel challenged it under Ricardo P.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113, stating: “I don’t think electronic devices for the
specific purpose of enforcing a restraining order, which is similar to the
Court’s holding in Ricardo, which is his future criminality, is a sufficient
nexus.” The court rejected the argument:
“The Court: I’m going to order it. [Tejeda is] the codefendant in this
case. It’s more than a [civil protective order] against somebody that he was

17
not supposed to be around. This is his codefendant in the case where they
planned together this ATM burglary attempt and failed together. So I
don’t—and he’s his employee, so I have to make sure that, in the course of his
employee [sic], that’s all terminated too. So I appreciate what you’re saying,
counsel. I think that it’s a strong nexus, especially given the codefendant
status.”
Gonzalez contends the court abused its discretion under Lent, supra, 15
Cal.3d 481 by ordering the probation search conditions of his computers,
recordable media, electronic devices and pass codes, and by failing to prohibit
searches of personal information and data created not just before, but also
after he accepted probation. According to Gonzalez, the conditions meet all
three prongs of the Lent test. Gonzalez also argues the conditions are
unconstitutionally overbroad and violate his First and Fourth Amendment
rights to free speech and privacy.
Gonzalez’s Lent challenge has merit. In Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th
1113, the Supreme Court held a similar condition failed the Lent test when
there was no evidence the defendant had used computers or other electronic
devices in the burglaries he admitted committing or in any other crimes,
reasoning the burden of the condition on the defendant’s privacy was
substantially disproportionate to the goal of deterring future criminality.
(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1119-1120.) After Ricardo P., this court
struck a search condition like the one imposed on Gonzalez in a case where
the defendant pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and the
record was absent evidence he used a computer, other electronic device, or
recordable media in committing any crime. (People v. Cota, supra, 45
Cal.App.5th at pp. 790-791.)

18
Here, Gonzalez has no prior criminal record, so we cannot say he has a
pattern of criminality that might be prevented by this type of condition. And
like the defendants in Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113 and People v. Cota,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 786, the record does not indicate Gonzalez (or his
codefendant Tejeda, for that matter) used a computer, recordable media, or
other electronic device in vandalizing the ATM. Of course, Gonzalez’s use of
such devices would not be inherently criminal.
That the court found the condition important to ensure Gonzalez does
not contact Tejeda does not save it. In Ricardo P.—in which a minor
committed felony burglaries along with his two cousins with no indication he
used an electronic device in connection with them—our high court rejected
the Court of Appeal’s determination that the electronics search condition was
“ ‘reasonably related to enabling the effective supervision of [the minor’s]
compliance with his other probation conditions’ ” (Ricardo P., supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 1119) similar to the trial court’s reasoning here. The court in
Ricardo P. emphasized that “ ‘[n]ot every probation condition bearing a
remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal
conduct can be considered reasonable’ under Lent.” (In re Ricardo P., at p.
1127.) It invalidated an electronics search condition on the record there,
which showed no indication the minor had used or would use electronic
devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity. (Id. at p. 1116.)
Here, where Gonzalez has no criminal record and there is no indication
electronic devices had anything to do with his vandalism offenses, “the
burden [the search condition] imposes on [Gonzalez’s] privacy is substantially
disproportionate to the countervailing interests of furthering his
rehabilitation and protecting society.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
1119.) We agree the portions of condition 6n to which Gonzalez objected,

19
including the court’s requirement that he turn over passcodes, are
unreasonable under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, and must be stricken. Given
our conclusion, we need not reach his challenges based on overbreadth or his
privacy and free speech rights.
IV. Condition Prohibiting Contact with Codefendant Tejeda
Gonzalez contends probation condition 6g, prohibiting contact with
codefendant Tejeda, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it
lacks a knowledge component. He argues the condition “does not provide
sufficient notice of what is required” of him and “does not closely tailor
limitations on his constitutional rights to the purpose of the condition.”
Gonzales maintains the court’s use of the term “social media” while imposing

the condition7 is of “further concern” because it is undefined. According to
Gonzalez, the condition is overbroad because “he might forego his
constitutional right to communicate, associate with others, and to travel in
an attempt to avoid the burden of being in violation of an unintentional
contact.” Gonzalez maintains his counsel’s failure to object did not forfeit the
constitutional challenge.
The People respond that Gonzalez forfeited the constitutional
argument, characterizing it as an “as-applied” challenge. They argue the
condition provides “clear notice that [Gonzalez] is prohibited from having any
contact with [Tejeda]” including through any form of social media, which is a
“commonly known” term.

7 The court’s remark was made in connection with Gonzalez’s counsel’s
objection to the search condition for electronics, computers and other
recordable media. The court responded: “How are we going to know if
[Gonzalez is] in contact with [Tejeda], if he’s calling him or texting him or
going onto social media accounts?” Counsel stated “for the record that [he
was] not addressing the no contact with Mr. Tejeda.”
20
We address the challenge de novo, as the claim is a pure question of
law. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 888 [addressing challenge to
probation condition forbidding defendant’s association with “anyone
disapproved of by probation”]; see also People v. Salvador (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 57, 63.)
The doctrine of vagueness “bars the government from enforcing a
provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that
people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.’ [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional
challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be
sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or
prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has
violated the condition.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) “[A]
probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally
vague ‘ “ ‘ if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its
language.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 501.)
In our view, Gonzalez’s vagueness challenge is resolved by People v.
Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494. There, the court addressed conditions barring the
defendant from possessing firearms or illegal drugs over a challenge they
were facially unconstitutionally vague because they did not include a
knowledge component. (Id. at p. 497.) The California Supreme Court
rejected the contention. It pointed out that it was well established or settled
that “[r]evocation of probation typically requires proof that the probation
violation was willful.” (Id. at pp. 498-499, in part citing People v. Patel (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [referring to “a substantial uncontradicted body of
case law” on that point].) It held the conditions “already include[d] an
implicit requirement of knowing possession” and thus afforded the defendant

21
“fair notice of the conduct required of him.” (Hall, at p. 497.) In reaching this
conclusion, the California Supreme Court observed that “[i]n determining
whether the condition is sufficiently definite . . . , a court is not limited to the
condition’s text” but “must also consider other sources of applicable law
[citation], including judicial construction of similar provisions.” (Id. at p.
500.)
The conditions were not unconstitutionally vague in part because
“California case law already articulates . . . a general presumption that a
violation of a probation condition must be willful . . . .” (People v. Hall, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 501; see also People v. Rhinehart, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p.
1128.) “Just as most criminal statutes—in all their variety—are generally
presumed to include some form of mens rea despite their failure to articulate
it expressly, so too are probation conditions generally presumed to require
some form of willfulness, unless excluded ‘ “ ‘expressly or by necessary
implication.’ ” ’ ” (Hall, at p. 502.) The defendant in Hall, as Gonzalez does
here, pointed to In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 as nevertheless
compelling modification. The court in Hall disagreed. It pointed out that in
Sheena K., involving a condition barring the probationer from associating
with “ ‘ “anyone disapproved of by probation,” ’ ” it “agreed that the condition
should have been modified to direct the probationer ‘not to associate with
anyone “known to be disapproved of” by a probation officer.’ ” (Hall, at p.
503.) However the Hall court found it “telling that this court declined to
modify the condition at issue in Sheena K. by inserting a requirement that
the probationer avoid knowingly associating with the specified group of
persons—which is the kind of modification defendant seeks here.” (Ibid.)
Hall stated: “At core, what defendant seeks through modification is
‘absolute clarity’ in the text of the condition itself, without the need to rely on

22
‘a judicial construction.’ But the question before us is not whether this
degree of precision would be desirable in principle, but whether it is
constitutionally compelled. As we have previously observed, the vagueness
doctrine demands ‘ “no more than a reasonable degree of certainty,” ’ ” which
was present in the conditions at issue there. (People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 503.) It “decline[d] defendant’s invitation to modify those conditions
simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit.” (Id. at pp. 503-
504.)
Here, the court’s condition bars Gonzalez from contacting a specific
person, his codefendant, and under the foregoing principles, it is not
unconstitutionally vague for not including the words “knowing contact” as

Gonzalez proposes or otherwise expressing the requisite mens rea.8 The
condition does not include the term “social media.” But because it prohibits
all contact, it is not vague for failing to define that term in any event.
Nor is the condition overbroad. “ ‘[A] probation condition that imposes
limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those
limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.’ ” (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p.
384; see Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) As stated, “ ‘[t]he essential
question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the
legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the
defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection

8 We are not persuaded to change this conclusion by Gonzalez’s other
cited cases, including People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, decided
before People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494, in which the court found
unconstitutionally vague a condition forbidding “ ‘any pornographic or
sexually explicit material as defined by the probation officer.’ ” (Pirali, at pp.
1342, 1353.) Rather, as discussed above, Hall favorably cited People v. Patel,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 956, which Pirali and other cases declined to follow.
23
in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.’ ” (People v. Arevalo, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 656-657; see
also People v. Gruis (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 19, 27.)
Gonzalez’s overbreadth challenge appears to turn on his claim that the
condition lacks a knowledge requirement; his argument is he might forego
certain constitutional rights to avoid unintentionally violating the condition.
Our conclusions above dispose of that type of claim. But we further conclude
the condition here is not overbroad in the traditional sense; it is narrowly
tailored to include only Gonzalez’s codefendant. “[R]estrictions on a
probationer’s right of association are permissible if reasonably required to
accomplish the needs of the state.” (People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
698, 703.) “However, probation conditions that restrict constitutional rights
must be carefully tailored and ‘reasonably related to the compelling state
interest’ in reforming and rehabilitating the defendant.” (Id. at p. 704; see
also People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 628 [limitation on the right to
associate is permissible if it is “ ‘(1) primarily designed to meet the ends of
rehabilitation and protection of the public and (2) reasonably related to such
ends’ ”].) This condition is reasonably related to the state’s interest in
rehabilitating Gonzalez and protecting the public by preventing him from
associating with the person with whom he committed his crime.
V. Criminal Conviction and Court Operations Assessments
Arguing the court operations and criminal conviction assessments are
collateral to his offense, Gonzalez contends they cannot be fashioned into a
probation condition. According to Gonzalez, the fees imposed as a condition
of probation are unlawful and unauthorized, so forfeiture does not apply. He
asks this court to order they be imposed as a separate order. The People
argue Gonzalez’s counsel forfeited the challenge by not raising it. However,

24
citing People v. Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392,9 People v. Kim (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 836 and People v. Bradus (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 636, 641-
642 [orders for the payment of appointed attorney fees and for the costs of
probation “cannot legally be imposed as conditions of probation” as they are
collateral]) they agree that if not forfeited, the assessments should be
imposed by separate order and not as a condition of probation.
We agree with Gonzalez his argument is not forfeited because the
assessments imposed as a condition of probation are unauthorized as a
matter of law and correctable without reference to the factual findings.
(People v. Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) The issue also presents a
pure question of law, which we review de novo. (People v. Tua (2018) 18
Cal.App.5th 1136, 1140.) As the People correctly concede, fines and
assessments cannot be imposed as probation conditions because they are
collateral to a defendant’s crime and punishment and are not oriented toward
a defendant’s rehabilitation. (Kim, at p. 842.) Instead, such fines and
assessments should be separately imposed. (Id. at pp. 842-843.)
Consequently, we direct the court to impose the challenged assessments by
separate order and not as probation conditions.

9 People v. Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 was disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 858.
25
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to that portion of Gonzalez’s probation
condition requiring him to submit his “computers” and “recordable media
including electronic devices” to warrantless search and turn over passcodes.
The matter is remanded with directions that the court strike those portions of
the condition. On remand, the court is directed to modify Gonzalez’s alcohol-
related conditions to either eliminate residential treatment as an option or
specify that they include residential treatment only if ordered by the court,
and to impose the $40 court operations assessment and $30 criminal
conviction assessment in separate orders. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

26

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