CourtListener 10161392•People v. Ocampo CA2/7
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Filed 10/24/24 P. v. Ocampo CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B330976
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA424985)
v.
ANDORENI LAZARO
OCAMPO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Andoreni Lazaro Ocampo appeals from a postjudgment
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 In 2015 a jury
convicted Ocampo of second degree murder, and the trial court
sentenced him to 15 years to life. In 2020 Ocampo petitioned for
resentencing, seeking relief from his 2015 conviction. Following
briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
the petition.
On appeal, Ocampo contends the superior court applied the
substantial evidence standard instead of the correct legal
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ocampo also
argues there was not substantial evidence to support the superior
court’s finding that, under current law, Ocampo is guilty of
implied malice murder as an aider and abettor. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
On the evening of April 25, 2014, members of the “H2O”
and “BYMS” tagging crews—Ocampo, Saul Ambriz, Joao Bonilla,
Giovanni Garcia, Felix Garcia, Jesse Chavez, and other
individuals—were at Ocampo’s house drinking beers and
smoking.2 Ocampo was a member of H2O, and Ambriz and
Bonilla were members of BYMS.3 Bonilla testified that Ocampo
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to Giovanni and Felix Garcia by their first names
to avoid confusion.
3 “BYMS” was identified as “BUMS” by another member,
Josue Bernal, who testified at trial. Bonilla and Bernal testified
2
became upset and agitated and wanted to leave and drive around.
Bonilla told Ocampo to calm down, and Ocampo turned his anger
toward Bonilla. Ocampo lifted his shirt to show Bonilla a scar
down the length of his abdomen, which Ocampo said was the
result of a stabbing three months earlier by a member of a rival
tagging crew. Referring to the scar, Ocampo said, “Look what
they did to me.” As Ocampo continued to be aggressive toward
Bonilla, others at the gathering tried to calm him down, telling
him to “relax.” One member of the group told Ocampo,
“[Bonilla]’s not the enemy, he’s a homie.” At that point Ocampo
ceased being aggressive toward Bonilla, but the group was still
“pumped up” and “emotional.” Bonilla heard someone say they
should go “lurking,” which meant hunting for enemies. In
generally regarding the tagging crew culture. BYMS and H2O
were separate tagging crews, whose members were friendly with
each other. Each tagging crew had its own territory and hand
signs, and members of the groups often had nicknames or
monikers by which they were known. The tagging crews also had
rivals who had their own territories. When one crew encountered
the graffiti art of a rival crew, its members would cross it out as a
sign of disrespect and write the name of their own crew. Rival
crews would retaliate in kind. Often when they went out tagging,
members of the crews would bring bats or other weapons to
protect themselves from rivals. Detective Armando Mendoza,
who testified as an expert witness on tagging crew culture,
confirmed Bonilla’s and Bernal’s firsthand descriptions that
tagging crews engaged in graffiti art, formed alliances and
rivalries, established known territories, retaliated against one
another for disrespectful behavior and graffiti, and, on occasion,
committed violence against rival crews.
3
response to the lurking comment, Ocampo said, “Let’s go get an
enemy.”
Before the group left the house, Ambriz and Giovanni told
Bonilla they were carrying knives. Ocampo and Giovanni got
into a car driven by Felix. A few moments later Bonilla, Ambriz,
and a third young man got into a car driven by Chavez. Although
Bonilla asked Chavez to take him home, Chavez followed Felix’s
car.
Around 9:00 p.m. Felix, Giovanni, and Ocampo arrived
near the intersection of Vermont Avenue and 40th Place, a
location within the territory of “UTF,” a tagging crew that was a
rival of both BYMS and H2O. Ocampo and Giovanni got out of
the car and walked down Vermont Avenue, where they
encountered Osmin Cerna leaving a liquor store carrying a
backpack and a skateboard. Cerna identified himself as a
member of UTF. Ocampo and Giovanni attacked Cerna, causing
him to drop his skateboard. Cerna put his hands up and said,
“Why are you all attacking me?” The two young men kept
striking Cerna, and Cerna tried to retreat. Ocampo and Giovanni
pursued Cerna, and Giovanni picked up the skateboard and
swung it at Cerna. Cerna tried to defend himself and was able to
knock Ocampo down, but Ocampo got up and kept fighting.
A few minutes after the fight started, Chavez arrived at the
location with Ambriz and the third man. Ambriz and the other
man got out of the car and ran to the fight. Bonilla saw Ocampo,
Giovanni, and two or three others fight with Cerna. The
attackers surrounded Cerna, who was on the ground. Cerna was
unable to get up and was screaming, “Help! Stop!” After another
few minutes the attackers returned to their cars and drove away.
Bonilla testified he got into Felix’s car along with Giovanni and
4
Ocampo. Bonilla heard Ocampo say, “‘We got him, we got him
good.’”
Paramedics arrived and took Cerna to the hospital, where
he died that night. The medical examiner testified Cerna had
been stabbed nine times during the fight, twice in the back, once
in the buttocks, once in the chest, twice in the abdomen, and
twice in the face. The fatal wound was the chest wound, which
had pierced the heart. One of the abdominal wounds might also
have been fatal if not treated.
Bernal, who had not been present at Ocampo’s house or at
the scene of the murder, called Ambriz on his cell phone between
9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on the night of the fight. Ambriz answered
and said, “We seen some enemies. I’ll call you back later.”
Bernal spoke to Ambriz later that night, and Ambriz said they
had “caught some enemies slippin.” Bernal understood that to
mean they had “caught people walking down the street that we
don’t get along with.” Around 3:00 a.m. the following morning,
Bernal and Ambriz went tagging with some other friends. While
in the car Bernal heard Ambriz say he had taken out his knife
and stabbed Cerna during the fight. Bernal testified he had seen
Ambriz carrying different types of knives on previous occasions.
On April 26, 2014, the day after the murder, someone
called a BYMS meeting at Bernal’s house. Bernal testified that
that there were at least seven individuals in attendance,
including Bonilla and Ambriz. The discussion turned to the
incident the previous night, and Ambriz stated he had stabbed
Cerna twice. Bonilla likewise testified that Ambriz said he had
stabbed Cerna. Ocampo said he had a knife at the time but
dropped it during the fight. The police recovered a folding knife
5
with its blade locked in an open position at the scene of the fight.
There was no blood or DNA found on the knife.
Ocampo did not testify at trial or present any witnesses in
his defense.
B. The Verdict, Sentencing, and Prior Appeal
The jury found Ocampo guilty of second degree murder,
and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 15
years to life. Ocampo appealed, and we affirmed. (People v.
Ambriz (Apr. 20, 2017, B268685) [nonpub. opn.].)
C. Petition for Resentencing, Evidentiary Hearing, and Denial
of Petition
On January 3, 2020 Ocampo filed a form petition for
resentencing seeking to vacate his murder conviction and be
resentenced in accordance with recent statutory changes relating
to felony murder and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. In his petition, Ocampo checked boxes stating he was
“convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine”
and he “could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.” At Ocampo’s request, the superior court
appointed him counsel. The People filed a response to the
petition, and on August 31, 2021 the court issued an order to
show cause.4
4 Judge Rand S. Rubin presided over the trial but retired in
2015. Judge William C. Ryan issued the order to show cause and
presided over the evidentiary hearing.
6
After additional briefing from the parties, on January 26,
2023 the superior court held an evidentiary hearing. At the
hearing, the prosecutor introduced the transcript from Ocampo’s
2015 trial, the exhibits admitted at trial (including surveillance
video footage of Ocampo and Giovanni’s fight with Cerna, which
was played for the court), and our opinion in Ambriz, supra,
B268685 (for the procedural history of the case). The prosecutor
argued that on the night of the incident, Ocampo was upset that
he had been stabbed by a rival tagging crew several months
earlier; he was armed with a knife; and he “was angry and out
hunting for an enemy.” Further, Ocampo instigated the fight; he
“was a direct perpetrator in the assault”; he knew that “going and
intending to stab an enemy is going to result in death”; and he
was armed and had the intent to kill.
Ocampo’s attorney acknowledged Ocampo was upset on the
night of the incident. But he argued Ocampo fought without a
weapon, and Ocampo did not plan or coordinate the fight against
Cerna. He maintained Ocampo dropped the knife when Cerna
knocked him to the ground. He also argued there was no
evidence that Ocampo stabbed Cerna, knew that other people had
knives, or intended for others to stab Cerna.
At the continued evidentiary hearing on February 2, 2023,
following additional argument from counsel, the superior court
took the matter under submission. On May 11, 2023 the court
issued an 11-page decision denying Ocampo’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The court found
“overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s implied malice
aforethought.” The court explained, “Petitioner’s malice
originated when he rallied the others for a retaliatory attack and
armed himself with a knife. Petitioner and the others already
7
had in mind when they arrived at the scene, before they select
the victim, that they are going [to] “‘hunt.’” Petitioner was the
initial and constant aggressor in the fight. He was armed with a
knife that was later found with the blade in an open position.
The open blade, combined with Petitioner’s agitated state and
desire to go hunting for an enemy in retaliation for his own prior
stabbing evinces an intent to use the blade in a fatal manner.
Moreover, Petitioner intentionally attacked Cerna with an open
knife; the natural consequence of which is dangerous to human
life. Petitioner, having been a stabbing victim himself, is acutely
aware that attacking someone with a knife is dangerous to
human life, yet he deliberately attacked Cerna and left him
bleeding on the sidewalk. Consequently, Petitioner is liable for
second degree murder under an implied malice [theory].”
The superior court continued, “[T]he evidence presented
here supports a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory of
liability.” The court reasoned, “Petitioner knew the purpose of
the group’s outing, including the actual killer’s (Ambriz), was to
go lurking or hunting for the enemy because Petitioner was the
one who rallied . . . the BYMS and H2O crews to go find a rival
crew. Petitioner not only encouraged the attack, but facilitated
the murder by going to enemy territory, arming himself, selecting
the victim, being the initial and continual aggressor throughout
the attack, then leaving the victim to die.”
The court added, “Petitioner’s argument that there is no
evidence that he ever shared in the actual killer’s intent to stab
the victim[] and that he did not have notice that the actual
perpetrator had a knife or intended to kill the victim is not
supported by the record here. He also alleges that there was no
coordination or shared destination between the three cars to go
8
lurking, but offers no other explanation for how the cars ended up
at the same location within minutes of each other after all having
discussed going lurking. Petitioner himself rallied the others at
his house, including Ambriz, to go hunting or lurking for enemies,
and violence between rival tagging crews was common, and even
occasionally resulting in death. Members of tagging crews
frequently carried weapons, Ambriz was known by members of
the crews to carry a knife on occasion, and indeed announced he
was carrying a knife that night. Even more, after leaving to go
‘get an enemy,’ Petitioner announced in the car leaving the scene
of the murder that ‘We got him, we got him good.’”
Ocampo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope
of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848 (Gentile); see
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes).) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
an individual’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e).
(Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Section 189,
subdivision (e), now requires the People to prove specific facts
relating to the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant
was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual
9
killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the
commission of murder in the first degree (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony
listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless
indifference to human life as described in section 190.2,
subdivision (d) (the felony-murder special-circumstance
provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at p. 708.) Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2),
effective January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of potential relief
to apply Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals
convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure (now codified in
section 1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime to petition the
sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on
any remaining counts if the individual could not have been
convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
10
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) &
(d)(1).)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. . . . A finding that there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence, provided
the court understood the elements of the offense and applied the
proper standard and burden of proof. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 988; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)
“[W]here there is an issue as to whether the trial court
misunderstood the elements of the applicable offense, the case
presents a question of law which we review independently.”
(Reyes, at p. 988.)
11
B. The Superior Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
Ocampo contends the superior court erred in reviewing the
evidence for substantial evidence instead of applying the correct
standard of proof to require the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of murder. The court
stated in its written decision, “[T]he court finds that Petitioner
could today be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second
degree murder under implied malice, and aiding and abetting
theories of liability.”5 Although the superior court was imprecise
when it stated that Ocampo “could today be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt” instead of saying Ocampo “is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the record shows the court and the parties
were aware of the correct legal standard. In response to
Ocampo’s petition, the prosecutor acknowledged, “The
prosecution has the burden at the hearing to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” In its order to show cause, the court stated “the
People bear the burden of proving Petitioner’s ineligibility for
relief beyond a reasonable doubt.” And in Ocampo’s ex parte
application for appointment of a defense investigator, Ocampo
stated, “At the hearing to determine whether petitioner is
entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.”
At the outset of the January 26, 2023 evidentiary hearing,
the court asked, “Who wants to go first?” Ocampo’s attorney
5 Ocampo asserts the superior court stated “‘the prosecution
could prove that petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt,’” citing to the court’s memorandum of decision. The
court’s decision does not contain that statement.
12
responded, “I think it’s the People’s burden,” and the court
replied, “Yeah.” The prosecutor then proceeded to discuss the
evidence at trial and presented her argument. In response,
Ocampo’s attorney argued with respect to the aiding and abetting
theory of liability that the “People have to prove that Mr. Ocampo
knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime of
murder. They have to establish, prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Mr. Ocampo knew that. They can’t.” Ocampo’s
attorney reiterated, “[T]he court knows you have to prove the
case beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s the burden on the People.
I don’t believe that they can prove it now that the law’s changed.”
He concluded his argument by stating, “[I]n light of the change in
the law, in light of the People’s theory in what is still a natural
and probable consequence theory, they cannot prove their case
beyond a reasonable doubt.” The superior court did not at any
time state that Ocampo’s attorney’s description of the
prosecution’s burden was incorrect or that the People did not
have the burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt.
In light of this record, it is clear that the court in its findings was
aware of the correct legal standard and found the People had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of
second degree murder under current law.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding of Aider and Abettor Liability
“‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of
natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
13
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’” (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990; accord, Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 850.) “‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus
reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-
endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus
includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the
life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice
murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct,
aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of
that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by
the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’”
(Reyes, at pp. 990-991; accord, People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 463; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712-713.)
Ocampo contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo
aided and abetted the second degree murder. He asserts the
evidence, at most, shows he was merely part of the group that
committed the assault, he had no knowledge of Ambriz’s intent to
commit the stabbing, and he did not assist in the stabbing.
Ocampo’s contentions lack merit.
Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding
that Ocampo possessed the requisite actus reus in aiding and
abetting the murder. As the superior court found, Ocampo by his
words and conduct aided the commission of the stabbing by
encouraging his fellow tagging crews (BYMS and H2O) to “hunt”
14
for a rival tagging crew member. On the night of the incident,
Ocampo was agitated and upset, and he got angry with Bonilla
after Bonilla told him to calm down. Ocampo showed Bonilla an
abdominal scar, which resulted from a stabbing three months
earlier by a rival tagging crew member, and said, “Look what
they did to me.” When someone suggested the group go “lurking,”
Ocampo responded, “Let’s go get an enemy.” Ocampo armed
himself with a knife, went to the territory of UTF (a rival tagging
crew), and initiated the attack on Cerna after Cerna identified
himself as a UTF member. During the fight, Ocampo took out his
folding knife with the blade locked in an open position, which
showed his intent to use the knife on Cerna.
Substantial evidence also supports the superior court’s
finding that Ocampo harbored the requisite mens rea as an aider
and abettor. Ocampo denies that he knew that Ambriz was
carrying a knife. But it is a reasonable inference that Ocampo
was present when Giovanni and Ambriz told Bonilla before the
group left Ocampo’s house that they were carrying knives to
“hunt” for a rival tagging crew member. And Ocampo was
physically fighting with Cerna when Ambriz joined the fight
armed with a knife, which further supports the court’s finding
that Ocampo had knowledge of Ambriz’s intent to stab Cerna.
Further, Ocampo would have seen Ambriz and possibly others
stab Cerna as the group was attacking Cerna.6 Ocampo intended
to assist Ambriz in the stabbing by continuing to attack Cerna as
the fight continued. And after Ocampo got into the car to flee, he
stated, “We got him, we got him good.” Ocampo knew the
6 Cerna was stabbed nine times, but Ambriz admitted to
stabbing Cerna twice.
15
stabbing was dangerous to life because he was a victim of a prior
stabbing. He acted in conscious disregard for life by continuing
to participate in the attack as Cerna was stabbed, and he left
Cerna bleeding on the street. Ample evidence therefore supports
the superior court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ocampo was guilty of second degree murder as an aider and
abettor of implied malice murder under current law.7
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
7 Ocampo also contends the denial of his section 1172.6
petition violated his due process rights and the proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment under the state and
federal Constitutions (U.S. Const., 8th and 14th Amends.; Cal.
Const., art. I, §§ 15, 17). Specifically, Ocampo argues the
superior court violated his constitutional rights because the court
denied his petition notwithstanding the prosecutor’s failure to
prove him guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of
implied malice murder, Ocampo’s contentions fail.
16
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