CourtListener 10125442•People v. Sanchez CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B333760
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA272661-02)
v.
BRYAN SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael E. Pastor, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 a jury convicted Sanchez of second degree murder,
attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder, and the
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 60 years
to life. In his direct appeal, Sanchez successfully challenged his
conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, and this court
reversed that conviction. On remand the trial court sentenced
Sanchez to an aggregate term of 35 years to life.
In 2023 Sanchez petitioned the superior court to recall his
sentence and resentence him under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A).1 The court denied the petition, ruling that
Sanchez’s sentence of 35 years to life was not the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and that
Sanchez had received a parole hearing the prior year and had
another one scheduled. While Sanchez’s appeal from the superior
court’s order was pending, a panel of the Board of Parole
Hearings granted Sanchez parole, although pending final
approval of Sanchez’s release by relevant authorities, Sanchez
remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
Citing People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard),
Sanchez argues the superior court erred in ruling he was
ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
Sanchez contends that his original sentence of 60 years to life
was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole and that the superior court erred in considering he has
had, and will have, parole hearings. We affirm.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2003, when Sanchez was 17 years old, he
drove fellow gang members into a neighborhood claimed by a
rival gang, looking for rival gang members to shoot. One of
Sanchez’s passengers fired several shots at a group of men,
killing one and injuring another. (People v. Flores (July 19, 2010,
B211207) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2008 a jury convicted Sanchez of second degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)); attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)); and conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true
allegations that Sanchez committed the offenses for the benefit of
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that the
murder had been committed by means of shooting a firearm from
a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury
(§ 190, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Sanchez to an
aggregate prison term of 60 years to life.
In 2010 this court reversed Sanchez’s conviction for
conspiracy and, as a result, vacated the judgment. On remand
the trial court sentenced Sanchez to 35 years to life on his
convictions for second degree murder and attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. (People v. Flores, supra,
B211207.)
In 2023 Sanchez filed a petition under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), which authorizes certain defendants who
were younger than 18 years old when they committed their
crimes and who received a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole to petition the superior court for recall and
resentencing. Sanchez argued that, though he was not sentenced
3
to life without the possibility of parole, he qualified for relief
under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 because he was 17 years
old when he committed his crimes, he had served almost 20 years
of his sentence, his original sentence of 60 years to life was the
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and
he had “engaged in substantial programming in support of his
rehabilitation.” Sanchez also asserted that, once the court recalls
his sentence, “his judgment will become no longer final, and
Proposition 57 will apply to his re-sentencing.”2 The People
opposed Sanchez’s petition, arguing that he was ineligible for
relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), because his
sentence of 35 years to life was not functionally equivalent to life
without the possibility of parole, that he received a parole
hearing in 2022, and that he was scheduled to have another
parole hearing in 2025.
At the hearing on Sanchez’s petition, counsel for Sanchez
argued that Sanchez met all of the “elements” of Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th 608 and that Sanchez did not have “a meaningful
opportunity [for] parole.” Sanchez addressed the court and
claimed that, when he next appears before the parole board, the
board will “only consider” the trial court’s recommendation
Sanchez “die in prison” and that “nothing else will be
2 “In 2016, the voters of California enacted Proposition 57, a
measure that amended the law governing the punishment of
juvenile offenses in adult criminal court by requiring hearings to
determine whether the offenses should instead be heard in
juvenile court.” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158.)
4
considered.”3 The court stated that Sanchez had already received
a parole hearing, that he was about to have another one, and
that, because Sanchez’s sentence “was modified,” the sentence
was not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole. The court concluded Heard did not apply to Sanchez and
denied the petition. Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal.4
DISCUSSION
Sanchez argues that his initial sentence of 60 years to life
was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole and that the superior court erred in ruling he was not
eligible for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
Sanchez contends that under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 628
an order denying a defendant sentenced to the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole the opportunity
to petition under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), violates
3 At Sanchez’s sentencing hearing in 2008, the trial court
told Sanchez: “You are very smart, you are very articulate, and
you are totally remorseless. . . . Your conduct, as demonstrated
even by the jury verdicts in this case, demonstrates extraordinary
violence and extraordinary manipulative ability. While I wish
you good luck, Sir, I am of the opinion that you should never be
released from custody.”
4 In addition to appealing from the superior court’s order
denying his petition under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A),
Sanchez appealed from the court’s order denying his motion for a
juvenile court referral. Because Sanchez does not make any
argument in his opening brief regarding the latter issue, he has
abandoned it. (See People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 654,
fn. 3.)
5
equal protection. Sanchez also contends that the “relevant
benchmark” for determining whether his sentence is the
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole is his
initial sentence of 60 years to life, not his current sentence of
35 years to life, and that his “eligibility for a parole hearing was
irrelevant to whether the sentence was the functional equivalent
of” life without the possibility of parole.
While this appeal was pending, Sanchez had another parole
hearing, and the parole panel granted him parole. We asked the
parties to submit letter briefs addressing the impact of the
favorable parole decision on Sanchez’s appeal. The People argue
the decision to parole Sanchez demonstrates Sanchez was not
serving the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole. Sanchez asserts that the decision to release him on
parole is still “subject to review by the Parole Board” for up to
120 days and that, even if the parole board approves Sanchez’s
parole, the Governor can still reverse that decision. Sanchez also
repeats his argument that “the analysis in [Heard] focuses on the
sentence actually imposed and not subsequent events.”5
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), states: “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
5 Sanchez also notified this court of the court’s decision in
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. The court in Sorto
followed Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and held section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), violates equal protection by denying relief
to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of life
without the possibility of parole. (Sorto, at p. 442.)
6
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” (See
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 845; People v. Sorto
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 443 (Sorto); Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Following the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48,6 the
Legislature enacted former subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170 (now
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)),7 “inspired by concerns
regarding sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders.”
(In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049.) Section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), “provides an avenue for juvenile offenders
serving terms of life without parole to seek recall of their
sentences and resentencing to a term that includes an
opportunity for parole.” (Kirchner, at p. 1049.) “The petition
must include a statement describing the defendant’s remorse,
identifying any work towards rehabilitation, and stating one of
6 In Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 48, the United
States Supreme Court held: “The Constitution prohibits the
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender
who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the
offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it
must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain
release before the end of that term.” (Id. at p. 82.)
7 In 2021 the Legislature renumbered section 1170, former
subdivision (d)(2), as section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
7
four qualifying circumstances is true.” (Sorto, at p. 443; see
Heard, at p. 618.)
“‘Statutory construction begins with the plain,
commonsense meaning of the words in the statute, “‘because it is
generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and
purpose.’” [Citation.] A statute is not to be read in isolation, but
construed in context and ‘“with reference to the whole system of
law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have
effect.”’ [Citation.] ‘“If there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it
said, and we need not resort to legislative history to determine
the statute’s true meaning.”’” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 622-623.) We review questions of statutory interpretation
de novo. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694; Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.)
B. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Sanchez’s Petition
Under Section 1170, Subdivision (d)(1)(A)
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), applies only to juvenile
offenders sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole.” (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 626
[“section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), limits eligibility to petition
for recall and resentencing to juvenile offenders sentenced to an
explicitly designated life without parole term”].) Sanchez, who
did not receive that sentence, argues he is nevertheless eligible
for relief because under Heard his original sentence was
functionally equivalent to a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole.
In Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 the defendant argued
that his prison sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life was the
8
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and
that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), should apply to him;
“a contrary interpretation,” the defendant in Heard asserted,
would violate his constitutional right to equal protection. (Heard,
at p. 612.) The court in Heard held that, even though
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), applies only to juvenile
offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
denying the defendant “the opportunity to petition for
resentencing under this provision violates his right to equal
protection of the laws.” (Heard, at p. 634.) The court rejected the
People’s argument that the Supreme Court in People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 held section 30518 had “reformed” the
defendant’s sentence so that it was no longer the functional
equivalent of life without parole.9 (Heard, at pp. 628-629.) The
court in Heard stated that, “although the retroactive operation of
section 3051 means [the defendant] will receive a youth offender
8 Section 3051 provides the Board of Parole Hearings must
hold a parole hearing for certain juvenile offenders after the
defendant has served 15, 20, or 25 years of his or her sentence,
depending on the defendant’s “controlling offense,” which the
statute defines as “the offense or enhancement for which any
sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.”
(§ 3051, subds. (a), (b); see People v. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 842-843; People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
9 In People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 the Supreme
Court held that section 3051 and related statutes “effectively
reformed” the defendant’s sentence of 50 years to life in prison
and that, by “operation of law,” the defendant’s sentence was “not
functionally equivalent” to a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. (Id. at pp. 286-287.)
9
parole hearing in his 25th year of incarceration, his original
sentence remains binding.” (Id. at p. 629.) The court held that,
notwithstanding the effect of section 3051, the defendant’s
sentence “was a de facto life without parole sentence at the time
it was imposed” and that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A),
refers to the “‘offense for which the defendant was sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole’ (italics
added).” (Id. at p. 629; see Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
p. 448 [“that section 3051 superseded [the defendant’s] sentence
is irrelevant” because “it is enough that he ‘was sentenced’ to the
functional equivalent of” life without the possibility of parole].)
Heard is distinguishable. In Heard the defendant’s
judgment of conviction had not been reversed at the time he
petitioned for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), and
his sentence of more than 80 years to life was still “binding” on
him, even though section 3051 gave him an opportunity for parole
well before the end of his sentence. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629; see People v. Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 278 [“The continued operation of the original
sentence is evident from the fact that an inmate remains bound
by that sentence.”].) In contrast, the sentence that is binding on
Sanchez is 35 years to life, not 60 years to life. Sanchez’s original
sentence no longer exists because we reversed one of his
convictions, which vacated the judgment. (See Hampton v.
Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655 [“[B]y a reversal, the
order or judgment appealed from no longer has any vitality or
force. In effect, the order or judgment appealed from is
vacated.”]; People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 718
[“‘“The effect of an unqualified reversal (‘the judgment is
reversed’) is to vacate the judgment, and to leave the case ‘at
10
large’ for further proceedings as if it had never been tried, and as
if no judgment had ever been rendered.”’”]; see also People v.
McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“In criminal actions, the terms
‘judgment’ and ‘“sentence”’ are generally considered
‘synonymous.’”].) Although section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A),
refers to the defendant’s sentence in the past tense, nothing in
the statute requires the superior court to consider only the first
sentence ever imposed on the defendant, without regard to
whether it survived direct appeal. At the end of the proceedings
in the trial court, Sanchez was sentenced to 35 years to life,
within the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
And not even Sanchez argues a sentence of 35 years to life
is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole. (See People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 949
[defendant’s sentence of 32 years to life “is on its face neither an
actual nor an effective life sentence without the possibility of
parole”]; People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [“by no
stretch of the imagination” can a sentence of 30 years to life “be
called a ‘functional’ or ‘de facto’” term of life without the
possibility of parole]; cf. People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349,
368-369 [sentences of 50 years to life and 58 years to life were
“functionally equivalent” to terms of life without the possibility of
parole because confinement “with no possibility of release until
age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely to allow for the reintegration
that Graham contemplates”]; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 445 [defendant’s sentence of 10 years plus 130 years to life
11
“provided no meaningful opportunity for parole during his
lifetime”].)10
DISPOSITION
The order denying Sanchez’s petition under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), is affirmed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
10
Sanchez asserts that, even if we consider his current
sentence of 35 years to life, “his release is unlikely after that time
period.” Because Sanchez does not develop this argument or cite
any supporting authority, he has forfeited it. (See People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2016) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363; People v.
Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 995, fn. 11; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
12
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