People v. June CA2/6

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Filed 9/26/24 P. v. June CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B326181
(Super. Ct. No. 2021005899)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

GLANDROS JUNE, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Glandros June, Jr., appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of discharge of a firearm with gross negligence
(Pen. Code,1 § 246.3, subd. (a); count 2) in an incident in a
Walmart parking lot, and three counts of assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 9, 10, 11) in an incident a year later at
a tattoo parlor. The jury also found true enhancements of
personal use of a firearm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) for count 2, and
§ 12022.5, subd. (a) for counts 9, 10, 11) and inflicting great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a) for counts 9 and 10), and convicted

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
him of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29805,
subd. (a); counts 3, 12). June pleaded guilty to possession of a
large capacity magazine (§ 32310, subd. (a); count 4), possession
of a firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29805, subd. (a); count 5),
and misdemeanor violations of providing false information to a
peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a); count 6) and resisting a peace
officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 7). June also admitted he was
released on bail during commission of counts 4, 5, 9, 10, and 11 (§
12022.1, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to 21 years in
state prison.
June contends: (1) the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence relevant to self-defense, (2) the prosecution failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence, (3) the trial court erroneously
admitted a jail phone call, (4) cumulative error denied him due
process, (5) the prosecution violated the California Racial Justice
Act of 2020 (RJA; § 745), and (6) the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to strike enhancements. We correct errors in
the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Walmart parking lot shooting
1. Prosecution evidence
Miah O. posted on social media that Neveah T. had drugged
her with methamphetamine. Neveah contacted Miah and
threatened to fight her.2
In February 2021, Neveah and June, who were dating,
entered the wireless store near Walmart in Oxnard where Miah
was working. Neveah threw her hands up to challenge Miah to

2 We refer to victims and witnesses by their initials or first
name and last initial because some have the same last name, and
to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.

2
fight. At Miah’s request, June and Neveah left the store.
Miah phoned her stepmother who was the store manager,
Cristal F. Cristal came to the parking lot outside the store and
told June and Neveah to calm down. Miah’s father and her
boyfriend, Justin H., then came to the parking lot.
June and Justin walked toward each other and they fought.
Cristal told police that June threw the first punch, but she
testified at trial she did not see who swung first. Others joined
the fight and some tried to separate the parties.
June pulled out a handgun and shot Justin in the arm.
June then aimed and fired at “[e]verybody in the crowd.” He ran
away, “air shooting” as he ran. Police recovered seven nine-
millimeter shell casings from the scene.
2. Defendant’s testimony
June testified that Miah falsely accused him and Neveah of
drugging and raping her about a month before the Walmart
parking lot incident. In the following weeks, he and Neveah
received four or five death threats in text messages. One text
said there was a “GREEN LIGHT” on Neveah. A “green light”
means “to attack somebody if you see them.” June also saw that
Neveah received a picture of a gun. June “didn’t think this was
that serious due to the fact that [he] didn’t do what they were
saying [he] did.”
June and Neveah went to the wireless store so Neveah
could talk to Miah, not to fight her. June and Neveah left when
Miah said she was going to call the police. Miah then texted
Neveah to return.
June and Neveah then walked toward the store to talk to
Miah. He said he had a gun with him because there are frequent
shootings and stabbings in Oxnard and he always tried to protect

3
himself. When they got to the parking lot outside the Walmart
store, there were 10 or more people standing outside smiling at
him.
Cristal argued with Neveah in the parking lot. June knew
Cristal was a professional boxer. Justin and Miah’s father got out
of a car and both hit June. June knew Miah’s father was
associated with a gang.
June ran away. He looked back and saw Neveah on the
ground. Justin, Cristal, and one or two other people were
stomping and hitting Neveah. June was concerned he and
Neveah would suffer great bodily injury because he had been “hit
really hard” and she was being beaten by men and a professional
boxer, “plus the previous pictures of guns and threatening me.”
June then shot six or seven times at people to defend Neveah.
3. Verdict
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of
assault with a firearm on Justin (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and that
charge was dismissed. The jury found June guilty of discharge of
a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 2) and
found true a special allegation that he personally used a firearm
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The jury also found him guilty of
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29805; count 3).
Tattoo parlor shooting
1. Prosecution evidence
June has four children with Kendra H. The day after his
birthday in April 2022, June went to a tattoo parlor in Ventura to
get a tattoo. June saw Kendra’s sister-in-law Quisha E., and
Quisha’s sister Quiana E. June believed that Quisha had
previously attempted to get Kendra arrested.
Quisha shook June’s hand and introduced him to Quiana,

4
who also shook his hand. June then got a tattoo that said “stop
snitchin’.” A verbal argument later ensued inside the shop. June
swung at Quisha and Quiana, and they backed up. He then
backed up and shot Quiana and Quisha. Five or six shots were
heard.
A customer, Andrew E., was getting a tattoo when he heard
“aggressive talking.” When he stood up, June shot him three
times. Nobody other than June had a gun.
A car outside was already running during the shooting.
June ran out of the tattoo parlor and jumped into the car, which
sped away.
Quisha suffered a gunshot wound in her right torso.
Quiana suffered gunshot wounds to her gallbladder and colon,
and was hospitalized for eight days. Andrew had bullet wounds
to his stomach and finger. He was in the hospital for 11 days and
could not walk for several weeks.
June was arrested the next day. He had a loaded
nine-millimeter handgun in his front pants pocket and a box of
ammunition. He also had minor injuries to his head and lip. In
the detective’s opinion, the injuries were not consistent with
being attacked by multiple people the day before.
June was also interviewed by police. He said Quiana shook
his hand “really, really hard” and told him he had “a weak-ass
handshake.” The owner of the tattoo parlor, R.W.,3 said he was
from “here and here,” which June interpreted to mean R.W. was
from Ventura Avenue and was “gang-banging” June. June said
Quiana walked by him and he assumed she had a gun. People in
the shop were giving him “weird looks.” He said people had

3 R.W. refers to R.W., Sr.

5
snitched on his “baby mama” and were mad he was getting the
“stop snitchin’ ” tattoo.
June said four to six people attacked him and were
“swinging at” him. Someone hit him in the head with a bottle and
he started bleeding. He said an unknown person then shot a gun.
June said Quiana was right in front of him, and he shot her
in the stomach. He then shot a “big guy” who had hit him earlier.
June said he was defending himself. He said he only fired two
shots. He was not just “spraying rounds,” but shot those who
attacked him. He ran out to a car but did not know whose car it
was or who was driving.
2. Defendant’s testimony
June testified he was upset because Quisha previously lied
about Kendra having a gun while holding a baby and got her
arrested. When June met Quiana at the tattoo parlor, he thought
she was “a really tough girl.” He knew she had just gotten out of
prison but did not think she was a gang member.
While June was getting his tattoo, Quiana passed him
“grabbing her waist like she had a gun.” She said, “What’s up,
fool.”
When a friend of June’s was about to leave the tattoo
parlor, June asked him to stay because “they’re tripping on me.”
Quiana ran up to June with her fists balled and yelled, “Who’s
trippin’?”
People attacked June from the back. Someone broke a
bottle over his head and stabbed him in the head with it.
Someone hit his lip, which caused scars. Someone also shot at
him.
June shot Andrew because Andrew was attacking him.
June shot Quiana because she was trying to hurt him. He feared

6
for his life. He denied shooting Quisha.
3. Verdict
The jury acquitted June of attempted murder of Quiana.
The jury found him guilty of assault with a firearm on Quiana,
Andrew, and Quisha. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 9, 10, 11). The
jury found true special allegations that he personally used a
firearm as to all three counts (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that he
inflicted great bodily injury on Quiana and Andrew (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). The jury also found him guilty of possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29805; count 12).
DISCUSSION
Exclusion of evidence
June contends the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence relevant to his claim of self-defense: a texted
photo of a gun, details of Quiana’s prior gang conviction, and
R.W.’s possession of a gun. We are not persuaded.
1. Photo of gun
June testified that Neveah received a picture of a gun. In
closing argument, the prosecution said the picture of the gun did
not exist and it was “made [up] by the defendant while on the
stand.”
After a full day of jury deliberations, defense counsel
announced he had just received from Kendra a copy of a text
message, purportedly sent by Miah to Neveah, that said in part,
“I can come at u however I want . . . . Ur done.” Accompanying
the text was a picture of a gun. Counsel stated the text exchange
occurred “immediately after the shooting” near Walmart. (Italics
added.) He said he had been in contact with Kendra throughout
the trial and had received pictures introduced at trial from
Kendra and Neveah.

7
Counsel asked to reopen the evidence, or for a mistrial or
new trial. He made an offer of proof that June could testify he
saw this text on Neveah’s phone before his use of force. Counsel
said his office had three investigators working on the case and he
sent the text to the prosecution as soon as he received it.
The prosecution argued that Miah had been released from
her subpoena, and could not be brought back without a long
delay. The prosecution also argued the evidence lacked
foundation because the text did not have a date, the phone
number did not correspond to Miah or Neveah or anyone related
to June, and the text could have been created by Kendra. The
court denied defense counsel’s requests because it shared “some of
the admissibility concerns,” the text should have been obtained
earlier through due diligence, and the “extraordinary measure” of
reopening the evidence was not warranted.
“ ‘A “motion to reopen [is] one addressed to the [trial]
court’s sound discretion.” [Citation.] In determining whether an
abuse of discretion occurred, the reviewing court considers four
factors: “ ‘(1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the
motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in
presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would
accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance
of the evidence.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Masters (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1019, 1069; see §§ 1093, 1094.)
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. A request to
reopen after a day of deliberations is “an extremely late stage in
the proceedings.” (People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506,
1520.) The defense was in contact with Kendra and Neveah
throughout the trial and, in light of the testimony about the text,
could have requested it earlier. If the court had interrupted

8
deliberations to present this one piece of evidence, the jury would
likely accord it undue importance. And even if June were able to
establish a foundation for the evidence, it “was far from critical”
(id. at p. 1521) in light of the issues regarding its source, defense
counsel’s representation that the text exchange occurred
“immediately after the shooting,” and June’s admission he “didn’t
think this was that serious.”
2. Details of gang prior
June contends the trial court erred by not allowing detailed
evidence regarding Quiana’s prior gang conviction to support his
claim of self-defense when he shot multiple people at the tattoo
parlor.
Gang Detective Anthony Reginato initially testified for the
prosecution that neither Quisha nor Quiana were gang members
or associates. But when recalled by the defense, Reginato
testified he had not previously reviewed reports of Quiana’s 2011
Ventura County conviction for second degree robbery with a gang
allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), her Santa Barbara County
conviction for assault for the benefit of a gang and being a gang
member, or photographs of Quisha and Quiana flashing gang
signs. After defense counsel had him review those documents,
Reginato testified the convictions were too old to change his
opinion, but based on the photographs, he now believed Quisha
and Quiana were Ventura Avenue gang associates.
The defense sought to question Reginato about facts from
the 2011 Ventura County case, i.e., that Quiana attacked
someone for badmouthing the gang and said, “Ventura Avenue
gangsters, don’t fuck with us.” The trial court excluded it based
on the age of the incident and the absence of evidence June was
aware of it.

9
The court may exclude evidence if “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) We review the
exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Montes
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 869.)
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. Detailed
evidence regarding Quiana’s prior gang conviction was not
relevant to June’s claimed need for self-defense because he was
not aware of it. Thus, Quiana’s statements in the 2011 case had
little if any probative value because they “had no connection” to
June’s conduct on the day of the crimes. (People v. Albarran
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 227 [gang members’ prior threats to
kill police officers irrelevant to charged crimes against others].)
3. R.W.’s gun possession
During jury selection, the defense learned information from
June’s mother, documented in an email. June’s mother said she
overheard part of a conversation between R.W. and a prosecutor
in the back of a courtroom. R.W. reportedly asked why he had to
come back to court and asked, “Just because I had a gun in the
drawer?” June’s mother said the prosecutor responded
“something to the effect of not to talk about it or to come back
here.”
Four days after the email, R.W. testified he did not have a
gun during the tattoo parlor shooting. The defense did not
question him about the purported courtroom conversation. Four
days after that, the defense forwarded the email to the
prosecutor.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense sought to

10
recall R.W. to inquire about the comment, both to impeach his
credibility, and to support June’s claim that he acted in
self-defense because he said he saw a gun. The prosecutor told
the court she spoke to R.W. in the back of a courtroom about
three weeks before trial. He did not want to be ordered back to
court, but she did not hear him say anything about a gun in a
drawer. She added that if the statement were admitted into
evidence, she would need to testify that he did not say that.
The court denied the request to recall R.W. The court noted
R.W.’s credibility had already “been impeached plenty,” and the
presence of a gun in a drawer that June was not aware of would
not support his claim of self-defense.
June’s only claim that he saw a gun pertained to Quiana,
and he later admitted he just assumed she had one. We agree
that whether R.W. had a gun in a drawer at some point, or said
he did, was of limited probative value. In our view, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 352; People v. Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 869.)
Failure to disclose evidence
June contends he was denied due process because the
prosecution failed to disclose its purported conversation with
R.W. about a gun in a drawer. We disagree.
Due process is violated by the prosecution’s suppression of
material exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor or
investigators acting on the government’s behalf, with or without a
request by the accused. (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83,
87; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.) “[A] violation
occurs ‘ “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it]
been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been
different,” i.e., “ ‘a probability sufficient to “undermine[]

11
confidence in the outcome” on the part of the reviewing court.’ ”
(Salazar, at p. 1050.)
June has not shown a Brady violation because the record
does not establish that “the prosecutor knew, or should have
known,” of the purported statement. (People v. Whalen (2013) 56
Cal.4th 1, 67.) On the contrary, the prosecutor stated she heard
no such statement.
Moreover, there was no suppression of evidence because the
statement from June’s mother was disclosed during the trial, “ ‘at
a time when the disclosure would be of value to the accused.’ ”
(People v. Superior Court (Meraz) (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 28, 51;
People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 467.) June’s
mother’s statement was disclosed before the prosecution called
R.W. as a witness, and could have been used for cross-
examination. It does not matter for Brady purposes that the
defense received the evidence from a source other than the
prosecution because the evidence was “in [the] defendant’s
possession.” (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1049.)
Jail phone call
June contends the court abused its discretion in admitting a
recording of a portion of a telephone call he made from jail to a
friend which undermined his claim of self-defense. We are not
persuaded.
In the recording, June said: “ ‘Cause, uh, ‘cause, uh, I
brought the gun. Bagged some shit in there like, oh, you can’t—
so, say I start a problem with somebody and then, you know, and
I fuckin’ kick those n----s and they hit me back and I pull out a
gun or whatever. And then, dude, you know that, that, that’s not
self-defense because I started it. You know. But, uh, that’s,
that’s my case like, um, I was reading some like

12
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) What the fuck? Like that’s what people do,
though.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. In our view,
June’s statement was probative to the claim of self-defense, was
not inflammatory, did not suggest June committed other offenses,
and was not unduly prejudicial. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v.
Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035.)
Nor was the statement inadmissible because it was
ambiguous. June testified he consistently told friends and family
he acted in self-defense. He denied he “start[ed] something” or
struck the first blow. He also said he was speaking
“hypothetically” based on cases in the law library. It was the
jury’s role to evaluate the conflicting interpretations and
determine the meaning of June’s statements. (People v. Kraft,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1035.)
June also contends the statement was taken out of context.
(See Evid. Code, § 356.) We disagree because June does not claim
the trial court refused to admit other statements or portions of
statements that would provide such context.
Cumulative error
June contends that cumulative errors constitute prejudicial
error. We disagree because we conclude June received due
process and a fair trial. (People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
1410, 1436.)
Racial Justice Act
June is Black. He contends the prosecutor violated the RJA
when during trial she referred to the mother of his children as his
“baby mama,” and during sentencing proceedings described his
conduct in the shootings as “wilding.”
The RJA prohibits a conviction or sentence based on race,

13
ethnicity, or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) A violation may
be shown if during trial an attorney “used racially discriminatory
language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin,
or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin,
whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
During closing argument, the prosecutor said June was
upset because Miah posted on social media that June and Neveah
drugged and raped her. The prosecutor said, “That’s telling the
world something that happened that the defendant didn’t want
the world to hear about his girlfriend. Not his baby mama. His
girlfriend Neveah.”
The prosecutor also referred to Kendra as “baby mama,”
outside the presence of the jury, while arguing the admissibility
of an audio recording that referred to her being put into custody.
The prosecutor used the phrase a third time, again outside the
presence of the jury, when she opposed the defense request to
introduce the text message containing the photograph of the gun.
She said, “So for all we know, it was baby mama who provided
this, Kendra, to the defense.” The defense did not object in any of
these instances.
June’s sentencing brief stated he was “a family man” who
“lives for his fiancée and children.” At the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor responded: “Well, if he had chosen to spend time
with his family instead of wilding with Neveah in the Walmart
parking lot, we wouldn’t be here. If he had chosen to spend his
birthday with his then pregnant girlfriend [Kendra] instead of
drinking and wilding in Ventura with his getaway driver and five
friends, we wouldn’t be here. Now that he’s being held
responsible for his actions, his family becomes of great

14
importance, his fiancee becomes the center of his attention. But
that wasn’t the case when he was committing crimes.”
Defense counsel said, “the way the DA is saying the word
‘wilding’ . . . is offensive and racist in my opinion.” The
prosecutor responded that “wilding” was “what the defendant did
. . . [he] wasn’t simply going and smacking someone. He shot at
multiple times at multiple people at multiple venues.”
Defense counsel did not file a motion in the trial court to
claim a violation of the RJA, as provided in section 745,
subdivisions (b) and (c). Defense counsel’s only references to the
RJA were for sentencing, i.e., conclusory statements that multiple
enhancements would have a discriminatory racial impact, and a
claim that the punishment was cruel and unusual.
We conclude June forfeited his claim under the RJA. “[T]he
Legislature did not intend to allow a defendant to pursue [an
RJA] claim for the first time on direct appeal where it could have
been but was not raised in the trial court.” (People v. Lashon
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 813; People v. Singh (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 76, 112-116 (Singh).) Had June made a timely
motion showing a prima facie violation, the trial court would have
held a hearing at which it could consider expert testimony and
other evidence (§ 745, subd. (c)) and “allow the parties to fully
litigate the issue” (Lashon, at p. 814).
We also conclude that June’s failure to file a motion
pursuant to the RJA did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. A defendant alleging ineffective assistance must prove
(1) deficient performance, and (2) resulting prejudice. (Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) We need not address
both prongs of this test. If a defendant fails to establish either
prong, the claim should be denied. (Id. at p. 697.)

15
To show prejudice, June must show a “reasonable
probability” that a motion filed pursuant to the RJA would have
been granted. (Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 118, 120.)
But because the record below was not sufficiently developed
(§ 745, subd. (c)(1)), we cannot speculate as to whether the trial
court would have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the prosecutor’s statements “exhibited bias or animus towards
the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin,” or was a use of “racially discriminatory language
about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745,
subds. (a)(1) & (2), (c)(2), (h)(4); Singh, at p. 117.) June’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
Sentencing enhancements
June contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
failed to strike the sentencing enhancements. We disagree.
The court sentenced June to the low term of two years for
count 9, and consecutive terms of one year each for counts 10 and
11, and eight months each for counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 12. The court
imposed the low term enhancement of three years for personal
use of a firearm for count 9, and consecutive terms of 16 months
each for two other firearm enhancements. The court imposed a
total of four years consecutive for great bodily injury allegations
and four years for on-bail enhancements. No additional time was
imposed for the misdemeanors (counts 6 and 7).
Section 1385 enables trial courts to dismiss enhancements
in furtherance of justice. Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), which was in effect at the time of
sentencing, requires the court to “consider and afford great
weight” to certain mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these

16
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (Ibid.) We review denial of a motion to dismiss
sentence enhancements for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.)
June contends several mitigating circumstances required
the court to dismiss the enhancements: discriminatory racial
impact, multiple enhancements, enhancements could result in a
sentence exceeding 20 years, mental illness, and childhood
trauma. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(E).)
Although June’s sentencing memorandum stated that
imposition of enhancements would have a discriminatory racial
impact, he made no showing that the sentence was “longer or
more severe” than that “imposed on similarly situated individuals
convicted of the same offense.” (§§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B), 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(A).) Counsel’s anecdotal examples about the race of
defendants he and his associates recently defended did not
establish a violation of the RJA.
Despite the seemingly mandatory language that multiple
enhancements beyond a single enhancement (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(B)) or enhancements that could result in a sentence of over
20 years (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)) “shall be dismissed,” the trial
court retained discretion to impose the enhancements if dismissal
would endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239-241, review granted
Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 291, 296-297.) The trial court here found that dismissal of

17
enhancements “would endanger public safety as the defendant is
not only a threat to the multiple people he shot in this case but
the public at large as well.” This finding is supported by
substantial evidence, including June’s prohibited possession of
firearms, and his shooting of four unarmed individuals in two
unrelated incidents, with the second incident occurring while on
bail.
June also contends the enhancements should have been
dismissed because “[t]he current offense is connected to mental
illness.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D).) Although he did not cite this
provision in the trial court, he presented documentation that
mentioned depression. He also contends “[t]he current offense is
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(E).) June’s parents separated when he was five and
he was raised in unsafe neighborhoods by a single mother who
was often absent. He began using marijuana and alcohol during
adolescence. He was attacked at age 14, “which left him with a
damaged shoulder and trauma stemming from his perceived
inability to defend himself and by extension his mother and loved
ones.” Even if June were able to show these factors were
connected to his commission of the offenses, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the enhancements based on
substantial evidence of his risk to public safety.
Absent a clear showing that the trial court’s refusal to
dismiss an enhancement was “irrational or arbitrary,” we
presume the court “ ‘ “acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) An abuse of
discretion may occur where the trial court is not aware of its

18
discretion, considers impermissible factors, fails to consider
relevant factors, or where the decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it. (Id. at pp. 377-
378.) No such showing has been made here.
Abstract of judgment
Without opposition, respondent requests correction of the
abstract of judgment. The minute order shows $700 due for
unspecified “Fees,” but the abstract does not specify the
mandatory imposition of a court facilities assessment of $300
(Gov. Code, § 70373) and a court operations assessment of $400
(§ 1465.8, subd. (a)). We order the abstract corrected to reflect
these fees, and to show that he was convicted of counts 4 and 5 by
plea rather than by jury. (§ 1260.)
DISPOSITION
We order the abstract of judgment to be corrected to show a
$300 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) and a $400
court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and to show
that June was convicted of counts 4 and 5 by plea. The trial court
shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and send a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.

19
David M. Hirsch, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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