People v. Gadson CA4/3

CourtListener 10125266Calctapp26 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Gadson CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062768

v. (Super. Ct. No. FMB22000236)

WOLFGANG OLIVER GADSON, OPINION
JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Rodney A. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with
directions.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted Gadson of 10 counts of oral copulation with a
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child under 10 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1–10), and
two counts of lewd acts with a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 11
& 12). The information also alleged 10 circumstances in aggravation,
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
The prosecution alleged two of the incidents of oral copulation,
charged as counts 1 and 10, occurred on separate occasions in the garage of
Gadson’s home on Breezy Lane. Gadson argues the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction on count 10. We disagree and conclude there was
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substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt on that count.
Gadson also argues the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the upper term on count 12. We find no abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Gadson further argues, and the Attorney General agrees, at the
time of sentencing, the trial court erred in awarding pre-sentence custody
credits. We therefore modify the judgment to correct this error and award

1
All undesignated statutory references are to this code.

2
Because we conclude Gadson’s conviction of count 10 was
supported by substantial evidence, we decline to address his alternative
argument that, even if count 10 could be based on an unspecified act which
occurred in the garage of the family’s former home on Keats Avenue, such
evidence was insufficient.

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Gadson 1,161 days of actual custody credit and 174 days of conduct credit, for
a total of 1,335 days of credit. We affirm the judgment as so modified, and
remand for the trial court to prepare amended abstracts of judgment.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2016, Gadson’s then four-year-old daughter, Jane Doe, asked
her mother (Mother), “‘what is the white stuff that comes out of daddy?’”
When Mother asked Jane Doe for more details, Jane Doe said something
about “itching” Gadson, and that his white stuff was in her mouth and she
would spit it out.
When Mother confronted Gadson, he admitted Jane Doe caught
him masturbating and he invited her to help him. He also told Mother he had
been sexually abused by his father as a child. Gadson apologized and
promised it would not happen again. Mother believed Gadson and did not
report his sexual abuse of Jane Doe at that time.
In August 2019, Jane Doe, who was then seven years old, and her
younger brother witnessed Mother giving Gadson oral sex in their bedroom.
Jane Doe told Mother she was jealous of Mother because that was what Jane
Doe did for Gadson. When questioned by Mother, Jane Doe told Mother that
had happened multiple times when she was between the ages of four and
seven years old. Mother again confronted Gadson; he initially stated Jane
Doe was lying, but then admitted Jane Doe was telling the truth and he was
sick. Mother called 9-1-1 to report Gadson, telling the dispatcher about the
molestation incidents in 2016 and 2019.

3
Our factual and procedural history is limited to provide context
relevant to the issues presented in this appeal.

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I.
THE CHARGED COUNTS AND EVIDENCE AS TO COUNT 10
Gadson was charged in an information with ten counts of oral
copulation with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1–
10), and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14
(§ 288, subd. (a); counts 11 & 12). At the time of trial, the prosecution elected
the facts supporting each of the twelve counts, rather than providing the jury
with generic testimony and an instruction requiring unanimity. (See e.g.,
People v. Archer (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 197, 202–203.)
Relevant to this appeal, count 10 alleged Jane Doe orally
copulated Gadson in the Breezy Lane Garage. This allegation was identified
as “Breezy Lane Garage #2” in the jury verdict forms for count 10 and was
argued by the prosecution as the second occurrence of oral copulation by Jane
Doe in the garage at the Breezy Lane home. (Some capitalization and
boldface omitted.) The other alleged incident of oral copulation by Jane Doe
in the garage at the Breezy Lane home, alleged in count 1 of the information,
was identified as “Breezy Lane Garage #1” in the jury verdict forms. (Some
capitalization and boldface omitted.)
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Jane Doe and Mother.
Recordings of Mother’s 9-1-1 call in August 2019, Mother’s and Gadson’s
statements to police, and Jane Doe’s initial statement to police and forensic
interview, were also played for the jury.
A. Mother’s Statements to Law Enforcement
In her initial interview with a sheriff’s deputy in response to her
9-1-1 call in August 2019, Mother stated Jane Doe told her she orally
copulated Gadson in the Breezy Lane garage while Mother was in the house
drinking coffee. According to Jane Doe, on that occasion, Gadson sent her

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brother to the shed to find toys to keep him away from the garage. Mother
stated she remembered a time when she was drinking coffee and Gadson sent
their son to the shed to retrieve toys. When asked how long ago this occurred,
Mother estimated that it was “[m]aybe two or three months ago.”
Later in the same interview, Mother stated Jane Doe “told [her]
about the two incidents in the garage.” Mother did not specify whether both
of these “two incidents” occurred at the garage on Breezy Lane or whether
they involved oral copulation. When asked about which incidents occurred at
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their prior home on Keats Avenue, Mother said Jane Doe told her “it”
happened in the parents’ bedroom, Jane Doe’s room, the living room, and the
garage. Mother stated, “[Jane Doe] told [her] that it happened once in the
garage at Keats.”
During a follow up interview approximately two weeks later,
Mother again said Jane Doe told her, “It happened twice in the garage.”
However, Mother did not specify whether both incidents were in the garage
at Breezy Lane or whether one occurred at Keats Avenue.
B. Jane Doe’s Statements to Law Enforcement, Statements to a Forensic
Interviewer, and Trial Testimony
Jane Doe was initially interviewed by a responding sheriff’s
deputy and later by a forensic interviewer at the local Children’s Assessment

4
Jane Doe and her family lived in two different residences which
were used at trial to identify the allegations in each count. The first residence
was on Keats Avenue and the second on Breezy Lane.

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Jane Doe called what happened during these incidents “itching”
and “itching him,” but at the time Mother stated she did not know what that
meant.

5
Center (CAC). In her initial interview with the sheriff’s deputy, she said she
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would “itch” Gadson. She indicated she has done this probably 20 times. She
reported this happening in the kitchen, the living room, and “probably” her
bedroom. She said one time it happened while they were in the living room of
their house on Keats Avenue. Jane Doe also told the deputy Gadson had
orally copulated her in her brother’s bedroom.
In Jane Doe’s interview at the CAC, she described rubbing
Gadson’s penis in her parents’ bedroom closet, and orally copulating Gadson
in a car parked in the driveway and in the kitchen at their Keats Avenue
home. When asked about a time she remembered the most, Jane Doe
responded, “[t]hat was in the closet. I think – oh, and I remember at Keats, it
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was in the garage!” She said it’s happened in her room, in the garage, and in
her parent’s room at the Breezy Lane home. She also reported one time
Gadson put honey on his “[p]rivate” so she “would want to do it.” Jane Doe
said Gadson placed his mouth on her vagina in her brother’s room. On one
occasion, she recalled being in the garage and she thinks Gadson “tricked
[her] brother to go into the shed and get him some toys.”
At the time of Gadson’s trial, Jane Doe was in the fifth grade.
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Jane Doe, “where at the
house on Breezy [Lane] did the inappropriate touching take place for that
last time?” Jane Doe replied, “Um, well, there was a couple of times.” She
then elaborated, “So one of the times was in the garage. Another one of the

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By “itch,” Doe described her orally copulating and masturbating
Gadson.

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The forensic interviewer did not ask any follow-up questions
regarding this latter incident.

6
times was in the bathroom. And another one of those times we were in my
room. And another one of those times we were in my brother’s room. And
another one of those times we were in the garage and in the living room. And
I think it might have been in the kitchen too.”
The prosecutor then asked Jane Doe whether the touching in the
Breezy Lane garage involved oral copulation; Jane Doe answered in the
affirmative. Later, the prosecutor asked, “I think I heard you say ‘garage’ two
times. So I want to make sure I don’t get anything wrong. [¶] Were there two
times that the inappropriate thing happened in the garage?” Jane Doe
replied, “Once.” The prosecutor inquired again, “Just once?” and Jane Doe
nodded affirmatively. The prosecutor asked if the garage incident at Breezy
Lane was when Jane Doe’s “dad had, um, sent [her brother] out to get some
dog toys?” Jane Doe replied, “Yes.” When asked if there was an incident of
oral copulation which occurred in the garage at Keats Avenue, Jane Doe
stated, “That wasn’t in the garage at Keats. That was the garage on Breezy
Lane.”
C. Gadson’s Police Interviews
When sheriff’s deputies arrived at Gadson’s home on Breezy Lane
in August 2019, Gadson spoke to one of them in his driveway. Gadson told
the deputy of an initial incident involving Jane Doe in 2016 at Gadson’s home
on Keats Avenue. Jane Doe had walked into her bedroom where Gadson was
masturbating. When Gadson told Jane Doe he was “itching myself,” she
asked if she could help. Jane Doe put her hand on Gadson’s penis and
“rubbed [it] up and down” for a minute before he told her he could finish it

7
himself. After he “finished, [he] cleaned up and went about [his] business,”
while Jane Doe laughed and ran out of the room.
Gadson told the deputy another incident occurred in November
2018, when he was masturbating in the garage at the home on Breezy Lane.
Jane Doe walked into the garage and “asked to help.” Jane Doe asked, “if she
could do what mommy was doin[g]” and orally copulated Gadson until he
ejaculated into her mouth. Gadson told the deputy he was molested by his
father and his father’s friend when he was between the ages of four and seven
years old. Gadson also told the deputy about an incident the evening before
the date of the police interview. He said, prior to the children watching a
movie, Jane Doe came into the garage where Gadson was, and Gadson sent
his son to the shed to get toys.
At the sheriff’s station, Gadson admitted to two incidents, one of
which occurred in Jane Doe’s bedroom at the Breezy Lane home in 2016 and
the other in the garage at the Breezy Lane home in 2018. In this interview,
Gadson said he told his son to get toys from the shed during the second
incident. Gadson denied any other instances of sexual abuse.
IV.
JURY VERDICT AND SENTENCING
The jury found Gadson guilty on all counts as charged in the
information. After Gadson admitted he took advantage of a position of trust
or confidence to commit the offenses within the meaning of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), the remaining aggravating factors alleged in the
information were dismissed. The court imposed an indeterminate prison term
of 150 years to life by imposing a term of 15 years to life on each of counts 1
through 10. The court also imposed a consecutive determinate prison term of

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10 years, by imposing the upper term of eight years on count 11 and a
consecutive term of two years on count 12.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY VERDICT OF
GUILTY ON COUNT 10
The prosecution alleged two of the 10 counts of oral copulation of
a minor, counts 1 and 10, occurred on two separate occasions in the garage of
Gadson’s home on Breezy Lane. Gadson acknowledges there was legally
sufficient evidence to support his conviction of count 1 but contends the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on count 10.
A. Standard of Review
“‘“‘“[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”’”’” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) The
standard is the same under the state and federal due process clauses. (People
v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.) “We presume ‘“in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier [of fact] could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.” [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or
circumstantial evidence is involved.’” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1179, 1251.) We must accept logical inferences the jury might have drawn
from that evidence. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
Unless it is clearly shown that “‘on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support the verdict,’” the conviction will not be
reversed. (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)

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B. Analysis
Gadson contends there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial
to prove two separate acts of oral copulation occurred in the garage on Breezy
Lane. We disagree.
The record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s
verdict on count 10. A reasonable jury could conclude, from Gadson’s
statements to police, Mother’s trial testimony, and Mother’s two separate
statements to police, in which she reported Jane Doe told her there were “two
garage incidents,” that both crimes occurred in the garage at the Breezy Lane
home.
Gadson admitted to police Jane Doe orally copulated him in the
Breezy Lane garage in November 2018 after Jane Doe walked in on him
masturbating. In this same police interview, Gadson told police about an
incident the evening of August 3, 2019, when prior to the children watching a
movie, Jane Doe came into the garage where Gadson was. During that
incident, Gadson sent his son to the shed to get toys.
Mother testified the family moved from Keats Avenue to Breezy
Lane in 2016. Mother stated she remembered a time when Gadson had called
Jane Doe to the garage and sent their son to the shed to get toys. She said
this incident occurred “two or three months” prior to her 9-1-1 call and before
their puppies were born on June 3, 2019.
During Mother’s first interview and follow-up interview with the
deputy sheriff, as well as during her trial testimony, Mother reported Jane
Doe told her there were two incidents in the garage. Although Jane Doe
testified to only one incident of oral copulation in the Breezy Lane garage
when Gadson sent her brother to the shed for toys, there was other evidence

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from which a reasonable jury could find there were two separate incidents of
oral copulation in the Breezy Lane garage.
Moreover, the jury’s question to the court during its deliberations
regarding the evidence required to find Gadson guilty of count 10
demonstrates it was aware it had to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence of two separate incidents of oral copulation in the Breezy Lane
garage. The jury inquired: “Charge #10 (Garage #2), happened at Keats, or at
Breezy? Evidence reference?” The court responded, “Answer 1A: Refer to the
‘possible verdicts’ forms as it relates to Count 10. [¶] Answer 1B: Refer to the
testimony received during trial and/or exhibits submitted to the jury.” Both
possible jury verdict forms for count 10 clearly identified the underlying basis
for this count as “Breezy Lane Garage #2.” (Some capitalization and boldface
omitted.) After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt there were two separate instances of oral
copulation in the Breezy Lane garage. Such a finding was supported by the
substantial evidence discussed ante. To the extent Gadson argues count 10
was based on an unspecified incident in the garage of the Keats Avenue
home, the express language of the jury’s verdict form on count 10 alone
dispels that notion.
II.
IMPOSITION OF THE UPPER TERM ON COUNT 12
Gadson next argues the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the upper term on count 12 after erroneously rejecting evidence of
his childhood trauma and by impermissibly considering Gadson’s statement
the court did not have jurisdiction over him. For the reasons we explain, we
find no abuse of discretion.

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A. Factual Background
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170 was amended to limit the
court’s sentencing discretion and to require the imposition of the lower term
in certain circumstances. Section 1170 as so amended now provides the court
“shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6).) “[T]his provision establishes a presumption of the lower term if the
defendant’s [childhood trauma] was ‘a contributing factor’ in his or her
commission of the crime ‘unless the court finds the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.’” (People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.) Consequently, the imposition of the upper
term is no longer permitted unless there are aggravating circumstances, and
“the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
In his sentencing brief, Gadson presented several factors in
mitigation, including a history of sexual abuse by his father and his father’s
friend when Gadson was a young child. Gadson alleged his victimization,
together with physical violence and other childhood trauma, “was a
contributing factor” in his sexual abuse of Jane Doe within the meaning of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Gadson’s psychological evaluation, which was
submitted to the court at his sentencing hearing, indicated Gadson’s
childhood physical and sexual abuse “appear[ed] to [have] contributed
directly” to Gadson’s molestation of Jane Doe.

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The court allowed Gadson to speak at the sentencing hearing. In
response, Gadson said the court lacked jurisdiction because the gold fringed
flag in the courtroom meant it was a maritime court without jurisdiction over
criminal matters. The court replied it would not engage “in a conversation as
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it relates to [Gadson’s] sovereign citizen malarkey.” When the court asked
whether Gadson had anything further to say, Gadson stated, “No, sir.”
In its sentencing determination, the trial court first noted it felt
“horrible for Mr. Gadson having suffered through such a traumatic
childhood.” However, the court stated, “this trial was about what Mr. Gadson
subjected his bright, intelligent, and beautiful child to for several years. She
will likely suffer long-term psychological effects from those years of Mr.
Gadson’s cruel and despicable sexual abuse.”
The court went on to state: “When a father commits years of
sexual abuse against his own child, that child needs the protection that her
own father was unable to provide her as he was the one perpetrating the
harm upon her. Should this court not impose a harsh and lengthy sentence,
Jane Doe would then just be known as the first of more of Mr. Gadson’s
victims. [¶] For that reason, and based on the 12 felony convictions, Mr.
Gadson will not ever be put in a position of harming another child, let alone
one of his own.”
The court then stated it would not exercise its discretion to grant
probation, citing multiple aggravating factors, pursuant to California Rules of

8
The court’s use of the word “malarkey” was probably
unnecessary. As pointed out in Gadson’s opening brief, “[t]he Sovereign
Citizen movement is an anti-government movement which has been
successful in convincing defendants that courts generally lack jurisdiction for
legally frivolous reasons.”

13
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Court, rule 4.414, including that the crime involved great violence, great
bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, and acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, and callousness. The court further determined the victim
was vulnerable; the manner in which the crime was carried out indicated
planning, sophistication, or professionalism; and Gadson took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence.
The court also stated it found Gadson’s request to find the crimes
connected to his childhood trauma “uncompelling” and declined to make such
a finding, noting when Gadson addressed the court, he only spoke about his
“sovereign citizen beliefs about the court lacking jurisdiction” rather than
expressing remorse. Regarding count 11, the court found the aggravated term
of eight years appropriate because Gadson admitted he took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.
B. Standard of Review
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters involving
probation and sentencing. (People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173,
179.) The party challenging a decision to grant or deny probation bears the
burden of establishing the court abused its discretion. (Ibid.) “The trial
court’s sentencing discretion must be exercised in a manner that is not
arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the
law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized consideration of the offense,
the offender, and the public interest.’” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th

9
“In determining the suitability of the defendant for probation,
the court may consider factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether or not
the factors have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.414(c).)

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825, 847.) “‘“In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
review.”’” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)
C. Analysis
“[N]othing in section 1170(b)(2) prohibits the court from imposing
an upper term sentence based on a single, properly proven aggravating
circumstance if, in the court’s discretion, that circumstance alone justifies a
sentencing exceeding the middle term.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, 764.) Here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s requirements justifying the
imposition of an upper term sentence were satisfied because Gadson
stipulated he took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the
offenses. Gadson abused his position of trust as Jane Doe’s father by
repeatedly molesting her starting when she was four years old. As the court
noted at the sentencing hearing, Jane Doe was abused by the person whose
duty as a father was to protect her. Thus, the trial court was within its
discretion to impose the upper term based solely on this one aggravating
circumstance.
III.
PRE-SENTENCE CREDITS
Gadson contends the trial court erred by failing to award him
1,161 days of actual custody credit and 174 days of conduct credit, for a total
of 1,335 days of credit. We agree.
Gadson was arrested on August 4, 2019, and sentenced on
October 7, 2022. However, the probation report erroneously lists Gadson’s
arrest date as June 6, 2022. Although the trial court did not orally address
Gadson’s entitlement to actual and conduct credits at the sentencing hearing,

15
both the indeterminate and determinate abstracts of judgment awarded
Gadson a total of only 142 days of credit, consisting of 124 days of actual
custody credit and 18 days of conduct credit, presumably based upon the
erroneous arrest date.
An incorrect award of presentence custody credits is an
unauthorized sentence which may be corrected at any time. (People v. Gisbert
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.) The Attorney General concedes Gadson is
entitled to presentence credits from the date of his arrest on August 4, 2019,
through the day of his sentencing on October 7, 2022. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a);
People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 394.)
We therefore modify the judgment to reflect the correct award of
1,161 days of actual custody credit and 174 days of conduct credit, for a total
of 1,335 days of credit, pursuant to section 2933.1, subdivision (c).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to provide Gadson an award of 1,161
days of actual custody credit and 174 days of conduct credit, for a total of
1,335 days of credit. The trial court is directed to prepare amended
indeterminate and determinate abstracts of judgment reflecting the correct
presentence credit award and is further directed to forward certified copies of
the amended abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

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In all other respects, and as so modified, the judgment is
affirmed.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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