People v. Briggs CA1/4

CourtListener 10125077Calctapp25 set 2024

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Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Briggs CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168609
v.
RONNIE LYNN BRIGGS, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 04-22-
Defendant and
01209)
Appellant.

Defendant Ronnie Lynn Briggs was found incompetent to
stand trial and committed to the Department of State Hospitals
(the Department). The trial court determined that Briggs lacked
the capacity to decide whether to take antipsychotic drugs, and,
without the drugs, he would likely suffer serious harm to his
physical or mental health. The court accordingly ordered Briggs
to be involuntarily medicated under Penal Code1 section 1370,
subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I). Briggs argues that the court’s order is
not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
After Briggs was found incompetent to stand trial and
committed to the Department, the Department filed a petition for

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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an order to compel involuntary treatment of Briggs with
antipsychotic medication under the procedures set forth in
section 1370, subdivisions (a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(D).2 The petition
included the required certification from Briggs’s treating
psychiatrist, who certified that involuntary medication was
required and warranted under section 1370,
subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I) and (II). The petition followed an
August 2, 2023 medication review hearing, at which an
administrative law judge ordered that temporary involuntary
antipsychotic medication be administered to Briggs.
The trial court held a hearing on the Department’s petition
and heard testimony from Briggs’s treating psychiatrist at
Atascadero State Hospital, Dr. Joshua Deane. The court
qualified Deane as an expert in psychiatric treatment of medical
illness, and Deane testified that his job entailed taking care of
patients in the units at the hospital, diagnosing their problems,
and prescribing proper medication to improve their mental state.
After hearing Deane’s testimony and argument from counsel, the
court granted the petition and ordered Briggs to be involuntarily
medicated under section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I). Briggs
filed a timely appeal.

2 These provisions allow for the filing of a petition to obtain

an order authorizing the involuntary treatment of a defendant
committed to the Department with antipsychotic medication
where the defendant previously consented to antipsychotic
medication but later withdrew such consent or where the treating
psychiatrist determines that antipsychotic medication has
become medically necessary and appropriate. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(C)–(D).)

2
DISCUSSION
Individuals have a qualified constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic medication under the federal and state
constitutions. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14–16.) Our
Legislature has amended section 1370 to meet modern
constitutional standards related to involuntary medication orders
for defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial and committed
to the Department. (People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
381, 396; § 1370, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (a)(2)(B) permits
involuntary medication in three circumstances. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I-III).) The trial court here made factual
findings under the first of these provisions, which requires that:
“[1] the defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding
antipsychotic medication, [2] the defendant’s mental disorder
requires medical treatment with antipsychotic medication, and
[3] if the defendant’s mental disorder is not treated with
antipsychotic medication, it is probable that serious harm to the
physical or mental health of the defendant will result.” (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).) The question for us is whether the record
contains substantial evidence from which the trial court could
have found it highly probable that the requisite facts were true
(the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof). (People v.
Garcia (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1054 (Garcia).)3 It does.

3 The parties agree that clear and convincing evidence is

the applicable standard of proof, so we assume for purposes of
this opinion that this standard applies. (See Garcia, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054, fn. 2.)

3
Briggs disputes only the trial court’s finding of probable
serious harm to his health. Under the statute, “Probability of
serious harm to the physical or mental health of the defendant
requires evidence that the defendant is presently suffering
adverse effects to their physical or mental health, or the
defendant has previously suffered these effects as a result of a
mental disorder and their condition is substantially
deteriorating. The fact that a defendant has a diagnosis of a
mental disorder does not alone establish probability of serious
harm to the physical or mental health of the defendant.” (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).)
The evidence was sufficient to support the order. Deane
opined that Briggs suffered from schizophrenia. When asked to
describe Briggs’s “active symptoms” Deane said, “He is very
delusional. Demonstrates disorganization, illogical thinking,
very poor judgment.” Briggs was under the belief that he was
sent to the hospital solely because he had difficulty with a “chief
police” who stole Briggs’s supplemental security income. Deane
had increased Briggs’s dose of medication a week before the
hearing, and Briggs thereafter was able to sit down and talk with
the doctor without displaying “any threatening behavior or
becom[ing] agitated.” Previously, Briggs was “very loud, in a
sense, belligerent,” and the hospital had to have a team with
Briggs, who demanded to make many calls, including to NASA.
After his dose increase, Briggs was able to sleep through the
night without yelling in his room, he was “cordial enough to get
along without the violence,” and he was less agitated, demanding,

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and aggressive. Briggs’s delusional beliefs nonetheless
continued. For example, on the day of the hearing, Briggs told
Deane that a hospital social worker’s husband was the cousin of
the “chief police” who stole Briggs’s money and conspired to send
Briggs to the hospital.
Deane’s testimony regarding Briggs’s behavior — his
delusions, agitation, and belligerence — established that Briggs
presently exhibited symptoms of a mental disorder that posed
“adverse effects” to his mental health. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I); Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1055–
1056.) Briggs undisputedly suffered from paranoid delusions,
and we agree with Garcia that accepting symptoms such as these
as evidence of adverse effects on a defendant’s mental health does
not violate the statutory mandate that a diagnosis of a mental
disorder may not alone establish the requisite probability of
serious harm to a defendant’s physical or mental health. (Garcia,
at p. 1056, citing § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).) Deane’s testimony
also supports findings that (1) without the increase in
medication, Briggs had not been sleeping through the night; and
(2) Briggs’s agitation and belligerence while not sleeping
rendered communication with Briggs, and hence treatment, more
difficult. Deane opined that medication is the only effective
means to treat schizophrenia, and Briggs’s behavioral and sleep
improvements correlated with the increase in his medication. A
rational fact finder could thus conclude that clear and convincing

5
evidence established that Briggs was suffering adverse effects to
his mental health caused by his mental disorder.4
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
DOUGLAS, J.

People v. Briggs (A168609)

4 Briggs also argues that there was insufficient evidence

that he was a danger to others. Given our determination that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding under
section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I), we need not address this
additional argument.

Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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