CourtListener 10125069•People v. Norris CA5
Testo completo
Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Norris CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087045
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 06CM0787HTA)
v.
BRITTNEY JANNA NORRIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kings County. Valerie R.
Chrissakis, Judge.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
Appellate counsel for defendant Brittney Janna Norris has filed an opening brief
summarizing the pertinent facts and raising no issues but asking this court to review the
record independently. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) The opening
brief also includes a declaration from appellate counsel stating defendant was advised of
her right to file a brief of her own with this court. By letter dated July 1, 2024, we also
invited defendant to submit additional briefing. Defendant has not filed a response.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, we have reviewed the entire record. Following our Supreme Court’s
direction in Kelly, we provide a brief description of the facts and the procedural history of
the case. (Kelly, at p. 110.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition
more favorable to defendant, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
An information filed on May 26, 2006, charged defendant with two counts of
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). Both counts in the information also alleged
defendant discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally used a firearm
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1) & 12022.53, subd. (b)). Finally, the information alleged
counts 1 and 2 involved special circumstances within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3).
On June 9, 2006, defendant pled guilty to both counts and admitted the crimes
were committed with premeditation and deliberation. Defendant also admitted at this
time that, as to count 1, she personally used a firearm within the meaning of
section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1).
On July 24, 2006, consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 25 years to life on count 1 and added a consecutive term of 10 years for the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
firearm enhancement. As to count 2, the court imposed a concurrent term of 25 years to
life, resulting in a total sentence of 35 years to life. The usual fines and fees were then
imposed, and defendant was awarded presentence credits against her total sentence.
Finally, the minute order entered for this date also stated that defendant was waiving her
appellate rights.
On May 9, 2023, appellant filed a motion to recall her sentence, citing
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). Defendant’s motion argued that because she committed
the underlying crimes at the age of 14, and was functionally serving a life without parole
(LWOP) term, she was eligible for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
once she served 15 years of incarceration. Defendant filed an additional request that if
the sentence was recalled, her case should be certified and moved to juvenile court.
On October 3, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to recall her
sentence, and declared the request to certify and move her case to juvenile court was
moot.2 On October 18, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal seeking a review of the
denial of her section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) petition.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
This summary is taken from the presentation of the factual basis for the plea taken
on June 9, 2006, and the probation report.
On March 6, 2006, defendant shot her mother Regina Yvette Powell in the back of
the head, causing her death. Defendant then stepped over her mother, went into a
bedroom, and shot her mother’s boyfriend, Lawrence Craig Norris, in the back of his
head while he was sleeping, also causing his death. Both deaths were committed with
premeditation and deliberation and were accomplished by using a .32-caliber handgun.
2 Various minute orders which are part of the record reference the fact a hearing
would be held pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. Any ruling
following a Franklin hearing is not part of the record before this court.
3.
When asked by the trial court, defendant agreed that these were the facts that
occurred on March 6, 2006, supporting the plea agreement.
DISCUSSION
Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we conclude there are no arguable
issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–443.) We briefly address,
however, defendant’s claim made in the trial court that she was entitled to a recall of her
sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
The relevant language of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), provides:
“When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated
for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A), emphasis
added.)
The sentence imposed on defendant in 2006 was 35 years to life. Defendant argued in
her petition in the trial court that because she would be 49 years of age by the time she
was first eligible for parole the sentence she received was “functionally” a LWOP term.
Case law has not supported this particular interpretation of the language of section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), for a sentence that is not near or beyond the juvenile’s life expectancy.
(See People v. Carter (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 985, 990, 995 [the People conceded a
sentence of 55 years to life imposed on a 17 year old was functionally the equivalent of
LWOP]; People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 614, 629 [the defendant’s sentence
of 23 years plus 80 years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP].)
“Statutory construction begins with the plain, commonsense meaning of the words
in the statute, ‘ “because it is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and
purpose.” ’ ” (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 885.) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity
or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it
said .…’ ” (People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 1185.) Based on the clear language
4.
of the statute, this particular statutory avenue is not available to defendant to reduce her
sentence.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion to recall her sentence is affirmed.
5.
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