People v. Struggs CA5

CourtListener 10124548Calctapp24 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/24/24 P. v. Struggs CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087265
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SC021518B)
v.

CEDRIC LYNN STRUGGS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
Pulskamp, Judge.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, a jury convicted petitioner Cedric Lynn Struggs1 with the first degree
murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; first count)2 of Alfred Joe Dishman. For this
offense, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 25 years to life with an additional
one-year term for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)). (People v. Struggs
(Jan. 24, 1983, 15006 [nonpub. opn.] (Struggs I).)
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing on his murder conviction
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).3 After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court applied a “sufficiency of the evidence” standard and denied relief
on the ground petitioner was a major participant in the offense who acted with reckless
indifference to human life, a disqualifying factor pursuant to section 1172.6. (People v.
Struggs (May 27, 2022, F082234 [nonpub. opn.] (Struggs II).)
Subsequently, this court held “the trial court erred in requiring the People to meet
the burden of ‘sufficiency of the evidence,’ rather than the burden of beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is required at the [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (d) evidentiary
hearing.” (Struggs II, supra, F082234.) Accordingly, we remanded the matter “for
further proceedings under [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (d) .…” (Ibid.) On
remand, the trial court granted petitioner’s section 1172.6 petition and resentenced him on
the remaining offenses. Petitioner filed a timely appeal.
On March 19, 2024, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo),
asking this court to independently review the entire record on appeal. On June 17, 2024,

1 Petitioner’s true name is “Cedric Lynn Veasey.”
2 All further references are to the Penal Code.
3 Former section 1170.95 has been renumbered as section 1172.6, with no change in
text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the current section 1172.6 in this
opinion.

2.
petitioner filed a “ ‘[s]upplemental [b]rief’ ” making several allegations of errors that
occurred during his 1981 trial.
Because the trial court granted the section 1172.6 petition and vacated petitioner’s
first degree murder conviction and resentenced him as to the remaining offenses, there is
nothing else for this court to address. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s ruling.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
I. Underlying Charges and Convictions
In Struggs II, we previously summarized the procedural background regarding
petitioner’s convictions as follows:
“On September 16, 1980, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information
charging petitioner with the first degree murder of Dishman (§ 187, subd. (a); first count),
with the special circumstances that the murder was committed in the commission or
attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i)) and burglary
(§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(vii)), along with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022,
subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon, to wit: a .22-caliber revolver (§ 245, former
subd. (a); second count (Nettie [S.]));[5] robbery (§ 211; third count (Dishman & Nettie))
with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)); and burglary (§ 459; fourth count) with
a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)).
“On February 27, 1981, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); first count), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, former subd. (a);
second count), robbery (§ 211; third count), and burglary (former § 459; fourth count)
and found true all enhancements and special circumstances. On March 27, 1981, the trial
court struck the special circumstances and sentenced petitioner on the first count to a term

4 The facts underlying petitioner’s 1981 conviction are irrelevant to resolving the
issues on appeal. We will not summarize the facts in this opinion.
5 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their
first names. No disrespect is intended.

3.
of 25 years to life, plus a consecutive one-year term for the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (a)). On the second count, the … court sentenced petitioner to the upper
term of four years, but stayed the term pending completion of the sentence on the
first count. On the third count, the … court sentenced petitioner to the upper term of
five years, but stayed the term pending completion of the sentence on the first count. On
the fourth count, the … court sentenced petitioner to the upper term of three years, but
stayed the term pending completion of the sentence on the first count. The aggregate
term to be served was 26 years to life.
“On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. ([Struggs I], supra, 15006.).”
(Struggs II, supra, F082234.)
II. Section 1172.6 Petition
“On February 14, 2019, petitioner, in propria persona, filed a petition for
resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to [former] section 1170.95. In the form
petition, petitioner stated a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him
that allowed him to be prosecuted under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; he was convicted of first or second degree
murder at trial; and he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. He also
requested the court appoint counsel during the resentencing process and stated that he
was not the actual killer; did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel, command,
induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree; was not a major participant in the felony or did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or felony; and that the murder
victim was not a peace officer acting in the performance of his or her duties.” (Struggs II,
supra, F082234, fn. omitted.)
“On August 12, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. The court
provided its tentative ruling that petitioner had made a prima facie case because he

4.
‘participated in the planning of the robbery, but didn’t look like, in this case, they were
planning on murdering.’ The court further stated petitioner was not the actual shooter or
murderer. The prosecutor agreed petitioner was not the actual killer, and pointed out that
the special circumstances were found true but were stricken. The prosecutor also noted
that, due to the nature of the jury instructions given, the ‘normal ruling regarding the
special circumstances does not apply.’ The court then found that a prima facie case had
been made and ordered that the matter be set for an evidentiary hearing.” (Struggs II,
supra, F082234.)
III. First Evidentiary Hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3))
The trial court conducted the first evidentiary hearing and concluded the
prosecution’s burden of proof is “ ‘much like the motion for a new trial, whether a jury—
there’s evidence that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[petitioner] is not eligible.’ ” (Struggs II, supra, F082234.) On appeal, both parties
agreed the court erred because it “was required to independently consider admissible
evidence that was admitted at any prior hearing or trial and conclude whether the
[prosecution] proved beyond a reasonable doubt petitioner is guilty of murder under the
law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 [(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)].” (Struggs II, supra,
F082234.) Accordingly, this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (Ibid.)
IV. Second Evidentiary Hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3))
On remand, the trial court conducted a second evidentiary hearing. The
prosecution filed a brief opposing dismissal and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6
because the petitioner was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Trial counsel argued petitioner was entitled to resentencing because he no
longer could be convicted of murder under the current law. The court considered the
parties’ briefing and subsequent arguments and made the following ruling:

5.
“[Petitioner’s] protestations that he was not present when the crimes
were committed are not persuasive. An abundance of evidence, including
[petitioner’s] own admissions, establish that he was present and participated
in the underlying crimes of robbery and burglary. Therefore, [petitioner]
certainly seems to qualify as a major participant in the robbery and
burglary.

“In addition, some evidence does tend to support the inference that
[petitioner] acted with reckless indifference to human life and perhaps even
anticipated the murder. For example, he apparently did not express any
surprise, dismay, or objection with the shooting either at the scene or
afterward when he continued to befriend the actual shooter; he did not
render any aide to the victim of the shooting; he immediately fled the crime
scene along with the other two perpetrators.

“These inferences of guilt, however, tend to be equaled or perhaps
even outweighed, by other facts that support the opposite conclusion. For
example, there is no evidence to suggest that [petitioner] used or possessed
a gun during the commission of the crimes. There is no evidence to suggest
that [petitioner] supplied the gun that [Ronald Roberson] used to shoot
[Dishman]. There is some implicit, but no explicit, evidence that
[petitioner] knew [Roberson] was armed at the time the crimes were
committed. The incident happened relatively quickly. There is no evidence
to suggest that [petitioner] did or said anything to encourage or facilitate the
shooting itself. Although [petitioner] was present in the store when the
shooting took place, he was not in the immediate vicinity of [Roberson] and
[Dishman]. Perhaps most significantly of all, the shooting seemed to have
been spontaneous. When [petitioner] confided in his friend (and soon to be
star prosecution witness) [Larry] Hickman, [petitioner] repeatedly stated
that he only thought they were going to scare the store clerk, grab the
money, and then run. [Petitioner] specifically told [Hickman] that the only
reason [Roberson] shot the store clerk was because the clerk had a ‘grin’
and did not release the money when [Roberson] demanded it. The Court
finds these statements to be particularly weighty because they were elicited
by the prosecutor on direct examination of [Hickman], in non-leading
questions, at a time when the distinction between the intent to commit
murder and the intent to commit robbery was not particularly relevant (i.e.
because the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine were in effect). The statements [petitioner] made to [Hickman]
that he and the other two perpetrators only intended to commit robbery
therefore do appear to be credible and are consistent with the overall facts
established in this case.

6.
“In addition, [petitioner] apparently suffered from unusually low
mental capacity during the time these crimes were committed. Although
this Court has some reservations about delving too deeply into this issue,
the fact is that the law has changed regarding this topic. In the early 1980s,
the mental state of a co-defendant charged under a felony murder theory
was arguably not relevant in the guilt phase of the case. Under a felony
murder theory, it was appropriate to hold [petitioner] responsible for the
killing solely because he participated in the underlying crimes of robbery
and burglary. His comprehension level was not a significant factor in
deciding guilt. Therefore, the evidence of [petitioner’s] limited mental
capacity was not admitted until the sentencing, at which time the Court did
have some discretion to consider this information. However, now that
[petitioner] can only be held liable for murder if he acted with reckless
indifference to human life, his mental capacity to understand the risks
created by his behavior does become relevant in the guilt phase.

“Similarly, [petitioner] turned eighteen years old approximately
two months before the crimes were committed. At the time of the offense
and subsequent trial, a defendant’s relative youth was not considered to be a
significant factor as long as the defendant had reached the age of majority
(i.e. eighteen). Since this conviction, however, scientific investigations
accepted by the appellate courts have established that the frontal lobe of the
brain does not fully develop until the age of 25. Therefore, [p]etitioner’s
relative youth at the time of the crimes is relevant.

“When reviewing the evidence and arguments of the parties in light
of the very high standard of proof, it becomes clear that the [prosecution]
cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [p]etitioner was the actual
killer, acted with an intent to kill, or acted as a major participant in the
underlying crimes with reckless indifference to human life. The conviction
for first degree murder must therefore be set aside. However, [p]etitioner’s
convictions for the other three crimes stand. Petitioner will be re-sentenced
accordingly. [¶] … [¶]

“Today’s ruling is a finding that [petitioner] cannot—beyond a
reasonable doubt—be convicted of murder under the current state of the
law.”
Thereafter, “the petition for resentencing filed by the petitioner … pursuant to
[s]ection 1172.6, [was] granted.” The first count was set aside and vacated.

7.
V. Resentencing
On February 2, 2023, the trial court resentenced petitioner. As to the third count,
the court sentenced petitioner to the low term of two years, plus a consecutive one-year
term for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)). As to the second count, the court
sentenced petitioner to a one-year term (one-third the middle term of three years), to run
consecutive to count 3. As to the fourth count, the court sentenced petitioner to the low
term of 16 months, plus a one-year term for the firearm enhancement (§ 12202, subd.
(a)), but stayed this sentence pursuant to section 654. The total aggregate sentence
imposed was four years. Defendant then filed an appeal.6
VI. Appellate Counsel Files a Delgadillo Brief
Subsequently, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende/Delgadillo from
the granting of petitioner’s section 1172.6 petition. The brief also included counsel’s
declaration that she advised petitioner he could file his own brief with the court.
Subsequently, on June 17, 2024, this court received petitioner’s supplemental brief.
Specifically, petitioner alleged numerous errors that occurred during his 1981 trial.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Review and Delgadillo
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held a Wende analysis is not applicable to a trial
court’s order that denies a petition for postconviction relief under section 1172.6.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 222.) Delgadillo held that instead of using the
process outlined in Wende, appointed counsel and the appellate court should do the
following “[w]hen appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be pursued on appeal:

6 On November 21, 2023, this court “grant[ed] petitioner’s request to file a belated
notice of appeal.” (In re Cedric Lynn Struggs (Nov. 21, 2023, F086812 [nonpub. opn.].)
The petitioner was ordered “to file, on or before 60 days from the date of this opinion, a
notice of appeal in Kern County Superior Court case No. 012151B.” (Ibid.) Thereafter,
on December 5, 2023, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.

8.
(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that determination, including a
concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court
should send, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is
filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.” (Delgadillo, at pp. 231–232.)
“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments in that brief and to issue a written
opinion.… If the defendant does not file a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal may dismiss the appeal as abandoned. [Citation.] … While it is wholly within
the court’s discretion, the Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own
independent review of the record in any individual section 1172.6 appeal.” (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
Here, to the extent petitioner intends to challenge his convictions on the ground of
repeated errors during his 1981 trial, such arguments would be more appropriately
brought, if at all, in a habeas petition rather than on an appeal after a granting of a
section 1172.6 petition. (People v. DeHuff (2023) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438
[section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged
trial error”].) To be clear, we express no opinion on whether a habeas petition by
petitioner would be either timely or successful; we note only that petitioner’s repeated
references to trial error have no bearing on his appeal founded upon section 1172.6.
Therefore, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the section 1172.6 petition for resentencing after
conducting an evidentiary hearing is affirmed.

9.

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