Memarzadeh v. Cohen CA2/1

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Filed 9/23/24 Memarzadeh v. Cohen CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MAHER MEMARZADEH, B327967, B329476

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC704662)
v.

LOTTIE COHEN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Lee B. Ackerman and Lee B. Ackerman for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Westwood Lawyers and Lottie Cohen for Defendants and
Respondents.
____________________________
Plaintiff Maher Memarzadeh appeals from a judgment of
dismissal in favor of defendants and respondents Lottie Cohen
and Law Office of Lottie Cohen (collectively, Cohen). The trial
court imposed a terminating sanction after Memarzadeh violated
a court order requiring him to sit for a deposition and produce
documents. On appeal, Memarzadeh argues the terminating
sanction is void because the trial judge had been disqualified at
the time he imposed the sanction, and, alternatively, the sanction
was an abuse of discretion. He also argues the trial court erred
in sustaining a demurrer to his second amended complaint.
By statute, disqualification determinations are not
appealable—review must be sought by petition for writ of
mandate brought within 10 days of notice of the determination.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).) Memarzadeh never filed
such a petition. His arguments concerning disqualification
therefore are not properly before us.
We further conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a terminating sanction for Memarzadeh’s
discovery abuses. This conclusion renders his arguments
regarding the demurrer moot.
Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. Complaint, demurrers, and motions to disqualify
On May 1, 2018, Memarzadeh filed a complaint against
Cohen, his former counsel, for legal malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud under theories of misrepresentation and
concealment, breach of contract, and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following a series of
demurrers, rulings, and amended complaints, the only causes of

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action remaining were breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and the trial court, Judge Robert B. Broadbelt, III
presiding, emphasized those causes of action remained viable
only insofar as they alleged that Cohen overbilled Memarzadeh.
The court sustained Cohen’s demurrer to the legal malpractice
and fraud causes of action without leave to amend. The court
denied Memarzadeh’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 2022, Memarzadeh, then in pro per,
electronically filed a declaration purportedly in support of a
“concurrently filed motion to disqualify” Judge Broadbelt
(capitalization omitted), although Memarzadeh did not file a
concurrent motion. As we shall address in more detail in our
Discussion, post, Memarzadeh contends he hired a process server
who on that same day attempted to personally serve a copy of the
declaration on Judge Broadbelt, but instead placed the copy in a
dropbox outside of the courtroom, purportedly in accordance with
the rules of that particular judicial department. The declaration
asserted Judge Broadbelt demonstrated bias through his rulings
on discovery and Cohen’s demurrers.
On August 19, 2022, Judge Broadbelt issued an order
striking Memarzadeh’s declaration, which Judge Broadbelt
construed as a statement of disqualification for cause under Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.3. Judge Broadbelt stated that
Memarzadeh had failed to personally serve him or his clerk with
the statement of disqualification as statutorily required, so Judge
Broadbelt did not learn of the declaration until August 17, 2022.
Judge Broadbelt found the allegations of bias concerned rulings
in 2019 and 2021 and therefore were untimely. Judge Broadbelt
further concluded Memarzadeh’s disagreement with the court’s

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rulings or expression of views on issues in the proceeding were
not a proper basis for disqualification.
Judge Broadbelt ended his order by advising the parties
that rulings on disqualification were not appealable and could be
reviewed only by writ of mandate sought within 10 days of
service of notice of the ruling. Memarzadeh did not seek writ
review of the ruling.
Memarzadeh then filed motions to disqualify Judge
Broadbelt on September 2, September 7, and September 12, 2022.
Judge Broadbelt issued orders striking each motion, reminding
Memarzadeh in each order that review of the court’s decisions on
disqualification could be reviewed solely by a petition for writ of
mandate. Memarzadeh did not seek writ review of these rulings.

2. Motion to compel deposition
On September 26, 2022, Cohen filed an ex parte application
to compel Memarzadeh’s deposition. Cohen’s counsel filed a
supporting declaration attesting that counsel had noticed
Memarzadeh’s deposition with document production for April 21,
2022, but Memarzadeh did not appear nor produce any of the
requested documents purportedly because he had an undisclosed
medical condition. Counsel renoticed the deposition for
August 29, 2022. Two days before that scheduled deposition,
Memarzadeh asked to delay the deposition, and after further
discussion, the parties agreed to conduct the deposition on
September 20, 2022 at a location selected by Memarzadeh. On
September 14, 2022, Memarzadeh asked Cohen’s counsel to take
the deposition off calendar pending Memarzadeh’s efforts to
disqualify Judge Broadbelt. Cohen’s counsel declined and stated
counsel would move to compel if Memarzadeh did not appear.

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Memarzadeh did not appear, at which point Cohen applied ex
parte to compel his attendance.
Memarzadeh opposed the application to compel his
deposition. He contended his pending attempts to disqualify
Judge Broadbelt justified delaying his deposition. Memarzadeh
further contended he suffered from an illness, specifically ear
pain, that impeded him from traveling for his deposition. In
support, he attached, inter alia, a document signed by a health
care provider dated September 22, 2022 stating he should not fly
for two weeks or until cleared by a doctor. He also attached a
document from a medical center’s emergency room, also dated
September 22, 2022, indicating he had been seen for ear pain and
an “episode of passing out this week,” but Memarzadeh had
declined “further work-up.”
The trial court denied Cohen’s ex parte application to
compel, instead treating it as an application to shorten time to
hear a motion to compel. It heard that motion at a hearing on
October 26, 2022, at which the court also considered a motion
from Memarzadeh to continue the trial date. Memarzadeh
appeared at the hearing telephonically and pro per.
At the hearing, the court stated its tentative ruling was to
continue the trial date given Memarzadeh’s illness, and also to
grant the motion to compel and require Memarzadeh to attend
his deposition, which he could elect to do either by
videoconference or in person. At this point the court realized
Memarzadeh had disconnected from the hearing and there was
no indication he was trying to reconnect. The court proceeded
with the hearing.
Cohen’s counsel objected to continuing trial, noting there
had already been three trial continuances, and stated Cohen was

5
ready to begin trial that day. The court asked if Cohen still
wished to depose Memarzadeh. Cohen’s counsel said, “No. We’ll
waive it if you start trial right now.” The court reminded Cohen’s
counsel of Cohen’s pending motion to compel. Counsel responded,
“Yeah. That motion was filed three weeks ago, ex parte, hoping
the depo would happen before today. Since we’re here today,
we’re ready to try the case. I’ll just cross-examine him on the
stand.” Counsel stated Cohen’s insurance policy “is almost
exhausted,” and “the more we push this out, the less likely she’s
going to have the funds to pay me to try this case.”
The trial court stated, “I’m sensitive to all those issues and
appreciate those concerns, and what I’m doing is balancing the
interest on both sides based on the evidence presented.” The
court adopted its tentative ruling and set a trial date for
February 8, 2023, in light of evidence from Memarzadeh’s
physician that he could not travel for 12 weeks. The court
further stated, “I think [Cohen] has the right to take
[Memarzadeh’s] deposition.” The court issued a written order
directing Memarzadeh to attend his deposition on December 9,
2022, to be conducted on a videoconference platform of Cohen’s
choosing or, if Memarzadeh so elected, in person at Cohen’s
counsel’s office.

3. Second motion to compel and impose sanctions
On December 6, 2022, Memarzadeh filed a declaration and
verified statement, ostensibly in support of his September 7, 2022
motion to disqualify Judge Broadbelt. In the first seven pages of
the declaration, Memarzadeh raised numerous objections to
Judge Broadbelt’s striking of his disqualification motion.
On page 8, paragraph 42 of the declaration, Memarzadeh
changed topics, stating in boldface type, “If I have to bring

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another Ex Parte Application to correct the date of [my]
deposition even though the court has now been made aware again
of my medical condition as reflected in the physician’s letter, my
medical condition will certainly be impacted because of the
distress of the duplicative process.” Memarzadeh declared he
could not attend his deposition in person because his ear disorder
prevented him from flying, nor could he attend remotely because
he was scheduled for a medical imaging test that day.
Memarzadeh further declared he could not agree to the privacy
policies of the videoconference program selected by Cohen, which
he contended allowed the videoconference provider to obtain and
disseminate his private information.
Memarzadeh did not appear for his deposition on
December 9, 2022. On December 12, 2022, Cohen filed an
ex parte application to compel Memarzadeh’s compliance with the
trial court’s October 26, 2022 order that he attend his deposition,
and seeking monetary sanctions or, in the alternative,
terminating or issue sanctions.
Memarzadeh opposed the ex parte application.
Memarzadeh noted he had informed both the trial court and
Cohen’s counsel via his December 6, 2022 declaration that he
could not attend his deposition because of his medical imaging
test scheduled that same day, yet Cohen’s counsel feigned
ignorance of this in bringing the application to compel.
Memarzadeh included with his opposition a medical imaging
center form indicating an MRI scheduled for December 9, 2022,
and a copy of his December 6, 2022 declaration.
Memarzadeh also attached an e-mail chain between
himself and Cohen’s counsel. In that chain, Memarzadeh
informed Cohen’s counsel on December 7, 2022 of his upcoming

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medical examination on December 9, 2022. Cohen’s counsel
responded that unless Memarzadeh obtained a court order
excusing him from his deposition, Cohen would move for
sanctions. Memarzadeh then demanded Cohen’s counsel cease
threatening him, and asked that Cohen cooperate with having a
new judge assigned to the case. In a later e-mail, Memarzadeh
stated he did not have the “required technology” for a remote
deposition “away from my usual place of residence.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
On December 13, 2022, the trial court construed Cohen’s ex
parte application as a motion to compel and seek sanctions. The
court set a hearing on the motion for January 17, 2023, and
allowed additional briefing from the parties.
The court also struck Memarzadeh’s December 6, 2022
declaration, finding it repetitive of prior statements seeking
disqualification. The court in its written order again notified the
parties that review of the court’s decisions on disqualification
could be reviewed solely by a petition for writ of mandate.
Memarzadeh did not seek writ review of the ruling.
Memarzadeh filed additional opposition to Cohen’s motion
to compel his deposition and impose sanctions, and in the same
filing requested a continuance of trial, his deposition, and all
related hearings. Memarzadeh again argued he needed
additional time because of his illness, and objected to Cohen’s
plan to videotape his deposition. He attached several doctor’s
notes advising him not to fly, the most recent dated
December 21, 2022 and stating he should not fly for the next
three to four months while he underwent diagnosis and
treatment.

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4. Trial court’s ruling
The trial court, Judge Broadbelt presiding, took the matter
under submission and issued a written order on January 17,
2023.1 The court found “that [Memarzadeh] has engaged in
conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process by willfully
disobeying the court’s October 26, 2022 order and failing to
respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery,” i.e., the
deposition the court had ordered him to attend.
The court rejected Memarzadeh’s contention that his illness
prevented him from attending his deposition. The court noted
that, although Memarzadeh had provided a physician’s letter
indicating he could not fly, he had not provided any “competent
evidence from a licensed physician establishing that a medical
condition prevented him from appearing remotely for deposition
on the date ordered by the court.” The court further noted
Memarzadeh’s illness had not prevented him from filing his
additional statement of disqualification with supporting exhibits
on December 6, 2022, or his opposition to Cohen’s ex parte
application on December 12, 2022.
As for Memarzadeh’s evidence that he had an MRI
scheduled for the same day as the deposition, the court observed
Memarzadeh had not presented evidence establishing that he
underwent the MRI on that date, that it took place at the same
time as the deposition, that the MRI appointment was scheduled
before the court had issued its October 26, 2022 order, and that
the MRI could not have been rescheduled.

1 It does not appear from the record the trial court held a
hearing.

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The court rejected Memarzadeh’s contention that
technological issues prevented him from attending the deposition
remotely, finding Memarzadeh had not sufficiently described the
technological limitations at issue or presented any evidence those
limitations prevented his appearance.
The court found Memarzadeh’s violations of its orders
willful, noting Memarzadeh had refused to appear for deposition
“numerous times before the court issued the October 26, 2022
order,” had never moved for a protective order or requested the
court change the date of his deposition, and Memarzadeh “did not
provide—and still has not provided—[Cohen] with alternative
dates for his deposition, instead stating only that he ‘may’ be
available at an unspecified time.”
The court found Memarzadeh’s failure to comply with the
court’s orders unduly prejudiced Cohen by preventing Cohen from
preparing a defense against Memarzadeh’s claims. The court
further found a terminating sanction was appropriate because “a
less severe sanction would not produce compliance with the
discovery rules or provide [Cohen] with an adequate remedy.”
The court reiterated that Memarzadeh had repeatedly refused to
attend noticed depositions, did not appear for his court-ordered
deposition on December 9, 2022, had never sought relief from the
court to change his deposition date, and had not offered any
alternative dates. “Because of [Memarzadeh’s] history of abuse of
the discovery process, the court finds that ordering
[Memarzadeh] to appear for deposition again, or imposing other,
less severe sanctions, is unlikely to result in [Memarzadeh’s]
appearance and production of documents at the deposition.”

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The court therefore ordered a terminating sanction under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, subdivision (d) and
dismissed the action.
On February 6, 2023, Cohen filed and served by e-mail and
regular mail a memorandum of costs seeking $9,467.95. On
February 27, 2023, Memarzadeh filed opposition to the
memorandum, arguing inter alia that Cohen improperly sought
reimbursement for jury fees, and that many of the costs related to
circumstances Memarzadeh could not control due to his illness.
On April 5, 2023, the trial court amended its order of
dismissal to award the costs requested by Cohen.
Memarzadeh filed notices of appeal from the original order
of dismissal and the amended order adding the costs award.

DISCUSSION

A. The Challenge to the Striking of the Statement of
Disqualification Is Not Properly Before Us
Memarzadeh argues Judge Broadbelt did not timely
respond to his August 1, 2022 statement of disqualification and
thus was disqualified as a matter of law. Accordingly, Judge
Broadbelt’s order imposing a terminating sanction is void. As we
explain, this challenge is not properly before us.

1. Applicable law
Under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 170.3,
subdivision (c)(1), a party seeking to disqualify a judge “may file
with the clerk a written verified statement objecting to the

2 Further unspecified statutory citations are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

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hearing or trial before the judge and setting forth the facts
constituting the grounds for disqualification of the judge.” The
statement “shall be personally served on the judge alleged to be
disqualified, or on his or her clerk, provided that the judge is
present in the courthouse or in chambers.” (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).)
Within 10 days of filing or service, whichever is later, the judge
may consent to the disqualification or file a written verified
answer. (Id., subd. (c)(3).) If the judge does not consent or
answer within the 10 days, the judge “shall be deemed to have
consented to his or her disqualification.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).)
Section 170.4, subdivision (b) provides judges with a third
option as to how to respond: “[I]f a statement of disqualification
is untimely filed or if on its face it discloses no legal grounds for
disqualification, the trial judge against whom it was filed may
order it stricken.” Although section 170.4 does not so state, case
law holds that a judge exercising this authority to strike must
do so within the 10-day limit imposed by section 170.3,
subdivision (c)(3) and (4). (PBA, LLC v. KPOD, Ltd. (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 965, 972.)
As the trial court stated repeatedly in its written orders
striking Memarzadeh’s disqualification motions, “[t]he
determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is
not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of
mandate from the appropriate court of appeal.” (§ 170.3,
subd. (d).) “The petition for the writ shall be filed and served
within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the
court’s order determining the question of disqualification.” (Ibid.)
Section 170.3, subdivision (d) also applies to orders striking
statements of disqualification under section 170.4,
subdivision (b). (See Dumas v. Los Angeles County Bd. of

12
Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 354.) Section 170.3,
subdivision (d) provides “the exclusive means for seeking review
of a ruling on a challenge to a judge.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35
Cal.4th 395, 444.)

2. Analysis
Memarzadeh purports to challenge on appeal an order
striking his statement of disqualification. Under section 170.3,
subdivision (d), Memarzadeh could only seek review of the trial
court’s ruling through a petition for writ of mandate filed within
10 days of service of written notice of the ruling. As noted, the
trial court specifically informed Memarzadeh in its written order
striking his statement of disqualification that he had to seek
review by writ, but Memarzadeh did not seek writ review of the
ruling, and the time for doing so is past. Memarzadeh’s appeal of
the disqualification ruling therefore is not properly before us.
Memarzadeh acknowledges the requirements of
section 170.3, subdivision (d), but argues they are inapplicable
when a judge fails timely to respond to a statement of
disqualification. Memarzadeh contends his statement was filed
and served August 1, 2022, yet Judge Broadbelt did not strike the
statement until August 19, 2022, outside the 10-day window
mandated by section 170.3, subdivision (c)(3). Accordingly,
Judge Broadbelt had already been disqualified by operation of
law under section 170.3, subdivision (c)(4) by the time
Judge Broadbelt purported to strike Memarzadeh’s statement of
disqualification.
We reject Memarzadeh’s arguments on both legal and
factual grounds. Memarzadeh cites In re Marriage of M.A. &
M.A. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 894 (M.A.) for his contention that he
may raise the issue of disqualification in this appeal as opposed

13
to through the writ procedures under section 170.3,
subdivision (d).
In M.A., a case concerning child support, the father filed a
statement of disqualification against the commissioner
overseeing the case, and the commissioner struck the statement.
(Supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 899–900.) Several months later,
the father filed a second statement of disqualification. (Id. at
p. 901.) The court, with the same commissioner presiding,
“indicated it would not ‘entertain any other motion on
disqualification’ at that time,” but “nonetheless assured father it
was not biased against him and responded to some of the
allegations [of bias] in the statement [of disqualification].” (Ibid.)
The court then issued orders pertaining to child support and
other matters. (Id. at pp. 901–902.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the orders issued
after the father had filed his second statement of disqualification,
holding that the commissioner, by “impermissibly ignor[ing]” the
statement, implicitly consented to it under section 170.3,
subdivision (c)(4). (M.A., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.) The
court acknowledged that “[g]enerally, a party may only obtain
review of the determination of the disqualification of a
commissioner by filing a petition for writ of mandate.” (Id. at
p. 903, fn. 5.) The court nonetheless concluded the appeal was
proper “because father is not challenging the propriety of the
court’s failure to act on his statement of disqualification. Rather,
he is challenging the import of the court’s failure to act on the
validity of the court’s subsequent orders.” (Ibid.)
M.A. is distinguishable in that in the instant case,
Judge Broadbelt did not ignore the statement of disqualification,
but addressed it in a detailed written order that included

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instructions on how to seek review to the extent Memarzadeh
disagreed with it. Unlike the commissioner in M.A., Judge
Broadbelt therefore made a “determination of the question of . . .
disqualification” subject to the writ requirements of section 170.3,
subdivision (d). To the extent Memarzadeh believed Judge
Broadbelt’s response was untimely, he should have challenged it
within 10 days by a petition for writ of mandate.
We also question the reasoning of M.A. The purpose of the
writ review requirement of section 170.3, subdivision (d) is to
resolve disqualification issues quickly and avoid the possibility of
an appellate court later reversing orders or a judgment upon
concluding a judge should, in fact, have been disqualified. (See
People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 336 (Brown) [noting “the
Legislature’s clear intent that disqualification challenges be
subject to prompt review by writ”].) This purpose is thwarted if a
party on whose statement of disqualification a trial court has
failed to act may simply sit on its rights, see how the court
ultimately rules on subsequent matters, and then invoke the
disqualification on appeal to void the court’s orders. To the
extent the holding of M.A. can be interpreted to allow such an
end run of section 170.3, subdivision (d), we decline to follow it.
Assuming arguendo we may consider in this appeal the
timeliness of Judge Broadbelt’s response to the statement of
disqualification, Memarzadeh nonetheless fails as a factual
matter to establish Judge Broadbelt or his clerk personally were
served with the statement of disqualification as required under
section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1), a prerequisite to triggering the
10-day period under section 170.3, subdivision (c)(3). In striking
the statement of disqualification, Judge Broadbelt stated neither
he nor his clerk were personally served, and he did not learn of

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the statement until August 17, 2022. Memarzadeh concedes in
his opening brief on appeal there was no personal service—
according to his brief’s statement of facts,3 his process server left
the statement of disqualification in a dropbox outside the
courtroom. Memarzadeh contends this was consistent with the
rules of Judge Broadbelt’s department, but the list of department
rules he provides in support of this contention say nothing about
a dropbox, much less that the court would deem documents left in
the dropbox personally served on the judge or his clerk.4 In the
absence of evidence of personal service, Memarzadeh cannot
establish Judge Broadbelt’s August 19, 2022 response to the
statement of disqualification was untimely such that Judge
Broadbelt was disqualified as a matter of law.
In his reply brief, Memarzadeh cites Brown for the
proposition that section 170.3, subdivision (d) “does not apply to,
and hence does not bar, review (on appeal from a final judgment)
of nonstatutory claims that a final judgment is constitutionally
invalid because of judicial bias.” (Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 335.) To the extent Memarzadeh is attempting to assert a
constitutional, nonstatutory basis for disqualification, that

3 Statements in appellate briefs may be construed as
admissions against the party. (Thompson v. Ioane (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1186, fn. 4.)
4 Based on Memarzadeh’s brief, it appears the department
rule to which he refers requires service copies of filed documents
to be placed in a box for courtesy copies. This rule does not
appear in the list of rules of which Memarzadeh requested we
take judicial notice. Regardless, Memarzadeh cites no authority
that departmental rules regarding service copies may substitute
for section 170.3’s requirement of personal service of a statement
of disqualification on the judge or clerk.

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argument is forfeited for failure to raise it in his opening brief.
(Hurley v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 634, 648, fn. 10.)
The argument also is without merit. Memarzadeh clearly
relied on a statutory basis for disqualification, because he had
stated repeatedly that Judge Broadbelt was disqualified as a
matter of law under section 170.3, subdivision (c)(4).
Even if arguendo Memarzadeh properly asserted a
nonstatutory, constitutional basis for disqualification, Brown
stated, “In order to give maximum effect to the Legislature’s clear
intent that disqualification challenges be subject to prompt
review by writ [citation], we conclude that a litigant may, and
should, seek to resolve such issues by statutory means, and that
his negligent failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of his
constitutional claim.” (Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 336; accord,
Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1332, 1339 [in civil cases, a constitutional question such as
judicial bias “ ‘must be raised at the earliest opportunity or it will
be considered to be waived’ ”].)
In Brown, the appellant had sought a writ under
section 170.3, subdivision (d) after the trial court denied his
disqualification motion, and the Court of Appeal summarily
denied relief. (Supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 330.) Under those
circumstances, the high court concluded the appellant could
assert on appeal “a constitutional due process claim that the
judge who presided over his hearing was not impartial.” (Id. at
p. 336.)
In the instant case, Memarzadeh has never sought writ
review of any of the disqualification rulings, despite the trial
court repeatedly informing him of the necessity of doing so, and

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indeed never asserted his due process claim until he filed his
reply brief on appeal. Under Brown, his “negligent failure” to
follow the statutory procedures for review “constitute[s] a
forfeiture of his constitutional claim.” (Supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 336.)
Because the issue of disqualification is not properly before
us, we do not address Memarzadeh’s arguments as to the merits
of the trial court’s order striking his statement of disqualification.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion In
Granting a Terminating Sanction
Section 2023.030 empowers a court, after notice and
hearing, to impose sanctions for “engaging in conduct that is a
misuse of the discovery process.” These include monetary
sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, and terminating
sanctions. (§ 2023.030, subds. (a)–(d).) A terminating sanction
may strike pleadings or parts of pleadings, stay further
proceedings until a discovery order is obeyed, dismiss the action
or part of the action, or render a judgment by default against the
offending party. (Id., subd. (d).) “We review a trial court’s
decision to impose terminating sanctions for abuse of discretion,
drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s
ruling.” (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 734, 749.)
Memarzadeh raises three arguments as to why the
terminating sanction was an abuse of discretion. First, he argues
Cohen suffered no prejudice by the inability to depose
Memarzadeh prior to trial, as evidenced by Cohen’s counsel’s
statement at the October 26, 2022 hearing that he was ready to
proceed with trial and would cross-examine Memarzadeh on the
stand. Memarzadeh contends Cohen never “demonstrate[d] how

18
taking the deposition or how the requested documents, even
assuming they existed, were necessary to defend against
Memarzadeh’s claims.”
Memarzadeh did not raise this argument below or seek a
protective order to the extent he believed it was unnecessary for
him to be deposed or to provide documents. He therefore has
forfeited the argument for purposes of appeal. (GoTek Energy,
Inc. v. SoCal IP Law Group, LLP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1248
[issue forfeited if not raised in trial court]). The argument also is
without merit. Cohen’s counsel’s later statements at the
October 26 hearing make clear he was willing to forgo deposing
Memarzadeh out of concern that further delays might lead to
Cohen exceeding the limits of her insurance policy. In other
words, Cohen’s counsel did not state Memarzadeh’s deposition
was unnecessary or undesirable, but rather Memarzadeh’s delays
had put Cohen in a position of possibly running out of insurance
funds if they did not proceed to trial. To reverse the terminating
sanction on this basis would be to reward Memarzadeh for his
misconduct.
Memarzadeh’s second argument is that the trial court
abused its discretion by not imposing a lesser sanction. Again,
Memarzadeh did not raise this argument below and it is forfeited.
Memarzadeh’s second argument also fails on the merits.
Memarzadeh asserts, “[T]he [court] could have imposed the lesser
sanction of prohibiting Memarzadeh from testifying at trial or
from using any document not produced prior to trial. Since the
court already confined Memarzadeh’s claim to one about billing,
he likely would have had to rely on expert witness testimony to
establish his claim. Not taking Memarzadeh’s deposition

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would not have deprived Cohen from conducting expert witness
discovery in order to present a defense.”
The trial court had no opportunity to consider this option
given Memarzadeh did not propose it below, further supporting
our forfeiture holding. Regardless, Memarzadeh does not explain
how, if he were unable to testify or offer documents into evidence,
he could effectively prove his case against Cohen. He suggests
somehow he could rely solely on expert testimony to prove his
case, but experts presumably would need to base their opinions at
least in part on evidence offered and authenticated by
Memarzadeh. The sanction he proposes therefore would be as
devastating to his case as a terminating sanction.
Finally, in his reply brief Memarzadeh argues he never
refused to sit for a deposition, only for a videotaped deposition,
and Cohen “made no effort to demonstrate that [Cohen] had a
right to videotape [Memarzadeh’s] deposition in light of
[Memarzadeh] refusing to agree to do so based upon his own
physicians’ directions.” Although Memarzadeh fails to provide
any record citation supporting this contention, we assume he is
referring to a declaration dated May 9, 2023 attached to
Memarzadeh’s motion to stay execution of judgment pending
appeal. The declaration, purportedly from a physician, states
that Memarzadeh’s “medical condition causes him additional
unusual and extreme stress well beyond what is reasonable
during video recordings (i.e. Zoom Meetings).” The declaration
further recites, “If a video deposition of . . . Memarzadeh is taken
his symptoms would re-occur,” and “he should not fly, drive, sit
for an oral deposition, or expose himself to situations and
circumstances induced by appearances before a camera.”

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This evidence was untimely, filed months after the trial
court had imposed the terminating sanction and ordered the case
dismissed. It is disingenuous for Memarzadeh to contend he
did not refuse to sit for deposition, only a videotaped deposition.
As summarized by the trial court, the evidence in the record
indicates Memarzadeh repeatedly refused to sit for any type of
deposition, and continually came up with varied excuses for doing
so. At no point prior to the terminating sanction did he present
evidence that he was medically unable to participate in a
deposition by videoconference or recorded on video.

C. Memarzadeh’s Remaining Challenges Are Moot or
Forfeited
Memarzadeh argues the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer against his second amended complaint. Because
Memarzadeh’s discovery abuses have led to dismissal of the
action, this argument is moot.
Although Memarzadeh filed a notice of appeal after the
trial court amended the dismissal order to award Cohen costs,
Memarzadeh raises no arguments concerning the costs award in
his appellate briefing. Any challenge to the costs award therefore
is forfeited. (Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line
Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
1127, 1136 [issue not raised in appellate briefing forfeited].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

KLINE, J.*

*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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