People v. Shooter CA1/2

CourtListener 10124280Calctapp23 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/23/24 P. v. Shooter CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169179
v.
RYAN WILLIAM SHOOTER, (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
No. SCR-756742-1)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Ryan William Shooter raises a single issue in this appeal:
whether, after an admitted violation of his probation, the trial court was
required to obtain Shooter’s consent before modifying his probationary term
to account for the time Shooter was in warrant status. Answering in the
negative, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 1, 2022, the Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office
filed a complaint charging Shooter with a single felony count of bringing
fentanyl into a jail facility in violation of Penal Code1 section 4573,
subdivision (a).
On November 8, 2022, Shooter entered a no contest plea in exchange
for two years of formal probation and 180 days in the county jail or release to

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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an inpatient drug treatment program “if/when bed space becomes available.”2
The court sentenced Shooter in accordance with the plea agreement on
December 6, 2022, meaning Shooter’s probation would expire by December 6,
2024. The conditions of probation required Shooter to report to the probation
department “within 2 working days of release from treatment” and “obey all
laws.”
On December 9, 2022, Shooter was released to a treatment facility; he
later overdosed and was hospitalized. Shooter “subsequently absconded after
being placed at a detox facility.” Unable to contact or locate Shooter, the
probation officer recommended that “probation be summarily revoked and a
no-bail bench warrant be issued.”
On February 6, 2023, the court summarily revoked Shooter’s probation
and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Shooter was arrested on
misdemeanor charges approximately eight months later. At the time of this
arrest, Shooter’s probation had been summarily revoked for a total of 255
days, and he had been “in active warrant status for 245 days.” Shooter’s
probation officer consequently recommended “that the time spent in
summarily revoked status be added to the supervision term,” with a new
termination date of August 18, 2025. Alternatively, “If the court wishes to
extend the probation grant for the warrant period only, the new termination
date would be August 8, 2025.”
On October 18, 2023, Shooter appeared in person for arraignment on
the alleged violation of probation; Shooter was appointed counsel and agreed
to admit to his violation and be sentenced consistent with the
recommendations of the probation department. Counsel joined in Shooter’s

2 Shooter’s plea agreement also included a no contest plea to an

unrelated case for which he was sentenced concurrently.

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waiver of constitutional rights and in Shooter’s admission. The court found
Shooter’s waivers and admission to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
and thus found Shooter guilty of violating his probation. Shooter and his
counsel waived time to allow for immediate sentencing, at which point the
court revoked and reinstated Shooter’s probation “on all the same terms and
conditions,” with the modification that Shooter serve an additional 90 days in
county jail prior to being released to a residential drug treatment program.
The court further indicated an intent to adopt the recommendation of
the probation department, “to toll the grant of probation and extend it for the
period of time that he was in warrant status.” Shooter objected: “I think the
defense’s position -- under AB 19[50] the maximum is two years -- it can’t be
extended beyond that, so that would be my objection.”3
The court ultimately adopted the recommendation of the probation
department and tolled probation for the period that Shooter was on warrant
status, “which is 245 days, with a new termination date of August the 8th,
2025.”
Shooter appeals.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Shooter does not, and cannot, challenge his
admission to violating the terms of his probation.4 Shooter also “concedes”—

3 We interpret Shooter’s objection to reference Assembly Bill No. 1950,

“which reduced the maximum term of felony probation to two years.” (People
v. Ornelas (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1305, 1313 (Ornelas), quoting Assem. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as
amended May 6, 2020, p. 6.)
4 Shooter did not obtain a certificate of probable cause pursuant to

section 1237.5. As Shooter acknowledges, absent a certificate of probable
cause, he cannot attack the validity of his admission of a probation violation.
(People v. Billetts (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [“Absent a certificate of

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and we agree—that “the trial court has the authority to extend the term” of
Shooter’s “probation to account for the 245 days that he was out of contact
with probation.” As this division recently held, trial courts possess the
“discretion to extend probation to account for the time when probation was
summarily revoked so long as the total period of probationary supervision
does not exceed the statutory maximum” of two years. (Ornelas, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1308, review den. Apr. 12, 2023; § 1203.1, subd. (a); see
also People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 502 [“we hold that section 1203.2,
subdivision (a)’s . . . tolling provision preserves the trial court’s authority to
adjudicate, in a subsequent formal probation violation hearing, whether the
probationer violated probation during, but not after, the court-imposed
probationary period”].)
Shooter asserts, however, that the “core issue” is “whether the trial
court deprived Mr. Shooter of the choice of whether to consent to this
‘adjustment.’ ” Counsel asserts that Shooter “should have been given the
opportunity to express his affirmative, informed consent to the court’s order
extending his probation.” (Italics added.) “By depriving Mr. Shooter of the
choice of whether to consent to extending his probation,” counsel argues that
“the trial court negated his long-standing right to consent to the terms and
conditions of his supervision.” We not only disagree but find counsel’s
representations misleading.
At the arraignment on Shooter’s probation violation, the court began by
explaining it had reviewed the probation officer’s recommendations and,
“[b]ased on the content of this [probation report], the court will summarily
revoke probation . . . .” As described above, the probation report

probable cause, the issues raised by defendant concerning the validity of his
admission of violation of probation, are not reviewable on appeal”].)

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recommended that the court “modify the termination date to August 18,
2025,” to match the time Shooter’s probation was in revoked status or,
alternatively, modify the termination date to August 8, 2025 “[i]f the court
wishes to extend the probation grant for the warrant period only.” In the
concluding section titled, “Evaluation and Recommendation,” the report
separately listed probation’s complete recommendations: (1) that Shooter
serve 90 days in jail, (2) that Shooter “be referred to TASC,” a drug treatment
program, (3) that Shooter “remain in custody until bedspace becomes
available” in the treatment program, and (4) that “the court modify the
probation termination date to August 18, 2025.”
Shooter’s appointed counsel represented on the record that he “did have
a chance to review this” probation report with Shooter, expressly
acknowledged the first three enumerated recommendations, and then offered,
“[Shooter] is prepared to admit to this universal if the court were to follow
that.” The district attorney also agreed with the recommendations with the
caveat that “the People would not be inclined to give another chance at
treatment the next time around.” The court responded, “So I would be fine
following the recommendation” and went on to discuss drug treatment
placement options with counsel. The court then repeated that it would “be
fine following the recommendation but I want to make sure Mr. Shooter is
crystal clear that, if we get to 90 days and he doesn’t have treatment lined
up, I’m not letting him out. . . .”
At the conclusion of these discussions, the court asked Shooter directly,
“You understand that, Mr. Shooter? [¶] . . . [¶] With that in mind, is that
what you’d like to do? You’d like to admit the violation today?” To both
questions, Shooter responded in the affirmative. The court then advised
Shooter of his constitutional rights, asking if he understood and if he wished

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to waive those rights so his admission could be taken; Shooter responded,
“Yes.” The court proceeded to restate the alleged violations of probation and
asked Shooter, “Do you admit that to be true?” Shooter responded, “Yes, I
do.” Shooter’s counsel joined in the admission, which the court accepted,
finding it to be “knowing, voluntary and intelligent”—which Shooter does not
now challenge. After Shooter and his counsel waived time for sentencing, the
court ordered terms and conditions consistent with its earlier representations
and again stated: “The recommendation is to toll the grant of probation and
extend it for the period of time that he was in warrant status.” When the
court gave defense counsel the opportunity to object, the only objection—
which Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at page 1316 has since clarified and
rendered baseless—was “under AB 19[50]” that “the maximum is two years”
and probation “can’t be extended beyond that.”
The record—including the express representation of Shooter’s
attorney—demonstrates that, before entering his admission, Shooter was
fully informed of the probation officer’s recommendation to adjust the end
date of probation, as well as the court’s inclination to adopt that
recommendation. Thus, there was no need for the court to have secured
Shooter’s separate “consent” to that specific term prior to imposing sentence.
Finding no authority on point, Shooter relies on People v. Bailey (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 828 (Bailey) to argue that, because “extension of the
probationary period is not mandatory, the defendant’s affirmative consent
should be required if the court wishes to extend the term of probation beyond
the statutory maximum.” (Italics added.) We are not persuaded.
First, the court’s adjustment of Shooter’s probation termination date to
reflect the time he was in warrant status, while discretionary, is not an
“extension” of an otherwise authorized probationary term. As confirmed in

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Ornelas, by modifying Shooter’s probation “to account for the [245] days in
which [Shooter] had been in warrant status and not under the supervision of
a probation officer, the trial court did not increase the term beyond the
statutory maximum of two years; instead, the court exercised its discretion to
adjust the termination date to provide [Shooter] with approximately two
years of probationary supervision, as [Shooter] had agreed to when he
accepted the terms of probation . . . .” (Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1312.)
Second, Bailey is inapposite. Bailey found “no legal impediment to
defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of the one-year limitation . . . on
confinement in the county jail.” (Bailey, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at pp. 831–
832 [“This permits the sentencing court at least to consider whether the
defendant merits a grant of probation in those cases where a one-year term of
local confinement seems inappropriately brief and a prison commitment
unduly harsh”].) But here, neither Shooter nor the court is attempting to
waive section 1203.1’s two-year limitation on a term of probation or otherwise
extend probation beyond the two-year cap. The probation termination date is
simply being adjusted to reflect the two-year term of probation originally
agreed to by Shooter in connection with his plea agreement for the
underlying offense. Under such circumstances, Ornelas suggests that further
consent is not required. (Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1309 [affirming
the reinstatement and extension of probation “ ‘over the defense objection’ ”].)
Seeking remand, Shooter’s appellate counsel uses carefully selected
words to argue that “[o]nce the issue was raised,” referring to the extension of
probation, “there is no indication that any off-the-record discussion took place
between Mr. Shooter and his counsel . . . .” However, there is no dispute that
prior to arraignment, Shooter and his appointed counsel were provided a copy

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of the probation report, which specifies in two places the recommendation for
an adjustment of the term of probation and includes new proposed
termination dates. (§ 1203d.) Shooter’s counsel represented he “did have a
chance to review this with Mr. Shooter,” who was “prepared to admit to this
universal if the court were to follow that.” And, when given the opportunity
to object to the probation adjustment, Shooter’s only comment was a
reference to Assembly Bill No. 1950, a legislative provision that has since
been clarified to provide the court with the “discretion to reinstate and extend
the probationary term to account for the period of revocation.” (Ornelas,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1313.) No other concern with the
recommendations of the probation report was uttered, notwithstanding the
court’s multiple indications that it would follow the recommendation. Nor
did Shooter ever indicate a desire to withdraw his admission after the on-
record modification of the probation end date to August 8—the earlier of the
two dates recommended. Therefore, to argue on appeal that “the court
deprived Mr. Shooter of the opportunity to reject the extension”5 is not just
misleading, it is factually incorrect.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed.

5 Because Shooter had the opportunity and did not “reject the

extension,” we take no position on whether Shooter had any such right in the
first instance.

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_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

_________________________
STEWART, P.J.

_________________________
MILLER, J.

People v. Shooter (A169179)

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