CourtListener 10120905•In re Se.G. CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 9/18/24 In re Se.G. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Se.G., A Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B334779
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 22JV00063)
(Santa Barbara County)
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.G. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
S.G. (mother) and H.G. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s
order terminating parental rights as to Se.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 366.26.)1 Both parents contend the juvenile court erroneously
found the parental-benefit exception inapplicable. Mother
asserts the sibling relationship exception applied as well. Father
claims Child Welfare Services (CWS) failed to satisfy its duty of
inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2022, CWS received a request for response to
the home of two-year-old Se.G. and 14-year-old Sh.G. Law
enforcement had contacted mother, who was drunk and
belligerent. Father was present in violation of a domestic
violence restraining order. CWS detained Se.G and Sh.G. and
placed them in a confidential resource home. Se.G and Sh.G. had
three adult brothers—Ivan, Manuel, and Joseph.
At the February 2022 detention hearing, the court ordered
continued detention. After a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing in April 2022, the court found the allegations
in an amended petition true by a preponderance of the evidence
and adopted CWS’s case plan.
At a six-month review hearing in October 2022 for which
father was absent, the court ordered continued reunification
services for mother and termination of services for father. At a
12-month review hearing in May 2023, the court extended
mother’s reunification services. At an 18-month review hearing
in August 2023, the court terminated mother’s reunification
services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation
hearing.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Sh.G., CWS social worker Alexis Zaragoza, the resource
mother, court appointed special advocate (CASA) Mariana
Solorio, mother, father, and the three adult brothers testified at
the January 2024 section 366.26 hearing. As Sh.G. opposed
adoption for herself, the hearing concerned Se.G.
Sh.G. was 16 years old at the hearing, and Se.G. was four.
Sh.G. testified Se.G. always enjoyed visits with mother. Se.G.
was excited to join the frequent phone or FaceTime calls with
mother and would complain if they did not occur. Se.G. awoke
from nightmares crying for mother. Se.G. said she wanted to go
home with both mother and father. Se.G. would be “[d]evastated”
if she could no longer see her brother Ivan.
The resource mother described Sh.G. as part of her family
and would encourage contact between Sh.G. and Se.G. post-
adoption. Sh.G. could continue living in the home. As for her
brothers, Se.G. had mentioned only Ivan to the resource mother.
The resource mother never heard Se.G. express to Sh.G. a desire
to go home to her parents. The resource mother did not feel it
would negatively impact Se.G. if she could not see her brothers or
parents in the future.
Zaragoza had observed a portion of one visit between Se.G.
and father. The interactions were appropriate. Zaragoza also
observed a visit with mother. Se.G. was excited to get there and
hugged mother. The visit was appropriate, affectionate, and
positive.
Zaragoza did not “know that adoption really resonates with
[Se.G.], that she understands that fully.” Se.G. said getting
another family—a “forever family”—“sounded good.” Se.G.
indicated she would like her resource parents to be her mother
and father. According to the section 366.26 report, Se.G. “shared
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she loves her home and her resource parents . . . .” When
Zaragoza asked how Se.G. would feel if she could not see mother
anymore, Se.G. indicated she did not know. With prompting,
Se.G. agreed it might be a little sad if she no longer saw her
parents.
Zaragoza did not believe severance of either parental
relationship would be detrimental. Although Se.G. loved mother
and was excited to see her, she was a “happy-go-lucky kid” who
easily reintegrated with her resource home. Based on
information obtained from the resource mother, Zaragoza
testified that Se.G. rarely asked or talked about mother. Se.G.
did not seek out or discuss father. Sh.G.’s testimony was the first
time Zaragoza heard Se.G. had made any statement about
wanting to go home with father.
Nor did Zaragoza believe severing Se.G’s relationships with
her brothers would be detrimental. As to Manuel and Joseph,
Zaragoza cited the rarity of visits and Se.G.’s lack of conversation
about them. Zaragoza acknowledged Ivan visited Se.G. more
frequently and was sure the two had established more of a
connection. Zaragoza believed severance of that relationship
would be a “shift” but not “detrimental.”
CASA Mariana Solorio supervised visits with mother and
Se.G’s brothers for nine months or longer. Solorio testified Se.G
was excited to see her mother and would run and hug her upon
arrival. Se.G. would become quiet toward the end of visits and
sometimes asked Ivan to put her in the car seat. Solorio was
unsure of the long-term impact of no further contact with mother.
Solorio thought Se.G. would be sad to no longer see mother or the
brothers.
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Mother testified Se.G. tells her how much she misses and
loves mother. Se.G. is always on her lap and is very affectionate.
Mother was responsible for Se.G.’s daily care prior to removal.
She described Ivan as a father figure.
Father testified he visited Se.G. approximately six times
during the dependency period. Father had a call or FaceTime
with his daughters about once a week since his restraining order
was removed. He testified Se.G. is excited to see him at visits
and calls him “daddy.” During about half of the visits, Se.G. said
she wanted to go home with mother and father.
Ivan, Manuel, and Joseph all testified to mother’s care for
and positive relationship with Se.G. prior to her removal at age
two, as well as the positive nature of Se.G.’s visits with mother.
Ivan and Joseph were living at home when Se.G. was born.
Manuel was “living in between places.” Manuel indicated he
joins his brothers, mother, Sh.G., and Se.G. on FaceTime calls
about three times per week.
The juvenile court found the parental-benefit exception
inapplicable as to both parents. The court concluded both
parents satisfied the visitation element. The court acknowledged
Se.G. recognized and was happy to see her parents. However,
neither relationship rose “to [the] level of a substantial positive
emotional attachment.” The court further concluded the benefits
of adoption outweighed any detriment from severance of parental
rights.
As to the sibling relationship exception, the court found a
significant sibling relationship between Se.G. and Sh.G. The
court determined the exception did not apply as to Sh.G. because
the resource mother was committed both to keeping Se.G. and
Sh.G. together and to maintaining their relationship. The court
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found no significant sibling relationship as to Se.G.’s brothers.
The court noted the benefits of adoption and found no evidence of
detriment regarding the brothers. The court terminated parental
rights.
ICWA Proceedings Concerning Father2
In March 2022, father informed CWS of Se.G.’s paternal
grandmother and aunt, but he did not have contact information
for them. He reportedly arranged to send CWS worker Meza a
text message with contact information for his sister.
In November 2022, an administrative office professional
emailed Child Welfare Worker Proietty to inquire about contact
information for paternal grandmother and aunt. Proietty replied
that she did not have contact information for either individual
but would attempt to get that information.
At a March 2023 hearing, father indicated he had no
Native American heritage in his family. Father filed an ICWA-
020 form to a similar effect. In August 2023, the court found no
reason to know ICWA applied to the children. In January 2024,
the court reaffirmed its finding that ICWA did not apply.3
DISCUSSION
Parental-Benefit Exception
Mother and father assert the court erred in finding the
parental-benefit exception inapplicable. We disagree.
2 As neither parent challenges the ICWA proceedings
concerning mother, we do not discuss them.
3 Given that this case does not present exceptional
circumstances, we deny CWS’s motion to augment the record
with an addendum to ICWA matrix report filed in the juvenile
court on May 29, 2024. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
6
“‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
The parental-benefit exception allows the court to consider
a plan other than adoption if it “finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child”
because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent invoking the exception has the burden of proof
and must establish three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact” between the parent
and child; (2) “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating
that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
The inquiry’s focus is the child’s best interests. (Id. at p. 632.)
We review the first two elements for substantial evidence
because they are essentially factual determinations. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We likewise review for
substantial evidence any factual determinations underpinning
the third element. (Id. at p. 640.) “In reviewing factual
7
determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should
‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (Ibid.)
The third element’s “ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) A court abuses its discretion only when
“‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Se.G. did not have a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to either mother or father. Se.G. was just four years
old at the hearing. She had spent nearly half of her young life in
the care of resource parents. (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) When asked an open-ended question
probing how she would feel if she could not see mother anymore,
Se.G. indicated she did not know. Zaragoza testified Se.G. rarely
asked or talked about mother. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 632.) As to father, evidence of attachment is even weaker
given that he visited only about six times during the nearly two-
year dependency. While both parents had positive interactions
with Se.G., “the beneficial relationship exception demands
something more than the incidental benefit a child gains from
any amount of positive contact with her natural parent.” (In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.)
Nor did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in concluding
that severing the parental relationships would not be detrimental
when balanced against the benefits of the adoptive home.
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Although Se.G. did not fully grasp the concept of adoption, she
said getting another family—a “forever family”—“sounded good.”
She indicated she would like for her resource parents to become
her mother and father. Zaragoza described Se.G. as a “happy-go-
lucky kid” who easily reintegrated into her life with the resource
parents. Zaragoza believed severing the parental relationships
would not cause detriment to Se.G. The resource mother
articulated a similar belief. Moreover, Se.G. shared that she
loves her resource parents and home. The court did not act
irrationally in finding the benefit of a stable, adoptive home
outweighed any detriment from severance.
Sibling Relationship Exception
Mother argues the court erroneously found the sibling
relationship exception inapplicable. We disagree.
An exception to termination of parental rights exists when
“[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling
relationship . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) To make this
determination, courts consider “the nature and extent of the
relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child
was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child
shared significant common experiences or has existing close and
strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in
the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional
interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through
adoption.” (Ibid.)
“If the court determines terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is
then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that
sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by
the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101
9
Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) “[W]e apply the substantial evidence
standard to the juvenile court’s underlying factual
determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
court’s weighing of competing interests.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 166, 174.)
The court did not err in finding this exception inapplicable.
Termination of parental rights would not substantially interfere
with Se.G.’s most important sibling relationship—her tie to Sh.G.
While Se.G. had positive bonds with her brothers, particularly
Ivan, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of no
detriment. (See In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 [no
substantial interference with sibling relationship if its
termination would not cause detriment].) Se.G. had not lived
with any of her brothers for nearly two years. Zaragoza testified
no detriment would result if she no longer saw her brothers. The
resource mother likewise felt Se.G.’s inability to see her brothers
would not negatively impact her. When reviewing for substantial
evidence, we do not evaluate witness credibility or reweigh the
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) This is not the
“rare” case in which the sibling relationship exception applies.
(In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
Finally, any deficiencies in the section 366.26 report do not
require reversal. The totality of the evidence before the court,
including extensive hearing testimony, provided a sufficient basis
for its rulings on both the sibling relationship and parental-
benefit exceptions. (See In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th
407, 413 [deficiencies in an assessment report go to the weight of
the evidence].)
10
ICWA
Father contends CWS failed in its initial duty of inquiry
under ICWA by not contacting paternal grandmother and aunt to
inquire about Native American ancestry on the paternal side of
the family. We are not persuaded.
ICWA defines an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25
U.S.C.S. § 1903(4) & (8); § 224.1, subd. (a).)
The juvenile court and county welfare department have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child
subject to dependency proceedings is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This duty “‘“can be divided into three phases:
the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the
duty to provide formal ICWA notice.”’” (In re Antonio R. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429.) Section 224.2, subdivision (b)
specifically includes “extended family members,” among others,
within the duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)
“We generally review ICWA findings for substantial
evidence.” (In re J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 504; see also
§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) When the material facts are undisputed,
“‘we review independently whether ICWA requirements have
been satisfied.’” (In re J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918.)
CWS’s inability to contact Se.G.’s paternal grandmother
and aunt did not constitute abdication of the inquiry duty.
According to a CWS report authored early in the dependency
proceedings, father did not have those relatives’ contact
information. Father also did not indicate these relatives would or
could have any information different than he had reported. The
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report indicates father arranged to send a text message with
contact information for the paternal aunt, but the record lacks
evidence he did so. While CWS has the duty to develop ICWA
information, “we cannot ask the agency . . . to interview
individuals for whom no contact information has been provided.”
(In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.) Nor can we
conclude CWS needed to repeatedly request the contact
information to satisfy its duty.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.G. (mother).
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant H.G. (father).
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
Santa Barbara County Department of Social Services.
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