People v. Davis CA1/2

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Testo completo

Filed 9/17/24 P. v. Davis CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
A169699 & A170137
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(San Francisco County
DON ANGELO DAVIS, Super. Ct. No. CR14031702)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2015, Don Angelo Davis was convicted of first degree residential
robbery (Penal Code,1 § 211), and other offenses. He received a third-strike
sentence of 60 years to life that included enhancements for prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Section 1172.75 mandates resentencing of persons
subjected to such enhancements before 2020. Davis filed a resentencing
petition that the trial court granted in part, imposing a determinate sentence
of 21 years. Davis appealed. His appellate counsel filed a brief stating he
had reviewed the record and found no arguable issues to pursue. (People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231 (Delgadillo).) We notified Davis of his
right to file a supplemental brief (id. at pp. 231–232), which he did. We have

1 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
After Davis filed his
petition in 2022 under what was then section 1171.1, the Legislature
renumbered the provision without substantive change to section 1172.75.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) We cite to section 1172.75 for consistency’s sake.

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evaluated his arguments and found none of
merit.C:\Users\lfischer\Documents\Cleaning (step 1)\h - co_footnote_B00012077441480_1 (Id. at
p. 232 [if appellant submits supplemental brief, the Court of Appeal must
“evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief”].) We thus affirm
the judgment, though we remand for the clerk to correct a clerical error in
the abstract of judgment.
BACKGROUND
Underlying Charges, Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal2
In 2015, Davis was charged with first degree residential robbery
(§ 211), first degree residential burglary (§ 459), and possessing a firearm as
a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged that Davis personally
used a firearm in committing the robbery and burglary (§ 12022.53, subd. (b))
and that he had two strikes (§ 667, subd. (c) & (d); § 1170.12, subd. (b)), two
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and nine prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)). A jury found Davis guilty on all counts, and the jury or
trial court found true all enhancement allegations.
The trial court imposed a third-strike sentence composed of an upper
term of 6 years for first degree residential robbery, plus a 10-year
enhancement for firearm use (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), two 5-year
enhancements for prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and seven
1-year enhancements for prior prison sentences (§ 667.5, subd. (b)),3 yielding
an indeterminate term of 33 years to life. To that, the court added the

2 We draw this summary from our opinion on Davis’s direct appeal.

(People v. Davis (Jan. 6, 2017, A145494) [nonpub. opn.].) Because the facts of
the underlying crime are not relevant to any issue on this appeal and are set
forth in that opinion, we do not recount them here.
3 The record shows the court stayed imposition of sentence on two of the

nine prior-prison-term enhancements, but it does not indicate why.

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enhancements listed above, totaling 27 years, for a total sentence of 60 years
to life.4 We affirmed.
Resentencing Proceedings
In January 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.75. The court appointed counsel, who arranged for an expert witness—
a “mitigation specialist”—to prepare a “Bio-Psychosocial Life History Report.”
Counsel urged the court to perform a full resentencing pursuant to section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), which requires a court to “apply the sentencing
rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (See People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [section 1172.75 authorizes full
resentencing].)
Counsel’s memorandum requested that, in addition to fulfilling its
statutory duty to dismiss the seven 1-year prior-prison-term enhancements
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the court exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence
based on factors discussed in the mitigation report made relevant by recent
amendments to section 1385, governing the dismissal of enhancements (see
Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), and by other recent ameliorative changes in
sentencing law. Noting that Davis’s two strikes were from 1989 and 1995,
counsel asked the court to (1) dismiss the 1989 strike (see People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497); (2) impose the middle or low term for
robbery (see § 1170, subds. (b)(2), (6) & (7), as amended by Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3); (3) strike the newly strikable five-year enhancement for a

4 The court imposed an identical indeterminate term for first degree

residential burglary, which it stayed pursuant to section 654, and a four-year
concurrent term for possessing a firearm as a felon.

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prior serious felony based on the 1989 conviction (see § 667, subd. (a), as
amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1–2); and (4) strike the newly strikable
firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2017,
ch. 682, § 1). In sum, Davis proposed a new determinate sentence of
11 years, consisting of a 3-year low term for robbery, doubled for the
remaining strike (§§ 211, 667, subd (e)(1); § 1170, subd. (b)(6)), and a single
5-year enhancement for the remaining serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)).
The People contended Davis was entitled only to have the seven 1-year
prior-prison-term enhancements stricken (both as components of the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence and in their own right), which
would reduce the aggregate sentence from 60 years to life to 46 years to life.
At the December 2023 resentencing hearing, the trial court accepted
Davis’s arguments in part. It struck the seven prior-prison-term
enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), found that the mitigation report showed
significant youthful trauma suffered by Davis that justified a low term of
3 years on the robbery count (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)), and dismissed the 1989
strike and the 5-year enhancement based on that conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
But the court declined to dismiss the 5-year prior-conviction enhancement
based on the remaining strike or the 10-year gun-use enhancement.
Collectively, those rulings yielded a determinate second-strike sentence of
21 years. The sentence comprises a 3-year low term for robbery (§ 211),
doubled for the 1995 strike (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)); a 10-year firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and a 5-year prior felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court imposed the same sentence on the
burglary count, stayed pursuant to section 654, and a concurrent 16-month

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low term for possessing a firearm as a felon, doubled to 32 months, and also
stayed pursuant to section 654.5

DISCUSSION
After carefully reviewing Davis’s brief, we conclude that many of its
arguments are not cognizable in this appeal, and those that are lack merit.
Davis’s first claim is that, at the resentencing hearing, the court
“struck a 1989 strike that was clearly not before him in [the] preliminary
hearing [in 2015].” Davis claims he was charged initially with only one
strike, and his trial counsel told him, “it would not be the 1989 strike.” Davis
submitted with his supplemental brief a copy of a section 995 motion by his
trial counsel to set aside two counts of the information. Its background
section noted that the People had pled special allegations under provisions
including “[sections] 667(d) & 1170.12(c)&(d) (1 prior strike).” Davis asserts
that, after he declined a plea bargain, he was “informed that the case was no
longer a one-strike case [but] was a two-strike case.” Based on those
allegations, Davis contends the trial court in 2015 “abused its discretion
trying and convicting [him] with a third strike” that was not initially pled.
This argument fails for three reasons. First, like the filing of a petition
for resentencing in light of changes in the law governing accomplice liability
for homicide (§ 1172.6), the filing of a section 1172.75 petition does not give a
petitioner a second chance to claim error in their underlying trial. (People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“The mere filing of a [section 1172.6]

5 The court continued the hearing to February 2024 for a calculation of

custody credits. Davis ultimately filed two notices of appeal: one in
January 2024, after the hearing at which the court determined all aspects of
his new sentence other than credits (appeal No. A169699), and one in
February 2024, after the court resolved that issue (appeal No. A170137).
This court granted an unopposed request to consolidate the appeals for all
purposes.

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petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of
trial error”]; cf. People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 713 [after Supreme
Court ordered remand limited to penalty-phase issues and otherwise affirmed
judgment, defendant cannot raise claims of guilt-phase error on appeal
following remand]; People v. Senior (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531, 535
[“California law prohibits a direct attack upon a conviction in a second appeal
after a limited remand for resentencing”].) Second, Davis has not provided a
record on appeal showing whether, when, or under what circumstances the
court allowed an amendment of the information to allege a second strike, let
alone that it erred in doing so. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609
[“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue
be resolved against [the appellant]’ ”].) Finally, even were Davis’s contention
cognizable and supported by the record, the hearing on his section 1172.75
petition eliminated any possible prejudice, for the trial court struck the
1989 strike and resentenced Davis from scratch to a sentence based on his
having only a single strike.6
Davis also notes that the trial court issued two abstracts of judgment in
2015 and requests that the first abstract “be honored”—by which he seems to
mean treated as limiting his sentence to the term listed therein. The first
abstract, issued on a form designed for cases involving determinate
sentences, recorded only Davis’s four-year determinate sentence for
possessing a firearm as a felon. The second abstract, issued nine days later
on a form for indeterminate sentences, recorded his indeterminate sentences

6 After the trial court resentenced Davis, the clerk of court issued an

amended abstract of judgment that fails to reflect that the court based the
new sentence on Davis having one strike—not zero. We will remand for the
clerk to file an amended abstract indicating Davis was sentenced as a
defendant with a prior strike.

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of 60 years to life for robbery and burglary, with enhancements. Davis’s
request to “honor” one abstract presumes they are in conflict or mutually
exclusive, when in fact they are complementary—one for his determinate
term, one for his indeterminate terms. The request also misapprehends the
nature of an abstract of judgment. It merely records in writing a sentence
pronounced orally. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [“The
record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls”]; People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186 [if oral pronouncement of judgment
and abstract of judgment differ, oral pronouncement controls].)
Davis’s remaining arguments claim errors in his underlying trial and
thus cannot be considered on this appeal following a proceeding limited to
resentencing. (See People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947; cf.
People v. Deere, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 713.)
After finding no arguable issues to pursue on appeal, Davis’s appellate
counsel requested in his brief that we exercise our discretion to review the
entire record of the section 1172.75 proceeding to identify any issues.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 230.) Having exercised our discretion to
do so, we found none (other than the above-noted clerical error in the
amended abstract of judgment).
DISPOSITION
The order resolving Davis’s section 1172.75 petition and the resulting
judgment are affirmed. The clerk of court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment, checking the box in part 4 to indicate that defendant
was sentenced “per PC 667(b)–(i) or PC 1170.12 (strike prior)” and to forward
a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

_________________________
STEWART, P.J.

_________________________
MILLER, J.

People v. Davis (A169699 & A170137)

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