People v. Wilson CA3

CourtListener 10106763Calctapp6 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/6/24 P. v. Wilson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099100

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. CRF14-
0000F73903, 14FF739)
v.

REBECCA JUNE WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Rebecca June Wilson appeals from an order denying her Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition.1 She contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that she could still be found guilty of murder under the current law.
Finding no merit to her contention, we affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2014, the People charged defendant with (among other offenses) the murders of
Tommy Burton and Michael Forsyth. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Defendant ultimately pleaded
guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), two counts of robbery
(§ 212.5), two counts of residential burglary (§ 459), two counts of arson (§ 451, subd.
(b)), two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and being an accessory to
murder after the fact (§ 32). Defendant also admitted to firearm use enhancements
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and to robbery in concert (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)).2 The trial court
sentenced defendant to 26 years eight months in prison.
In 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing under what is now section 1172.6.
The trial court issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated to several facts and to the admission
of: (1) excerpted transcripts of two statements defendant made to detectives; and (2) a
transcript of defendant’s testimony in the case of People v. Byron Willis (Case
No. 14F0739).
According to this evidence, defendant met Forsyth at a property in Ingot,
California, in May or June 2013. She planned a burglary or robbery of the property and
specifically targeted Forsyth because she believed he was a child molester. Defendant
told detectives “who would fuckin’ do that to their own fuckin’ kid. You know what I
mean? Like, he doesn’t deserve anything, you know?” Defendant also told detectives
she knew Forsyth lived at the property but later testified she believed Forsyth only looked
after the property but did not live there. On October 25, 2013, defendant brought her
boyfriend Joshua McCormick and Eric Ratledge to the property to steal from it.

2 As part of the same agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to offenses in three different
cases, which are not relevant here.

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Defendant’s relationship with McCormick was abusive and he was extensively physically
violent with her.
Defendant did not want to rob the property if somebody was there. She did not
think anyone was there when they arrived because there was no car out front--though she
knew it was possible someone would still be there. Defendant also claimed she did not
know McCormick and Ratledge were armed with shotguns and brought zip ties. While
she was driving on the property, defendant encountered McCormick with Forsyth tied up.
Forsyth was peering through a blindfold. Defendant was concerned Forsyth would
recognize her by voice or sight and told McCormick, “when he sees me, he’s gonna know
who I am. I came here with Jesse.” Defendant told law enforcement that, at this point,
she still did not know McCormick had a shotgun. But her testimony suggested
McCormick was holding a shotgun when she discovered Forsyth tied up.
According to defendant, she asked McCormick if they could leave but McCormick
said no. Defendant also claimed she told McCormick not to kill Forsyth. McCormick
then told defendant to go to the trailer and steal the safe. When she returned, McCormick
said Burton had arrived and McCormick had shot him. Defendant approached Burton; he
was still alive, and he reached out to grab her. She went to find Ratledge and tell him
what happened. She then heard a shot, which was McCormick shooting Forsyth in the
head. The victims’ bodies were taken inside separate structures on the property and those
structures were set on fire. Defendant, McCormick, and Ratledge left in a truck with the
stolen goods with defendant driving. Defendant claimed she was going to leave her
accomplices behind because she was freaking out, but she could not get the truck started
and backed up in time. After returning home, defendant helped her accomplices open the
safe and dispose of it. She also used some of the coins taken from the property to
“further [her] drug habit.”
Afterwards, Byron Willis told McCormick and defendant that they should “get
rid” of Ratledge because he was a witness. Defendant believed McCormick and Willis

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had ultimately decided to just beat up Ratledge. She planned to warn Ratledge of the
impending attack but never did. In early November 2013, Ratledge visited defendant and
McCormick’s home. Defendant left because she did not want to be there when Ratledge
got beat up. When she returned, Willis told her he shot Ratledge twice, after which
Ratledge said “I won’t tell anybody, I promise” and ran out the back door. McCormick
and Willis pursued Ratledge and, after catching him, McCormick shot Ratledge in the
head, killing him. Defendant and McCormick used towels and bleach to clean up the
blood and body tissue where Ratledge was shot. Defendant also went to the store to get
more bleach and cleaning supplies. She and McCormick attempted to paint the walls.
In her testimony, defendant admitted to lying to detectives about several aspects of
the crimes, including her involvement in Ratledge’s death. She also admitted lying to
detectives about never having been in the truck that was used for the robbery in Ingot.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that
defendant could still be found guilty of the murders of Burton and Forsyth because she
was a major participant in the underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Applying the factors set forth in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks), the court explained:
“Here, the Petitioner had prior knowledge of the location of the first incident,
having been there previously with someone else. She helped to plan the burglary. She
was also aware of and had the same intent as the co-defendants to burglarize the
residence and steal property prior to going to the location. [¶] Afterwards, she was
aware of the plan to possibly kill or at least beat up Ratledge, who had been part of the
initial incident.
“The second factor is what role the Defendant had in supplying or using lethal
weapons. I think it’s clear from the evidence that the Petitioner denied any prior
knowledge that anyone was armed within that first incident.

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“The third factor is what awareness the defendant had of any particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, the weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants. Here, the Petitioner was aware that co-defendant McCormick was a
violent person. They had a physically abusive relationship. However, by her testimony
and the evidence I’ve read, she didn’t expect there to be anyone at the residence. And as
to the Ratledge death, she knew that Willis initially said he wanted to kill him.
“The fourth factor[] was the Defendant present at the scene of the killings in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder? And did his or her own actions or
inaction play a particular role in the death? [¶] Here the Petitioner was at the scene along
with McCormick and Ratledge. Just prior to McCormick shooting a victim, the
Petitioner said, ‘When he sees me, he’s going to know who I am. I came here with
Jessie[’] . . . . [¶] McCormick then told her to go into the next room to find the safe, and
immediately after that, she heard a gunshot. McCormick afterward told her that he
shot the victim. Later on in the Ratledge death, she was present at the scene.
“The fifth element was what did the Defendant do after lethal force was used? In
that first incident, McCormick told her to move the truck, which she did. She then rode
in the truck back to their house where McCormick and Ratledge retrieved the contents
from the safe. She was also present again at the scene of Ratledge’s death and helped
clean up blood and tissue from the scene. [¶] In other words, this Court’s theory is that
by assisting in the cleanup of the Ratledge death scene, she was also helping to conceal
evidence of the crimes committed in the original scene.”
As to whether defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, the court
explained the factors it considered:
“Here, once again, the Defendant had no prior knowledge that weapons were
going to be used or that anyone was harmed. However, with regard to her proximity to
the crime, she once again was at the scene of all killings. [¶] Her statement to
McCormick that the victim would recognize her immediately preceded McCormick

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killing the victim, and she was present immediately prior to [and] immediately after the
Ratledge killing. [¶] Petitioner’s relationship with the participants. Her involvement in
the planning and her presence at the scene all provided her with many opportunities to
prevent or mitigate the crimes. [¶] Petitioner was, once again, aware of McCormick’s
propensity for violence. She knew of Willis’s stated intention to kill Ratledge. [¶] I
don’t find that there were any efforts along the way of Wilson to minimize the possibility
of violence in the first incident. Petitioner did make an attempt to speak with Ratledge
during the second incident to warn him about something but didn’t do so. She then asked
to leave the scene briefly because she ‘didn't want to be there doing it’. She eventually
left and came back after the killing had occurred and assisted with the cleanup.”
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the trial court stated: “Even if this Court were
to separate the two incidents and not consider Petitioner’s actions that relate to the
Ratledge killing, the second killing, and focus solely on those actions related to the two
killings in the first incident, I would find that the People have met their burden beyond a
reasonable doubt that Petitioner was a major participant in the underlying crime and that
she acted with reckless indifference to human life. [¶] I just feel that the additional
actions of the Petitioner related to the Ratledge killing just further show the extent of her
intimate – intimate involvement, her knowledge and her mental state.”
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find she was
a major participant in the burglary and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
We disagree.
A trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 41-43.) In applying this standard,
we “ ‘ “ ‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,

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credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the
necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citation.] Our job on review is different
from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact
finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
466, 480.) Reversal is not warranted unless “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support the [trial court’s ruling].” ’ ” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
Our Supreme Court has set out the elements required to establish a defendant was
a major participant in a felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
former means a defendant’s personal involvement must be “substantial” and greater than
the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder. (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 802.) The ultimate question “is ‘whether the defendant’s participation
“in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered “major.” ’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 611
(Clark).)
Our Supreme Court identified the following list of nonexclusive factors to
consider when analyzing whether a defendant acted as a major participant: (1) “ ‘What
role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more
deaths?’ ”; (2) “ ‘What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons?’ ”; (3) “ ‘What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed
by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants?’ ”; (4) “ ‘Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position
to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death?’ ”; and (5) “ ‘What did the defendant do after lethal force was

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used?’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
It is not necessary that each factor be present, but the presence of no single factor is
dispositive. Instead, “[a]ll may be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether
the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’
[citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’ ” (Banks, at p. 803.)
As for the mens rea requirement of reckless indifference to human life, our
Supreme Court has explained that a defendant must be “ ‘ “subjectively aware that his or
her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.” ’ ” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 807.) The question is “whether a defendant has ‘ “knowingly engag[ed]
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.” ’ [Citations.] The defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.” (Id. at p. 801.) This requires more than the foreseeable risk of
death inherent in any armed crime. (Id. at p. 808; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 617-618 [participation in an armed robbery, alone, does not demonstrate reckless
indifference to human life].) Instead, the defendant must consciously disregard a
substantial and unjustifiable risk to human life. (Clark, at p. 617.) In addition to a
subjective component, the reckless indifference element also encompasses an objective
component; a reviewing court asks whether the defendant’s behavior was a “ ‘gross
deviation’ ” from what a law-abiding person would have done under the circumstances.
(Ibid.)
Recognizing the overlap between the major participant and reckless indifference
elements (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615), our high court has considered the
following list of nonexclusive factors in determining whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life: (1) a defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and use
and number of weapons; (2) a defendant’s physical presence at the crime and
opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) the duration of the felony;

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(4) a defendant’s knowledge of the cohort’s likelihood of killing; and (5) a defendant’s
efforts to minimize the risks of the violence during the felony (id. at pp. 618-623). No
one factor is required or dispositive. (Id. at p. 618.) We analyze the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether defendant acted with reckless disregard to human
life. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.)
Applying these factors here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant was a major participant in the burglary who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
Defendant planned the crime by targeting Forsyth and telling McCormick and
Ratledge where to go. She was aware McCormick was violent and acknowledged it was
possible someone would be at the property. Knowing McCormick’s violent nature,
defendant told him that Forsyth would be able to recognize her after seeing that
McCormick had tied up and blindfolded Forsyth.3 She was present at the scene when
Forsyth and Burton were murdered and did not take any meaningful steps to stop the
murders or aid the victims, even when Burton reached out to her. She drove McCormick
and Ratledge away with the stolen property after the murders and used some of the stolen
goods to fund her drug habit. She also helped cover up the crimes by helping to clean up
Ratledge’s murder and disposing of the safe. This evidence shows defendant was not
merely a passive participant, but actively participated in the underlying felonies that led
to the victims’ deaths.

3 Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s finding that her “statement to McCormick
that the victim would recognize her immediately preceded McCormick killing the victim”
(italics added) because Forsyth was not the victim who most immediately followed
defendant’s statement. It is not clear from the record when Burton died, though he was
shot before Forsyth. Regardless, the trial court’s point--that McCormick killed Forsyth
soon after defendant recklessly conveyed to him the perceived threat that Forsyth posed--
remains valid.

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Regarding the reckless indifference to human life, the fact that defendant did not
initially know McCormick and Ratledge were armed and brought zip ties weighs in her
favor, as does the fact that she wanted to rob the property when no one was present.4 At
the same time, defendant knew McCormick was violent. Though defendant was present
at the scene, she did not aid the victims or summon help--not even after she discovered
Forsyth was tied up and McCormick was armed, or after McCormick shot Burton. (See
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [“Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to
it may be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable
result of several intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally commits the
murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force”].) Indeed,
instead of intervening, defendant left a defenseless Forsyth alone with McCormick after
McCormick had just shot Burton.
Further, the trial court reasonably concluded that the statement that Forsyth could
identify defendant was made with reckless indifference to Forsyth’s life given
McCormick’s known propensity for violence and that Forsyth was defenseless.
Defendant argues the statement “was made with the intent to convince her accomplices to
immediately end the burglary, not to effectuate a murder to conceal the burglary.” This
contrary inference did not foreclose the trial court from making an alternate reasonable
inference. (See People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591 [explaining that
“contrary and conflicting inferences” must be rejected when reviewing finding of
reckless indifference to human life for substantial evidence]; cf. People v. Myles (2023)

4 We note that a reasonable fact finder could have discounted defendant’s self-serving
statement that she was unaware McCormick brought a shotgun, as this claim strains
credulity. But given that the trial court appeared to accept defendant’s statement, we do
not address this in our analysis.

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89 Cal.App.5th 711, 740 [“for purposes of substantial evidence review, we are not
permitted to draw inferences contrary to the verdict”].)
While acknowledging that she did not intervene in the murders or abandon the
robbery, defendant submits she was powerless to do so given that her accomplices were
armed. As noted, there is conflicting evidence as to when defendant first learned
McCormick had a shotgun. Defendant initially told law enforcement, and now claims in
her appellate briefing, that she did not know McCormick had the shotgun until after the
first victim was killed. This would mean McCormick was unarmed when defendant
drove up in the truck and discovered Forsyth tied up. If this was the case, defendant
could easily have abandoned the robbery plan in its early stages, as she was driving the
vehicle and her accomplices were unarmed. But she chose not to. Instead, she continued
participating in a robbery that ultimately resulted in two deaths. Alternatively, if
McCormick was already wielding a shotgun when defendant discovered Forsyth tied up,
her statement that Forsyth could identify her was even more reckless. And defendant
would then have been aware early in the robbery (prior to either murder) that her
accomplice was armed, but still continued to participate in the robbery. Either scenario
gives rise to inferences that support finding defendant was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
The evidence here is in stark contrast to that in Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522.
There, the defendant’s accomplice killed a person during the robbery of a computer store.
(Id. at pp. 536-538.) Our Supreme Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to
support the inference that the defendant was recklessly indifferent to human life. (Id. at
p. 623.) But in that case, unlike here: (1) there was no evidence the shooter “was known
to have a propensity for violence, let alone evidence indicating that [the] defendant was
aware of such a propensity” (id. at p. 621); (2) the “defendant was not in the immediate
area” where the shooting occurred because he was “orchestrating the second wave of the
burglary” (id. at p. 614); (3) the defendant knew help was on the way for the victim (id. at

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p. 620); and (4) the defendant abandoned the shooter by driving off without him, leaving
him to be apprehended by police (id. at pp. 536-537, 613).
Having found that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion, we
reject defendant’s challenge.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

/s/
Duarte, J.

We concur:

/s/
Earl, P. J.

/s/
Wiseman, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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