P v. Heimlich CA4/3

CourtListener 10105517Calctapp5 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/5/24 P v. Heimlich CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G061974

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19NF1502)

KENNETH ALEXANDER OPINION
HEIMLICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
A criminal defendant is entitled to credits for the number of days
spent in custody prior to sentencing (custody credits). Ordinarily, a trial court
also grants additional credits for good conduct based on a formula devised by
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the Legislature (conduct credits). (Pen. Code, § 4019.)
If a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, proceedings
are suspended. Incompetent defendants are usually treated while in custody
in a state mental hospital, but incompetent defendants can also be treated
while in custody in a county jail. (See § 1368 et seq.)
Incompetent defendants are currently entitled to conduct credits
regardless of whether they are housed in a state mental hospital or a county
jail. (§ 4019.) But in an earlier version of section 4019 (effective 2019 through
2021), incompetent defendants housed in state hospitals did not have the
opportunity to earn conduct credits, while incompetent defendants housed in
county jails did have the opportunity to earn conduct credits.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether this temporary unequal
treatment of incompetent defendants violated the equal protection clause.
There is presently a split of authority among the appellate courts. (People v.
Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App. 5th 319 [finding no equal protection violation];
People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120 (Yang) [finding an equal protection
violation]; People v. Shkrabak (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 943 (Shkrabak) [same].)
We agree with the holdings in Yang and Shkrabak.
Kenneth Alexander Heimlich was charged with several crimes
and found incompetent to stand trial. From October 2020 to February 2021,
Heimlich was treated in a state mental hospital and restored to competency.
Heimlich was later tried and convicted. When imposing a sentence, the trial

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Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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court did not award Heimlich conduct credits for the time he was housed in
the state hospital. We find this was an equal protection violation.
Thus, we reverse Heimlich’s sentence and remand for
recalculation of his presentence custody and/or conduct credits. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2019, Heimlich tried to take a bicycle from a man. When
the man refused to give up his bicycle, Heimlich severely beat him. Later that
day, Heimlich severely beat a second man and took his wallet. Heimlich then
punched a third man who tried to intervene. During his processing into jail,
Heimlich took off his shoes and threw them at an officer.
In September 2019, the prosecution filed an information charging
Heimlich with various crimes: attempted murder, robbery, assault with
means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, battery with serious bodily
injury, and battery on a police officer. Great bodily injury enhancements were
also alleged as to some of the charges.
In December 2019, the trial court found Heimlich incompetent to
stand trial and suspended criminal proceedings. In January 2020, the court
ordered Heimlich to be delivered to the custody of the Department of State
Hospitals. In October 2020, Heimlich was admitted to Atascadero State
Hospital. In February 2021, the Medical Director signed a “Certificate of
Mental Competency,” and Heimlich was later returned to the county jail.
In February 2021, the trial court found Heimlich competent to
stand trial and proceedings were reinstated. In August 2022, after an eight-
day trial, the jury could not reach a verdict as to the attempted murder

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charge and the prosecution dismissed that charge. The jury found Heimlich
guilty of the remaining charges or lesser included offenses. The jury also
found true three great bodily injury allegations.
In October 2022, the trial court sentenced Heimlich to a 10-year
prison term. The court awarded 1,344 days of presentence credits to be
applied against Heimlich’s prison term (1,235 custody credits and 109
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conduct credits). The court found Heimlich was not entitled to conduct
credits for the time he spent in the Atascadero State Hospital because of the
version of section 4019 that was in effect during his hospital commitment.

II.
DISCUSSION
From January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2021, incompetent
defendants housed in state hospitals did not have the opportunity to earn
conduct credits, while incompetent defendants housed in county jails did
have the opportunity to earn conduct credits. In this appeal, Heimlich claims
this version of section 4019 violated the equal protection clause. We agree.
Heimlich’s equal protection claim is a challenge to a prior version
of section 4019. This is a pure question of law; therefore, we apply an
independent standard of review. (See Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 125
[equal protection challenge to section 4019 is reviewed de novo].)
In the remainder of this discussion, we shall: A) review relevant
legal principles regarding presentence credits; B) review relevant legal

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There are discrepancies in the record as to the precise date
when Heimlich began his state hospital commitment. At sentencing, the trial
court determined Heimlich had spent 512 days in the hospital, but the
parties agree this calculation was in error.

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principles regarding the equal protection clause; and C) analyze whether the
version of section 4019 that was in effect from January 1, 2019, to December
31, 2021, violated the equal protection clause.

A. Presentence Credits
A defendant convicted of a felony is generally entitled to credits
applied against an eventual “term of imprisonment” for any actual time spent
in custody before sentencing (custody credits). (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) The
location of a defendant’s custody commitment includes “any time spent in a
jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility,
hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or similar residential institution.”
(§ 2900.5, subd. (a), italics added.)
In addition to custody credits, additional credits are ordinarily
available to a prisoner for good conduct during presentence confinement
(conduct credits). (§ 4019.) “For each four-day period in which a prisoner is
confined in or committed to a facility as specified in this section, one day shall
be deducted from the prisoner’s period of confinement unless it appears by
the record that the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with the
reasonable rules and regulations established by the sheriff, chief of police, or
superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp.” (§ 4019, subd. (c).)
“Historically, ‘section 4019 has provided that defendants confined
in specific facilities and various settings may earn conduct credit for
performing assigned labor and for complying with applicable rules and
regulations.’” (Shkrabak, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947–948.) Prior to
January 1, 2019, incompetent defendants who were treated in state hospitals
or other facilities were not statutorily eligible for conduct credits under
section 4019. (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)

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Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1187 amended section
4019 by adding subdivision (a)(8). Section 4019 now provided that prisoners
undergoing competency restoration treatment in county jail facilities would
be eligible for conduct credits. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 5.)
“Senate Bill 1187 was enacted to ensure that [incompetent]
defendants being held and treated in county jail would be entitled to earn
conduct credits just as other jail inmates. (Assem. Com. On Public Safety,
Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018,
p. 5.) Although legislative analyses reflected the Legislature’s express
awareness that [incompetent] defendants in a state hospital were not
statutorily or constitutionally entitled to conduct credit under [former]
section 4019, the analyses disclosed no explanation why the Legislature—at
that point—declined to similarly extend the availability of conduct credit to
such defendants.” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 126-127.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 317 further amended
section 4019 to provide that prisoners receiving competency treatment in a
state hospital could now also receive conduct credits.3 (Stats. 2021, ch. 599, §
3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) “The legislative history indicates the bill was meant to
‘ensure[] incompetent defendants are eligible for the same time served credit
for good conduct as their competent counterparts, while receiving treatment
in any treatment facility or as an outpatient, not just . . . county jail
treatment.’” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 127.)
Consequently, from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2021,

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“When a prisoner is confined in or committed to a state hospital
or other mental health treatment facility, or to a county jail treatment facility
in [mental incompetency] proceedings . . . .” (§ 4019, subd. (a)(8), italics
added.)

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incompetent defendants housed in state hospitals were not able to earn
conduct credits under section 4019, while incompetent defendants housed in
county jails were able to earn conduct credits under section 4019. The sole
issue in this appeal is whether this temporary unequal treatment of
incompetent defendants was an equal protection violation.

B. Equal Protection
“The equal protection clause . . . provides that no state may ‘deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’
[Citation.] This provision is ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.] ‘At core, the requirement of equal
protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people
unequally without some justification.’” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834, 847, fn. omitted.)
The California Supreme Court recently clarified how California
state courts are to approach the analysis of facial challenges to statutes on
equal protection grounds. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.) The
Court held that “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions
drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at
the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of
the law in question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard
of review.” (Ibid.)
“‘“[I]n cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or touching on
‘fundamental interests’ . . . courts . . . subject[] the classifications to strict
scrutiny.”’ [Citation.] Under strict scrutiny, ‘“‘the state bears the burden of

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establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law
but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its
purpose.’”’” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 131.) The strict scrutiny test
requires that the law being challenged is both narrowly tailored and the least
restrictive means possible to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
(San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 16–17.)
“‘[W]here the law challenged neither draws a suspect
classification nor burdens fundamental rights, the question we ask is
different. We find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational
relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate
government purpose.’” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 131.)

C. Application and Analysis
Again, this case concerns only the former version of section 4019
that was in effect from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2021. Specifically,
the equal protection question is whether section 4019’s temporary denial of
conduct credits to incompetent defendants housed in state hospitals (as
opposed to those housed in county jails) was justified under the appropriate
standard of review (strict scrutiny or rational basis).
The parties disagree on whether the strict scrutiny or the
rational basis test applies to Heimlich’s equal protection claim. Heimlich
argues the strict scrutiny test applies because his inability to earn conduct
credits effectively increased the number of days he must spend in prison, and
therefore his fundamental liberty rights are burdened by section 4019’s
unequal treatment of incompetent defendants. (See People v. Lara (2012) 54
Cal.4th 896, 905–906 [“We need not take issue with the proposition that a
person who is released a day early is punished a day less. The very purpose of

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conduct credits is to foster constructive behavior in prison by reducing
punishment”].) The Attorney General argues that the rational basis test
applies because it “appears more appropriate.” We find that Heimlich plainly
has the better argument.
As the Attorney General concedes, the California Supreme Court
has “applied strict scrutiny, also referred to as the compelling state interest
test, to evaluate disparities in the law concerning credit allowances.” For
instance, the Court held that the denial of conduct credits to mentally
disordered sex offenders (MDSOs) affected their “fundamental” personal
liberty interests; therefore, the Court in that case applied the strict scrutiny
or compelling state interest test in an equal protection challenge. (People v.
Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 228; see also People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d
498, 506–508 [compelling state interest test applied to law affecting conduct
credits]; People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 569 [same].)
Nonetheless, the Attorney General cites two appellate court
opinions involving conduct credits where “courts have applied rational basis
review.” (People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 53; In re Bender
(1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 380, 388–389.) However, we must obviously follow the
precedents of the California Supreme Court, which has applied the strict
scrutiny test. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455 [“The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed
by all the state courts”].)
In any event, the appellate court opinions cited by the Attorney
General are distinguishable on their merits. (See People v. Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 42; In re Bender, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 380.) In both
cases, the defendants argued that amendments to section 4019 that were
favorable to them should apply retroactively. But as the Supreme Court has

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made clear, the equal protection clause cannot be used by a defendant to
challenge the Legislature’s discretion to make prospective-only changes to the
law. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 329–330; see also Yang, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 [“In holding that the prospective-only application of
the 2009 amendment did not violate equal protection principles, Brown was
essentially rejecting the defendant’s attempt to make an end-run around the
amendment’s non-retroactive application”].)
Here, Heimlich does not argue that the January 1, 2022,
amendment to section 4019, which extended conduct credits to incompetent
defendants in state hospitals applies retroactively. “Instead, the instant case
concerns the disparate treatment of two groups of [incompetent] defendants
whose confinement for competency treatment postdated [an earlier] statutory
amendment [effective January 1, 2019,] that authorizes conduct credits only
for those committed to a jail facility but not for those committed to a state
hospital.” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 130–131.)
To reiterate, we must apply the strict scrutiny (or compelling
governmental interest) test to Heimlich’s facial challenge to section 4019
under the equal protection clause. (See People v. Saffell, supra, 25 Cal.3d at
p. 228; People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 506–508 & fn. 6; People v.
Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569.)
Having resolved which equal protection test applies, we now
proceed to analyze the state’s (i.e., the Attorney General’s) proffered
justifications for not granting custody credits to incompetent defendants
housed in state mental hospitals. (See Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 136
[“under strict scrutiny, ‘“the state must first establish that it has a compelling
interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose”’”].)

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The Attorney General appears to be proffering four justifications
as to why the Legislature (for a three-year period) did not allow incompetent
defendants who were being treated and restored to competency in state
hospitals to earn conduct credits, while at the same time the Legislature did
allow incompetent defendants who were being treated and restored to
competency in county jails to earn conduct credits.
The Attorney General’s first proffered justification is that the
purpose of conduct credits is for a prisoner to conform to jail regulations;
therefore, he argues: “The Legislature could have concluded that this
incentive to behave remains appropriate to the jail setting, . . . but not
necessary[ily] for those undergoing treatment in a state hospital, who are not
around general population prisoners.” (Italics added.)
But as the appellate court reasoned in Yang, “state hospitals—
like jails—are structured environments governed by various rules.
[Citations.] Thus, the same interest in incentivizing good behavior appears
equally reasonable and workable for defendants receiving competency
treatment in a state hospital where patients with varying issues and/or
criminal histories or proclivities are housed. [Citations.] Finally, the notion
that the availability of conduct credit would serve no purpose for
[incompetent] defendants confined in a state hospital is undermined by the
recent passage of Senate Bill 317 which, effective January 1, 2022, amended
section 4019 to extend conduct credit to such defendants.” (Yang, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) We agree with the analysis in Yang and reject the
Attorney General’s first proffered justification.
The Attorney General’s second proffered justification is: “The
Legislature could have also rationally concluded that those receiving
competency restoration in a county jail treatment facility receive a different,

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and not as comprehensive treatment as those who receive competency
restoration in a state hospital.”
But the Attorney General offers no facts to support the premise of
his argument, which is that incompetent defendants receive different kinds of
treatment depending upon where they are housed. In any event, even if we
were to accept this premise as true, we cannot fathom why the Legislature
would not want to incentivize good behavior by incompetent defendants
regardless of the kinds of treatment they may be receiving, and regardless of
the location where they may be receiving the treatment (a hospital or a
county jail). In short, we reject the Attorney General’s second proffered
justification under the compelling state interest (strict scrutiny) test.
The Attorney General’s third proffered justification is “because
county jail treatment is intended to be an interim measure only, before
transfer to state hospital.”
But as the court noted in Yang, based on the legislative history of
section 4019, the Legislature’s impetus for extending competency treatment
to incompetent defendants housed in county jail facilities was to address “a
longstanding problem with bed availability in state hospitals for treating
[incompetent] defendants.” (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 137.) The Yang
court reasoned that: “Every defendant found incompetent to stand trial meets
the same standard for commitment (§ 1367, subd. (a)), and the circumstance
that an [incompetent] defendant may be committed to either a jail facility or
a state hospital depending on the availability of a bed provides yet another
reason to invalidate the challenged conduct credit disparities.” (Ibid.) We
again agree with the analysis in Yang and reject the Attorney General’s third
proffered justification.
The Attorney’s General’s fourth proffered justification is frankly

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difficult to understand. By way of background information, defendants who
are convicted of serious felonies are generally limited to 15 percent conduct
credits, meaning that they must effectively serve 85 percent of their total
sentences. (§ 2933.1.) Section 2933.1’s limitation to conduct credits appears to
apply to incompetent defendants while they are being treated in a county jail,
but it does not appear to apply to incompetent defendants while they are
being treated in a hospital. Based on this differential treatment of violent and
nonviolent defendants under section 2933.1, the Attorney General argues,
incompetent “defendants in appellant’s position who were subject to the
section 2933.1 limitation would receive a windfall that their counterparts in
county jail did not, thus justifying the Legislature not immediately extending
the benefit.”
What is perplexing about the Attorney General’s argument is
that Heimlich’s equal protection claim is plainly a facial challenge to section
4019, and not a challenge to section 2933.1, or any other statute. Under the
version of section 4019 as it existed from January 1, 2019, to December 31,
2021, incompetent defendants were not able to earn conduct credits while
they were being housed in state hospitals, regardless of whether they were
later convicted of violent felonies or nonviolent felonies. In short, we fail to
understand how the 15 percent credit limitation for defendants convicted of
violent felonies under section 2933.1 has any bearing on our equal protection
analysis of Heimlich’s facial challenge to the former version of section 4019.
(See Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 136 [“incentivizing good behavior
appears equally reasonable and workable for defendants receiving
competency treatment in a state hospital where patients with varying issues
and/or criminal histories or proclivities are housed”].)
To conclude, we hold that the Legislature’s denial of conduct

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credits under section 4019 to incompetent defendants housed in state
hospitals from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2021, was not justified by
any compelling governmental interests and therefore the law constituted a
violation of the equal protection clause. (Accord, Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
120; Shkrabak, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 943.)
In this case, Heimlich was found incompetent to stand trial and
he was housed in a state hospital for approximately two months during the
relevant timeframe. And at the time of his sentencing hearing, the trial court
denied Heimlich conduct credits under section 4019 while he was in the
hospital. Thus, we find that Heimlich’s sentence was in violation of the equal
protection clause. We remand this matter for an accurate determination of
the number of credits Heimlich is entitled to during his presentence
confinement at the county jail and at Atascadero State Hospital.

III.
DISPOSITION
Heimlich’s sentence is reversed; the matter is remanded. The
trial court is directed to recalculate Heimlich’s presentence custody credits,
and to award the number of conduct credits Heimlich is entitled to under
section 4019. The court should prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward it to the Department of Corrections.

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In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.

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