CourtListener 10105515•People v. Lopez CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 9/5/24 P. v. Lopez CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publi-
cation or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or-
dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169183
v.
DANIEL LOPEZ, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR228164)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Daniel Lopez appeals after a remand for resentencing. His
appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues, but asking this court for an
independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues
that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or
modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende).) Defendant has filed a brief raising several arguments, including
challenges to his original trial. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),1 three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)), and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
1
subd. (a)(1)) and found true several enhancements. Defendant filed a motion
for new trial and a Romero motion.2 The trial court denied both motions and
sentenced defendant to an aggregated term of 111 years 8 months to life,
which included the imposition of two, one-year enhancements for defendant’s
prior prison terms.
On direct appeal of the conviction (People v. Lopez (Mar. 17, 2022,
A154417) [nonpub. opn.]), this court struck the one-year prior prison term
enhancements in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which
amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to limit its prior prison term
enhancements to only prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses, as
defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b), and
remanded the matter to the trial court for a full resentencing hearing.
(Lopez, supra, A154417.) In all other respects, we affirmed. (Ibid.)
Upon remand, the trial court denied defendant’s renewed Romero
motion and imposed a new aggregate term of 109 years 8 months (reduced by
two years for the stricken prior prison term enhancements) with credit for
2,875 days.3 Defendant filed the instant appeal, and his counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of
the record. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.)
As our Supreme Court recently explained, Wende held that “Courts of
Appeal must conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed
counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which raises no specific issues or
describes the appeal as frivolous.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, 221.) The Wende procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3 The court filed both a determinate and indeterminate amended
abstract of judgment.
2
compelled by the constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.” (Delgadillo, at p. 221.)
Delgadillo held that Wende independent review is not constitutionally
required in an appeal from a postconviction order denying a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing because the denial does not implicate a defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel in a first appeal as of right. (Delgadillo, at
pp. 222, 224–225.) It further held that if the defendant files a supplemental
brief, the court must evaluate the arguments presented, but the court is not
required to independently review the entire record to identify unraised
issues. (Id. at p. 232.) Although the postconviction relief at issue here is
different than that in Delgadillo, the same principles apply because this is
not defendant’s first appeal as of right. We therefore address the issues in
defendant’s supplemental brief and further exercise our discretion to
independently review the record.
Issues Raised in Supplemental Brief
Challenges to Original Trial
In his supplemental briefing, defendant raises several errors that
allegedly occurred during his original trial, including that the trial court
erred in admitting certain in-court identifications and excluding his expert’s
testimony, and prosecutorial and juror misconduct. None of these issues are
cognizable in this appeal. (People v. Senior (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531, 535
[“California law prohibits a direct attack upon a conviction in a second appeal
after a limited remand for resentencing”]; see People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d
705, 713 [appellate claims regarding the guilt phase of trial could not be
raised in a subsequent appeal following remand as to the penalty phase only
where the judgment had been affirmed in all other respects in the original
appeal].)
3
Racial Justice Act
Defendant also raises a claim under the Racial Justice Act (RJA)
(§§ 745, 1473, subd. (f), 1473.7, subd. (a)(3)). Specifically, defendant, who is
Hispanic, maintains he was “over sentenced due to [his] race,” and that his
sentencing judge and Solano County courts sentence Hispanic and Black
inmates to much more “severe” sentences than other races convicted of the
same crime. (§ 745, subd. (a)(4).)
Effective January 1, 2021, the RJA prohibits the state from seeking or
obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence
“on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).)
As relevant here, section 745, subdivision (a)(4) states a violation of the RJA
occurs where a “longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the
defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted
of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more
frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or
national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.” (§ 745,
subd. (a)(4)(A); People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 966.)
As originally enacted, “defendants could seek relief by filing a motion in
the trial court or, if judgment had been imposed, by filing a ‘petition for writ
of habeas corpus or a motion under section 1473.7, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).)’ [Citation.] When
enacted, section 745 applied only prospectively to cases in which judgment
had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.” (People v. Lashon (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810 (Lashon); Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2020, ch. 317.) “Section 745 was later amended effective
January 1, 2023, to provide for retroactive application to judgments that were
4
not final and created a timeline for judgments entered before January 1,
2021. (Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) After retroactive application became
possible, section 745 was modified by Assembly Bill [No.] 1118 (Stats. 2023,
ch. 464), effective January 1, 2024,” providing a third means for defendants to
seek relief. (Lashon, at p. 810.) As relevant, defendants may now seek relief
through: (1) motion filed in the trial court or in a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) a petition for habeas corpus; or (3) for claims “based on the
trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of
subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.” (§ 745,
subd. (b); Lashon, at p. 810.)
The principle holding of Lashon is that while a defendant may now
pursue an RJA claim on direct appeal from the judgment, the appellate
principles of forfeiture and waiver apply and therefore a defendant cannot
raise an RJA claim for the first time on appeal. (Lashon, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 810.) Defendant failed to make any mention of the RJA
during the resentencing proceedings and has therefore forfeited any RJA
claim on direct appeal therefrom. (Id. at pp. 809–816.)
In addition, defendant’s RJA claim is not based solely on the trial court
record. Rather an RJA claim asserting the Solano County courts, including
the trial court here, have sentenced Hispanic and Black defendants more
harshly than defendants of other races “necessarily involve[s] facts existing
beyond the trial court record” and therefore cannot be resolved on a direct
appeal from the challenged judgment or sentence. (Couzens et al.,
Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group Aug. 2024 Update) ¶ 28:6; § 745,
subd. (b) [only claims based on the trial record may be raised on direct
appeal].)
5
In sum, for at least two reasons, defendant’s RJA claim is not properly
before this court. “This does not leave [defendant] without an adequate
remedy,” as he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
appropriate court. (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 817–818.)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also claims his counsel at the resentencing hearing was
ineffective because he did not provide the court his files showing defendant’s
mental and physical health issues and evidence of his rehabilitation.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) “must
show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” measured against “prevailing professional norms.”
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.) “Reasonableness must
be assessed through the likely perspective of counsel at the time.” (People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 445.) We “ ‘ “defer to counsel’s reasonable
tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
[citation], and there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 876.) Additionally, the defendant must also
establish prejudice: “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Strickland, at p. 694.) “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Ibid.)
As defendant notes, at a resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, the
court “may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
6
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since
the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interests of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the record shows defense counsel
did argue for a lesser sentence, pointing out defendant’s health issues and
rehabilitative efforts.
With respect to defendant’s health issues, counsel identified in his
sentencing memorandum as a factor in mitigation that defendant was
suffering from a mental or physical condition that greatly reduced his
culpability. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(2).) At the hearing, counsel
argued, “regarding the physical or mental condition, . . . from what I
understand he was at a bar drinking, so I think that would also factor into
him having a mental condition that has effected [sic] his ability to think
rationally at that point in time.”4 Counsel further stated defendant “has
some medical issues that he’s been dealing with from what I understand
since he was tried back in 2015, 2016, specifically injuries to his back, his
neck, his leg. That’s why he’s in a wheelchair, so Mr. Lopez’s lifespan based
on those injuries I will think will be less than the average person,” and in
light of “his health conditions,” counsel asked for 20 years to life because then
defendant would be 60 years old.
Regarding defendant’s rehabilitative efforts, counsel told the court
defendant had given him, that afternoon, “certificates and things regarding
his school.” Defendant, himself, presented the documents to the court
4 We note, however, that defendant has not claimed he suffered a
mental illness at the time of the offense or that his conduct gave rise to the
underlying charges, as would be required for purposes of dismissing an
enhancement (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)) or as a factor in mitigation (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.423(b)(2)).
7
stating, he “wanted to show part of my rehabilitation, things I’m doing.” The
trial court went through the documents and listed each one for the record
stating, “There is a Health Right 360 from Family Ties through the sheriff.
There is an Individual Change plan certificate through the sheriff’s
department. There is a self-control and substance abuse cognizant behavior
program through the sheriff’s department.” None of the certificates were
dated, but the court confirmed they were all within the most recent period of
his incarceration when he “came back from the state prison and was here in
the county jail.” Additionally, the court observed there was a “Solano
Community College Rising Scholars program fall semester 2023 and shows a
syllabus and looks like maybe some course work but introduction to
philosophy class. It’s fall of 2023, so all this has been recent.”
We also observe that, at the original sentencing hearing, defense
counsel asked the same trial court to consider, among other things, that
defendant had “suffered a devastating injury, debilitating injury for his
entire life” at his job “when he was set to be a supervisor. There is a workers’
compensation claim that is pending,” and “after this devastating injury . . .
there was great depression for Mr. Lopez and, you know, devastating changes
in his life.”
In short, the record shows counsel apprised the trial court of
defendant’s mental and physical difficulties. And defendant, himself,
presented evidence of the classes and rehabilitative efforts he had
undertaken. Indeed, defendant does not explain exactly what information his
counsel assertedly failed to provide the court. Thus, on this record, there is
no basis for concluding defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at
the resentencing hearing.
8
Independent Review
We have also exercised our discretion to independently review the
record and find no arguable issues on appeal.5
However, “ ‘on [our] own motion or upon the application of the
parties,’ ” we may correct clerical errors in the abstract of judgment. (People
v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; ibid. [clerical errors in abstract of
judgment may be ordered corrected at any time]; People v. Burke (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244 [ordering correction of clerical errors in abstract of
judgment following Wende review]; see People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831,
855 [“Any discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as
recorded in the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the
result of [a] clerical error.”].) Accordingly, we will order the trial court to
correct the abstracts of judgment as follows:
First, the captions of both the determinate and indeterminate amended
abstracts of judgment reflect a sentencing date of April 27, 2018, the date of
the original sentencing. The court shall correct the captions to reflect the
date of the resentencing hearing, which was October 2, 2023.
Second, the captions of both amended abstracts state defendant’s
counsel at the resentencing hearing was Ms. Meenha Lee. However, Ms. Lee
was relieved as counsel and Mr. Rashaan Jones was appointed and
5 Defendant also requests new appellate counsel, arguing he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s contention is without merit.
Simply filing a Wende brief does not deem counsel’s performance as
ineffective. Both counsel and this court notified defendant of his right to file
a supplemental brief, which he has done. As stated above, having
independently reviewed the record there are no arguable issues for new
appellate counsel to make on defendant’s behalf. Accordingly, defendant’s
request for appointment of new counsel is denied.
9
represented defendant at his resentencing hearing. The court shall correct
the captions to reflect Mr. Rashaan Jones as defendant’s counsel.
Finally, the amended determinate abstract of judgment should be
corrected to reflect the updated credits awarded by the trial court toward
defendant’s determinate term—2,500 days of actual credit plus 375 days of
local conduct credits, for a total of 2,875 days.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the court is directed to prepare
amended abstracts of judgment reflecting the correct date of the resentencing
hearing, defendant’s counsel at the resentencing hearing, and the credits
awarded by the trial court and to forward certified copies to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
10
_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
_________________________
Siggins, J.*
*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
A169183, People v. Lopez
11
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.