Smith v. Guillosson CA2/2

CourtListener 10103320Calctapp3 set 2024

Testo completo

Filed 9/3/24 Smith v. Guillosson CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

GREGORY EDWARD SMITH, B327837

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant (Los Angeles County
and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
19STCV33506)
v.

JEAN-CLAUDE GUILLOSSON
et al.,

Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Malcolm H. Mackey, Judge. Affirmed.

Jean-Claude Guillosson and Maureen Mansfield-
Guillosson, in pro. per., for Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Appellants.
Gavrilov & Brooks, Bradley E. Jewett and Michael
Coleman for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
______________________________

Appellants Jean-Claude Guillosson and Maureen
Mansfield-Guillosson (the Guillossons) appeal from the trial
court’s denial of their motion to compel respondent Gregory
Edward Smith (Smith) to execute an acknowledgment of partial
satisfaction of the judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Underlying Litigation and Judgment
Smith and the Guillossons owned adjacent residential
properties in the Hollywood Hills, which we refer to respectively
as the Smith property and the Guillosson property. A dispute
arose regarding the use of two easements—one benefitting the
Smith property (the patio easement) and another benefitting the
Guillosson property (the walkway easement). Smith sued the
Guillossons, and the Guillossons filed a cross-action against
Smith. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where Smith
prevailed on each of his claims and the cross-claims against him.
In October 2021, the trial court entered judgment in Smith’s
favor.
The judgment awarded Smith a total of $126,500 in
compensatory damages, comprised of: (1) $15,000 for the
diminution in value to the Smith property and the related loss of
use and enjoyment of the patio easement; (2) $8,000 for obtaining
and recording an updated property survey and staking the
boundaries of the patio easement; (3) $1,500 for the cost of

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rebricking the patio area; (4) $1,000 for Smith’s pain and
suffering; (5) $100,000 for the expense of removing the
Guillossons’ encroachments from the Smith property, including a
gate, retaining wall, and concrete walkway; and (6) $1,000 for
fines Smith paid due to the Guillossons’ encroachments.
The judgment also provided injunctive relief. As relevant
here, it permitted (1) “Smith to rebrick the land subject to the
[p]atio [e]asement”; and (2) “Smith and any contractor, agent
and/or representative working on Smith’s behalf to enter the
Guillosson [p]roperty for the purpose of removing the
[e]ncroachments from the Smith [p]roperty . . . .”
The Guillossons did not appeal from the judgment, which
became final.1
II. Sale of the Smith Property; Partial Assignment of Rights
On April 6, 2022, Smith sold his property to Casa For You,
LLC (Casa For You) for $1,010,000. Smith subsequently
assigned “the non-compensatory land use rights set forth in
the . . . judgment” (bolding omitted) to Casa For You, including
the provision of injunctive relief. Smith “retain[ed] all rights to
[the] compensatory damages” set forth in the judgment. On
June 8, 2022, the Guillossons filed an objection to Smith’s partial
assignment of rights to Casa For You.
III. Motion for Acknowledgement of Partial Satisfaction of the
Judgment
On August 2, 2022, the Guillossons filed a postjudgment
motion for acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the

1 Smith appealed from a postjudgment order denying his
motion for attorney fees. We affirmed. (Smith v. Guillosson
(Jan. 30, 2024, B322717) [nonpub. opn.].)

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judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.110 et seq.2
Specifically, the Guillossons sought an order “(1) compelling
Smith . . . to acknowledge that the [j]udgment in its order to pay
$101,500.00 to Smith for costs for future remediation is satisfied
in that Smith has sold his property without performing the
remediation work . . . ; (2) directing the clerk . . . to enter a
partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount of $101,500.00;
[and] (3) requiring Smith to pay to the Guillossons their attorney
fees in the amount of $8,940.00 for bringing th[e] [m]otion
pursuant to . . . [s]ection 724.260.”
The Guillossons argued that, because Smith had sold his
property, he no longer had the “capacity . . . to perform
remediation work as provided in the [j]udgment . . . or to receive
payment from the Guillossons for such work.” The Guillossons
contended that $101,500 of the compensatory damages “was
specifically and expressly provided for future remediation”—
$100,000 for removing the encroachments onto the Smith
property and $1,500 for rebricking the patio.
Smith opposed the motion. In an accompanying
declaration, Smith averred: “Based on my research and
understanding of the Los Angeles residential real estate market
and my understanding of the value of the [Smith property] as the
(now former) owner thereof, I understand that the sale price of
the [Smith property] was hundreds of thousands of dollars below
the market price for comparable properties. . . . This reduced sale
price was based in large part on the encroachments the
Guillossons built on and refused to remove from the [Smith
property]. My understanding from [Casa For You] is that [Casa

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

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For You] purchased the [Smith property] at a below market price
knowing that [Casa For You] would have to bear the financial
burden of removing the [e]ncroachments.”
IV. Trial Court’s Order
After entertaining oral argument, the trial court denied the
Guillossons’ motion on January 13, 2023. The court’s minute
order stated: “The [c]ourt cannot discern that there would be a
windfall profit. Logically, the sales price of the [Smith] property
was diminished due to conveying it without the improvements,
and with the burden of the buyer taking on that expense.”
V. Appeal
The Guillossons filed a timely notice of appeal from the
order denying their motion for acknowledgment of partial
satisfaction of the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Justiciability
As an initial matter, we address the justiciability of the
Guillossons’ appeal. Smith contends that we “must dismiss this
[a]ppeal as untimely” because it is a belated attack on the long-
final judgment.3
We certainly agree that the judgment is now final and,
therefore, not subject to collateral attack. (Summit Media LLC v.
City of Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 921, 932 (Summit
Media) [“a litigant ‘may not collaterally attack a final judgment
for nonjurisdictional errors[]’”].) But, here, the Guillossons are
not purporting to attack the judgment itself. Rather, they have
appealed from the postjudgment order denying their motion for
acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the judgment. We have

3 Smith raises this argument in his respondent’s brief; he did
not file a separate motion to dismiss the appeal.

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jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(2)
[an appeal may be taken from an order made after an appealable
judgment]; cf. Horath v. Hess (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 456, 462
[“Postjudgment orders granting or denying section 724.050
motions [for acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment] are
appealable”].)
II. Relevant Law
A judgment debtor “may serve on the judgment creditor a
demand in writing that the judgment creditor execute,
acknowledge, and deliver an acknowledgment of partial
satisfaction of judgment . . . .” (§ 724.110, subd. (a).) If the
judgment creditor does not timely comply with the demand, the
judgment debtor may move the trial court for an order requiring
compliance. (§ 724.110, subd. (b).) “If the court determines that
the judgment has been partially satisfied and that the judgment
creditor has not complied with the demand, the court shall make
an order determining the amount of the partial satisfaction and
may make an order requiring the judgment creditor to comply
with the demand.” (Ibid.)
III. Standards of Review
We review the denial of a motion for acknowledgement of
partial satisfaction of a judgment for an abuse of discretion. (See
Jhaveri v. Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 [“A trial
court’s decision to apply a credit in partial satisfaction of the
judgment is an exercise of the court’s equitable discretion”].) “An
abuse of discretion occurs when, in light of applicable law and
considering all relevant circumstances, the court’s ruling exceeds
the bounds of reason. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
This appeal also requires us to construe the terms of the
judgment. We do so de novo. (See Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co.

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(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326 [“The interpretation of a
judgment . . . is a question of law subject to a court’s de novo
review”].)
IV. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Guillossons’ Motion
The judgment awarded Smith a total of $126,500 in
compensatory damages. The record, however, does not reflect
that the Guillossons had paid any amount to Smith as of the
filing of their motion for acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of
the judgment. The Guillossons do not dispute this. Rather, they
contend that Smith failed to comply with a “condition precedent”
to receive $101,500 of the judgment—that is, to perform the
remediation work of removing the encroachments onto the Smith
property ($100,000) and rebricking the patio ($1,500).
Accordingly, they argue, they are entitled to an $101,500 “offset”
against the judgment.
The Guillossons misinterpret the judgment. The judgment
provides compensatory damages to Smith “for the cost of
re[]bricking the patio area” and “for the expense of removing the
Guillossons’ encroachments from the Smith [p]roperty,” as well
as “an injunction permitting Smith to rebrick the land subject to
the [p]atio [e]asement]” and “an injunction permitting Smith . . .
to enter the Guillosson [p]roperty for the purpose of removing the
[e]ncroachments . . . .” While permitting Smith to undertake the
remediation work, the plain language of the judgment does not
require him to do so and does not condition receipt of
compensatory damages on the completion of such work. The
compensatory damages at issue were simply measured by the
estimated costs of remediation. The judgment contains no
condition precedent to Smith’s entitlement to those damages.
(See Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 334, col. 1 [defining

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“condition precedent” as “[a]n act or event, other than a lapse of
time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something
promised arises”].)
As the premise of the Guillossons’ motion is fundamentally
flawed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.
Nevertheless, urging reversal, the Guillossons raise various
challenges to the trial court’s order. All lack merit.
First, the Guillossons take issue with the trial court’s
reasoning that, “[l]ogically, the sales price of the [Smith] property
was diminished due to conveying it without the improvements,
and with the burden of the buyer taking on that expense.” It is
axiomatic, however, that we “‘review the trial court’s order, not
its reasoning, and affirm an order if it is correct on any theory
apparent from the record.’ [Citation.]” (City of Claremont v.
Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164, fn. 3.) In any event, we
find nothing unreasonable about the court’s statement, which
merely explains the rationale for measuring damages based on
estimated costs of remediation. (See Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985)
164 Cal.App.3d 427, 431 [rejecting contention that a “plaintiff
may not recover the reasonable cost of making repairs to the
premises without actually making the repairs and incurring the
attendant expense”].)
Second, the Guillossons fault the trial court with
disregarding declarations filed in support of their motion. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we assume that the court
followed the law and considered all admissible evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 664.) That the court did not rule in the Guillossons’ favor
does not mean that it failed to consider or give any weight to
their evidence.

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Third, the Guillossons assert that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to redetermine the amount of damages awarded in
the judgment, which had become final. This argument is
irrelevant because the court’s order did not alter the judgment in
any manner.
Finally, the Guillossons argue that the trial court’s order
unfairly exposes them “to a permanent cloud on the land title”
and the potential for the new owners of the Smith property to
seek damages from them. To the extent that this is a challenge
to the judgment itself, it is untimely and improper. (See Summit
Media, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 932.) It is also entirely
speculative and does not meet the Guillossons’ burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error on appeal. (See Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion for acknowledgment of
partial satisfaction of the judgment is affirmed. Smith is entitled
to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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