Simon v. Brabec CA1/3

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Filed 8/30/24 Simon v. Brabec CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LORAN SIMON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A168223
v.
TODD BRABEC, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CCH-22-584550)
Defendant and Respondent.
LORAN SIMON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A168226
v.
WHITNEY GOLDSEN, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CCH-22-584652)
Defendant and Respondent.

Loran Simon appeals from two judgments denying his requests for civil
harassment restraining orders (CHRO) against defendants Todd Brabec and
Whitney Goldsen.1 He contends the trials were marred by numerous due
process violations, including both procedural issues and alleged bias by the
presiding judge. Simon also asserts the trial court erred in awarding

1 On April 26, 2024, this court granted Simon’s unopposed motion to

consolidate Simon v. Brabec (Case No. A168223) and Simon v. Goldsen (Case
No. A168226).
attorney’s fees and denying his motions for new trial. We disagree and affirm
the judgments.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Simon and Brabec own separate units within a three-unit building in
San Francisco. Brabec has owned his unit since 2004, and Simon owned his
unit since 2021. Both serve on the Homeowners Association (HOA) board.
Goldsen is a tenant in Brabec’s unit.
On April 6, 2022, Simon sought a temporary restraining order and
CHRO against Brabec. Simon alleged that (1) Brabec repeatedly sent Simon
“9 harassing emails” after Simon requested that Brabec not communicate
with him, (2) forged Simon’s name on a USPS parcel, (3) mailed Simon “torn-
up and ripped-up envelopes and documents,” (4) engaged in belligerent and
racist behavior, (5) closed a door leading to Simon’s unit to make it physically
difficult for him to access his unit, (6) intentionally played loud music, and (7)
had unauthorized workers in the yard without providing notice to Simon.
On May 9, 2022, Simon sought a temporary restraining order and
CHRO against Goldsen. Simon asserted Goldsen intentionally hit Simon
with a door and continuously closed a door leading to Simon’s unit, making it
difficult for Simon to access his unit.3

2 On March 12, 2024, Simon filed an unopposed motion to augment in

Simon v. Brabec, which this court granted on March 28, 2024. On April 5,
2024, Simon filed an unopposed motion to augment in Simon v. Goldsen,
which we now grant.
3 Simon also filed two other CHRO requests. One CHRO was against
another unit owner in the building, Deborah Rosenthal. The trial court
denied that CHRO request, which is the subject of a separate appeal
currently pending before this court, Simon v. Rosenthal (Case No. A168225).
The other CHRO was against the co-owner of Brabec’s unit, Simon v. Nancy
Goldsen. That matter is not before this court.

2
Brabec and Goldsen both denied the allegations in response to the
CHRO requests. Brabec stated Simon engaged in numerous instances of
verbal abuse and threats of litigation after he and Rosenthal declined to
amend the Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions (CC&Rs) to either grant
Simon exclusive use of the shared deck and backyard or allow him to build a
separate deck on the rear of his unit. Brabec noted he had never met Simon
in person as Brabec resides in Southern California. Goldsen stated she did
not intentionally hit Simon with a door and was unaware he was leaning
against the opposite side of the door when she attempted to open it. She
“ha[d] not touched the fire door leading to [Simon’s] unit” but noted the Fire
Marshall had previously issued violations due to failures to keep the door
closed.
The CHROs were initially scheduled to be heard on June 10, 2022. The
matters were continued six times, to an eventual hearing date of April 4,
2023.
On February 10, 2023, Simon filed an amended CHRO request. He
alleged Goldsen intentionally vandalized and destroyed notices and signage
Simon had placed in the building and the “private corridor leading to my
unit.” Simon alleged this conduct was racially motivated. Goldsen again
denied the allegations, stating the signs were removed because they were not
authorized by the HOA board and violated the CC&Rs.
On March 30, 2023, the dockets in Simon v. Brabec and Simon v.
Goldsen indicate Judge Tong in Department 505 was recused, and the matter
was “continued” to the same date and time but in Department 502 before
Judge Ross. All parties appeared as ordered on April 4, 2023. The record
does not reflect any party objecting to the commencement of trial in
Department 502 at that time. The court first tried Simon v. Brabec followed

3
by Simon v. Goldsen, with the Goldsen matter concluding the morning of
April 5, 2023. The evening of April 4, 2023, Simon sought to continue the
Goldsen matter due to alleged bias by Judge Ross.4 The filing was rejected as
Simon had used an outdated form, and it is unclear whether Simon refiled
the request.
On April 13, 2023, Simon sought to file a motion to disqualify Judge
Ross for cause. The motion asserted (1) a reasonable person would entertain
doubt as to whether Judge Ross would be able to be impartial, (2) Judge Ross
“has shown racial bias and racial prejudice against [Simon],” and (3) Judge
Ross should disqualify himself but refuses to do so. Simon alleged a variety
of malfeasance against Judge Ross, including that Judge Ross: (1) failed to
disclose a campaign contribution from defense counsel; (2) failed to disclose a
gift from the San Francisco Trial Lawyers Association; (3) converted the
CHRO hearing into a trial and advanced the trial date “without proper
notice”; (4) prevented Simon from filing a peremptory challenge; (5) “called
the Sheriff (law enforcement) on me for no legitimate or lawful reason in an
attempt to threaten, humiliate, and embarrass me”; (6) had improper ex
parte communications with opposing counsel; (7) “intentionally went off-
record” when Simon sough to preserve objections; (8) discriminated against
Simon because of race by refusing any scheduling accommodations and
“show[ing] preferential treatment to Caucasian parties”; and (9) likely had
notice of various complaints Simon lodged against Judge Ross with the
Offices of the Presiding Judges and other administrative bodies.
The clerk’s office rejected these filings because the court had entered
orders on April 10 and 11 denying the CHRO requests and dismissing the

4 Simon asserts he sought a request for accommodations, but the cited

records only contain a request for a continuance.

4
petitions with prejudice. Simon filed subsequent statements of
disqualification on May 19, 2023.
Simon then moved for a new trial. He raised thirteen bases for his
motion, including irregularity of proceedings, accident or surprise, newly
discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficient evidence
to support the decision, decision was contrary to law, error in law, failure by
Judge Ross to disclose gifts/campaign contributions and recuse himself, racial
bias and prejudice, and reasonable doubt regarding Judge Ross’s
impartiality.
In advance of the hearing, Simon filed “supplemental CRC Rule 3.1306”
declarations in support of his motion for new trial. These declarations raised
numerous other arguments, including that Goldsen was not an owner or HOA
member, the CC&Rs were fraudulently rescinded, the court misinterpreted
the CC&Rs, the existence of “new evidence” from HOA meetings, and
allegations of witness and evidence tampering.
On June 12, 2023, Simon filed a petition for writ of mandate,
challenging the court’s order striking his statement of disqualification in
Simon v. Brabec. On June 15, 2023, Simon filed a petition for writ of
mandate, challenging the court’s order striking his statement of
disqualification in Simon v. Goldsen. Simon filed subsequent petitions for
writ of mandate related to his statements of disqualification in both matters
on September 12, 2023. After issuing Palma5 notices in response to the
initial petitions, this court denied Simon’s second set of petitions. (See Simon
v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (Case No.
A168666); Simon v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco
(Case No. A168665).)

5 Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171

5
On June 14, 2023, the court denied Simon’s motions for new trials.
After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, the court “found no
factual or legal basis for granting” either motion. Simon filed objections to
the court’s judgments and orders. He objected on numerous grounds that
substantially mirrored the issues raised in his motion for new trial and
supporting declarations.
On June 30, 2023, the court entered judgments in both matters. Those
judgments dismissed the respective petitions with prejudice and awarded
$21,505.00 in attorney’s fees to Brabec and $7,507.50 in attorney’s fees to
Goldsen. Simon timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Simon challenges the validity of the trials and subsequent
judgments based on his for-cause challenges to Judge Ross, the court’s failure
to properly consider his accommodation request, and the court’s failure to
properly notice the transfer of trial to Department 502. Simon further
asserts the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs and abused
its discretion in denying his motions for new trial. We address each
argument in turn.
I. The CHRO Trials
Simon raises various due process arguments regarding the CHRO
trials and Judge Ross’s role therein. Under state and federal law, due
process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a
neutral decision-maker. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County
Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) “ ‘We review procedural due
process claims de novo because “the ultimate determination of procedural
fairness amounts to a question of law.” ’ ” (Severson & Werson, P.C. v.
Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944.) If there is a violation of due

6
process, reversal is not required if it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (In re Enrique G. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 676, 686–687.)
A. Simon’s Claims Against Judge Ross
Simon contends Judge Ross should have been disqualified as he
displayed bias and a lack of impartiality during the trial. He further
contends Judge Ross’s bias violated his due process rights to an impartial
judge.
1. Statement of Disqualification for Cause
Simon asserts the court erred in rejecting his April 2023 statement of
disqualification for cause. Simon asserts his statement of disqualification
should have been determined by another judge under the procedures set forth
in the Code of Civil Procedure, and a “different result” would have been
“reasonably probable” without the error.
Simon was required to raise this argument in a petition for writ of
mandate, and it cannot be raised on appeal.6 “The exclusive avenue for
review of orders regarding disqualification is by writ of mandate.” (Rivera v.
Hillard (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 976.) While an exception to this rule
exists for claims asserting a deprivation of constitutional due process rights,
Simon’s argument focuses on statutory compliance. (In re Marriage of M.A.
& M.A. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 894, 903, fn. 5 [party may obtain review of
disqualification order on appeal “for claims asserting the deprivation of
constitutional due process.”].)

6 And, in fact, Simon raised these issues in multiple writ petitions,

which were resolved by this court. (See, e.g., Simon v. Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco (Case No. A167996); Simon v. Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco (Case No. A168033); Simon v.
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (Case No. A168665);
Simon v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (Case No.
A168666).)

7
Simon thus cannot seek review of any alleged statutory violations
arising from the denial of his statement of disqualification in this appeal. To
the extent he reasserts his claims of bias and lack of impartiality that formed
the basis for his disqualification motion in his assertion of a due process
violation, we address those arguments in Part I.A.2., post.
2. Other Claims Against Judge Ross
Simon also asserts his due process rights were violated because Judge
Ross was engaged in an ongoing “controversy” with him, displayed bias, and
lacked impartiality.
“ ‘The Due Process clause “requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal before
a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome
of his particular case.” ’ [Citations.] However, ‘ “[o]nly in the most extreme of
cases would disqualification on the basis of judge bias be constitutionally
required.” ’ ” (Sivak v. Hardison (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3d 898, 924.) As
relevant here, due process requires recusal if a judge becomes personally
“embroiled in a running, bitter controversy” with a litigant. (Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania (1971) 400 U.S. 455, 465.)
Here, Simon has not identified a “running, bitter controversy” that
would raise questions about Judge Ross’s impartiality. The only
“controversy” identified by Simon arose from the various complaints against
Judge Ross that Simon sent to the presiding judge, the Court’s Elimination of
Bias Committee, and the Commission on Judicial Performance. The mere
existence of such complaints is insufficient; otherwise, any litigant who was
unhappy with a judge’s rulings could assert allegations of bias and then claim
that due process required recusal because of a “running controversy.” Simon
has not cited any authority adopting such an approach, and we decline to
create such a rule.

8
Furthermore, the evidence Simon cites—a letter to Simon from the
presiding judge, an email from the chair of the court’s Elimination of Bias
Committee, and an email from a judge tasked with assessing Simon’s
complaint—does not demonstrate “there was a mounting display of an
unfavorable personal attitude toward [Simon].” (See Taylor v. Hayes (1974)
418 U.S. 488, 501–502.) None of the evidence cited by Simon indicates Judge
Ross allowed any “personal feelings” to impact the proceedings or otherwise
took action against Simon because of the allegations. (See id. at p. 503.)
Accordingly, Simon has failed to prove Judge Ross was personally “embroiled
in a running, bitter controversy” with him or overcome the “strong
presumption that a judge is not biased or prejudiced.” (Rhoades v. Henry (9th
Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 511, 519.)
Next, Simon contends Judge Ross was biased, prejudiced, and lacked
impartiality during the proceedings based on the following allegations:
• Judge Ross “mocked and ridiculed” him when he made evidentiary
errors during trial.

• Judge Ross imposed “arbitrary and misleading time limits” on Simon
for presenting his cases.

• Judge Ross was “continuously short” with Simon, and “showed patience
only to the Caucasian parties in his courtroom.”

• Judge Ross failed to disclose his status as a landlord, and appeared to
be relying on his experience and preemptively concluding Simon’s
cameras were illegal.

• Judge Ross ignored Simon’s request for accommodations under
California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 while acquiescing in “ ‘Caucasian
defendants[’]’ ” scheduling requests.

• Judge Ross received a gift from witness Deborah Rosenthal’s
corporation.

9
• Judge Ross received a campaign contribution from attorney Joshua
Davis, counsel for Brabec and Goldsen.

• Judge Ross had improper ex parte communications.

• Judge Ross called the Sheriff on Simon for no legitimate or lawful
reason, causing petitioner to fear for his life.

• Judge Ross’s “procedural errors” in handling Simon’s statement of
disqualification “is proof positive of prejudice.”

Simon has not supported his allegations so as to show a due process
violation. Rulings made against Simon, such as denying a continuance or
accommodation, are not evidence of bias or impartiality. (Brown v. American
Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“The trial judge’s
adverse legal rulings and denial of a request for a continuance do not reflect
personal bias.”].) Nor are allegations based on speculation or “belief”
sufficient to support judicial disqualification. (See N. Beverly Park
Homeowners Ass’n v. Bisno (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 762, 778.)
To the extent Simon alleges the court made inappropriate comments
during trial, a review of the record does not support Simon’s claim. For
example, Judge Ross’s comment, “I think you are a member of the bar, are
you not?” was made in the context of the court determining how much
explanation it needed to provide regarding how to procedurally offer exhibits
into evidence. When Simon responded in the affirmative, the court then
stated, “Okay. So, you know what I’m talking about. If you want to admit an
exhibit into evidence, you have to lay a foundation, give a copy to opposing
counsel, and then we will admit it in evidence and I’ll consider it.” Likewise,
Judge Ross’s comment about the cameras was an attempt to clarify whether
the witness said “legally” or “illegally” because he “didn’t hear.” The other
statements identified by Simon are likewise reasonable or insufficient to
demonstrate bias when considered in the context in which they arose.

10
Next, Simon’s allegations that Judge Ross “called the Sheriff” on Simon
or engaged in ex parte communications are conclusory at best as they lack
context and/or factual support. Simon provides no context for either event or
evidence that (1) ex parte communication occurred, or (2) the presence of a
bailiff in the courtroom was targeted at Simon and was done “ ‘for no
legitimate or lawful reason.’ ” Nor does Simon explain how these events
demonstrate that Judge Ross was not impartial or otherwise support
disqualification. An appellate court “need not consider . . . a perfunctory
assertion [in a brief] unaccompanied by supporting argument.” (People v.
Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 616, fn. 8.)
Similarly, Simon mentions campaign contributions without discussing
whether the manner of the gifts or the amounts at issue would give rise to
any presumption of bias or due process violation. Such assertions without
analysis are deemed waived. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellant’s burden “requires more than a mere
assertion that the judgment is wrong. . . . When an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”].)
Accordingly, Simon has failed to demonstrate Judge Ross was biased or
lacked impartiality such that Simon was denied his due process rights.
B. Other Challenges to the CHRO Trials
Apart from his claims against Judge Ross, Simon challenges two
aspects of the CHRO trials that he contends violated his due process rights:
(1) the CHRO trials were improperly reassigned from Department 505 to
Department 502; and (2) the court failed to properly address his request for
accommodations under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100.

11
1. Reassignment to Department 502
Simon contends Judge Ross and Department 502 “lacked subject
matter jurisdiction” over the CHRO trials because the local rules required the
CHRO requests to be heard by the CHRO division.
“Government Code section 69508, subdivision (a) provides: ‘The judges
of each superior court having three or more judges, shall choose from their
own number a presiding judge who serves as such at their pleasure. Subject
to the rules of the Judicial Council, the presiding judge shall distribute the
business of the court among the judges, and prescribe the order of business.’ ”
(Alvarez v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 969, 977–978 (Alvarez).)
“The presiding judge’s full authority over judicial assignments is spelled out
in [California Rules of Court,] rule 10.603. Rule 10.603(c)(1) confirms the
presiding judge ‘has ultimate authority to make judicial assignments.’ Rule
10.603(b)(1)(A) and (B) authorizes the presiding judge to ‘[a]ssign judges to
departments,’ ‘designate supervising judges for divisions,’ and ‘[a]pportion
the business of the court, including assigning and reassigning cases to
departments.’ Rule 10.603(c)(1)(D) directs the presiding judge to ‘[r]eassign
cases between departments as convenience or necessity requires.’ ” (Alvarez,
supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 978, italics added.)
Here, the judge assigned to Department 505, who generally hears
CHRO matters, recused herself. Accordingly, the matters were reassigned
for the CHRO hearings to Department 502. This reassignment was well
within the powers of the court. “The assignment procedure is an allocation ‘of
the “business” of the court among judges of the court’ over which the
presiding judge has ‘wholly discretionary’ authority.” (Alvarez, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 980.)

12
The authorities on which Simon relies do not hold otherwise. Witkin’s
California Procedure, which Simon cites repeatedly, discusses when “a
distinct subject matter” is given to a special department or court “by
statute”—i.e., probate and juvenile courts. (See Witkin, Cal. Proc. (6th ed.)
§§ 278, 281.) Apart from these unique statutorily created courts, Witkin
emphasizes that “[t]he creation of ordinary departments for the convenient
disposition of classes of cases does not, on any theory, involve a distribution
of subject matter jurisdiction[, and] all these judges have concurrent
jurisdiction over civil actions and special proceedings.” (Witkin, Cal. Proc.
(6th ed.) § 281.) “[T]he authorized and procedurally sufficient transfer or
reassignment of a cause that has been set for trial or hearing, to another
department, is not a transfer of jurisdiction but merely a convenient means of
securing a speedy determination.” (Ibid.)
Department 502 did not lack jurisdiction to hear the CHRO matters,
and these trials were properly assigned to Judge Ross after the judge in
Department 505 recused herself.
2. Notice of Reassignment to Department 502
Next, Simon contends he was not provided proper notice of the
reassignment from Department 505 to Department 502.
“ ‘An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
[Citations.] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, [citation], and it must afford a reasonable time for
those interested to make their appearance [citations]. But if with due regard
for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are

13
reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. . . . [¶] . . . The
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method
may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected . . . .’ ” (Rasooly v. City of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348,
356–357.)
Simon has not shown his due process rights were violated. Although
there is no written notice in the record, courts may infer actual notice from
the facts of a case. (In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 259.) These
matters were two of three filed by Simon that were simultaneously
transferred to Judge Ross for trial. The dockets reflect this transfer from
Department 505 to Department 502. Moreover, the day prior to the trial
Simon filed a supplemental brief and declaration in support of his CHRO
request, which identified the department as “502” and the judge as “The
Honorable Jeffrey Ross.” Simon also acknowledged that Department 505
orally informed him these cases—Simon v. Brabec and Simon v. Goldsen—
had been transferred to Department 502 for trial. The record further reflects
that Judge Ross informed the parties all three cases had been sent to him for
trial. Because the record indicates the court provided Simon with actual
notice of the April 4, 2023 hearing in time to appear, there was no due
process violation. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 316 [no due
process violation where party in question had both actual notice and an
opportunity to be heard].)
Moreover, even if the court failed to give proper notice, any such error
was harmless. (See In re Iris R. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 337, 343 [“due
process error [does not] per se warrant a reversal, but rather is subject to a
harmless error analysis”].) Simon appeared at the trials. After each matter
was called, Simon proceeded with presenting his argument and testifying on

14
his own behalf. He had the opportunity to call witnesses and offer evidence.
At no point did he claim to be unprepared or otherwise surprised that trial
was commencing in Department 502 before Judge Ross.
3. Request for Accommodation
Finally, Simon contends he made verbal and written requests for
accommodation, but Judge Ross ignored his requests and “failed to provide
[Simon] with the process due under” California Rules of Court, rule 1.100.
The purpose of California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 is “[t]o ensure
access to the courts for persons with disabilities.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
1.100(b).) A request for accommodation “must be made . . . no fewer than 5
court days before the requested implementation date.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 1.100(c)(3).) Such request may be oral or in writing, and “must include a
description of the accommodation sought, along with a statement of the
medical condition that necessitates the accommodation.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 1.100(c)(2).)
Here, nothing in the record indicates Simon made a request for
accommodation as a “person with disabilities” pursuant to this rule. In the
middle of the Brabec CHRO trial, Simon and the court engaged in the
following exchange:
Simon: “Your Honor, could we go off the record--”
Court: “No. I think we need to continue with your testimony. These
three cases have to conclude by noon today. . . .”
Simon: “Can I go off the record and approach with you and counsel?”
Court: “Excuse me. No. We’re on the record. This is your trial. Please
proceed with your testimony.”
Simon: “Your Honor, I would like to disclose an issue with you and
counsel.”
Court: “Please do it on the record. . . . We want a complete record.”

15
Simon: “It is a confidential medical issue, and I don’t want to disclose it
on the record or in public. . . .”
Court: “If there’s anything you want me to consider, it has to be on the
record. I can’t take -- have the communications off the record
about evidence in the case. We need to have a complete record.”
Simon: “It’s not about evidence.”
Court: “Are you asking for a continuance?”
Simon: “No, not at this time.”
Court: “Okay. Then please proceed with your testimony.”
The record indicates that Simon never requested a disability accommodation
or indicated he was seeking a disability accommodation. Likewise, in the
subsequent CHRO hearing in Simon v. Goldsen, Simon only informed the
court he would be “filing a notice of continuance” later that afternoon “[o]n
the basis that I have a medical appointment.” He did not state he was
seeking a disability accommodation or indicate in any manner that his
requested continuance was necessary to accommodate a disability. And the
subsequent filings by Simon were requests for a continuance—form CH-115—
and not a disability accommodation requests—form MC-410. Accordingly,
the processes set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 were never
triggered.7
Moreover, even if Simon’s vague reference to a medical issue could
qualify as an official disability accommodation request, he failed to make the
request five days prior to the implementation date—i.e., the date of trial—as
required by subdivision (c)(3). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.110, subd.

7 Simon also references an email he sent to the presiding judge.

However, to the extent the email asserts Simon requested Judge Ross provide
medical accommodation, the record demonstrates otherwise.

16
(c)(3).) Simon does not assert any argument for why this time limit should be
excused. Accordingly, Simon has failed to demonstrate any error.
II. Judge Ross Was Entitled to Proceed With the CHRO Trials and
Post-Trial Proceedings After Simon Filed His Disqualification
Motion
Simon incorrectly asserts the court was unable to rule on his CHRO
requests, deny his motions for new trial, or grant Brabec’s and Goldsen’s
requests for attorney’s fees after Simon filed his statements of
disqualification. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1)
provides, “If a statement of disqualification is filed after a trial or hearing has
commenced . . . by the swearing of the first witness . . . , the judge whose
impartiality has been questioned may order the trial or hearing to continue,
notwithstanding the filing of the statement of disqualification.” Here, Simon
did not file his motions for disqualification for cause until April 13, 2023 and
May 19, 2023—after both CHRO trials had been completed. Accordingly,
Judge Ross was entitled to rule on the CHROs and determine post-trial
motions despite Simon’s statements of disqualification.
III. Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Simon challenges the court’s award of attorney’s fees to Brabec and
Goldsen. He contends the awards are excessive, do not correspond to
Brabec’s and Goldsen’s responses to the CHRO requests, and are
unreasonable.
A. Relevant Background
In May 2023, following the CHRO trials, Brabec and Goldsen filed
motions for attorney’s fees and costs. Both asserted they were entitled to fees
as prevailing parties.
Brabec argued his counsel’s rates were comparable to those charged by
other attorneys performing similar work, and the number of hours billed was

17
reasonable. Specifically, he noted the CHRO was “contentious and
complicated,” due to the allegations of racism and discrimination, the various
HOA issues, and a separate civil lawsuit filed by Simon raising may of the
same issues, which required coordination with other counsel. He further
noted that the case involved multiple continuances, which required
additional preparation for new hearing dates. He sought fees and costs in the
amount of $46,570.64.
Likewise, Goldsen asserted her counsel’s rate and number of hours
billed were reasonable. She noted the same complexities as set forth in
Brabec’s motion in support of her fee request. She sought fees and costs in
the amount of $8,638.40.
Simon opposed both motions. In connection with Brabec’s motion,
Simon argued fees are discretionary and a fee award would “have a chilling
effect on plaintiffs who file legitimate CHRO cases.” Simon asserts his
factual allegations were not in dispute but rather how such facts should be
interpreted, and Simon reasonably interpreted Brabec’s conduct to be
harassing. Simon further argued Brabec’s counsel’s fees are “unreasonably
inflated.” He noted (1) Brabec’s counsel claimed to be ready to try the matter
in June 2022, but then proceeded to charge “another $25,026.65,” between
that date and the eventual hearing date in April 2023, and (2) Brabec’s
counsel did not distinguish between his work on Simon v. Brabec as
compared to those incurred in Simon v. Whitney Goldsen or Simon v. Nancy
Goldsen. Simon also disputed the requested costs, both as untimely and
unreasonable.
Simon raised the same objections to Goldsen’s motion as asserted in
opposition to Brabec’s motion. He also claimed the fee request was untimely.

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The court granted Brabec’s and Goldsen’s fee requests. In connection
with both requests, the court first concluded the billing rate of $325 per hour
is “reasonable in the context of fees charged by Bay Area attorneys” and the
fact that “the litigation . . . intertwined civil harassment law, property
issues[,] and homeowners’ association matters.” The court then reviewed the
billing statements submitted by counsel. In connection with Brabec’s motion,
the court struck certain fees related with counsel’s “review” of “HOA history”
and related litigations and disallowed billings for an associate attorney “as
this matter did not require the services of two attorneys.” After removing
these and other unspecified items, the court awarded $21,505 in fees. The
court found all of the fees sought by Goldsen’s counsel reasonable, and
awarded $7,507.50 in fees. The court denied both Brabec’s and Goldsen’s
request for costs, concluding they “did not file a Memorandum of Costs . . .
and therefore the right to recover costs is waived.”
B. Fee Award
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (s), authorizes courts
to award “court costs and attorney’s fees” to the prevailing party. The statute
does not limit the recovery of attorney’s fees “to those instances where a
party’s conduct was frivolous or in bad faith.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 796, 803.) “ ‘ “ ‘On review of an award of attorney fees after
trial, the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a
reasonable fee. . . . As we have explained: “The ‘experienced trial judge is the
best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and
while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong’ ”—meaning

19
that it abused its discretion.’ ” (People ex rel. Becerra v. Shine (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 288, 293.)
Simon first contends the fee award was “to punish [Simon] . . . due to
the multiple continuances,” but those delays “were not the fault of [Simon].”8
However, nothing in the record indicates that fees were sought or awarded to
penalize Simon. And Simon cites no authority to support his claim that fees
are excessive when awarded in cases with continuances. While Simon
asserts certain continuances were based on Brabec’s requests and should not
justify additional fees, that merely raises a question of whether the court
should have exercised its discretion to exclude those amounts.
More specifically, Simon contests the invoices as excessive because:
(1) the invoices contained entries involving “re-reviews” of material, and
(2) the invoices failed to separate costs in this matter from those related to
Simon v. Whitney Goldsen and Simon v. Nancy Goldsen. However, Simon
does not identify any line items that indicate fees for Simon v. Whitney
Goldsen and Simon v. Nancy Goldsen were included in the disputed invoices.
Likewise, Simon does not address whether these charges were part of the fees
struck by the court. Based on this court’s review of the invoices, it appears
the fees disputed by Simon regarding “re-reviews” total approximately
$5,800. But the court struck over $21,000 in requested fees.
Here, the record indicates the court appropriately examined the billing
statements in detail and did, in fact, exercise its discretion to exclude
approximately half of the requested fees. This reduction presumably includes
any excessive duplication of work, as well as other items the court found

8 Simon also argues Brabec never sought “to modify, terminate, or

dismiss the TRO or CHRO request” or request a more expedited hearing.
This argument is irrelevant to the question of whether the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding fees.

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excessive or unnecessary. In light of the court’s significant reduction in the
requested fees, Simon fails to identify with any detail which additional fees
he contends should have been excluded.
Next, Simon argues Brabec and Goldsen were awarded “hidden costs”
that were listed on their counsel’s invoices as expenses. However, the record
demonstrates that the court recognized the invoices contained both fees and
costs. In awarding attorney’s fees, the court only considered the fee section of
the invoices—which this court confirmed by reviewing the fee totals listed on
each invoice. The “expense” section of the invoice—i.e., the costs—were
deemed waived and not awarded, as discussed above.9
Finally, Simon appears to suggest Brabec’s and Goldsen’s failure to list
a specific dollar amount on their CHRO response precludes any award of
attorney fees and costs. However, Simon fails to cite any authority for this
position. Nor are we aware of any authority suggesting the right to seek
attorney’s fees is waived by a party’s failure to delineate all such fees in his
or her response to a CHRO request.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering the fee awards. While the “re-review” entries suggest
duplication, the record indicates the court conducted a detailed review of the
invoices and struck over $21,000 in fees—an amount that easily encompass
those entries as well as others. Accordingly, we decline to find error.

9 Simon seems to conflate the cost of items, such as any telephone call

charge, with the attorney fees for the time incurred in conducting those calls.
Here, the court properly excluded the cost of the telephone call, but allowed
recovery of some portion of counsel’s time.

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C. Timeliness and Service of Fee Motions
Simon contends Brabec’s and Goldsen’s motions were untimely because
they were not filed sixteen days prior to the hearing date. He contends there
is “no exemption or exception to the timeliness requirements.”
To the contrary, “ ‘[a] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject
late-filed papers.’ ” (Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1210.)
“ ‘The principal purpose of the requirement to file and serve a notice of
motion a specified number of days before the hearing ([Code Civ. Proc.,]
§ 1005, subd. (b)) is to provide the opposing party adequate time to prepare
an opposition. That purpose is served if the party appears at the hearing,
opposes the motion on the merits, and was not prejudiced in preparing an
opposition by the untimely notice.’ ” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 828–829.)
Brabec and Goldsen assert they set the June 8, 2023 hearing date for
their motions at the instruction of the court. The record indicates Simon filed
detailed oppositions. He does not contend he was impaired in his ability to do
so or to appear and argue the motions. Accordingly, the trial court had
discretion to accept the filings, and Simon has not demonstrated any
resulting prejudice.
Simon also contends the motions were improperly served. He did not
raise this issue below, and thus it is waived. (Arambula v. Union Carbide
Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 342 [“A party who appears at the hearing
on a motion and contests the motion on the merits without objecting to a
defect or irregularity in the notice of motion ordinarily is deemed to waive the
defect or irregularity”].)

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IV. Denial of Motions for New Trial
Simon contends he timely filed a motion for new trial and lists the
thirteen bases on which his motion was based. He asserts his motion
included grounds such as “[i]rregularity in the proceedings,” “[a]ccident or
surprise,” “[n]ewly discovered evidence,” and “[e]xcessive or inadequate
damages.” Simon’s subsequent argument is contained in one sentence: “But
the structure errors were a miscarriage of justice and requires reversal and a
new trial.”
A new trial motion may be granted based on irregularity in the court
proceedings, accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, insufficient
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or for any error in law, which
occurred at the trial and to which the party making the new trial motion
objected. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subds. 1, 3, 4, 6 & 7.) While Simon listed all
these as grounds for his new trial motion, he failed to explain why they
support his claim for new trial and why the trial court erred in denying his
motion. (Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
498, 523 [“Conclusory assertions of error are ineffective in raising issues on
appeal.”].) Having failed to elaborate or support his position, Simon’s
argument is deemed forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondents may recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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_________________________
Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A168223/Simon v. Brabec
A168226/Simon v. Goldsen

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