Siddiqui v. Molayem CA2/1

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Filed 8/28/24 Siddiqui v. Molayem CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RUBY SIDDIQUI, B317507, B319705

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SC127504)
v.

GEORGE MOLAYEM et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Stanley H. Kimmel and Stanley H. Kimmel
for Defendants and Appellants.
Child & Marton and Bradford T. Child for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
_______________________________
Defendants Hill Street Jewelers USA, Inc. (Hill Street) and
George Molayem (collectively, defendants) committed fraud
against plaintiff Ruby Siddiqui when they induced her to pay
$171,663.15 for jewelry she successfully bid on through their
online jewelry auctions, by misrepresenting that the auctions
were affiliated with the United States government and
misrepresenting the sources, quality, and workmanship of the 63
items of jewelry she purchased. Defendants do not challenge the
trial court’s determination, made after a court trial, that Siddiqui
had been defrauded, but they do challenge the amount of
restitution damages and prejudgment interest awarded, as well
as the award of punitive damages.
After the bench trial, the trial court awarded Siddiqui
$171,663.15 as restitution for rescission of the auction contracts
based on fraud; prejudgment interest on that amount at an
annual rate of 10 percent from the date Siddiqui paid defendants
for the jewelry; and $343,326.30 in punitive damages (two times
the restitution amount). We affirm the trial court’s award of
restitution and punitive damages. However, we agree with
defendants that the court erred in awarding prejudgment
interest at the 10 percent rate applicable to breach of contract
claims. We reverse that portion of the judgment and remand the
matter for recalculation of prejudgment interest.
Siddiqui appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order
1
denying her motion for attorney fees under Civil Code section
1717 based on an attorney fees provision in the auction contracts.
The trial court concluded Siddiqui is not entitled to attorney fees
because (1) the contractual fee provision states that it applies

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

2
only to collection actions and (2) this action is not “on a contract”
within the meaning of section 1717. We disagree with these legal
conclusions. Under section 1717, the attorney fees provision
must be applied to all claims on the auction contracts in order to
effectuate the complete mutuality of remedy intended by the
legislature. This action for rescission of the auction contracts
based on fraud is “on a contract,” in that an interpretation of the
terms and conditions of the contracts was integral to the trial
court’s resolution of Siddiqui’s claims and defendants’ defenses
thereto. We reverse the order denying Siddiqui’s motion for
attorney fees and remand the matter for a determination of the
amount of attorney fees to award her.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Siddiqui Decides to Use Her Disability Insurance
Payment to Start a Jewelry Business
In 2012, Siddiqui became disabled from her profession as a
medical doctor. In 2015, she received a lump sum payment from
her disability insurance. She had previously learned to make
jewelry during an earlier illness and she decided to start a
business with the funds from her disability insurance. She
devised a plan to purchase some pieces of jewelry from federal
government auctions, refurbish them, and sell them for a higher

2
Unless otherwise specified, the summary of events is
taken from Siddiqui’s trial testimony. As discussed, post, the
trial court found her testimony to be credible and found
Molayem’s testimony on important issues to be not credible.

3
price. She trusted government auctions more than other auction
houses because she did not believe she “would get cheated” there.
B. Siddiqui Finds “Federal Government Auction” and
“U.S. Jewelry Liquidation,” and She Purchases 63
Pieces of Jewelry Through Them for $171,663.15
Siddiqui searched online for auction houses. She
discovered a website called Invaluable that connected her with
many different sellers. Through Invaluable, she found “Federal
Government Auction” and “U.S. Jewelry Liquidation.” Based on
their marketing, she believed these auction sites were affiliated
with the United States government. Federal Government
Auction represented on its website that its luxury inventory came
from tax delinquency cases, and it listed a case number in
connection with each piece of jewelry. Siddiqui did not see
anything on the websites indicating Federal Government Auction
and U.S. Jewelry Liquidation were not affiliated with the United
States government.
The auction catalogs Siddiqui reviewed before she placed
her bids, included photos and descriptions of each item of jewelry.
She relied on these photos and descriptions in deciding to bid on
certain items. Some of the pieces also had gemological reports
associated with them that were purportedly signed by a graduate
gemologist. She took note of these reports before she made her
bids, believing they looked official. She explained, “It was very
important to [her] that there was an actual gemological
laboratory that had looked at the jewels and certified them.”
The auction catalogs for Federal Government Auction
included terms and conditions, which Siddiqui skimmed before
she placed her bids. She understood that all sales were final, and
she knew she would owe a buyer’s premium of 19 percent as well

4
as a restocking fee of 25 percent if she canceled her purchase.
She did not see a term indicating Federal Government Auction
was not affiliated with any federal government agency.
On April 15, 2016, Siddiqui successfully bid on 55 items of
jewelry from Federal Government Auction. The following day,
she was the high bidder on six items from U.S. Jewelry
Liquidation. On April 17, 2016, she successfully bid on an
additional item from Federal Government Auction and another
from U.S. Jewelry Liquidation. She received invoices for her
purchases totaling $171,663.15. The invoices included black-and-
white photos of the jewelry she purchased and descriptions of the
jewelry.
On April 18, 2016, Siddiqui received a text message and an
email from defendant Molayem, who indicated he worked for a
company called “Multi Auction Services,” an entity that serviced
Federal Government Auction and U.S. Jewelry Liquidation.
Molayem requested that she wire a total of $171,663.15, in two
separate wire transfers, to a bank account in his name. The
same day, Siddiqui went to her bank and made the transfers as
instructed.
C. Siddiqui Discovers Federal Government Auction and
U.S. Jewelry Liquidation Are Not Affiliated With the
United States Government, and She Attempts to
Cancel Her Purchases
Within 30 minutes after she made the wire transfers,
Siddiqui called Molayem to let him know her bank had sent
them. She asked him why the wires were going to a personal
account instead of a federal government account. She inquired

5
about his connection with the federal government. He indicated
he had none, explaining, “ ‘It’s just marketing.’ ”
Siddiqui conducted online research regarding Molayem and
discovered his affiliation with defendant Hill Street. She learned
that Hill Street conducted business under many different names.
After subsequent telephone conversations and text messages with
Molayem, she believed “this was a really clever scam,” and she
did not want to be a part of it. She attempted to cancel the wire
transfers, but the bank told her it was too late.
During their telephone calls, Siddiqui told Molayem she
wanted to cancel her auction purchases and asked him not to
send the jewelry. Molayem said there would be a “restocking fee”
and other charges totaling around $70,000, even though she had
not received any of the jewelry yet.
On April 25, 2016, Siddiqui sent an email to Molayem,
attempting to cancel her purchases and get a full refund of the
money she paid. She was unsuccessful. On April 27, 2016,
Molayem advised Siddiqui that her request to cancel the
transactions was denied and represented that most of the auction
lots were under inspection getting ready to ship.
On May 2, 2016, Siddiqui sent Molayem another email to
the same effect as her previous email. By this point she had
received invoices for her purchases from Invaluable, which
included color photos of the items she purchased (instead of the
black-and-white photos she received in the invoices from
defendants), and she realized the photos of the items and the
descriptions of the items in the invoices did not match (e.g., color
of the stones).
After defendants refused her requests to cancel the
purchases, Siddiqui demanded they ship the jewelry to her

6
immediately. She made the demand because she suspected
defendants did not yet have the jewelry in their possession, and
she wanted to confirm her suspicion. On May 18, 2016, Siddiqui
refused to accept a delivery that came from defendants’ address.
At some point, thereafter, Siddiqui told Molayem she would
forfeit the $70,000 in fees and charges if defendants would refund
the rest of her money. They declined to refund any of her money.
D. Siddiqui Files This Action and Shortly Thereafter
Defendants Send Her Some of the Auction Items
Under the Guise of Amazon Shipments
In May 2017, more than a year after Siddiqui made her
purchases from defendants, she filed this action seeking return of
her money and other damages. Around a month later, in June
2017, Siddiqui received two packages in Amazon boxes, that she
believed were products she had purchased from Amazon. She
opened the boxes and found little baggies inside containing
jewelry. She had not asked defendants to send her the jewelry at
that time. She noticed that the jewelry she received did not
match the photos and descriptions of the items on which she bid
during the auctions. Moreover, the boxes contained four fewer
pieces than what she had ordered. She taped the boxes back up
and placed them on a shelf in her closet and did not reopen them.
In the operative first amended complaint in this action,
Siddiqui asserted causes of action for fraud, statutory fraud
3
under Business and Professions Code section 17533.6,

3
Under Business and Professions Code section 17533.6,
subdivision (a), except in circumstances not relevant here, “it is
unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association that is a
nongovernmental entity to use a seal, emblem, insignia, trade or

7
conversion, and violation of Penal Code section 496 (receipt of
property obtained by theft). On the fraud cause of action—which
alleges defendants defrauded her by making misrepresentations
in the auction contracts and concealing true facts to induce her to
pay them $171,663.15—Siddiqui sought rescission of the auction
4
contracts and restitution of the $171,663.15 she paid defendants.
On April 29, 2019, defendants moved for summary
judgment/summary adjudication contending that terms and
conditions of the auction contracts demonstrated defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For example, they
asserted they did not misrepresent that they were affiliated with
the United States government, citing a disclosure in the contracts
stating that Federal Government Auction is not directly affiliated
with any federal government agency. They also argued the
contracts obligated Siddiqui to pay for and accept the auction

brand name, or any other term, symbol, or content that
reasonably could be interpreted or construed as implying any
federal, state, or local government, military veteran entity, or
military or veteran service organization connection, approval, or
endorsement of any product or service, including, but not limited
to, any financial product, goods, or services, by any means,
including, but not limited to, a mailing, electronic message,
Internet Web site, periodical, or television commercial
disseminated in this state, unless the nongovernmental entity
has an expressed connection with, or the approval or
endorsement of, a federal, state, or local government, military
veteran entity, or military or veteran service organization.”
4
What the parties and the trial court refer to as the
“auction contracts” are the auction catalogs, which contain photos
and descriptions of the jewelry and the terms and conditions of
the auctions, among other things.

8
items, citing specific terms of the contracts, including a provision
stating all sales were final. Moreover, defendants invoked
provisions in the contracts requiring a buyer to pay a 19 percent
buyer’s premium and a 25 percent restocking fee for any returns
(which, in this case, would have required Siddiqui to forfeit
around $75,000 or 44 percent of $171,663.15 she paid defendants)
and contended that her refusal to honor these contractual terms
5
precluded her from cancelling the contracts. The trial court
denied the motion, and defendants have not appealed from that
6
ruling.
E. The Trial
1. Pertinent witness testimony
In addition to Siddiqui’s testimony, which we have already
summarized, her expert gemologist and appraiser (Diana
Cinamon) testified that she examined 58 pieces of jewelry
Siddiqui received from defendants and reviewed the
corresponding auction listings. She found 244
misrepresentations in the auction listings regarding the quality

5
As noted above, Siddiqui testified that the fees and
charges defendants sought to impose for cancellation of the
contracts equaled around $70,000. In fact, the true calculation
amounts to around $75,000.
6
Although the matter is not directly before us, we take note
of the substance of defendants’ motion because it is relevant to
Siddiqui’s contention on her appeal that her action is “on the
contract” for purposes of an entitlement to an award of attorney
fees under section 1717. (See, post, Discussion section B.2.)
Defendants invoked the auction contracts and asked the trial
court to interpret and enforce numerous terms in their favor in
their attempt to defeat Siddiqui’s fraud causes of action.

9
of the gemstones, the weight of the gold, and the workmanship of
the jewelry. She testified that 21 of the 58 pieces had gemological
reports attached as part of the auction listings (i.e., the auction
contracts). She concluded, based on her research, that both the
laboratory listed as the source of the gemological reports, and the
graduate gemologist who purportedly authored the reports, did
not exist.
Molayem testified that he is the sole owner of Hill Street.
He stated that Hill Street operated online jewelry auctions under
the names Federal Government Auction and U.S. Jewelry
Liquidation. Defendants and their fictitious businesses had no
affiliation with the government. Molayem selected the name
“Federal Government Auction” as “a marketing effort,” but not to
make buyers believe it was the United States government that
was auctioning off the jewelry. Molayem testified that the
auctions were supposed to include real property, and that is why
one of Hill Street’s employees included tax delinquency case
numbers in the titles of the auctions; but the employee did so
prematurely, before they had the real property to put in the
auctions, and without Molayem’s knowledge. Molayem also
testified about certain terms and conditions in the Federal
Government Auction contracts, including fees and charges for
returns; a provision stating Federal Government Auction is not
responsible for the opinions and appraisals of third parties; a
provision indicating there is no affiliation between Federal

10
Government Auction and the federal government; and an
attorney fees provision.
One of Hill Street’s employees testified about Hill Street’s
practice of manufacturing jewelry after a buyer purchases the
jewelry at the auction.
2. Statement of Decision
On September 16, 2021, after defendants had an
opportunity to submit objections to the proposed statement of
decision, the trial court issued its final statement of decision.
The trial court ruled in Siddiqui’s favor on her fraud cause
of action, finding clear and convincing evidence defendants
“intentionally misrepresented affiliation with the United States
Government to deceive purchasers like [Siddiqui].” The court
further found defendants’ 244 misrepresentations in the auction
contracts (“the images, descriptions and gemological reports in
their auction listings”), which Cinamon had identified, were also
intended to induce reliance by purchasers like Siddiqui. The
court concluded Siddiqui’s reliance on these misrepresentations
was reasonable, and expressly found Molayem’s testimony not to
be credible on significant issues: “The Court does not find
credible Mr. Molayem’s testimony that [Hill Street employee]
‘Reggie’ carried out the concept of auctions under federal
government names and fake ‘tax’ cases without Mr. Molayem’s
consent and approval.” Based on the clear and convincing
evidence of fraud, the court found Siddiqui is entitled to an award
of punitive damages against defendants.
The trial court also ruled in Siddiqui’s favor on her
statutory fraud cause of action, based on defendants’ use of the
names Federal Government Auction and U.S. Jewelry
Liquidation. The court calculated the statutory damages under

11
Business and Professions Code section 17533.6 as $400,770
(three times the amount solicited, which does not include the
sales tax and “cost of sale” Siddiqui paid).
The trial court ruled against Siddiqui on her causes of
action for conversion (concluding there was no personal property
of Siddiqui’s that was converted) and violation of Penal Code
section 496 (concluding the statute “is limited in application to
persons receiving stolen property”).
The trial court found Siddiqui “effected a valid rescission of
the auction contracts and her payments of the auction invoices
and is entitled to return of her $171,663.15 from [d]efendants.
[She] must return the received jewelry to [d]efendants within 60
days of [d]efendants paying this judgment in full.” The court
awarded Siddiqui $343,326.30 in punitive damages (two times
the restitution amount). The court concluded the statutory
damages of $400,770 “are duplicative of the rescission and
punitive damages to which [Siddiqui] is entitled under the fraud
and rescission claims in the [first amended complaint].” The trial
court awarded Siddiqui prejudgment interest on the restitution
amount from April 18, 2016 (the date she wired defendants the
money), at a rate of 10 percent or $47 per day.
3. Judgment and Siddiqui’s motion for attorney fees
On September 29, 2021, the trial court entered a judgment
consistent with the Statement of Decision. On October 26, 2021,
the court entered an Amended Judgment, reflecting that
defendants are entitled to a $10,000 offset against the total

12
amount of the judgment based on Siddiqui’s settlement with
Invaluable LLC, the auction platform defendants had used.
Defendants moved for new trial, which was denied. They
challenged all amounts awarded under the judgment.
Siddiqui moved for attorney fees under section 1717, based
on a provision in the auction contracts with Federal Government
Auction providing, “Bidder shall be responsible for all costs of
collection, including court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”
The trial court denied the motion, concluding Siddiqui is not
entitled to attorney fees because (1) the provision applies only to
collection actions, and (2) this action is not “on a contract” within
the meaning of section 1717.
Defendants appealed from the judgment, and Siddiqui
appealed from the order denying her motion for attorney fees.
Both sides acknowledge that defendants have paid the judgment
in full.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendants’ Appeal
1. The trial court did not err in awarding Siddiqui
restitution of amounts paid for rescission of the
auction contracts
Defendants argue the trial court erred in awarding tort
damages without complying with section 3343, subdivision (a),
which provides, in pertinent part, “One defrauded in the
purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the
difference between the actual value of that with which the
defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he
received, together with any additional damage arising from the

13
7
particular transaction . . . .” They contend the matter must be
remanded for a new trial on compensatory damages because the
trial court awarded Siddiqui the amount she paid for the jewelry,
but did not make a finding as to the value of the jewelry she
received, and subtract the latter amount from the former.
Defendants’ argument is inapposite. Siddiqui did not seek,
and the trial court did not award tort compensatory damages.
Rather, the court found Siddiqui elected the remedy of rescission
of the auction contracts under section 1691 based on fraud; and
the court awarded her restitution of the money she paid
defendants for the jewelry and ordered her to return the jewelry
to defendants. (See § 1692 [on “a claim for relief based upon
rescission,” the “aggrieved party shall be awarded complete relief,
including restitution of benefits, if any, conferred by him [or her]
as a result of the transaction and any consequential damages to
which he is entitled; but such relief shall not include duplicate or
inconsistent items of recovery”].)
In her respondents’ brief, Siddiqui points out this flaw in
defendants’ argument. In their reply brief, for the first time in
this appeal, defendants raise arguments challenging the
propriety of rescission as the appropriate remedy for defendants’
fraud (rather than challenging only the monetary amount
awarded for rescission, as they did in the trial court and in their
opening appellate brief). “ ‘When an appellant fails to raise an
issue in the opening brief, raising it for the first time in a reply
brief or at oral argument, we generally decline to address the
issue or address it in a summary manner.’ [Citation.] ‘Obvious

7
Defendants raised this issue below in their objections to
the statement of decision and in their motion for new trial.

14
reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue
raised’ so late. [Citation.] Bearing those considerations in mind,
we decline to address [the untimely arguments].” (Ramirez v.
Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, ___ [322
Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 843].) Defendants offer no reason for choosing
not to raise these arguments in their opening brief. (See Shade
Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10 [“ ‘ “points raised in the reply
brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason
is shown for failure to present them before” ’ ”]; Julian v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4
[same].) We also note that defendants did not raise these
arguments in the trial court.
Defendants have demonstrated no error in the trial court’s
award of restitution for rescission of the auction contracts.
2. Prejudgment interest was properly awarded but must
be recalculated at the applicable rate
Defendants argue Siddiqui is not entitled to an award of
prejudgment interest under section 3287 or 3288, and even if she
were, the trial court applied the wrong interest rate. We reject
the first argument and agree with the second.
Under section 3287, subdivision (a), a “person who is
entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made
certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in
the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover
interest from that day,” except under enumerated circumstances
not relevant here. Section 3288 provides, “In an action for the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every
case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the
discretion of the jury.” “[W]hen sections 3287 and 3288 are read

15
together, the proper rule is that [a] defrauded party may ask for
damages from the date of the fraud, but whether interest is to be
awarded is left to the discretion of the trier of fact which is to be
exercised in consideration of the circumstances of the individual
case.” (Pepitone v. Russo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 685, 690;
Michelson v. Hamada (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1586-1587
(Michelson) [“the trier of fact, whether jury or the court,
appropriately decides the issue of prejudgment interest under”
section 3288].) Here, the trial court awarded Siddiqui
prejudgment interest from April 18, 2016, the date she wired
defendants the money for the jewelry (the same date she
questioned defendants about their affiliation with the United
States government).
Defendants argue section 3287, subdivision (a) is
inapplicable because Siddiqui’s claim for damages was
unliquidated (i.e., not “certain, or capable of being made certain
by calculation”) and required the trial court to make factual
findings based on evidence. This is an extension of their
argument that the court violated section 3343 by awarding
Siddiqui damages without making a finding as to the value of the
jewelry she received and subtracting that amount from what she
paid—an argument we rejected above. Siddiqui’s claim for
$171,663.15 in restitution for rescission of the auction contracts
was an amount certain on April 18, 2016. Under sections 3287
and 3288, an award of prejudgment interest from that date is
proper.
Defendants’ second argument regarding prejudgment
interest is that the trial court erroneously applied a 10 percent
interest rate rather than a 7 percent rate applicable to fraud
claims. Siddiqui acknowledges the court applied the 10 percent

16
rate, and she also acknowledges a 7 percent rate applies to
prejudgment interest awarded on fraud claims under section
3288. (See Michelson, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587 [“There is
no legislative act specifying the rate of prejudgment interest for a
fraud claim, and therefore the constitutional rate of 7 percent
[under Article XV, section 1 of our state Constitution] applies to
the [amount] awarded as tort damages”].)
However, Siddiqui asserts defendants forfeited their
challenge to the 10 percent interest rate by not raising it below,
“either at the time of the award or in their new trial motion.”
Defendants ask us to exercise our discretion and decide the issue
on the merits. “Whether the proper interest rate was applied is a
question of law.” (Michelson, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1585.)
“As a general rule, a new theory may be presented for the first
time on appeal if it raises a question of law that can be decided on
undisputed facts.” (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 922, 948, fn. 14.) This is such a question, and we
exercise our discretion to decide it on the merits despite
defendants’ failure to raise it below.
Responding to the merits of defendants’ contention that the
interest rate awarded is excessive, Siddiqui argues the 10 percent
rate the trial court applied is proper under section 3289, which
provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) Any legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract
remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before until the
contract is superseded by a verdict or other new obligation.
“(b) If a contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does
not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear
interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach.”

17
Here, Siddiqui’s recovery against defendants is not based
on a finding of breach of the auction contracts. Rather, the trial
court awarded her restitution after deeming the contracts
rescinded based on fraud. Absent a finding of breach of contract,
section 3289 is inapplicable. We agree with defendants that 7
percent is the applicable interest rate for prejudgment interest on
the amount Siddiqui recovered on her fraud cause of action.
We reverse the award of prejudgment interest and remand
the matter to the trial court to calculate prejudgment interest
from April 18, 2016 to October 26, 2021 (the date of the Amended
Judgment), at a rate of 7 percent, and to exercise its discretion in
deciding whether to award simple or compound interest. (See
Michelson, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1587-1588 [trier of fact
has discretion to award compound prejudgment interest under
8
section 3288].)
3. Defendants have not shown error as to the punitive
damages award
The trial court awarded Siddiqui $343,326.30 in punitive
damages. A party who recovers restitution for rescission of a
contract based on fraud may also recover punitive damages for
that fraud. (Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors (1969) 270
Cal.App.2d 477, 484 (Horn); § 1692 [a party who seeks relief
based upon rescission of a contract may recover restitution and
“any other relief to which he may be entitled under the
circumstances”]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2024)
Contracts, § 902 [“In a number of situations involving contractual

8
Siddiqui acknowledges an award of compound
prejudgment interest at a rate of 7 percent would be less than the
amount of prejudgment interest the trial court awarded.

18
obligations, the injured party has the election of alternative
contract or tort actions, and punitive damages may be recovered
in causes of action in contract and tort”].) Defendants do not
dispute this general principle. Nor do they challenge the court’s
finding of clear and convincing evidence of fraud, entitling
Siddiqui to an award of punitive damages under section 3294.
Defendants challenge the punitive damages award on grounds (1)
that the amount is excessive given the lack of reprehensibility of
defendants’ conduct and (2) there is insufficient evidence of
defendants’ assets, liabilities, net worth, and ability to pay to
support the award of punitive damages.
a. Defendants have not demonstrated the punitive
damages award is excessive
Defendants contend the punitive damages award is
excessive under federal due process standards, citing Colucci v.
T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442 (Colucci). The
appellate court in Colucci explained that, in reviewing a punitive
damages award for compliance with the due process clause of the
United States Constitution, “a court must ‘consider three
guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award;
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by
the [trier of fact] and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.’ ” (Id. at p. 457, quoting State Farm Mutual
Automobile Inc. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 418 (State
Farm).)
“In deciding whether an award of punitive damages is
constitutionally excessive under [United States Supreme Court
precedents], we are to review the award de novo, making an

19
independent assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct, the relationship between the award and the harm done
to the plaintiff, and the relationship between the award and civil
penalties authorized for comparable conduct.” (Simon v. San
Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1172 & fn.
2.) “On the other hand, findings of historical fact made in the
trial court are still entitled to the ordinary measure of appellate
deference.” (Id. at p. 1172.)
The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct—
the “guidepost” on which defendants focus in this appeal—is the
“ ‘ “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award.” ’ ” (Colucci, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 457,
quoting State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419.) Courts
“ ‘determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering
whether: [(1)] the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; [(2)] the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; [(3)] the target
of the conduct had financial vulnerability; [(4)] the conduct
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and [(5)]
the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,
or mere accident.’ ” (Colucci, at p. 457.)
The first three factors for measuring reprehensibility are
inapplicable, as Siddiqui suffered only economic harm, there is no
evidence defendants’ conduct impacted health or safety of others,
and Siddiqui was not known to defendants to be financially
vulnerable.
As to the remaining two factors, they weigh strongly in
favor of finding defendants’ conduct to have been reprehensible.
They engaged in a fraudulent online scheme to trick and deceive
buyers into believing they were purchasing high-quality antique

20
and heirloom jewelry, that had been seized in tax cases, from
9
auction sites affiliated with the federal government. In reality,
defendants had no affiliation with the federal government; the
tax cases they identified on their auction sites were fake; and
they provided items to Siddiqui that did not match the quality
described and shown in the auction catalogs. In fact, the jewelry
shipped to Siddiqui had not been seized in tax cases, but was
fabricated by defendants after the auctions. Moreover, when
Siddiqui sought to cancel her purchases because she had been
misled into believing defendants were affiliated with the federal
government, defendants sought to impose punitive penalty
provisions in the terms and conditions of their auction materials
that would require her to forfeit 44 percent of her payments.
Defendants received $171,663.15 from Siddiqui through their
fraudulent scheme. The award of $343,326.15 in punitive
damages was not excessive when considered in light of the
reprehensibility of defendants’ conduct.
With respect to the second “guidepost,” defendants suggest,
relying on Colucci, that a ratio of 1.5-to-one between punitive and
compensatory damages is the maximum ratio permitted by due
process. The Court of Appeal did not make such a broad
pronouncement in Colucci. The court concluded a 1.5-to-one ratio

9
Defendants maintain they “did not seek to mislead the
public,” noting that fictitious business name statements
“identified Hill Street as the operator of the auctions,” and “the
terms of sale of the auction stated Federal Government Auction
was not an entity of the US Government.” The trial court
rejected this contention and found that the government affiliation
representations, along with the other representations relied upon
by Siddiqui, were fraudulent.

21
was “the federal constitutional maximum” in that case, “[g]iven
the low to moderate range of reprehensibility of [the defendant]’s
conduct” and the “substantial” award of compensatory damages
($1,020,042), the “majority of which was for noneconomic harm
and/or emotional distress ($700,000),” indicating a “ ‘punitive
component’ ” to the compensatory damages award. (Colucci,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 459 [action against former employer
for workplace retaliation based on disability].) Here, the trial
court awarded Siddiqui restitution of amounts she paid
defendants, with no consequential damages. There was no
punitive component in the restitution award, which simply
returned Siddiqui to her position before the transaction she
succeeded in rescinding. Given these factors, the two-to-one ratio
between punitive damages and restitution does not violate due
process. (See Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of
San Diego, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 88, 108, 110 [ratio of two-
to-one between punitive and compensatory damages did not
violate due process where the defendant employer’s conduct
(workplace disability discrimination) was “moderately
reprehensible” and there was a “sizable compensatory damages
award”].)
As for the third “guidepost” in evaluating an award of
punitive damages under due process standards, defendants’
arguments fail to address a comparison of the punitive damages
awarded against them to “ ‘the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.’ ” (Colucci, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th
at p. 457, quoting State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 418.) Here,
the trial court found defendants liable for $400,770 in damages
for statutory fraud (three times the amount defendants solicited
from Siddiqui) under Business and Professions Code section

22
10
17533.6, subdivision (e). But the court found the statutory
damages to be “duplicative” of the restitution and punitive
damages, so the court did not order defendants to pay them.
Section 17533.6, subdivision (e), however, provides that statutory
damages may be awarded “in addition to any other available
remedies.” The trial court could have awarded Siddiqui
$171,663.15 in restitution and $400,770 in statutory damages for
a total of $572,433.15. The amount it did award, $514,989.45
(restitution plus punitive damages), fits comfortably within the
11
zone of reasonableness when evaluated under this guidepost.

10
The trial court found that the “amount solicited” did not
include the sales tax ($12,691.35) and the “cost of sale”
($25,382.10), which were included in the restitution award.
11
We note that Siddiqui also sought treble damages and
attorney fees under Penal Code section 496 for defendants’
receipt of property (money) obtained by theft. The trial court
ruled against her, concluding the statute “is limited in
application to persons receiving stolen property.” Subsequent to
entry of judgment in this case, the California Supreme Court
reversed the case on which the trial court relied and held a
“plaintiff may recover treble damages and attorney’s fees under
section 496(c) when property has been obtained in any manner
constituting theft,” including theft by false pretense. (Siry
Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 361;
see Pen. Code, § 532, subd. (a) [“person who knowingly and
designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense,
defrauds any other person of money, labor, or property” is guilty
of theft by false pretenses].) Siddiqui did not appeal the trial
court’s ruling on her Penal Code section 496 claim, but the
potential availability of another statutory basis for awarding
treble damages for conduct such as was proven in this case

23
b. Sufficiency of the evidence of defendants’
financial condition and ability to pay the
punitive damages award
In their opening appellate brief, defendants argued there is
insufficient evidence of defendants’ assets, liabilities, net worth,
and ability to pay to support the award of punitive damages.
“The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the
defendant for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff and deter the
commission of future wrongful acts.” (Soto v. BorgWarner Morse
TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 191 (Soto).) The “ ‘proper
level of punitive damages is an amount not so low that defendant
can absorb it with little or no discomfort [citation], nor so high
that it destroys, annihilates, or cripples the defendant.’ ” (Id. at
p. 192.)
“In order for the [trier of fact] (and the reviewing court) to
ascertain whether a punitive damages award is properly
calibrated so as to inflict economic pain without financially
ruining the defendant, it needs some evidence about the
defendant’s financial condition and ability to pay the award.”
(Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 192; Adams v. Murakami
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 (Adams) [“an award of punitive
damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record
contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial
condition”].) The plaintiff bears the burden of introducing such
evidence. (Adams, at p. 109.)
Under section 3295, subdivision (c), a “plaintiff may
subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at the trial for

further validates the reasonableness of the trial court’s decision
to award punitive damages equal to twice the rescission award.

24
the purpose of establishing” the defendant’s financial condition.
The defendant’s failure to comply with such a subpoena may
preclude the defendant “from challenging the punitive damage
award[] based on lack of evidence of his financial condition or
insufficiency of the evidence to establish his ability to pay the
amount awarded.” (Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1338; Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 194
[“the Court of Appeal has upheld awards of punitive damages
where the dearth of evidence of the defendant’s financial
condition is attributable to the defendant’s failure to comply with
discovery obligations or orders”].)
In her respondent’s brief, Siddiqui argues “defendants have
forfeited a challenge to the punitive damages award based on
insufficient evidence of net worth” by failing to produce
documents in response to the trial subpoena she served on them
seeking financial records. The parties discussed the subpoena in
court during trial. Defense counsel questioned the timeliness of
the subpoena, which was served in the midst of trial. Siddiqui’s
counsel argued the subpoena was timely and explained he
wanted to make sure Siddiqui “had some evidence of net worth to
present with respect to punitive damages in the case.” Defense
counsel informed the court that defendants had no documents
responsive to the subpoena, and he had told Siddiqui’s counsel
the same thing earlier. The court inquired: “There’s no bank
statements? The most recent set of documents reflecting the net
worth, income, assets, brokerage accounts, bank statements,
retirement accounts, liabilities, real estate, and other financial
holdings of George Molayem. [¶] So obviously to the extent he
has bank statements, brokerage accounts, you know.” Defense
counsel indicated he would check with Molayem regarding the

25
existence of such documents and suggested the court “bifurcate
this out and deal with it if we get to a point where [Siddiqui] can
show intentional outrageous misconduct by Mr. Molayem.” The
court responded, “We’ll deal with it then.” There was no further
discussion on the record regarding the subpoena, and there was
no bifurcated punitive damages phase of the trial.
Defendants did not respond to Siddiqui’s forfeiture
argument in their appellate reply brief (or reference the subpoena
at all in their appellate briefing). They did not dispute that their
failure to produce documents prevented Siddiqui from
introducing additional evidence based on such documents,
regarding their liabilities, net worth, or other aspects of their
financial condition. An appellant’s failure to respond in the reply
brief to an argument made in the respondent’s brief may be taken
as an implicit concession of the validity of the argument. (Rudick
v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90
[appellants made implicit concession by “failing to respond in
their reply brief to the [respondent]’s argument on th[at] point”];
Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519, fn. 4
[“since [appellant] did not dispute respondent’s claim in his reply,
we assume that there is no remaining question as to” the claim].)
We will not disturb the judgment based on insufficiency of the
evidence where defendants do not challenge Siddiqui’s claim that
their failure to comply with discovery obligations precluded her
from presenting additional evidence.
Defendants have shown no cause for us to disturb the
punitive damages award.

26
B. Siddiqui’s Appeal
In her appeal, Siddiqui challenges the trial court’s
postjudgment order denying her motion for attorney fees under
section 1717, which provides, in pertinent part:
“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to
enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is
determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he
or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.
“Where a contract provides for attorney’s fees, as set forth
above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire
contract, unless each party was represented by counsel in the
negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that
representation is specified in the contract.” (§ 1717, subd. (a).)
The auction contracts with Federal Government Auction
included the following attorney fees provision, which appears
twice in the contracts’ terms and conditions: “Bidder shall be
responsible for all costs of collection, including court costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees.”
The trial court denied Siddiqui’s motion for attorney fees
for the following reasons. First, the court concluded the attorney
fees provision is inapplicable here because this action does not
involve a “collection.” Second, the court concluded Siddiqui “did
not seek to enforce the contract and did not proceed under a
theory of breach of contract. [She] has not shown that this action
is an action on a contract under Civil Code section 1717.” We
disagree with both conclusions.

27
“An order granting or denying attorney fees is generally
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, though
determination of whether the criteria for an award have been met
is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.” (Gillotti v.
Stewart (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 875, 905.) In this case, the issue
presented is whether the applicable attorney fees provision in the
auction contracts should apply under section 1717, which turns
on whether Siddiqui’s action is “on the contract.” Our review is
de novo. (See 347 Group, Inc. v. Philip Hawkins Architect, Inc.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 209, 213 [a party’s entitlement to attorney
fees under section 1717 is a question of law that we review de
novo].)
1. Under the express language of section 1717, the
attorney fees provision applies to the entire contract,
not just defendants’ efforts to collect amounts due
As quoted above, the second paragraph of section 1717,
subdivision (a) expressly provides that where a contract includes
an attorney fees provision, “that provision shall be construed as
applying to the entire contract” (except in limited circumstances
not relevant here). The “legislative intent was to provide
complete mutuality of remedy where a contractual provision
makes recovery of attorney fees available to one party.” (Harbor
View Hills Community Assn. v. Torley (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 343,
349.) Where a contract includes a one-sided attorney fees
provision that by its terms only applies to actions one side would
bring (e.g., collections here), that attorney fees provision will be
applied to the entire contract and all actions on the contract.
(Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 596, 617
(Reyes) [where a contract included a “one-sided” attorney fees
provision allowing the defendant to seek an award of attorney

28
fees for collecting what plaintiffs owed under the contract,
§ “1717, subdivision (a) makes the remedy mutual as to
plaintiffs”].) Thus, the attorney fees provision in the auction
contracts is not limited to collection actions that defendants
might have brought.
2. Siddiqui’s action is “on a contract” for purposes of
entitlement to attorney fees under section 1717
A party may only recover attorney fees under section 1717
where the action is “on a contract.” The statute, however, does
not require that the action be for breach of contract. “ ‘ “ ‘[I]t is
difficult to draw definitively from case law any general rule
regarding what actions and causes of action will be deemed to be
“on a contract” for purposes of [section] 1717.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘Nevertheless, we distill . . . the following principle: An action (or
cause of action) is “on a contract” for purposes of section 1717 if
(1) the action (or cause of action) “involves” an agreement, in the
sense that the action (or cause of action) arises out of, is based
upon, or relates to an agreement by seeking to define or interpret
its terms or to determine or enforce a party’s rights or duties
under the agreement, and (2) the agreement contains an attorney
fees clause.’ ” (Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 375, 407-408 (Orozco).)
Applying these principles here, Siddiqui’s action arises out
of a contract because the court had to “define and interpret” the
representations in the contract as part of its determination of the
parties’ “rights or duties under the agreement.”

29
a. Siddiqui’s action seeking rescission based on
fraud is an action on a contract within the
meaning of section 1717
A party need not seek to enforce the contract in order to be
entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 1717. A party
may be entitled to such fees even where the court finds the
contract is “ ‘invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent.’ ” (Hsu v.
Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 870 (Hsu); see Super 7 Motel
Associates v. Wang (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541 (Super 7 Motel
Associates); Eden Township Healthcare Dist. v. Eden Medical
Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 418, 427 [“it is difficult to think of
an action that is more likely to be characterized as an ‘action on a
contract’ than one in which the party bringing the action
explicitly seeks to have the subject contract declared void and
invalid in its entirety”].)
In contrast, an action for fraud seeking tort damages “ ‘ “is
not ‘on a contract’ for purposes of an attorney fee award, even
though the underlying transaction in which the fraud occurred
involved a contract containing an attorney fee clause.” ’ ”
(Orozco, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.) “However, where the
plaintiff’s claim instead seeks rescission based on fraud, the
courts have concluded such claim does sound in contract” for
purposes of an award of attorney fees under section 1717. (Super
7 Motel Associates, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 549.) Here,
Siddiqui did not seek compensatory damages in tort for
defendants’ fraud. She sought to rescind the auction contracts,
based on false representations in the auction materials
constituting the contracts, and she succeeded in doing so, which
makes her action “on a contract.” (See Star Pacific Investments,
Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 447, 461-463

30
[where a plaintiff elects the contract remedy of rescission for a
defendant’s fraud (intentional misrepresentation), the action is
“on a contract” within the meaning of section 1717].)
As we explained above, there is nothing legally inconsistent
or impermissible about a plaintiff electing the contract remedy of
rescission on a fraud cause of action and also recovering punitive
damages for the defendant’s fraud. (Horn, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d
at p. 484.) Similarly, there is nothing legally inconsistent or
impermissible about Siddiqui recovering punitive damages for
defendants’ fraud and also recovering attorney fees under section
1717 because the fraud action is “on a contract.” We are aware of
no authority holding to the contrary.
b. The present action is distinguishable from
fraudulent inducement of contract actions
in which interpretation of contract terms was
not central to the trial court’s resolution of the
action
An action for fraudulent inducement of a contract that does
not require the trial court to interpret or enforce any of the
contract’s terms may not be “on a contract” for purposes of section
1717. (See Orozco, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 409 [the plaintiffs
were not entitled to attorney fees under section 1717 where the
“key question at trial was whether [one of the defendants]
induced [one of the plaintiffs] to enter into the long-term lease,”
and the plaintiffs did not argue that that defendant “had
breached the lease in any way,” and the “action did not seek to
interpret or enforce any provision in the lease or guaranty”].)
At oral argument, defendants cited Reyes, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th 596, a fraudulent inducement of contract case which
is distinguishable. There, the plaintiffs filed an action alleging,

31
among other things, that they had sought to rescind a retail
installment sales contract for a used automobile on the ground
the salesperson made oral misrepresentations about the
condition of the vehicle which induced them to sign the contract.
(Id. at p. 602.) In addition to the oral representations, their
causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were
based on the implied warranty of merchantability arising by
operation of law. (Id. at p. 619.) The plaintiffs brought a motion
for attorney fees before trial, after accepting the defendant’s offer
to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, so the
appellate court’s analysis was based on the allegations of the
operative complaint. (Id. at pp. 601-603.) The Court of Appeal
concluded the plaintiffs’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation
causes of action, as alleged, were not “on a contract” within the
meaning of section 1717, citing the general principle that a
“cause of action for fraudulent inducement is not ‘on the contract’
for purposes of section 1717.” (Id. at p. 621.) The plaintiffs’
causes of action, as pleaded, would not have required an
interpretation of the terms of the contract in determining the
defendant’s liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Here, in contrast, Siddiqui claimed defendants made
misrepresentations in the auction contracts themselves, entitling
her to rescission of the contracts. Siddiqui also had to overcome
all of the defense arguments, at summary judgment and at trial,
seeking to enforce provisions in the auction contracts which the
defendants contended defeated her request to rescind the
contracts. After considering the evidence presented at the bench
trial, the trial court interpreted the provisions of the auction
contracts in Siddiqui’s favor.

32
In resolving the issue here, we follow the general principle
that where an action “ ‘arises out of, is based upon, or relates to
an agreement by seeking to define or interpret its terms or to
determine or enforce a party’s rights or duties under the
agreement,’ ” it is “on a contract.” (Orozco, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 408.) Thus, we conclude Siddiqui’s action is on a contract.
c. An award of attorney fees here is consistent with
the purpose of section 1717 to establish
mutuality of remedy
“The courts have consistently held that the award of Civil
Code section 1717 contractual attorney’s fees is to be governed by
equitable principles.” (Jones v. Drain (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 484,
489-490 [“prevailing defendant sued for breach of contract
containing an attorney’s fees provision and having had to defend
the contract cause of action is entitled to recover its own
attorney’s fees and costs therefor, even though the trial court
finds no contract existed”].) A conclusion that this action is “on
the contract” is both equitable and consistent with the “purpose
underlying section 1717,” which is “ ‘to establish mutuality of
remedy where [a] contractual provision makes recovery of
attorney’s fees available for only one party [citations], and to
prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s fees provisions.’ ”
(Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 870.) “Nothing in section 1717
suggests an intent to punish a party by awarding attorney fees;
its intent is to make reciprocal any contractual right to attorney
fees.” (Marina Glencoe, L.P. v. Neue Sentimental Film AG (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 874, 879.)
Had Siddiqui sought to cancel the auction contracts before
she wired the money, and defendants sued her to collect, or if
they had sued for a declaratory judgment seeking to collect the 44

33
percent penalties in their contract as a condition to refunding her
money, surely they would have asserted a right to recover
attorney fees based on the contract. Precluding Siddiqui from
recovering her attorney fees under the circumstances presented
here, simply because she was forced to commence the litigation as
a result of having been induced to send defendants her payment
before discovering the fraud, would be inequitable and
contravene the purpose underlying section 1717 of mutuality of
remedy.
Because Siddiqui’s action is “on the contract,” and there can
be no dispute that she is the prevailing party, she is entitled to
attorney fees under section 1717. We reverse the trial court’s
order denying Siddiqui’s motion for attorney fees and remand the
matter for a determination of the amount of attorney fees to
award her.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment awarding $94,789 in
prejudgment interest is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
the trial court to recalculate prejudgment interest from April 18,
2016 to October 26, 2021, at a rate of 7 percent, and to exercise
its discretion in deciding whether to award simple or compound
interest. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The
postjudgment order denying Siddiqui’s motion for attorney fees is
reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to
determine the amount of attorney fees to award Siddiqui under

34
Civil Code section 1717. Each side is to bear its own costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

KELLEY, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

35

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