CourtListener 10098114•People v. Vo CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Vo CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062694
v. (Super. Ct. No. 93WF0571)
KHUONG QUOC VO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Thirty years ago, appellant Khuong Quoc Vo was sentenced to
prison for an indeterminate life term after a jury found him guilty of special
circumstances felony murder. In this appeal, he challenges the denial of his
petition for resentencing following an evidentiary hearing under Penal Code
1
section 1172.6. Appellant contends reversal is required because there is
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that he was a major
participant in the underlying felony and that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. We disagree and find there is substantial evidence
to sustain the court’s findings in that regard. We thus affirm its denial order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Early one morning in 1993, while armed with knives, appellant,
Duc T. and Tung N. went to a motel room where Tuan T. was hanging out
with three other people.2 During the encounter, appellant beat Tuan and a
robbery occurred. Duc also stabbed Tuan in the leg. Although Duc did not act
with what the law regards as malicious intent, his knife severed Tuan’s
femoral artery, and he bled to death at the scene.
Appellant, Duc and Tung were charged with first degree murder
and robbery. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 211.) It was also alleged as special
circumstances that the murder occurred during the commission of a burglary
and a robbery. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i) & (vii).) Following the prosecution’s
1
That section was originally housed in Penal Code section
1170.95, but it was subsequently renumbered without substantive change as
Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For ease of reference,
we will refer to the current provision. All further statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2
Because many of the people involved in this case have the same
last names, we will refer to them by their first name to facilitate clarity. No
disrespect is intended.
2
case-in-chief, defendants moved to dismiss the special circumstances
allegations for lack of evidence. (§ 1118.1.) The trial court gathered from the
prosecution’s evidence that defendants entered Tuan’s motel room to beat
him up, not to commit robbery. Therefore, it dismissed the burglary-murder
allegation, which required proof of larcenous intent upon entry.
However, the trial court found that once defendants were inside
the room, they committed a robbery during which Tuan was killed. It thus
allowed the robbery-murder allegation to go to the jury. Ultimately, the jury
found that allegation true as part of its finding that defendants committed
first degree murder. It also convicted defendants of four counts of robbery and
found they used a knife during the commission of that offense.
At sentencing, appellant moved to strike the special
circumstances finding on Eighth Amendment grounds. In granting the
motion, the trial court found it significant that appellant was only 19 years
old at the time of his crimes. In light of appellant’s age and the circumstances
surrounding Tuan’s murder, the trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to
life in prison, instead of life without parole, for that offense. (See generally
People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [trial courts are empowered to reduce a
defendant’s sentence if imposing the prescribed term would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment].) We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
(People v. Vo et al. (July 19, 1995, G015257) [nonpub. opn.].)
After appellant petitioned for resentencing in 2020, the trial
court issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d). At the hearing, the court
relied on the record transcript of appellant’s underlying trial, which contains
the following facts:
3
There were two groups of people involved in this case. One group
consisted of appellant, Duc and Tung and a man named Dung N. And the
other group consisted of Tuan, Hiep H., Nhan T. and Kim T. Although
appellant had worked with Hiep and Nhan in the past, he was not on good
terms with them when this case arose. Appellant’s relationship with Tuan
was also strained. Their ill feelings toward one another were evidenced in a
series of telephone conversations that occurred on April 13, 1993, starting at
about 1:30 in the morning.
At that time, Tuan and his companions were at a small motel
room in Garden Grove, and appellant’s group was at a nearby apartment.
During one of the phone calls, Duc argued with Tuan before handing the
phone over to appellant. Tuan accused appellant of interfering with his drug
business and said that if he wanted to, he could have appellant killed for a
mere 25 cents. This angered appellant. He threatened to go over to Tuan’s
room and hurt him, but Tuan doubted appellant’s resolve, calling him
“chicken” and accusing him of being all talk and no action.
That was an unfortunate assessment. Within about 15 minutes,
appellant and his companions arrived at Tuan’s motel armed with knives.
Dung knocked on Tuan’s motel room door, and when it opened, appellant,
Duc and Tung burst into the room with their knives out and at the ready.
Dung stayed outside and was not involved in the ensuing confrontation,
which pitted appellant and his two cohorts against Tuan, Hiep, Nhan and
Kim.
Appellant put his knife up to Tuan’s neck and threatened to stab
him if he moved. Then he pushed Tuan onto the bed, straddled his chest and
began punching him in the head, not far from where Kim was sitting. During
the beating, appellant was initially holding his knife in one hand and
4
punching Tuan with his other hand. Then he put the knife down on the bed
and pummeled Tuan with both his hands.
In the course of the attack, appellant nicked Tuan on the face,
ear, neck and shoulder with the blade of his knife. He also told Tuan that,
unlike “the old Vo” in the past, he was now tough and mean and unwilling to
put up with any disrespect. And instead of just making idle threats, he was
going to follow up his words with actions.
While appellant was attacking Tuan, Tung confronted Hiep and
held a knife up to his neck by the window. Then he pushed Hiep to the floor,
snatched the necklaces from his neck, and took up a lookout position by the
window.
Duc was also busy. Upon entering the room, he ripped the
telephone cord out of the wall and turned off the lights, leaving the glow of
the television as the only light in the room. Then, with knife in hand, he
ordered Nhan to sit on the floor and began rummaging through the room for
valuables. As he was doing so, he told Nhan, Hiep and Kim that he would kill
them if they did not hand over their watches and jewelry to him quickly and
quietly. After Hiep and Nhan surrendered their possessions, Duc kicked and
punched them, but he did not harm Kim when she turned over her jewelry.
Duc also opened Tuan’s wallet, which was lying on the bed next
to where appellant was beating him. However, appellant said he had already
looked through the wallet, so Duc put it back down. Duc wasn’t finished,
though. About 10 minutes into the ordeal, while appellant was still
straddling and punching Tuan, Duc took his knife and plunged it into Tuan’s
thigh.
Appellant did not realize Tuan had been stabbed until he felt
blood pouring out of his leg. At that point, he gave Tuan one more “heavy
5
blow” to the face. Then he got off Tuan, kneed Hiep and Nhan in the head,
and asked Duc, “Why did you stab him?” Duc said he wanted to gain respect
and to give Tuan a scar to remember for the rest of his life.
Appellant and Duc ripped up a towel with their knives, but they
made no attempt to assist Tuan. Instead, their thoughts turned to escaping.
They would have left the room then but there was a police car outside, so
they stayed there for about 10 more minutes before departing.
After they left, Kim wrapped a sheet around Tuan’s leg and
called 911, but Tuan was not breathing at that time. He suffered a deep
laceration that severed his femoral artery, and he was already dead from the
loss of blood by the time the police arrived. The nature of his injury was such
that without medical attention he could not have survived for more than 10
minutes after the stabbing. When the police examined him at the scene, they
noticed his watch and ring were still on. And when they looked in his wallet,
they discovered it contained slightly over $500 in cash.
Appellant and his cohorts were stopped and arrested as they
were driving away from the motel. A search of their vehicle turned up three
knives, and later on at the police station, the police found the victims’ jewelry
in Duc’s possession.
While appellant and Duc were in custody, the police
surreptitiously recorded them talking about the incident. Appellant told Duc
they would have been wealthy if they had gotten away with the victims’
jewelry, but regardless of the way things had turned out, they would still “go
on robbing.” Appellant and Duc also laughed about the injuries they inflicted
on Tuan, as if his suffering was a joke. They both expressed the belief Tuan
would have survived if they had bandaged his wound after the stabbing.
However, appellant also remarked that he had beaten Tuan so savagely with
6
his fists that even if he had managed to survive, “he would have been
mentally ill.”
At trial, appellant testified that during his phone call with Tuan
on the night in question, Tuan ridiculed and threatened to kill him. So, he
armed himself with a knife and asked Duc and the others to accompany him
to Tuan’s motel room. According to appellant, he just wanted to settle the
score with Tuan; there was no talk about robbing anyone or stealing
anything. In fact, appellant insisted the only reason he brought Duc and
Tung along was so that they could keep Tuan’s friends from interfering with
the beating he intended to inflict on Tuan.
However, on cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that he
nodded affirmatively during his post-arrest interview when the police asked
him if he had heard his cohorts talking about getting money from the victims
before entering their motel room. Appellant also admitted nodding when
asked if he knew that getting money was part of the reason that Duc and
Tung accompanied him to the room.
During his police interview, appellant further admitted that he
had ripped a necklace off Tuan while he was beating him on the bed. And
although he contended the stabbing took him by surprise, he conceded that
prior to entering Tuan’s motel room, Duc had told him that he wanted to stab
Tuan.3
3
When appellant was first asked about this aspect of his
interview on cross-examination, he denied telling the police that is what Duc
said he wanted to do. However, later in his testimony, appellant admitted
Duc had told him he wanted to stab Tuan. Appellant said that was Duc’s way
of letting him know he would have his back during the confrontation with
Tuan.
7
In addition to all this evidence, the trial court heard testimony
from defense witness Elizabeth Cauffman at the evidentiary hearing.
Cauffman is an expert on adolescent brain development. She testified that for
most people, their brain does not become fully developed until the mid-20s or
early 30s. Prior to that age, people tend to lack impulse control and emotional
insight. They are also susceptible to peer pressure and prone to risky,
impetuous behavior. However, Cauffman admitted that every person is
different in terms of their cognitive development and that she could not speak
to appellant’s maturity at the time of his offenses.
Based on all these facts, the trial court was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that, for purposes of the current felony murder rule,
appellant was a major participant in the underlying robbery, and he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. In reaching this conclusion, the
court determined appellant was the driving force behind the violent
confrontation that led to the Tuan’s death. The court also found appellant’s
degree of involvement in the robbery was greater than that of an ordinary
aider and abettor, and his age did not preclude him from understanding the
grave risks associated with his dangerous behavior. Therefore, the court
denied his petition for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s decision to deny his petition. We disagree.
Appellant’s claim for resentencing is grounded in Senate Bill No.
1437 (Senate Bill 1437), which narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for
the crime of murder in California. As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437
restricted the felony murder rule so that it can only be applied in limited
situations, such as when—as alleged in this case—the defendant was a major
8
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
To obtain relief under the statute, the defendant must first show
he was convicted of murder based on a theory of imputed liability, and he
would not be liable for murder under current law. (§ 1172.6. subd. (a).) If the
defendant makes a prima facie showing to that effect, the trial court is
required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.
(Id., subds. (c), (d).) At the hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct did in fact rise to the level of
murder as redefined by Senate Bill 1437. (Ibid.) Otherwise, the defendant is
entitled to vacatur and resentencing pursuant to the terms of section 1172.6.
When, as here, the trial court denies a resentencing petition
following an evidentiary hearing, we review the court’s ruling under the
substantial evidence standard. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988;
People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 41-43.) Under that standard, “‘we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact the [trial judge]
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] “Conflicts [in
the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of
a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge . . . to determine
the . . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.
[Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.)
“Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314), reversal is not warranted
unless “‘“upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence
to support [the trial court’s ruling].”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, 508.)
9
Assessing the record from that deferential perspective, we are
convinced there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that appellant was a major participant in a felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Our analysis is guided by the judicial
interpretation of those statutory requirements.
The major participant and reckless indifference requirements
stem from a pair of United States Supreme Court cases, Enmund v. Florida
(1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137
(Tison). In those decisions, the high court considered under what
circumstances the death penalty could be imposed on a person “who aids and
abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but
who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place
or that lethal force will be employed.” (Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797.)
Earl Enmund was just such a person. After hatching a robbery
plot, he drove his cohorts to the victim’s house and waited nearby while they
confronted the victim at gunpoint. When the victim’s wife appeared with a
gun of her own, they shot and killed her, as well as the intended victim.
Enmund then drove them from the scene and helped them get rid of their
guns. Focusing on Enmund’s conduct and culpability, the United States
Supreme Court determined that because he played a minor role in the
robbery and lacked the intent to kill, he could not be subjected to the death
penalty, even though the victims were murdered during the course of a
serious felony—armed robbery—that he planned and facilitated. (Enmund,
supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 798-801.)
In Tison, the defendants’ conduct was more egregious, although,
like Enmund, they harbored no murderous intent. The defendants in Tison
were two brothers who sprang their father Gary and another convicted
10
murderer, Randy, from prison during an armed confrontation with guards.
Following the breakout, the group flagged down a car, captured its occupants
at gunpoint and took their belongings. Then Gary and Randy shot and killed
them while the defendants looked on from a distance. The group evaded
authorities for several days but was eventually apprehended after a shootout
with the police. The question presented was whether the defendants—
nonkillers who lacked the intent to kill but were heavily involved in the
armed breakout and kidnapping for robbery—could lawfully be put to death
for the murders committed by Randy and their father.
The high court answered that question in the affirmative,
explaining the defendants’ “own personal involvement in the crimes was not
minor, but rather, as specifically found by the trial court, ‘substantial.’ Far
from merely sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the murders acting
as the getaway driver to a robbery [a la Enmund], each [defendant] was
actively involved in every element of the kidnaping-robbery and was
physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating
in the murder of the [victims] and the subsequent flight.” (Tison, supra, 481
U.S. at p. 158.) Equally important, the facts demonstrated the defendants
“subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking of
innocent life.” (Id. at p. 152.) The court found their “reckless indifference to
the value of human life [was] every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an
‘intent to kill.’” (Id. at p. 157.)
In the wake of Tison, California voters passed Proposition 115,
which amended the felony murder rule to prohibit imposition of the death
penalty for nonkillers who lacked the intent to kill unless they were “a major
participant” in a qualifying felony and acted “with reckless indifference to
human life.” (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) By finding appellant guilty of special
11
circumstances felony murder in 1993, appellant’s jury necessarily determined
he met those criteria.
However, it was not until several years later, in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark), that the California Supreme Court fully examined the meaning of
the terms “major participant” and “reckless indifference” in order to “clarify”
and provide “a deeper understanding” of how they should be applied in a
given case. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801; In re Taylor (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 543, 546.) Therefore, the jury’s true finding on the special
circumstance felony murder allegation is not dispositive of appellant’s right
to resentencing. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703.) Rather, we
must assess his eligibility in light of how Banks and Clark interpreted the
major participation and reckless indifference requirements. (Ibid.)
The facts in Banks were akin to those in Enmund in that the
defendant served as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which his
confederate shot and killed a person who resisted the robbery. In examining
the parameters of the major participation requirement, the Banks court
explained, “Tison and Enmund establish that a defendant’s personal
involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary
aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as Earl Enmund. The
defendants’ actions in Tison [] and Enmund [] represent points on a
continuum. [Citation.] Somewhere between them, at conduct less egregious
than the Tisons’ but more culpable than Earl Enmund’s, lies the
constitutional minimum for death eligibility.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
802.)
The Banks court then articulated several factors bearing on the
major participation requirement: “What role did the defendant have in
12
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role
did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature
of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the
defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
803.) The court stated, “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in determining the
ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation . . . was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major’ [citations].” (Ibid.)
Applying these factors to the defendant’s actions in Banks, the
Supreme Court found his conduct failed to satisfy the major participant
requirement because he was not involved in planning the robbery, he did not
procure weapons for the shooter, neither he nor the other participants had
any history of violent crime, he was not present at the scene of the shooting,
and there was “no evidence he saw or heard the shooting, that he could have
seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in instigating
it or could have prevented it.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805.)
The Banks court also addressed the mens rea requirement for the
felony murder special circumstance. While acknowledging there is an
inherent risk of death in all armed robberies, the court stated that risk alone
is not enough to support a finding of reckless indifference. Rather, the
evidence must establish the defendant engaged in conduct that is “‘“known to
carry a grave risk of death.”’ [Citations.]” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.)
The Supreme Court found that standard was not met in Banks because,
13
unlike the situation in Tison, there was no evidence the defendant
“knowingly conspired with accomplices known to have killed before. Instead,
as in Enmund, [the fatal shooting] was apparently a spontaneous response to
armed resistance from the victim.” (Id. at p. 807.)
In Clark, the Supreme Court further elaborated on the reckless
indifference requirement. Clark planned and organized the closing-time
robbery of an Orange County computer store and was orchestrating events
from his car in the parking lot when the mother of one of the victims
unexpectedly entered the store. An accomplice in the store promptly shot her
dead, leading to Clark’s conviction for special circumstances felony murder.
Without deciding whether Clark was a major participant in the underlying
robbery, the Supreme Court noted there is significant overlap between the
major participant requirement and the reckless indifference requirement,
“‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more
likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
This overlap was further elucidated when the court announced
the factors it considered pertinent to the reckless indifference analysis,
namely, “the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use and number of
weapons; the defendant’s proximity to the crime and opportunity to stop the
killing or aid the victim; the duration of the offense conduct, that is, ‘whether
a murder came at the end of a prolonged period of restraint of the victims by
defendant’; the defendant’s awareness his or her confederate was likely to
kill; and the defendant’s efforts to minimize the possibility of violence during
the crime.” (In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 973, quoting Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.) As it did in enunciating the major participant
factors in Banks, the Supreme Court in Clark made it clear that none of these
14
factors was necessary, or necessarily sufficient, to satisfy the reckless
indifference requirement in a given case. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.)
However, on balance, the Supreme Court felt those factors
militated against a finding Clark acted with reckless indifference in his case.
As to that issue, the court found it significant the sole gun used in the
robbery held a single bullet and was carried by an accomplice, not Clark.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) In addition, although Clark was nearby
at the time of the shooting, he was not physically present at the scene,
rendering him unable to prevent it. (Ibid.) Furthermore, there was no
evidence Clark ordered the shooting or wanted it to occur. (Id. at pp. 619-
621.) In fact, the evidence suggested just the opposite, in that Clark planned
the robbery to take place after the store was closed, and he thought the gun
was unloaded. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court determined those circumstances
warranted reversal of the special circumstance findings because, at bottom,
there was nothing about the planning and nature of the robbery “that
elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed
robbery.” (Id. at p. 623.)
“Since Clark, courts have discerned an additional factor that may
be relevant to the reckless indifference analysis – the defendant’s youth.”
(People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558.) Indeed, it is now well
recognized that minors and young adults are generally less responsible than
older adults because they typically lack the experience and judgment to
recognize and avoid situations that could be harmful to themselves and
others. (Ibid.) Therefore, along with all of the other attendant circumstances,
the defendant’s youthfulness must be considered when determining whether
he acted recklessly indifferent to the victim’s life. (People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 487-488.)
15
Turning first to the major participant requirement, it is
important to keep in mind that while this prong of the felony murder rule
focuses on the defendant’s involvement in the underlying felony, it
encompasses a broad range of factors. So, in addition to examining
appellant’s actions viz-a-viz the robbery in this case, we must also consider
his involvement in the events leading up to Tuan’s death, his subjective
awareness of the dangers presented, whether his actions facilitated the
killing, and what he did after Tuan was stabbed. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.)
In that regard, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
appellant was the driving force behind the deadly encounter with Tuan. After
arguing with and threatening Tuan on the phone, appellant recruited Duc
and Tung to accompany him to Tuan’s motel room. All three of them had
knives by the time they entered the room. And like appellant, Duc had also
argued with Tuan on the phone that night. Thus, it would have been readily
apparent to appellant that the stage was set for a violent and potentially
deadly confrontation.
Although appellant testified that he did not expect the
confrontation to extend beyond his fight with Tuan, he admitted to the police
that he had heard his cohorts talking about getting money from the victims
before entering their motel room, and that was a factor in the decision to
have Duc and Tung go with him to the room. Duc had also mentioned to
appellant that he was prepared to stab Tuan during the encounter. Indeed,
Duc told appellant that he would be happy to stab Tuan if appellant needed
protection. Therefore, while appellant’s main objective may have been to beat
Tuan, he had good reason to suspect that other violent crimes might unfold
during the confrontation.
16
And that is precisely what happened when appellant’s group
entered the victims’ motel room. After Duc turned out the lights, he and Tung
promptly robbed Hiep, Nhan and Kim at knifepoint. In the process, Duc not
only threatened to kill the victims, but he also hit and kicked Hiep and Nhan
after they surrendered their jewelry. This signaled that Duc was not going to
be content with just pulling off a robbery. And even though appellant was
busy beating Tuan at that time, it is reasonable to infer he knew that Duc
was in the midst of a life-threatening rampage. After all, the room was rather
small, and Duc made no secret of his hostile intentions.
Appellant’s own actions were also exceedingly dangerous. Upon
entering the motel room, he immediately confronted Tuan with his knife.
While holding the weapon up to Tuan’s neck, he threatened to stab Tuan if he
so much as moved. He also nicked Tuan with his knife on the shoulder, neck,
face and ear as he was straddling and pounding him on the bed. Given the
chaos unfolding in the room, appellant’s conduct created a high likelihood of
death. One false move by either him or Tuan could easily have resulted in a
fatality, even before the stabbing occurred.
But appellant did not just nick up, beat, and threaten to kill
Tuan. The evidence indicates he also yanked off Tuan’s necklace and rifled
his wallet. So, even if appellant was somehow oblivious to the fact Duc was
robbing Hiep, Nhan and Kim right there next to him, he was fully engaged in
the robbery himself. His actions also immobilized Tuan such that Tuan was
highly vulnerable to Duc’s deadly knife attack. Thus, in terms of sheer
egregiousness, appellant’s conduct was much closer to the defendants in
Tison than the defendant in Enmund.
Appellant testified he was surprised by the attack, but once he
realized Tuan was bleeding abundantly from being stabbed, he did not try to
17
help him. Instead, he punched Tuan hard in the face one more time for good
measure. Then he kneed Hiep and Nhan in the head before asking Duc—
somewhat offhandedly—why he stabbed Tuan. Although appellant may have
been taken unaware by the stabbing, his reaction to it was callous and
uncaring. At no point did he try to render aid to Tuan, even though, as he
later admitted to Duc, he probably could have saved Tuan’s life by doing so.
Despite his deep, personal involvement in the events leading up
to the stabbing, appellant argues he was not a major participant in the
underlying robbery. In so arguing, appellant contends that both the judge in
his underlying trial, and the judge at his resentencing hearing, found that his
intent in going to the victims’ motel room was simply to fight Tuan, not to rob
anyone. However, in reducing appellant’s sentence from life without parole to
25 years to life in prison, the sentencing judge determined appellant
harbored “dual intent[s]” on the night in question. While acknowledging
appellant’s primary intent was to confront and attack Tuan, the judge was
convinced appellant also had the intent to rob.
Moreover, at appellant’s resentencing hearing, the trial court
found that even if appellant was not part of the robbery scheme from the get-
go, it would have been obvious to him soon after entering Tuan’s motel room
that Duc was bent on committing a very violent robbery. So, by continuing to
beat Tuan, appellant became “part and parcel” of the robbery; his actions
kept Tuan at bay while Duc collected the victims’ belongings.
The trial court also found that the robbery fit well within
appellant’s plan to attack Tuan. As the trial judge put it, “The robbery was
part of the confrontation[,] of the disrespect. I think [appellant] and his co-
defendants were . . . going to do whatever they needed to do to show that Vo
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was not the old Vo, that he was not going to take the threats and the
disrespect without answering with violence.”
The record amply supports this assessment. Given everything
appellant knew and did during the encounter, we cannot quarrel with the
trial court’s rejection of his attempt to distance himself from the robbery is
simply unpersuasive. There is substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding he was a major participant in that offense.
For largely the same reasons, we uphold the trial court’s finding
that appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life. To satisfy that
requirement, “‘The defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, demonstrating
reckless indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’
[Citation.]” (In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1021.) As illustrated
by the Enmund decision, this mental state rarely exists in a defendant who
plays a minor role in a garden-variety armed robbery, especially if he or she
was not personally armed or physically present at the scene of the killing.
(Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 798-801 [getaway driver did not act
recklessly indifferent to the victims who were killed during a robbery that he
helped plan]; accord, In re Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1025-1026
[overturning reckless indifference finding where the defendant helped plan
the robbery but was not present at the murder scene].)
But if the defendant actively participated in the underlying
robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and his conduct led to the victim’s
death, it may be entirely reasonable to infer he acted recklessly indifferent to
human life. (People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077.) This is true even
if the defendant did not actually kill the victim or specifically intend for him
to die. (In re Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 969.) Therefore, it is not
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dispositive here that Duc was the person who killed Tuan and that appellant
did not intend for Tuan to die.
However, for purposes of assessing appellant’s culpability, it is
relevant that he was personally armed, and that he knew his cohorts had
knives, when they entered the victims’ motel room. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 618.) How they used their knives is also important. (Ibid.) As to that
issue, the record shows Tung immediately neutralized Hiep at the window
with his knife, Duc brandished his knife while robbing the victims and
threatening to kill them, and appellant told Tuan that he was going to stab
him if he resisted in any way. Appellant then proceeded to nick up Tuan with
his knife before pummeling him with his fists. The number of knives involved
and the way they were used created an extremely dangerous situation inside
the room.
Appellant testified he was so busy beating Tuan that he did not
see Duc plunge his knife into Tuan’s leg. But appellant also admitted that
Duc had expressed his willingness to stab Tuan before they entered the motel
room. By beating and restraining Tuan for so long, appellant made Tuan
particularly susceptible to Duc’s knife attack. The fact the attack occurred
after a substantial period of violence and restraint supports the conclusion of
the trial court that appellant was recklessly indifferent to human life. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 620-621.)
So do other circumstances. Even after the stabbing occurred, and
after he felt blood pouring out of Tuan’s leg, appellant showed no regard for
Tuan’s life. In fact, instead of trying to help Tuan, appellant continued to
attack him. Appellant argues his failure to assist Tuan is immaterial because
there was nothing he could have done to save Tuan anyway. In so arguing, he
relies on the medical evidence indicating that Tuan could not have survived
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longer than 10 minutes after the stabbing. However, that time estimate
reflected Tuan’s prospects “without medical attention.” And, as it turned out,
10 minutes is the amount of time that appellant and his cohorts lingered in
the motel room after the stabbing so Tuan may well have been dead when
they left. But rather than rendering aid to Tuan, they were more concerned
about avoiding apprehension. Appellant’s failure to make any effort to assist
Tuan is another sign that he was recklessly indifferent to human life. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) The issue here is not whether Tuan could have
been saved, but whether appellant’s conduct evinced recklessness. The trial
court thought it did, and we find substantial evidence supporting that
conclusion.
We recognize that appellant was only 19 years old at the time of
his crimes and that young adults are more prone to impulsive behavior than
their elders. Appellant clearly acted immaturely and impetuously, when in
response to Tuan’s taunting telephone remarks, he rushed over to Tuan’s
motel room to beat him up. Appellant’s adolescent behavior was also on full
display when he and Duc laughed about Tuan’s death while they were
talking at the police station following their arrest.
However, during that same conversation, appellant also
acknowledged that Tuan probably would have survived if he had helped him
out after the stabbing. Along with all of the other circumstances presented,
this indicates appellant was aware of the life threatening situation that he
and his cohorts had created. (See generally People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 595 [“The fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other factors”
in the reckless indifference analysis].)
While “[y]outh can distort risk calculations” (People v. Mitchell,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595), appellant was a full-fledged adult in the
21
eyes of the law at the time of his offenses. This is not a case where an
extremely young defendant got caught up in deadly events that he neither
anticipated nor could have reasonably foreseen. (Compare People v. Keel,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 560-562 [reversing reckless indifference finding
absent evidence the subject robbery was planned or the 15-year-old defendant
had any idea it would actually take place]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 991-992 [15-year-old defendant lacked the experience and
maturity to appreciate the grave risks associated with his criminal actions];
In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 451-455 [holding similarly in the case
of a 16-year-old defendant].)
For all these reasons, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that appellant acted in a manner that was
recklessly indifferent to human life. Although the evidence of appellant’s
culpability is not overwhelming in nature, we see no basis to disturb the trial
court’s findings under the deferential standard of review applicable in this
case. Because the record contains substantial evidence that appellant
committed felony murder for purposes of the current felony murder rule, the
trial court properly denied his petition for resentencing.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
BEDSWORTH, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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