People v. Pulley CA3

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Testo completo

Filed 08/20/24 P. v. Pulley CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

THE PEOPLE, C097480

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62180526A)

v.

DESLONDE STEVEN PULLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Deslonde Pulley guilty of one count of pandering and one
count of pimping, and the trial court found true other aggravating circumstances in a
bifurcated bench trial. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in permitting
expert witnesses to respond to hypothetical questions that closely tracked the evidence
and to opine that defendant was in a pimping or pandering relationship; (2) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel if we conclude he forfeited his challenge to the expert
testimony; (3) the trial court prejudicially erred in declining to give a pinpoint jury
instruction; (4) the trial court’s errors caused cumulative prejudice against him; and

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(5) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was guilty of
pimping.
We agree with defendant that the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony
as to the existence of a pimping or pandering relationship, but conclude the error was
harmless. We reject defendant’s other claims and affirm the judgment. Undesignated
statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2020, Detective Steven Foster responded to a woman’s online
prostitution ad as part of a human trafficking sting operation. They agreed to meet at a
hotel room to have sex for a price. Detective Foster and several other officers arrived at
the hotel in uniform and asked the receptionist for information about the hotel room.
While they were speaking, defendant walked by and the receptionist gestured at him,
suggesting he was connected to the hotel room. The officers then went upstairs towards
the hotel room and saw defendant in the parking lot from the second-floor window. The
woman texted Detective Foster, stating there were police officers in the hotel and refused
to meet him. Detective Foster knocked on the hotel room door, but no one answered.
Detective Foster then moved to the hallway near the elevator, where he saw
defendant walk up the stairs and knock on the same hotel room door. The door opened,
defendant went inside, and later came out withice4 a woman who resembled the picture
on the prostitution ad. Detective Foster arrested defendant and the woman.
A jury found defendant guilty of pandering by encouraging (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2),
count 1) and pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a), count 2). In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial
court found true that defendant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 211, 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that defendant had served two prior prison
terms (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)). The prior strike was later dismissed.

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The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for the upper term of six years for
pimping and imposed a stayed sentence of four years (middle term) for pandering.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Expert Testimony
Defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) admitting expert testimony from
Detective Foster and Detective David Tuggle stating that defendant and the woman had a
pimping or pandering relationship based on their text messages; and (2) permitting
Detective Foster to respond to “thinly disguised” hypothetical questions that closely
tracked the evidence of the case. He further contends the errors violated his federal
constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence, to a fair trial, and to due process
under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We conclude that the expert
testimony responding to hypothetical questions was properly admitted, but the testimony
as to the pimping or pandering relationship was not. However, the error was harmless.
A. Additional Background
Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude any expert testimony on the
behaviors of pimps and prostitutes and on whether defendant and the woman had a
pimping or pandering relationship, citing Evidence Code section 720 and People v.
Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465 (Leonard). Defendant’s motion stated “[t]he
proposed expert testimony is a usurpation of the jury’s role as fact-finder” and “an expert
may not opine on whether a defendant’s actions meet the elements of the charged
offenses.” At the motion in limine hearing, defense counsel stated “it would be almost
impossible for an expert to testify that [defendant] was acting as a pimp and not
simultaneously infer his guilt.” The prosecutor agreed, acknowledging the expert can
only “explain the subculture, the different types of pimping and pandering relationships,
and explain the language used interpreting the text message themselves.”

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The trial court admitted expert testimony on the culture of pimping and pandering
and allowed the expert to consider whether text messages were consistent with the
culture. But it stressed that the use of expert testimony must be consistent with Leonard
and that the expert cannot offer opinion on guilt or innocence.
At trial, both Detective Foster and Detective Tuggle testified as the prosecution’s
expert witnesses on human trafficking and pimping and pandering. Detective Foster
explained it is common for a pimp or panderer to keep track of a prostitute’s date, to stay
close to the prostitute, and to conduct counter surveillance including looking out for law
enforcement. It is also common for the prostitute to immediately give her pimp or
panderer the money she receives from the sex buyer. These practices allow the pimp or
panderer to protect the prostitute and ensure that the prostitute is properly compensated.
The prosecutor also asked Detective Foster to interpret certain text messages
between defendant and the woman. During a conversation about a sex buyer who had
trouble paying, defendant accused the woman of “free fucking” and told her to “[g]et up
let’s go or I’m getting up out this car and acting up.” Detective Foster opined that this
conversation was consistent with a conversation of a pimp or panderer with a prostitute.
On a different occasion, defendant urged the woman to “give [a potential sex
buyer] a try tomorrow.” The woman initially refused, stating “I think he was up to
something.” But defendant insisted: “I mean he got 50 dollars[.] We could use the
money . . . He[ ][m]ight become a regular[.] Give him a try[.] Fuck if he’s a pimp he
gonna let you know. If he’s a [sex buyer]. He will pay [y]ou[.]” The woman was
eventually persuaded. Defendant added: “Just. Check him out. I’ll be close if shit go
wrong. He might just want some pussy.” Detective Foster opined that this was
consistent with a discussion between a prostitute and a pimp or panderer about a potential
sex buyer.
Detective Foster further testified that he did not find anything in the text messages
that was inconsistent with a pimping or pandering relationship.

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Detective Foster also responded to four hypothetical questions raised by the
prosecutor, confirming the scenarios therein were consistent with a pimping or pandering
relationship: (1) an “individual [who] knows that a prostitute is operating out of a hotel
room . . . stays in close contact with that prostitute during her dates via text message and
purposely stays close to the room, either in the staircase or outside in a parked car”;
(2) “that same individual that is conversing with the sex worker that they are close and
being a task master as to how long the date should go . . . tells the prostitute that he will
get out of the car and act up if the client doesn’t pay”; (3) “that individual tells the
prostitute not to open a door to a potential client until he checks around to see if law
enforcement is present” and (4) the individual “tells the prostitute ‘we can use the money’
when texting about a potential date with a [sex buyer].”
Detective Tuggle testified that it is common for pimps to stay close to the
prostitute if they are at the same location and explained a “boyfriend pimp” relationship.
The prosecutor asked Detective Tuggle: “[Y]ou saw [defendant] walking out of the
lobby as you and Detective Foster were speaking to the . . . hotel worker there. And then
a few minutes later you see him parked in . . . a vehicle facing the hotel. Based on your
training and experience, you mentioned earlier that it’s common for pimps and panderers
to conduct counter surveillance. Is part of what you mean by counter surveillance of a
pimp or panderer’s job to look out for law enforcement?” Detective Tuggle responded
affirmatively, explaining that the industry is dangerous and a pimp or panderer usually
stays close to protect the prostitute. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s
intervening Evidence Code section 352 objections.
The jury was instructed that, to prove defendant guilty of pandering, the
prosecutor must prove: (1) defendant used any device or scheme to encourage the
woman to become a prostitute, although defendant’s efforts need not have been
successful; and (2) defendant intended to influence the woman to be a prostitute. And to
prove defendant guilty of pimping, the prosecutor must prove: (1) defendant knew that

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the woman was a prostitute; and (2) the money that the woman earned as a prostitute
supported defendant, in whole or in part. For both crimes, a “prostitute” is defined as “a
person who engages in sexual intercourse or any lewd act with another person in
exchange for money or other compensation.” The jury was further instructed that it was
not required to accept expert opinion as true or correct.
At closing, the prosecutor argued the text conversation where defendant
encouraged the woman to give a potential sex buyer “a try” because “he got 50 dollars”
and “we could use the money” was sufficient to support both charges, and the jury
“didn’t really need an expert opinion from Detective Foster or Detective Tuggle” to make
its decision.
B. Forfeiture
Defendant did not object to the admission of expert testimony based on the Fifth,
Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments in the trial court. But a defendant’s new federal
constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal to the extent the “new arguments do
not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to
apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the
reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating
the Constitution.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17, citing People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439.) Because defendant argued in the trial court that
the expert testimony exceeded the permissible scope and usurped the jury’s function, he
may argue on appeal that the error has the additional legal consequence of violating his
federal constitutional rights.
Having concluded defendant preserved his challenge to the admission of expert
testimony, we need not address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
C. The Admission of Expert Testimony
An expert witness may opine on “a subject that is sufficiently beyond common
experience” even if his opinion “embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of

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fact.” (Evid. Code, §§ 801, subd. (a), 805.) The expert may also “ ‘render opinion
testimony on the basis of facts given “in a hypothetical question that asks the expert to
assume their truth.” ’ ” (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045.) “Such a
hypothetical question must be rooted in facts shown by the evidence” and may mirror
case-specific facts. (Ibid.) In fact, “[a] hypothetical question not based on the evidence
is irrelevant and of no help to the jury.” (Id. at p. 1046.)
On the other hand, an expert “may not express an opinion on a defendant’s guilt.”
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.) “The reason for this rule is not
because guilt is the ultimate issue of fact for the jury, as opinion testimony often goes to
the ultimate issue. [Citations.] ‘Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible
because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of
fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the
issue of guilt.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Leonard, the detective who investigated the defendant’s case also testified as an
expert on the pimping subculture. (Leonard, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 476.) He
explained the difference between a “finesse pimp” and a “gorilla pimp” and offered his
opinion on the type of pimping relationship between the defendant and the prostitute. (Id.
at p. 492.) The court of appeal there observed the expert’s testimony “could reasonably
be interpreted as unhelpful comments on [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence on the
charge of pimping. [Citation.] The jury was as qualified as [the expert] to determine
whether the evidence showed [the defendant] was acting as a ‘gorilla pimp’ or ‘finesse
pimp,’. . . after [the expert] had explained those terms.” (Id. at p. 493.) Without deciding
whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony, Leonard
concluded any error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
(Leonard, at p. 493.)
“We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 157.) A trial court

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abuses its discretion when its ruling transgresses the confines of the applicable principles
of law governing admission of expert testimony. (Ibid.) Separately, we review de novo
whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant’s federal constitutional rights.
(People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 23-24.)
Here, Detective Tuggle’s testimony did not exceed the permissible scope. He may
explain to the jury a pimp’s common practice and a “boyfriend pimp” relationship. (See
U.S. v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2001) 239 F.3d 994, 998 [“the relationship between prostitutes
and pimps is not the subject of common knowledge”].) Although the prosecutor also
recounted Detective Tuggle’s encounter with defendant, he followed with only a question
about whether counter surveillance involved looking out for law enforcement. Detective
Tuggle’s response did not opine on whether defendant conducted counter surveillance as
a pimp or panderer, but stated generally that looking out for law enforcement is part of
the counter surveillance and that counter surveillance was made necessary by the
potential danger in the industry. He thus gave no opinion on defendant’s guilt.
Detective Foster’s responses to the hypothetical questions were properly admitted.
The questions were based on evidence in this case and were unrelated to defendant.
Although they mirrored case-specific facts, “[t]he questioner is not required to disguise
the fact the questions are based on that evidence.” (People v. Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 1041.) Detective Foster did not express his opinion about defendant himself in
answering these questions and thus offered no opinion on defendant’s guilt.
Defendant contends the hypothetical questions were “so thinly disguised that it
had to be apparent to the jury that the prosecutor was asking about the facts of the current
case,” citing People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644. But Killebrew has been
disapproved by our Supreme Court because “it overlooked the critical difference between
an expert’s expressing an opinion in response to a hypothetical question and the expert’s
expressing an opinion about the defendants themselves.” (People v. Vang, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 1049.) To the extent the expert’s testimony responds to hypothetical

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questions, it expresses no opinion on the defendant’s guilt or how the jury should decide
the case. (Ibid.) Moreover, to find a hypothetical question improper merely because it
tracks the evidence in a manner that was “thinly disguised” “transforms the requirement
that a hypothetical question be rooted in the evidence into a prohibition—or at least into
the confounding rule that the party posing the question must disguise from the jury the
fact it is rooted in the evidence — and not ‘thinly,’ it appears, but thickly.” (Id. at
p. 1046.)
On the other hand, Detective Foster improperly offered his opinion that the text
messages between defendant and woman, where defendant accused the woman of
performing free sex services and urged her to see a potential buyer because they needed
50 dollars, demonstrated they had a pimping or pandering relationship; it was further
improper for Detective Foster to opine that nothing in the text messages was inconsistent
with a pimping or pandering relationship. The jury was instructed on the definition of
pimping and pandering, and both experts explained the common practice of a pimp or a
panderer. With this information, the jury was as capable as Detective Foster to determine
whether a pimping or pandering relationship existed between defendant and the woman
based on the text messages. Detective Foster therefore improperly gave an opinion on
defendant’s guilt. We next consider whether this error was harmless.
D. Harmless Error
The parties disagree on the appropriate test for evaluating whether the error was
prejudicial. Defendant contends the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test under Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies, while the People rely on the reasonably probable
test under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818. Without settling this dispute, we
conclude the error was harmless even under the more stringent Chapman test.
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test in Chapman “requires the People here ‘to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542.) “ ‘ “To say that an

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error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the
record.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463.) “ ‘Thus, the focus is what
the jury actually decided and whether the error might have tainted its decision. That is to
say, the issue is “whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. The jury was instructed
that to be found guilty of pandering, defendant must intentionally encourage the woman
to engage in sexual intercourse with another person in exchange for money; and to be
found guilty of pimping, defendant must know the woman was a prostitute and the
money she earned as a prostitute supported defendant. It was further instructed that it
need not accept expert opinions as true or correct. A text message thread showed
defendant encouraged the woman, despite her initial reluctance, to see a potential sex
buyer for 50 dollars because they “could use the money.” The prosecutor argued to the
jury at closing that this message alone was sufficient for them to find defendant guilty on
both counts, and they did not need to rely on either Detective Foster’s or Detective
Tuggle’s expert opinion. Moreover, a different text conversation showed defendant
became irritated when he thought the woman was not properly compensated for her sex
work.1 And Detective Foster opined that hypothetical situations similar to the ones in
this case were consistent with a pimping or pandering relationship. In light of the above
compelling and properly admitted evidence, the verdict was not attributable to Detective
Foster’s improperly admitted testimony. Thus, any error in admitting this testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1 These two text conversations also defeat defendant’s argument that no substantial
evidence showed he derived support from money earned by the woman as a prostitute.

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II
Jury Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in declining to give a
pinpoint instruction related to the defense theory that defendant’s actions were not part of
pandering but of a dating relationship. We disagree because the proposed pinpoint
instruction was redundant in light of the general pandering instruction.
A. Additional Background
Defense counsel requested the trial court to give a special instruction that “the
mere knowledge that a person with whom the defendant was in a dating relationship that
she was a prostitute is not pandering. Merely acting as a lookout or offering to act to
protect a person that the defendant knows is a prostitute is not pandering.” The trial court
denied the request.
During closing, defense counsel argued to the jury that defendant had merely
“f[allen] in love with a woman that was a prostitute and was addicted to drugs, and he
was seemingly caught in between her bad life choices. He is a byproduct of her
decisions.”
B. Analysis
A pinpoint instruction “relate[s] particular facts to a legal issue in the case or
‘pinpoint’ the crux of a defendant’s case, such as mistaken identification or alibi.”
(People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119.) “A trial court must give a requested
instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to
deserve jury consideration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.) “But where
standard instructions fully and adequately advise the jury upon a particular issue, a
pinpoint instruction on that point is properly refused.” (People v. Canizalez (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 832, 857.) “Put another way, ‘[t]here is no error in a trial court’s failing
or refusing to instruct on one matter, unless the remaining instructions, considered as a
whole, fail to cover the material issues raised at trial.” (People v. Jo (2017)

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15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1174.) We review the trial court’s denial of the requested pinpoint
instruction for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442,
497.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request.
The general instruction on pandering specifically requires the jury to find that defendant
encouraged the woman to engage in sexual intercourse with another person in exchange
for money, and that defendant did so intentionally. This instruction adequately covered
the valid points in the proposed pinpoint instruction, namely, the mere knowledge that the
woman was a prostitute or the mere act of surveillance or protecting the woman would
not support a guilty finding. Thus, the pinpoint instruction requested by defendant was
unnecessary.
Having reached both this conclusion and the above conclusion that the admission
of Detective Foster’s expert testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we find
no cumulative prejudice.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

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