Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists CA2/7

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Filed 8/19/24 Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LORENZO BENTON et al., B318867

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
No. BC349267)
v.

TELECOM NETWORK
SPECIALISTS, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David S. Cunningham III, Judge. Reversed.
Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Randall B. Aiman-Smith,
Reed W.L. Marcy, Hallie Von Rock; Law Offices of Jared E.
Peterson and Jared E. Peterson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
McDermott Will & Emery, Pankit J. Doshi, Saniya Ahmed,
Rae Chung, Paul W. Hughes, Andrew A. Lyons-Berg; Greenberg
Traurig and Ronald Holland for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Lorenzo Benton filed this wage-and-hour class action in
2006 against Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (TNS)—a
company that maintains and upgrades equipment at cell sites in
California—on behalf of several hundred technicians who
serviced the equipment at the sites. In 2012 the trial court
denied Benton’s motion for class certification. We reversed.
(Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 701 (Benton I).)
On remand the trial court, after granting Benton’s motion
for class certification, granted the class plaintiffs’ motion for
summary adjudication on some of the causes of action, found in
favor of the plaintiffs on other causes of action following a court
trial, and entered judgment. We reversed again, holding (among
other things) the trial court erred in granting summary
adjudication in favor of the class on the causes of action for
failure to provide meal and rest breaks. (See Benton v. Telecom
Network Specialists, Inc. (Oct. 13, 2023, B312572 [nonpub. opn.]
(Benton II).)
While the appeal in Benton II was pending, the trial court
issued an order on Benton’s motion for attorneys’ fees—an order
from which both parties now appeal. Because an award of
attorneys’ fees falls with a reversed judgment, and because we
cannot conclude with certainty the trial court will make the same
fee award, we reverse the order.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Benton Prevails on Several Causes of Action, and the
Trial Court Enters Judgment
In 2006 Benton filed a class action complaint against TNS
on behalf of TNS technicians who worked at cell sites in
California. Benton asserted causes of action for failure to provide
meal and rest breaks, failure to pay overtime compensation,
waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203,1 and
penalties under section 226 for failure to furnish accurate wage
statements. (Benton II, supra, B312572.)
The trial court resolved several causes of action on motions
for summary adjudication. On the causes of action for failure to
provide meal and rest breaks and failure to pay overtime
compensation, the court granted motions by Benton on behalf of
the class for summary adjudication. On the causes of action for
waiting time and wage statement penalties under sections 203
and 226, the court separately analyzed two sets of claims:
(1) those for penalties for unpaid and unreported meal and rest
break premiums and (2) those for penalties for unpaid and
unreported overtime compensation. On the first set of claims—
those based on the meal and rest break premiums—the court
granted a motion by TNS for summary adjudication. (Benton II,
supra, B312572.) On the second set of claims—those based on
overtime compensation—the court conducted a court trial. The
court ultimately found in favor of the class on the claim for
waiting time penalties under section 203, but in favor of TNS on
the claim for wage statement penalties under section 226.
Following the court trial, the court entered judgment awarding

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

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the class a total of $9,494,585 on the causes of action on which it
prevailed. Both Benton and TNS appealed from the judgment.
(Benton II, supra, B312572.)

B. The Trial Court Grants Benton’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Costs
While the appeal in Benton II was pending, Benton filed a
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The court ruled Benton was
entitled to fees and costs under section 1194 on the cause of
action for failure to pay overtime compensation.2 The court
further ruled that, before it granted Benton’s motion for
summary adjudication on that cause of action in February 2019,
all of the claims were intertwined and that therefore Benton was
entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for all work performed in the
case before the February 2019 order.
The court ruled, however, that once the class prevailed on
summary adjudication, Benton’s remaining claims for penalties
were no longer intertwined with the then-resolved cause of action
for failure to pay overtime compensation. The court ruled Benton
therefore was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 1194
for work performed after the February 2019 order granting
summary adjudication (including fees relating to the court trial).
Similarly, the court ruled Benton was not entitled under other
provisions of the Labor Code or the Code of Civil Procedure to

2 Section 1194, subdivision (a), provides: “Notwithstanding
any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving
less than . . . the legal overtime compensation applicable to the
employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid
balance of the full amount of this . . . overtime compensation,
including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit.”

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attorneys’ fees incurred on the claims for waiting time and wage
statement penalties. The court, however, awarded as fees under
the common fund doctrine a percentage of the class’s recovery on
the claim for section 203 waiting time penalties (an award less
than Benton’s requested lodestar under the asserted statutory
bases).
The court awarded Benton over $17 million in attorneys’
fees and $700,000 in costs, plus an incentive award for Benton
and another class representative. The award included a lodestar
of $7,893,640, with a lodestar multiplier of 2.0 (for a total of over
$15.7 million) for fees incurred prior to the February 2019 order
granting the motion for summary adjudication.
Benton appealed, arguing (among other things) that,
“[t]hrough a series of errors, the trial court failed to award
statutory fees for work done after February 2019 and reduced the
lodestar for work done prior to February 2019 to $7,893,640,
resulting in a 41% cut to Plaintiffs’ lodestar for work on the
merits.” TNS cross-appealed, arguing (among other things) the
trial court “awarded too much” in attorneys’ fees, including for
“excessive and unreasonable intra-office communications and
non-compensable travel time.”

C. We Reverse the Judgment in Benton II
After the trial court issued its attorneys’ fee order, we
issued our opinion in Benton II, supra, B312572 reversing the
judgment. We held that the trial court erred in granting the
motion for summary adjudication in favor of the class on the
causes of action for failure to provide meal and rest breaks. We
concluded TNS created triable issues of material fact regarding
whether some class members were informed of their right to take

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breaks, were authorized to take breaks, and in fact took breaks.
We also held the trial court erred in granting TNS’s motion for
summary adjudication on the claims for waiting time and wage
statement penalties under sections 203 and 226 for unpaid and
unreported meal and rest break premiums. We held the trial
court did not err, however, in granting the motion for summary
adjudication in favor of the class on the cause of action for failure
to pay overtime compensation or in finding in favor of the class
after the court trial on the claim for waiting time penalties for
unpaid overtime compensation. (Benton II, supra, B312572.)

DISCUSSION

A. Because We Reversed the Judgment in Benton II, We
Must Reverse the Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
TNS argues that, because we reversed the judgment in
Benton II, we must also reverse the order awarding attorneys’
fees and costs. TNS argues that “[t]hese attorney-fee cross[-
]appeals are moot” and that the “merits judgment on which the
fee award is predicated has been reversed, with the result that
the order awarding fees is automatically nullified as well.” TNS
contends that our reversal of the judgment in Benton II
“necessarily vacated the fee order” and that it is “for the trial
court on remand, once it has entered a new final judgment, to
reassess whether, and in what amount, attorney fees might be
available.”
Mootness aside,3 TNS is correct. As stated, an order
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs “‘“falls with a reversal of the
judgment on which it is based.”’” (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines,

3 See infra, section B.

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Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358; see Rose v. County of
San Benito (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 688, 728; Bevis v. Terrace View
Partners, LP (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 230, 263; California Grocers
Assn. v. Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 220.)
Because we reversed the judgment on which the award of fees
was based, we must also reverse the order on the motion for
attorneys’ fees. (See Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community
College Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 107 [“Because we reverse
the judgment in [the plaintiff’s] favor, it necessarily follows that
she is not presently entitled to any award of attorney fees” and
that the “trial court’s attorney fees order is therefore reversed”];
Bevis, at p. 263 [“[o]ur reversal of the judgment also necessarily
compels the reversal of the award of attorney fees and costs to
plaintiffs based on the judgment”].)
Benton contends we need not reverse the fee order because
the “entitlement to the fee award was based . . . solely on [his]
overtime claim,” which we did “not reverse[ ].” But even where
“there is a limited reversal,” we still “remand for the trial court to
consider anew the propriety of attorney’s fees unless we can say
with certainty the court would have exercised its discretion the
same way had the successful party not prevailed on the issue on
which we reverse.” (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 358-359; see Boatworks, LLC v. City of
Alameda (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 290, 307; Ventas Finance I, LLC
v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1233-1234.)
The problem for Benton is that, even if Benton II were a
“limited reversal” (which is hard to say: we reversed a lot in
Benton II), we reversed the order granting the motion for
summary adjudication in favor of the class on the meal and
rest break claims, and the attorneys’ fee order was based, in part,

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on the class’s success on those claims. The trial court applied a
lodestar multiplier of 2.0 based, in part, on the fact that “Class
counsel obtained a $9.5 million judgment, which is $l5,000 per
class member.” $7,288,266 of that $9.5 million judgment (nearly
77 percent) was for the meal and rest break claims. Now that we
have directed (in Benton II) the trial court to vacate the order
granting TNS’s motion for summary adjudication on those claims,
the class has lost (at least for now) most of the recovery justifying
the lodestar multiplier. Therefore, until the meal and rest break
claims are fully resolved, we cannot say with certainty that the
court would again exercise its discretion to apply a lodestar
multiplier of 2.0, or even that the court would apply a multiplier
to the same lodestar. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th
1122, 1138 [trial court “has broad discretion to adjust” the
lodestar amount]; Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 493, 510 [“trial court has broad discretion to
increase or reduce the proposed lodestar amount based on the
various factors identified in case law”]; see also Snoeck v.
ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 920 [trial
court “‘“has the discretion to increase or reduce the lodestar
figure by [adjusting the] ‘“multiplier”’ based on a variety of
factors”’”].)
Benton argues that, because the trial court made only
“passing mention” of the class’s recovery, the court did not place
“significant reliance on the amount of recovery.” That is not a
fair characterization of the court’s ruling. In the motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs, Benton asked the trial court to apply a
lodestar multiplier of 2.5. The court listed six factors supporting
its ruling a lodestar multiplier of 2.0 was appropriate. One of
those six factors was the $9.5 million ($15,000 per class member)

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the class recovered. We presume the court meant what it said:
The total recovery for the class was a factor underlying the
court’s decision to adjust the lodestar upward.

B. We Decline To Exercise Our Discretion To Hear the
Appeal
Benton argues that, even if our decision in Benton II “moots
the fees appeal,” several general exceptions to the mootness
doctrine justify denying TNS’s motion to dismiss the appeal and
exercising our discretion to decide some or all of the issues in this
appeal. But we are not dismissing the appeal from the order
awarding attorneys’ fees because it is moot. Indeed, “dismissal of
an appeal for mootness operates as an affirmance of the
underlying judgment or order” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
285), which is not what either side wants or what we are doing.4
We are reversing the fee order because we reversed the judgment
on which it was based and we cannot say with certainty that on
remand the trial court will award the same amount of attorneys’
fees. Benton (when appropriate) will undoubtedly file a new
motion for attorneys’ fees, and the trial court will recalculate the
amount of fees. It would be a waste of the parties’ and the courts’
resources to decide issues that the trial court will have to decide
anew and that may or may not arise in a subsequent appeal.
(See Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
p. 263 [when a reviewing court reverses a judgment, the issue of
attorneys’ fees and costs is “‘“‘set at large’”’”]; Allen v. Smith
(2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 [same].)

4 And which makes it odd TNS filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal: Granting TNS’s motion and dismissing the appeal would
affirm the order TNS is challenging.

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In any event, the reasons Benton gives for exercising our
discretion to review issues he raises are not persuasive. For
example, Benton argues we should decide this appeal because it
concerns two issues of broad public interest: “application of Labor
Code section 218.5 to claims for waiting time penalties under
Naranjo [v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th
93]” and “application of the ‘public benefit’ theory” of attorneys’
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 “to successful
Labor Code litigation.” Neither concern justifies deciding this
appeal now.
On the first issue, even if there is a general public interest
(at least among employment litigators) in the application of
section 218.5 to waiting time penalties under section 203, Benton
does not identify a dispute we need resolve that would provide
precedential guidance in future litigation. Section 218.5
authorizes a prevailing employee to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs in an “action brought for the nonpayment of wages.” In its
order on the motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court ruled that
waiting time penalties under section 203 are not “wages” under
section 218.5 and that therefore Benton was not entitled under
section 218.5 to attorneys’ fees and costs for work performed on
the claim for waiting time penalties after the February 2019
summary adjudication order.
The former ruling turned out to be wrong. In Naranjo,
decided after the trial court ruled on the motion for attorneys’
fees, the Supreme Court held that “missed-break premium pay
constitutes wages for purposes of . . . section 203, and so waiting
time penalties are available under that statute if the premium
pay is not timely paid.” (Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services,
Inc., supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 117.) TNS concedes that, under

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Naranjo, “the law is now that Section 218.5 does authorize
recovery of attorney fees for waiting-time claims under
Section 203” and that we should therefore “remand to the trial
court to decide in the first instance” how Naranjo applies to
Benton’s request for fees for work performed on his claim for
waiting time penalties. Given TNS’s concession following
Naranjo, there is no dispute about the application of
section 218.5, and therefore no need for us to weigh in on the
issue to guide these or other parties in the future.
On the second issue, Benton’s appeal does involve Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5, but that does not mean the public
has an interest in the issues in this appeal. Benton contends the
trial court erred in not awarding attorneys’ fees under
section 1021.5 for all work performed after the 2019 order
granting the motion for summary adjudication. Claims for
attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5, however, are case-specific
and discretionary. The court may award fees under section
1021.5 only if “(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or
nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large
class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against
another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate,
and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out
of the recovery, if any.” (See Vasquez v. State of California (2008)
45 Cal.4th 243, 251.) “‘[U]tilizing its traditional equitable
discretion,’ [the trial] court ‘must realistically assess the
litigation and determine, from a practical perspective’ [citation]
whether or not the statutory criteria have been met.” (Baggett v.
Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142; see Grossmont Union High
School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th

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552, 574.) There is no pressing need to decide these issues now.
(See MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [“given the fact-driven nature of
the questions presented, it is unlikely that our resolution of the
. . . appeal would ‘provide much needed guidance for “the orderly
administration of justice”’”]; Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
206, 228 [“[b]ecause plaintiffs’ claim is a particularly factual
determination that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, . . .
it is not one on which we would exercise our discretion to address
on the merits”].)
Benton also contends his entitlement to attorneys’ fees and
costs for work performed after the 2019 summary adjudication
order “is ripe in this appeal” and, “if left unresolved, might
preclude Plaintiffs from litigating their right to recover for that
work even though that issue has not been addressed by this
Court.” That’s not right either. There is nothing to prevent
Benton from continuing to litigate this issue on remand. Once
the trial court resolves all claims and enters a new judgment,
Benton may file a new motion for attorneys’ fees and, if
unsuccessful, may appeal from that order.
Finally, Benton argues we should decide two issues he
raises in his appeal that will “necessarily recur” if we do not.
First, Benton argues the parties will continue to dispute whether
he is entitled to attorneys’ fees for work performed after the 2019
summary adjudication order. But as discussed, TNS
acknowledges the Supreme Court’s decision in Naranjo v.
Spectrum Security Services, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.5th 93 and
concedes section 218.5 applies to claims for waiting time
penalties under section 203. Therefore, it is reasonably likely (if
not certain) that the trial court will award Benton statutory

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attorneys’ fees, at least for some of the work performed after the
2019 summary adjudication order, and that several grounds
Benton asserts for why he is entitled to attorneys’ fees will not
require further consideration.
Second, Benton contends his “assertions of error by the
trial court in deciding the lodestar will also necessarily arise
again if not decided in the present appeal.” For example, Benton
asserts the trial court erred in reducing the hourly rates of his
attorneys and in calculating the number of reasonable hours they
worked on the case. Perhaps. But that does not justify
exercising our discretion to decide (some of) the attorneys’ fees
issues now. After our decision in Benton II, there are unresolved
causes of action. Once there is a judgment on all of the causes of
action, Benton is almost certain to file a new motion for
attorneys’ fees, and the parties may (read: will) litigate the issues
raised by that motion, both in the trial court and on appeal from
the trial court’s ruling on that motion. It makes much more
sense for the parties to brief, and the courts to decide, the issues
raised by the future fee order in a single appeal, rather than
through piecemeal appellate litigation. (See Dana Point Safe
Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5-6
[“‘“piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals’” . . . ‘“tend to be
oppressive and costly,”’” and “burden the courts and impede the
judicial process in a number of ways”].)

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DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. TNS’s motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied. Benton’s request for judicial notice is denied. The
parties are to bear their costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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